

PART 1

UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS OF NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION DURING THE 1980
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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May 17, 1984

Honorable William D. Ford
Chairman
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and Rule X 2 (b)(1) of the House Rules, on July 14, 1983, the Subcommittee on Human Resources adopted guidelines for an investigation into allegations concerning unauthorized transfers of material and information during the 1980 Presidential election.

Since that time the subcommittee has gathered and analyzed significant material on the above subject. That material and our analysis are fully presented in the attached subcommittee report.

The American public raised legitimate questions last summer, when this inquiry began. This report attempts to answer many of those questions. Congress, it has been shown, can play a very important oversight and informing function. I believe that the Committee and the House can be proud that this report follows that long tradition. Furthermore, this report lays the groundwork for improvements in the ethics laws and programs of the Federal Government.

This report has been approved by the subcommittee, and minority views are attached at the conclusion of the report.

Sincerely,


Don Albosta
Chairman

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Subcommittee on Human Resources has completed its investigation into alleged unauthorized transfers of materials and information from the Carter administration to the Reagan Bush campaign. The investigation, which officially began in July 1983 and was completed in April 1984, was wide-ranging and thorough. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also conducted an intensive investigation into the allegations involved, and the subcommittee was provided the results of that investigation.

The subcommittee was able to conduct its lengthy investigation without issuing a single subpoena. The subcommittee believes this was in no small measure due to the cooperation provided by the Counsel to the President, Fred Fielding, and to President Reagan's directive that his administration and campaign staff should cooperate with the subcommittee's investigation.

The subcommittee has reached a number of basic conclusions about the matters investigated. The more important of these conclusions are presented here. The subcommittee's detailed report supports and elaborates on these conclusions. The subcommittee invites close study of the report and the documents and affidavits that form its foundation, especially by those who may be inclined to view these conclusions as ill-founded or partisan.

- Before the October 28, 1980 debate between President Carter and Governor Reagan, the Reagan Bush campaign obtained foreign policy and national defense briefing papers prepared to assist President Carter in that debate, and also acquired briefing papers on those subjects prepared for Vice President Mondale. No one in authority in the Carter White House authorized the transfer of these documents to the Reagan Bush campaign.
- The Carter debate briefing papers were used by persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign to enhance Governor Reagan's performance in the debates. The persons using these papers were aware that they were using Carter debate briefing materials.
- It is likely that, prior to the debate, the Reagan Bush campaign also obtained a second, more concise version of President Carter's foreign policy and national defense briefing book, which was not completed until October 21, 1980, one week before the debate. Several persons who worked for the Reagan Bush campaign indicated that they saw, or likely saw, this briefing book during the 1980 presidential campaign.

- It is very probable that the Reagan Bush campaign also acquired some version of the domestic policy briefing book prepared for President Carter. Several persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign told the subcommittee that, during the 1980 campaign, they saw domestic issue briefing materials prepared for President Carter.
- The subcommittee does not believe that all briefing materials improperly transferred from the Carter Administration campaign to the Reagan Bush campaign necessarily traveled by the same route.
- The subcommittee has interviewed numerous persons connected with the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign about the briefing book issue. The subcommittee believes that it has received responses from some of these persons that were not candid. This prevented it from fully resolving the briefing book issue. The subcommittee also concludes that the denial by Reagan Bush campaign staff of knowledge about the sources of the Carter information and material is not consistent with their acceptance and use of the material and information. The subcommittee believes that this acceptance and use would have occurred only if the source or sources of the briefing materials were known and considered trustworthy.
- The subcommittee finds that the better evidence indicates that Carter debate briefing materials entered the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign through its Director, William J. Casey, and that Casey provided Carter debate briefing materials to James A. Baker, III, as stated by Baker whose testimony is corroborated by a credible witness. The subcommittee does not agree with the Department of Justice's surprising conclusion that "[a]ny seeming inconsistencies [in witness statements] could be explained by differences in recollection or interpretation".
- The subcommittee has found no evidence that President Ronald Reagan was involved in the transfer of the Carter debate briefing materials.
- The subcommittee concludes that, in the main, the Carter and Mondale briefing materials found in the Reagan Bush campaign were property of the Federal Government, and thus disagrees with the Department of Justice conclusion that "[n]o government documents are among the briefing materials that were obtained by the Reagan campaign". Federal employees participated in the production of those briefing materials, did so on Government time, worked on them in Government-owned space, and used Government-owned equipment to prepare them. During the 1980 campaign, the White House Counsel was of the opinion that these documents in large part were Government property.

- The subcommittee finds that the Carter administration and the Carter Mondale campaign gave the briefing materials insufficient protection. Individuals with access to them did not consider them to be classified, although the materials were considered confidential and not widely circulated.
- While the subcommittee has not learned who removed the briefing materials found in 1983 in Reagan Bush campaign files from the Carter White House, it believes those materials likely were taken from the offices of the National Security Council.
- The subcommittee has interviewed numerous persons connected with the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign about the briefing book matter. The subcommittee believes that it has received responses from one or more of these persons that have not been entirely candid.
- While the subcommittee, like the Department of Justice, has been unable to determine precisely how briefing materials moved from the Carter White House to the Reagan Bush campaign, the subcommittee cannot agree with the Department that there is "no specific, credible evidence of a federal crime". No Senior White House Official authorized the release of Carter debate briefing materials and the presence, acknowledged receipt, and use of these materials in the Reagan Bush campaign is itself "specific, credible evidence" that some crime has occurred. The subcommittee thus agrees with the conclusion reached by District Judge Harold H. Green that the Attorney General was required by the Ethics in Government Act to conduct a "preliminary investigation" into the briefing book matter.
- Moreover, the subcommittee believes that further investigation of possible crimes relating to this matter is warranted. The subcommittee concludes that the appointment of an Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act is necessary to conduct this additional investigation, to evaluate the evidence ultimately discovered, and to make an independent, objective decision as to prosecution. Appointment of an Independent Counsel is particularly appropriate in view of the questionable and flatly contradictory statements made to the subcommittee during the course of its investigation.
- The subcommittee finds that persons in the Reagan Bush campaign organization engaged in organized efforts to obtain from the Carter administration, and from the Carter Mondale campaign, information and materials that were not publicly available.
- In addition to Carter and Mondale briefing materials the subcommittee found a number of documents and items of information in Reagan Bush campaign files that were transferred in unauthorized fashion from the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign. In a number of instances, the subcommittee was able to determine how the documents and information came into the Reagan Bush campaign. In other

instances, the subcommittee was prevented from answering the questions raised by the professed failures by witnesses to recall critical facts. In some instances, these failures to recall were not credible.

- While the subcommittee does not agree with all the conclusions reached in the "Report of the Department of Justice Regarding the Carter Debate Briefing Material," the subcommittee does believe that the investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was conscientious.
- The subcommittee concludes that standards of conduct governing White House and other Federal employees—particularly those standards regarding misuse of government information—were violated by persons employed by the Carter administration.
- The subcommittee finds that various former and current Federal officials and employees interviewed during the investigation were not adequately informed as to the standards of conduct that govern Federal personnel.
- The subcommittee recommends several changes in Federal law and the administration of Federal law. These recommendations are detailed in the body of this report.

CHAPTER 1—ORIGIN OF THE INVESTIGATION

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 9, 1983 two small articles appeared in *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, reporting that—according to author Laurence I. Barrett's recently published book "Gambling with History" (Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1983)—the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign had obtained a copy of President Carter's debate briefing book before the October 1980 debate between the two Presidential candidates. An article by Jody Powell, columnist and former Press Secretary to President Carter, appeared three days later in *The Washington Post*, criticizing the media for its apparent disinterest in Barrett's story. Following publication of that article, Powell's allegations of possible wrongdoing began to elicit more interest from the news media and others. Serious ethical and legal questions were raised about the unauthorized transfer of material and information from the Carter White House and administration to the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign. This chapter details the events leading up to the involvement of the Subcommittee on Human Resources in the briefing book matter, and explains why the subcommittee felt obligated to investigate the alleged transfers of nonpublic information from Government sources to the Reagan Bush campaign.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND ALLEGATIONS LEADING TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

On Wednesday, October 29, 1980 *The Elkhart Truth* newspaper in Elkhart, Indiana, reported that Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, then a Michigan Congressman, had informed a group of about 65 people at a luncheon on Tuesday, October 28th, that he had used a "pilfered copy" of President Carter's debate briefing book to prepare Governor Ronald Reagan for that evening's debate between the two Presidential candidates. [See app., I. p. 127.] The story also was reported Wednesday in the *Dowagiac Daily News* in Dowagiac, Michigan. [See app., I. p. 128.]

Mr. Stockman was speaking to the Cassopolis (Michigan) Optimist Club when he mentioned the briefing book. According to the *Dowagiac Daily News*, Stockman said he used the "pilfered copy" to run Governor Reagan through "eight or nine mock rehearsals" of what he called "an historic debate." "I think the debate will decide the election," Stockman was quoted as saying. Both newspapers reported that Stockman previewed the debate for the Optimist Club, outlining the five "white lies" the Carter camp would use to attack the Republican nominee.

According to Stockman, the "white lies" involved inflation, the Reagan-Kemp-Roth tax plan, energy, and charges Governor Reagan was an "extremist" and a "warmonger." The Elkhart Truth reported that "apparently the Reagan Camp's 'pilfered' goods were correct, as several times both candidates said almost word for word what Stockman predicted. The line of attack was exactly like the Michigan Representative said it would be."

At the time, no ethical questions were raised. The national media and the Democratic Party were apparently unaware of Stockman's revelation. The "pilfered" briefing book matter was forgotten until it resurfaced almost three years later, with the publication of Laurence I. Barrett's book "Gambling with History." Barrett's small mention of the incident, on pages 382 and 383 of the book, was repeated in short articles that appeared in The Washington Post and The New York Times on June 9, 1983. Barrett referred to the incident as "a dirty trick perpetrated against Carter". The author said that James Baker, then a campaign official, was faced with "something of an ethical problem" when he learned that someone in the Reagan campaign had acquired the briefing materials—"an unusual prize". Barrett said that, although Baker was fastidious about propriety, he looked the other way this time, and "was glad not to know the mechanics of it." Later, according to Barrett, the Reagan camp realized that the debate papers "provided by their informant had included every important item Carter used on the air except one: his reference to his daughter, Amy, in connection with nuclear arms control." Barrett added, "The Carter people then, as later, apparently were unaware of this hole in their security."

After publication of "Gambling with History", the briefing book story received national attention. It began with the two small articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times in June 1983 referred to in the introduction, followed by Jody Powell's article. All three articles cited "Gambling with History" as their source of information. Powell called the Reagan campaign's acquisition of the briefing book "skulduggery", and expressed amazement that the Reagan people would engage in such actions in the aftermath of Watergate. Powell asked whether the Ethics in Government Act required an FBI investigation of the theft and use of the Carter material. He also questioned whether anything else had been stolen, who else had been involved, and how the "mole" was paid for the information. While Powell acknowledged that the briefing materials' effect on the election was questionable, he maintained that ethical violations had occurred and should be investigated.

After these initial reports, the briefing book matter became a major news story. By late June it was front page news. Questions of ethics were raised on the editorial pages. Former Carter administration officials publicly criticized the Reagan campaign and called for an investigation into the entire matter. Critics of the massive news coverage said the media was creating a scandal because there was not much other news to report during the quiet summer season.

On June 15, 1983, Subcommittee on Human Resources Chairman Don Albosta sent letters to Mr. Stockman, Assistant to the Presi-

dent for Communications David Gergen, and White House Chief of Staff James Baker. [See app. I, pp. 132, 134, and 136.] In the letters, Chairman Albosta stated that the recent reports stemming from Barrett's account of the "pilfered" briefing book materials in "Gambling with History" had come to the attention of the subcommittee. The chairman observed that the reports cited Messrs. Stockman, Gergen and Baker as the persons who had received the material and used it. The chairman asked these individuals to explain their knowledge of and participation in the reported transactions. The chairman sent a similar letter on June 20th to CIA Director William Casey, who had been the Reagan Bush campaign manager in 1980. [See app., I, p. 138.] Chairman Albosta explained that, because of the subcommittee's continuing efforts to review agency ethics programs and the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, he was writing to request responses to the recent allegations. His letter stated explicitly, however, that he did not accept those allegations at face value.

On June 23rd, the subcommittee received responses from Messrs. Stockman, Gergen, Baker and Casey. [See app. I, pp. 140, 142, 145, and 148.] Stockman stated that he did receive a package of material by messenger from the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters that contained "policy issues" and "Carter Administration Achievements". Stockman said there were no markings on the documents to indicate they were official Government business or in any way classified. He added that, while the material was useful in preparing him for the practice debate, he doubted it was of significant value to others in the Reagan campaign.

Gergen responded that he did not recall ever seeing a "Carter debate book" or other notebooks from the Carter campaign. He said it was possible he did see some pages of "Carter material" for a brief period, but he did not recall it. Gergen stated that he did remember hearing that there was some Carter campaign material present in the Reagan camp, but he recalls that it was not described as important or dramatic. Gergen also said he has no idea how the material came into the possession of the Reagan campaign.

Baker told the subcommittee that he did recall seeing a large looseleaf bound book that was thought to have been given to the Reagan campaign by someone in the Carter camp. Baker said his best recollection is that he was given the book by William J. Casey. But Baker added that he had checked with Casey, who did not share his recollection. Baker said he does not know how the book was obtained by the Reagan campaign. He stated that the material did not appear to be official White House business. He did not recall the documents' containing any strategic or tactical information relating to the upcoming debate. Baker said the material appeared to be more of a compilation of Carter administration positions.

Casey responded that he had no recollection of ever having received, heard of or learned in any way about a set of papers that laid out Carter's debate plans or the points the President planned to make. Casey assured the subcommittee that the Reagan campaign management never contemplated, directed or authorized any effort to obtain this information. Nor to his knowledge did the cam-

paing ever use or have the kind of information described in Barrett's book.

Meanwhile, The Washington Post had reported on June 18th that Reagan campaign aides had received several hundred pages of anticipated questions and answers from a Carter briefing book before the debate. The Washington Post stated that Francis Hodsoll—who helped prepare Governor Reagan for the debate and is now Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts—had said he was given a “great big stack of double spaced papers” in the final weeks of the campaign covering a wide variety of issues that might be raised in the debate. The newspaper reported that Hodsoll said he did not know how the material was obtained, who initially received it, or who gave it to him. He described it as “very routine sorts of stuff”, including questions Governor Reagan might ask and possible Carter responses.

On June 23rd, Media General News Service reported that a Reagan campaign aide had asked, before the 1980 debate, that briefing materials obtained from the Carter campaign be returned. [See app. I, p. 159.] Myles Martel, a speech consultant with the Regan Bush campaign, reportedly said he was told about the briefing material by Hodsoll, who was in charge of research for the debate. Media General quoted Martel as saying, “When I was told they were (being used) in the campaign, the first thing I said was I thought they should be shipped back. My basic feeling was that it violated a sense of fair play.” Martel reportedly said he had raised his objections with Hodsoll only once and the matter was never discussed again. Martel allegedly said the word “mole” may have been used.

Media General reportd that, in addition to David Stockman and Hodsoll, Reagan campaign researcher Stefan Halper also had said that the briefing book had passed through his hands. Halper reportedly said he did not know where the book came from or what he did with it.

On Friday, June 24th, President Reagan responded to questions from reporters about the matter for the first time, calling the interest in the incident “much ado about nothing.” The Washington Post reported on June 26th that the White House had no plans to probe further into the matter, although aides said privately that they were searching for the missing briefing book.

On June 27th, President Reagan asked the Justice Department to conduct a “vigorous monitoring” of the incident for evidence of illegality. The White House announced that anyone with information related to the allegations, including the President's own aides, was being asked to inform the Justice Department. The Washington Post reported on June 28th that the administration was given a copy of the allegedly purloined Carter debate strategy book by former Carter campaign pollster Patrick Caddell. The White House later issued a statement saying there were “similarities” between the briefing book and information the Reagan camp had used to prepare for the debate. But the White House said the Carter material provided in June 1983 by Caddell appeared to be a “far more finished, more sensitive briefing book,” than that recalled by Reagan campaign officials.

On June 28th, the subcommittee received a second letter from David Gergen, making corrections in his first response. [See app. I, p. 149.] Gergen stated that, after a more thorough review of his files, he had found a set of materials, clearly prepared by the Carter camp, relating to foreign policy and national security issues. Gergen said the materials were dated from September 10 through 29, 1980, and appeared to have been early drafts to be included in the final briefing materials on those subjects. Gergen states that he had also found an unsolicited note sent by campaign volunteer Wayne Valis on October 21, 1980, with a one-page attachment. In the note, Valis described the attachment as "notes . . . based on a Carter debate staff brainstorming session—middle level types—nothing spectacular, but interesting—from a source intimately connected to a Carter debate staff member . . .". Gergen said that the documents he found, as well as others, were being forwarded to the subcommittee that day by Counsel to the President, Fred Fielding.

That same day (June 28) the White House released hundreds of pages of documents prepared by President Carter's staff for the 1980 debate. [See app. I, p. 151.] This material had been found in the campaign files of David Gergen and Francis Hodsoll, and included discussions of foreign policy and national security issues. Also included was the Wayne Valis memorandum referred to in Gergen's second letter to the subcommittee. The Washington Post quoted President Reagan on June 29th as saying that he "never saw anything of the kind", in reference to the Carter debate material.

On the 28th, David Stockman also acknowledged in a memorandum to Fielding that he had received materials that appeared to be Carter briefing papers on domestic issues, although such documents had not been released to the public that day. [See app. I, p. 153.] Stockman said the documents were delivered to him by officials of the Reagan campaign.

At a news conference on the evening of the 28th, President Reagan was asked repeatedly by reporters about the ethical questions raised by the allegations of a pilfered briefing book. The President said the monitoring he had called for by the Justice Department "amounted to an investigation" of the incident. The President said he had directed Justice to "find out if there was any wrongdoing and take action."

On June 29th, 1983, Subcommittee Chairman Don Albosta announced a legislative oversight investigation into the facts surrounding the allegations of the unethical and unauthorized transfer of property from the Carter administration to the Reagan Bush campaign. Chairman Albosta said the subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over the Standards of Conduct for Federal employees, the Ethics in Government Act and White House personnel, would look into possible violations of ethics codes by Federal workers. The subcommittee sent a letter to President Reagan on the 29th, requesting copies of all White House materials handed over to the Justice Department relating to its investigation. [See app. I, p. 154.] The subcommittee also sent letters to U.S. Representative to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick and to Francis Hodsoll, asking about their knowledge of or participation, if any, in the reported debate material transaction. [See app. I, p. 155.]

III. FBI INVESTIGATION

The Justice Department announced on June 30th that it had asked the FBI to join a "criminal investigation" into how the Reagan campaign obtained Carter campaign briefing materials and other White House information. The Washington Post reported on July 1st that "anyone at the White House then or now" would be interviewed by the FBI in connection with the case. An FBI spokesman reportedly said the problem would center on possible criminal violations such as the theft of Government property, receipt of stolen property with knowledge that it was stolen, obstruction of justice by failing to report a theft and the promise of a job in return for the theft of a document.

The FBI investigation dealt strictly with the possible criminal violations in connection with the case. The Subcommittee on Human Resources' probe was broader and was aimed in part at determining if the Standards of Conduct for Government employees are sufficient to discourage the type of unethical activity alleged. However, the FBI and the subcommittee agreed to share information and documents pertinent to each other's inquiries, through an arrangement finalized on August 11, 1983. [See app. I, p. 167.] The subcommittee and the FBI also both looked into the additional allegations of an "intelligence operation" conducted by officials of the Reagan campaign in anticipation of an "October surprise," which are discussed below.

IV. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING AN "INTELLIGENCE OPERATION" AND THE "OCTOBER SURPRISE"

On July 1, 1983, The Washington Post reported that CIA Director William J. Casey, while manager of the Reagan campaign in 1980, had established what he called "an intelligence operation" to monitor whether President Carter would spring an "October surprise" before the November election. The Washington Post, citing the statements of former Reagan campaign officials, reported that Casey had feared a dramatic move that would free the U.S. hostages in Iran and produce a surge of voter support for President Carter. Casey used the term "intelligence operation" to describe the hostage situation monitoring when he and campaign chief of staff, Edwin Meese, met with reporters during the Republican National convention in 1980. The Washington Post repeated the allegations of an intelligence operation, which The Washington Star had first reported on July 15, 1980.

The Washington Star quoted Casey in 1980 as saying that an "intelligence operation" tracking the President's actions and statements was "already in germinal form" under his direction. [See app. IV, p. 1370.] The newspaper reported that the subject came up on the second day of the GOP convention following Governor Reagan's appearance on CBS' "60 Minutes" the previous evening, during which the Republican nominee suggested that the Soviet Union would "throw a few bones" Carter's way to help him continue as President. Casey and Meese also reportedly suggested that the President might contrive events for his own political advantage.

According to The Washington Star, Casey cited as an example President Carter's early morning news conference to announce a breakthrough in the Iranian hostage crisis on the day when Democratic primary voters were going to the polls in Wisconsin in April. Meese reportedly added that the "October surprise" could be anything from a summit conference on energy, to developments in Latin America, to wage and price controls. The Washington Star said both Casey and Meese conveyed a conviction that, with or without the Russians' help, President Carter would "try to spring a fast one on the electorate to avert defeat in November."

The July 1, 1983, Washington Post article repeated The Washington Star's allegations. The Post said that Casey's use of the term "intelligence operation" "alarmed" Meese and others in the campaign back in 1980, and it was never used again. The Post reported that Robert Garrick, who was Director of Policy Development and Research for the Reagan Bush campaign, said the campaign group's intelligence information came mainly from a "network" of retired military officers who monitored the movement of U.S. troops and transport planes at various air bases across the country. Garrick reportedly said he did not receive information from the Carter campaign or the White House.

The Post reported that a former high-level Reagan campaign advisor had told the newspaper that campaign official Richard V. Allen received copies of portions of daily staff reports that were sent to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski by his senior aides. The newspaper said the former advisor described the material as "mostly atmospherics . . . stuff about low morale at the NSC." Several other Reagan campaign officials reportedly said they were unaware of such incidents. Brzezinski, however, told the Post that the daily reports from his staff were "sometimes extraordinarily sensitive".

In the book "Blue Smoke and Mirrors" (The Viking Press, 1981) by Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, Casey's remarks to reporters during the 1980 GOP convention are repeated. The authors go on to say in the first chapter that Casey was true to his word about setting up an "intelligence operation".

In July 1983 the national news media devoted heavy coverage to the Casey "intelligence operation" story. Allegations were made that the Reagan campaign may have been receiving sensitive White House information regarding national security and foreign policy issues. On July 7th, The New York Times reported that, according to present and former Reagan campaign officials, an operation to collect inside information on Carter administration foreign policy was conducted by the Reagan campaign. A source reportedly said the operation was made up of retired CIA officials and was highly secretive. The Times said Stefan Halper was in charge of the operation, according to its sources. The newspaper said Halper worked under Garrick, the director of campaign operations. Garrick was quoted as saying that Halper was "supposed to help with communications, but I kind of thought he had another agenda going—he was always on the phone with the door closed, and he never called me in and discussed it with me."

Because of the allegations of an organized effort to obtain sensitive Carter administration foreign policy and national security in-

formation by the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee on Human Resources expanded its ongoing investigation to address those charges.

V. THE DANIEL JONES ALLEGATIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

On July 6th, The New York Times had reported that Casey reaffirmed his contention that he never obtained Carter briefing materials and had not passed any such material to James Baker, as Baker had publicly recollected. [See app. I, p. 161.] Casey was quoted by The New York Times as saying "I wouldn't tolerate it. I wouldn't touch it with a ten foot pole." Casey denied that any kind of "intelligence organization as such" existed in the 1980 campaign, "except the whole organization had its antennae out." He faulted the debate team as "remiss" for not bringing to the attention of top campaign officials the presence of the Carter materials in the Reagan Bush campaign to permit the assessment of a possible "setup" by the opposition.

That evening, Richard Allen confirmed on the ABC News program "Nightline" that he had received unsolicited Carter White House material from an NSC source on perhaps three occasions during the presidential campaign. Allen said the information was innocuous and unclassified.

On July 7th, The Washington Post reported that, according to documents from Reagan campaign files provided to the newspaper, a Reagan campaign volunteer had given top campaign officials Carter White House documents and information that he described as coming from "a reliable White House mole". [See app. I, p. 162.] The Washington Post published three documents: (1) a cover memorandum from the volunteer, Daniel Jones, to Robert Gray, William Casey and Edwin Meese listing President Carter's travel itinerary through the end of the campaign, which Jones wrote had come from "a reliable White House mole"; (2) a White House memorandum from Anne Wexler and Al McDonald containing economic information for the Carter Cabinet; and (3) a photocopy of that White House memorandum with a typewritten notation across the top that read: "To: William Casey (for transmittal to Martin Anderson)".

In an interview with the Post, Jones confirmed that he had sent the memoranda to officials in the Reagan campaign. Gray told the newspaper that he did not doubt their authenticity, but did not recall them. Meese was quoted as saying he did not recall the documents or any other information from inside the White House. When asked about the memoranda, Casey told the Post "That's all new to me." Casey told the newspaper that material with his name on it would not necessarily have gone to him, "any more than it would in my present job." Anderson, who was Governor Reagan's top domestic policy advisor during the campaign, said he did not recall any Carter White House memoranda, but added that he received "an awful lot of stuff" while travelling with the Republican candidate aboard his campaign plane.

The subcommittee has investigated the Jones documents and how the campaign obtained and used them. And it has sought in-

formation concerning other possible transfers of Carter administration material to the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign.

Thus, on July 7th, the subcommittee also sent letters to Counselor to the President Meese and to Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver requesting an explanation of their participation, if any, in the reported debate material transactions. [See app. I, pp. 169 and 171.] The subcommittee also wrote White House Counsel Fred Fielding on the 7th, requesting additional information as part of its continuing investigation. [See app. I, p. 173.]

The subcommittee asked Mr. Fielding for a copy of the memorandum he had sent to former Reagan campaign personnel requesting their assistance in locating documents or evidence pertaining to the briefing book matter. The subcommittee also requested a list of the people the memorandum was sent to and a list of the people interviewed by Mr. Fielding's office in this matter. Mr. Fielding was also asked to provide copies of all the materials he had received, or would receive in the future, from the Hoover Institution's Reagan Collection in regard to this investigation. In addition, the subcommittee requested a copy of any ethics guidelines or regulations issued to White House employees, and an explanation of any changes in those guidelines or their implementation since the previous administration.

On July 8th, the subcommittee received a response from Jeane Kirkpatrick stating her involvement in the simulated debate held in Wexford on October 26, 1980. [See app. I, p. 175.] Mrs. Kirkpatrick stated that she had no knowledge of the use of Carter debate materials at that time or during the course of the Reagan campaign.

On July 9th, the subcommittee sent a telegram to the Hoover Institution in California requesting access to the Reagan Campaign Collection. [See app. I, p. 174.]

On July 11th, the subcommittee received a response from Fred Fielding on behalf of the President, stating that the White House would no longer be receiving any campaign materials relating to the briefing book matter from the Hoover Institution's Reagan Collection or from the personal files of former campaign officials. [See app. I, p. 177.] Fielding said all relevant documents would go directly to the Department of Justice. Fielding informed the subcommittee that the President had directed representatives of the Justice Department to meet with the subcommittee to work out an access agreement to any materials located in the Hoover files, in order to assist the subcommittee in its investigation "while maintaining the integrity of the Justice Department investigation."

VI. ADOPTION OF GUIDELINES FOR THE INVESTIGATION BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND ITS JURISDICTION AND OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES

The jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service includes "all Federal Civil Service". The rules of the full Committee set forth the oversight authority of the Subcommittee on Human Resources, and provide several bases for the subcommittee's jurisdiction over this investigation.

Most importantly, the Subcommittee on Human Resources has jurisdiction over the "code of ethics" that govern Federal employees. This includes jurisdiction over pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 11222 (Standards of Conduct for Government Officers and Employees), the regulations of the Office of Personnel Management and the Executive Office of the President issued pursuant to that Executive order, which prohibit Federal employees from (a) using public office for private gain, (b) using Federal property for other than official purposes, (c) using official information to further a private interest, and (d) committing crimes.

The bases for the subcommittee's jurisdiction were noted in the "Guidelines of Legislative Purpose for Investigation of Unauthorized Transfer of Information and Material from the Carter Administration to the Reagan Campaign." The subcommittee, unanimously adopted these guidelines, which will be fully discussed and reprinted in the next chapter of this report, on July 14, 1983. The guidelines state:

The objectives of this investigation are to define legislative needs and remedies for reform of the Ethics in Government Act, based upon allegations of possible ethical violations in both presidential campaigns of 1980.

In adopting guidelines for the investigation, the subcommittee agreed to develop a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the reported transfers of property and information. The subcommittee said it would turn over to the Justice Department or to local prosecutors any evidence that a Federal or local crime may have been committed. The subcommittee also agreed to report, for the use of other committees, any information that might warrant their consideration or fall under their jurisdiction.

In 1983 the subcommittee had acted on legislation introduced by subcommittee chairman, Don Albosta, to reauthorize and strengthen the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.¹ The bill was approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and was signed into law by the President on November 11, 1983. However, the briefing book and intelligence operation allegations raise the question whether additional legislative or administrative remedies were needed. Specifically, the subcommittee has asked whether there are adequate provisions in the regulations to prevent the misuse of Presidential or Federal Government property and information, whether these provisions are adhered to, and whether they are enforced or enforceable at all.

The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate Executive branch activities. Investigations into executive branch operations are, of course, commonplace as "The Congressional Oversight Manual" states:

Legislators need to know how effectively programs are working, how well agency officials are responding to committee directives, and the scope and intensity of public support for Government programs. The investigatory

¹ Public Law 98-61, House Rept. 98-89 Pt. II.

method helps to ensure a more responsible bureaucracy, while supplying Congress with the information needed to formulate new legislation.²

In *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957), the Supreme Court said, that there is "a power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government." The Supreme Court has long recognized the need for the vigorous legislative oversight advocated by Woodrow Wilson in his book, "Congressional Government":

It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees . . . Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Government should be preferred even to its legislative function.³

The Subcommittee on Human Resources' investigation into the allegations of unauthorized transfers of material and information from the Carter White House and administration to the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign was intended to fulfill its informing or oversight function as well as to determine whether additional legislation is necessary. Subsequent events have justified this decision. On February 23, 1984, the Department of Justice released its report on its investigation into the briefing book matter. While the Justice report outlines the Department's conclusions, it does not publicly release any of the documents or material obtained and studied by the FBI during the agency's investigation. The subcommittee, in issuing this report, has included for public examination the relevant documents and information it obtained and studied during its investigation. Moreover, it makes available in this report relevant information and materials obtained by the FBI during that agency's investigation and subsequently provided to the subcommittee. The subcommittee believes that in this way it fulfills its responsibility to inform the Congress and the public of all of the relevant findings of its probe. The subcommittee also believes that publicizing its findings is an important step in ensuring that Federal employees properly treat Government materials entrusted to them and that the process of electing Federal officials is conducted with integrity.

² Congressional Research Service, "The Congressional Oversight Manual," February 1984, p. CRS-5.

³ Wilson, "Congressional Government" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1900) 14th impression, p. 303.

CHAPTER 2—INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth briefly the method by which the subcommittee pursued its investigative responsibilities and the philosophy that underlay its inquiry.

A. SUBCOMMITTEE'S GUIDELINES

On June 29, 1983, Chairman Albosta announced that the Subcommittee on Human Resources would conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the unauthorized transfer of material and information from the Carter administration during the 1980 Presidential campaign. On July 12, 1983, Chairman Albosta called a meeting of the subcommittee to discuss proposed objectives and procedures of the investigation.

1. Objectives for the Investigation

The ultimate objectives of the investigation, as finally approved by the subcommittee on July 14, 1983, are, "to define legislative needs and remedies for reform of the Ethics in Government Act, based upon the allegations of possible ethical violations in both Presidential Campaigns of 1980." The objectives were stated in this manner to address the concern expressed by Members of the minority that the subcommittee not be limited to investigating only the activities of the Reagan Bush campaign, should serious allegations involving Federal employees be discovered, concerning ethical violations by the Carter Mondale or Anderson Lucy campaigns. More specifically, the subcommittee sought to determine "whether there are adequate provisions in the regulations to prevent the misuses of Presidential or Federal Government property or information, and whether these provisions are understood, and whether they are enforced or enforceable at all." The objectives were drawn to ensure that the subcommittee's activities were limited and to avoid an unfocused "fishing expedition." But the objectives state that, to fulfill its oversight function, it is the intention of the subcommittee, "to develop a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer of property or information of the President's, apparently involving Federal personnel."

a. Cooperation with other entities

The subcommittee wanted to ensure that the investigation would not impede the efforts of the Justice Department in this matter. There was also the concern that information relevant to the work

of other congressional committees be made available to them. These two concerns were specifically addressed in the guidelines.

During the course of the investigation, the subcommittee shared information with other entities on three occasions. First, the Department of Justice requested and received access to certain subcommittee documents and interview reports. Second, two members of the U.S. Senate, which was considering the nomination of Edwin Meese III as Attorney General, requested access to subcommittee information relevant to Mr. Meese. Under the provisions of the guidelines, the subcommittee was obligated, and ultimately voted to provide such access. Finally, on April 11, 1984, the subcommittee received a request for access to information from Jacob Stein, the Independent Counsel appointed to investigate the allegations surrounding Mr. Meese. This request was honored by a vote of the subcommittee on April 12, 1984.

2. Specific Guidelines and Procedures

In addition to objectives, the subcommittee determined that it should lay out specific procedures for this investigation. The Rules of the House, as well as the Rules of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, provide authority for the oversight investigations of matters within the jurisdictions of the various subcommittees.¹ Incorporated in those rules are safeguards to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, nonpartisanship in the committee process.

At the July 12, 1983 meeting of the subcommittee, it became evident that, because of the nature of the issues being investigated, consideration should be given for special rules to deal with potential problems.

a. Need for bipartisanship

The primary concern among the membership of the subcommittee was that the investigation be conducted in a bipartisan manner. The members agreed that the integrity of the investigation depended on the adoption of a bipartisan approach. There was concern on the part of the minority members of the subcommittee that interviews and document review would be undertaken solely by the majority, without involvement of the minority. There was consensus among the members of the subcommittee that such an approach would serve no legitimate interest. The guidelines thus provide that both majority and minority investigators would be present for interviews and document review unless there was a specific request from a witness to exclude minority investigators.

All members were welcome to participate in the investigation. The staffs of both the minority and majority sides were in frequent contact.

Majority members were concerned that members of the minority would have independent dealings with the White House and other persons who were the subject of the subcommittee's investigation. Independent contact could adversely affect the integrity of the investigation. It was thus agreed that the guidelines would be violated if members or staff of the minority contacted members of the

¹ House Rules, Rule X2(b)(1). Committee Rules, Rule 14.

administration and did not report such contact to the subcommittee chairman or the staff director.

b. Access to subcommittee files

Minority members desired access to the files of the investigation. House and Committee rules provide that members cannot be denied access to any House files and Chairman Albosta accordingly agreed that the guidelines should provide access for all members and their designated staff to the subcommittee's permanent investigative files secured in the subcommittee's safe.

c. Statements to the press

A major concern of both majority and minority members was the possibility of press leaks in an investigation of this nature. There is thus a section in the guidelines prohibiting release of material information without notification to the subcommittee. Additionally, subcommittee staff could not discuss the investigation with the press unless authorized by the chairman or the staff director. The chairman stated that any staff member violating this provision would be terminated.

The guidelines that address the above concerns were formally approved by the subcommittee by a voice vote on July 14, 1983, and are as follows:

GUIDELINES AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE FOR INVESTIGATION
OF UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS OF INFORMATION AND MATERIAL
FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO THE
REAGAN CAMPAIGN

(1) The objectives of this investigation are to define legislative needs and remedies for reform of the Ethics in Government Act, based upon the allegations of possible ethical violations in both Presidential Campaigns of 1980.

The jurisdiction of the subcommittee includes "codes of ethics . . ." and the "White House personnel authorization" as derived from the full Committee's jurisdiction over Federal personnel.

In regard to White House personnel, the selection, appropriate numbers and use of personnel at each level in the White House in addition to discipline and removal of White House personnel are clearly matters of concern in regard to use of White House materials, in addition to standards of conduct.

The subcommittee has continued work on the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which was the result of bills reported from the Post Office and Civil Service Committee among others. This year, we have reviewed the Act as an organic whole to determine whether the Act is operating as anticipated to ensure the ethical operation of the government at all levels.

Our jurisdiction over this matter includes the Standards of Conduct for Government officers and employees, as prescribed by Executive Order, by regulation and by law.

The questions are whether there are adequate provisions in the regulations to prevent the misuses of presidential or Federal Government property or information, whether these provisions are understood, and whether they are enforced or enforceable at all.

The report on H.R. 2717, filed by Mr. Albosta, includes an admonition that it is apparent that better ethics education is needed for government employees and officials in particular.

The same transactions that may be a violation of civil law or regulations concerning Federal officials or employees may also rise to the level of a violation of criminal law.

The Office of Government Ethics is required to report such potential violations to the Attorney General in certain cases—for example, when financial conflicts of interest are indentified and not corrected or eliminated.

Another question that arises is whether current Federal employees or officials, such as White House personnel, have or should have a responsibility to report ethics violations that may signal a continuing weakness in, or threat to, the effective operation of the government.

Therefore, we intend to ask such questions to determine whether each element of the Ethics Act and our ethics program is working effectively in concert with other appropriate elements to ensure that Federal personnel at all levels know their rights and responsibilities and live by them.

We intend to develop a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer of property or information of the President's, apparently involving Federal personnel.

In the course of that investigation we will turn over to the Justice Department or to local prosecutors any evidence that a Federal or local crime may have been committed. We will consider any findings which may indicate a need for changes in the law under our jurisdiction and report for the use of other Committees information which may warrant their consideration in regard to other laws such as Federal election law or Criminal law.

PROCEDURES FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

(I) Files

Files will be kept under lock and key; except for immediate working files of staff, all subcommittee files will be open for inspection by any Member. At the request of any Member, one staff member who is not on the staff of the subcommittee may be permitted access to the files on an in-house basis, signing for the files and inspecting them in the subcommittee rooms.

(II) Interviews

Minority Staff Counsel will be informed of, and included in, interviews to be conducted by subcommittee staff, with exceptions permissible in the interest of responding to unsolicited calls, visits or stipulations of witnesses concerning circumstances under which they will consent to be interviewed. Even when participation in interviews by Minority Counsel or staff is not possible, notes from the interviews, as reduced or committed to paper or tape for filing will be available to the Minority and to each Member as outlined under paragraph I (files).

(III) Statements to the Press

To the greatest extent possible, release of material information by the Chairman or his staff will be preceded by notice to all Members of the subcommittee.

Subcommittee staff will not discuss the investigation with the press unless authorized to do so by the Staff Director or Chairman. The subcommittee Staff Director and Counsel will be available twenty-four hours a day to answer questions or assist any Member of the Committee or designated staff of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member to the greatest extent possible in order to provide accurate and current information about the investigation in order to respond to press inquiries, or simply to inform the Members.

Each Member and each staff is expected to respect and uphold the confidentiality of the investigation and the information held by the subcommittee. In order to ensure proper control of information while allowing as open a process as possible, it is expected that material information will not be released unless first cleared by the Chairman or Staff Director, in consultation with the Ranking Minority Member. If information or materials or allegations that may have a bearing on the investigation are made available without clearance by the Chairman or Staff Director and notice to all Members, then it is expected that the person or persons who have knowledge of the statement or release of information will bring it to the attention of the Chairman, Staff Director and Ranking Member of the full Committee as soon as possible. Members of the Subcommittee and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the full Committee will also be briefed about major material announcements and action before any such announcement is made or action taken whenever possible.

(IV) Staff Assignments

All staff persons detailed to the subcommittee or retained by the subcommittee for the investigation will be reporting to the Chairman and/or permanent subcommittee staff.

Minority staff persons detailed to the subcommittee or retained by the Minority for this investigation will be reporting to the Minority Counsel, the Minority Staff Director, or the Ranking Minority Member, in consultation with the Chairman of the Committee, providing it does not violate the Rules of the House.

(These Objectives and Guidelines were approved by a voice vote of the entire membership of the Subcommittee on Human Resources on July 14, 1983.)

II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE INVESTIGATION

It was clear from the responses to Chairman Albosta's letters from Messrs. Casey, Baker, Stockman and Gergen that a comprehensive investigation was needed to answer the many questions that still remained about the transfer of Carter briefing materials. The investigative plan was to conduct staff interviews of relevant individuals and review all files that might contain relevant documents.

A. STAFF INTERVIEWS

The investigation generally adopted the "satellite" approach to interviewing. Under that method, persons are interviewed "from the bottom up." Instead of first talking with principals and then to their subordinates, the subordinates were contacted first. This method allowed the subcommittee to discover the facts necessary to prepare adequately for interviews with key witnesses.

This investigative plan resulted in the discovery of a great deal of relevant information on the production and handling of the Carter debate briefing materials, as well as the movement of the Carter materials through the Reagan campaign. This process also exposed additional materials that were relevant to the subcommittee's investigation.

The subcommittee formally interviewed over 250 persons. Also, approximately 50 more were contacted briefly to determine whether a full scale interview was warranted. The subcommittee also sought an additional 150 signed answers to questionnaires from persons employed by the U.S. Secret Service, the White House Motor Pool, and the NSC Situation Room during the Carter administration. [These signed questionnaires are found in appendix III of this report.] The subcommittee's resources were limited and this process ensured thoroughness without diverting available personnel from other important assignments.

In June, President Reagan pledged his full cooperation with the investigations by the subcommittee and the FBI. The President also asked all his campaign workers and members of his administration to cooperate fully with the investigations. In part because of this commitment to a full airing of the facts by the President, the subcommittee was able to conduct its investigation without issuing a subpoena for testimony or document.

1. Interview Reporting Process

At the conclusion of an interview, a member of the majority staff drafted a report of that interview. The draft was then reviewed by other interviewers, both majority and minority, for accuracy. The approved report was then made a part of the subcommittee's permanent files.

A decision was made not to tape, or otherwise record, interviews in most cases. It was felt that such a technique might inhibit a witness and thus hamper the subcommittee's ability to obtain frank and cooperative responses to the subcommittee's questions. Accuracy in the interview reporting process was ensured by the review process.

Witnesses were interviewed without administering an oath. The House Rules authorize subcommittees to administer oaths to obtain sworn testimony.² However, to do so, a subcommittee must be in session. Since these interviews were not public, sworn testimony would have required convening an executive session of the subcommittee. Under the Rules of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, there must be a vote of the subcommittee, while in public session, to close a meeting and conduct an executive session.³ With nearly 300 interviews, this process would have been burdensome. To ensure that the subcommittee obtained sworn testimony from relevant persons, Chairman Albosta decided in January to ask for sworn affidavits, as is discussed below.

2. President Reagan Not Interviewed

While the subcommittee interviewed top officials of both the Carter and Reagan administrations, the subcommittee chose not to interview President Reagan. This was done for several reasons. First, the subcommittee has discovered no evidence showing that President Reagan was involved in the obtaining of President Carter's debate briefing material. Second, the FBI conducted an extensive, thorough interview with President Reagan. The subcommittee has reviewed the summary of that session. The subcommittee believed that an interview with the President of the United States to hear only what the subcommittee already knew would not be appropriate.

B. AFFIDAVITS

1. Postponing of Hearings

On January 18, 1984, Chairman Albosta postponed indefinitely public hearings on the matters under investigation. [See app. I, p. 178.] In his statement Albosta said:

Some time ago, I tentatively scheduled hearings into the matters under investigation for January 26th. However, recently I have become concerned that holding public hearings on the highly charged issues involved in a Presidential election year could have unwanted, undesirable

² See House Rule, Rule XI, 2(m)(1)(B).

³ See Committee Rules, Rule 25.

and possibly counter-productive consequences. Because of the issues and the persons involved, there is potential for public hearings to degenerate into partisan bickering and a media extravaganza. If this occurred, the ultimate goals of the hearings—an objective presentation of the subcommittee's factual findings and the development of proposals for administrative or legislative solutions—would be seriously impeded, if not defeated.

The chairman concluded, however, that it was still necessary to obtain sworn statements from certain individuals. He instructed the subcommittee staff to draw up affidavits for various persons. These statements were based upon the testimony given to the staff during the course of the investigation. Additionally, since the subcommittee had access to FBI interview reports, the affidavits also reflected, where appropriate, what an individual had stated to FBI investigators. The prospective affiants were, of course, allowed to make appropriate changes in their affidavits.

Since the chairman's statement on January 18, the subcommittee sent out 63 affidavits. Thirty-two of these were sent to officials of either the Carter administration or his campaign. Thirty-one affidavits were sent officials of the Reagan Bush campaign. All the affidavits are reprinted in appendix III of this subcommittee report.

C. DOCUMENT REVIEW

In inquiries of this nature documents are extremely useful, particularly where memories are deficient. During the course of its investigation, the subcommittee attempted to identify relevant documents for review and analysis, as now discussed.

1. Hoover Institution Archives

The subcommittee sought and obtained limited access to the Reagan campaign collection at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California. On July 9, 1983, the subcommittee sent a telegram to the archivist of the Reagan Collection requesting access to Reagan Bush campaign files. [See app. I, p. 174.] The response from Hoover indicated that the subcommittee's request was forwarded for decision to the Trustees of the Reagan Campaign Collection—President Reagan, Edwin Meese III, and Michael Deaver. In a July 11 letter to Chairman Albosta, Fred Fielding indicated a willingness on the part of the President to work out an access agreement. In that same letter, Mr. Fielding noted that the President had "directed that representatives of the Department of Justice meet with you to work out procedures to provide you and your subcommittee with access to any such materials located in the Hoover Institution or elsewhere to assist you in your investigation while assuring the integrity of the Department of Justice investigation." [See app. I, p. 177.] The day following the subcommittee's initial request, the FBI requested, and was immediately granted, access to the Reagan campaign files located at Hoover.

On July 12, 1983, negotiations began between the subcommittee and White House Counsel Fielding. Special Counsel James Hamil-

ton, of the law firm Ginsburg, Feldman and Bress, met with Fielding on numerous occasions on the subcommittee's behalf.

Fielding sought to ensure: (1) that the subcommittee did not have access to documents that clearly were not relevant to the subcommittee's work, (2) the subcommittee access to documents did not, in any way, impede the investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice, and (3) that the subcommittee would agree to review the files of the 1980 Carter campaign. The subcommittee's position was generally that access should be granted to any files that could contain documents that might indicate the transfer of information from the Carter administration or campaign to the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign. Unfortunately, no comprehensive index of the Hoover files existed.

To resolve the first concern of the Hoover Trustees, the subcommittee agreed to limit its request for access to files that appeared more clearly relevant, although, because of the lack of an index, this was difficult. To meet the second concern, the subcommittee agreed to consult with the Department of Justice before the release of any documents. The subcommittee also adopted guidelines restricting the release of such information. The third concern of the Trustees presented the most problems.

During the investigation the subcommittee requested numerous documents from the Carter files at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. However, to seek unlimited access to the thousands of boxes of documents contained there would have stalled the subcommittee's investigation, given the panel's limited resources. Absent specific allegations that, with the involvement of Federal employees, material flowed from the Reagan Bush campaign into the Carter administration and campaign, the subcommittee chairman believed that it would serve no legitimate purpose for the subcommittee to agree to such a search.

Various proposals and counter proposals were made by Hamilton and Fielding. On July 20, 1983, the subcommittee received a letter from Fielding indicating that, if the subcommittee was unwilling to commit itself to a full search of Carter files, the Reagan Collection Trustees would not approve direct subcommittee access under any conditions. Instead, Fielding offered the subcommittee access to only those documents that the FBI had located and retained in its search of the Reagan files. [See app. I, p. 182.]

In his letter to the subcommittee, Fielding stated:

The product of the FBI search can be made available to the subcommittee. The subcommittee can review the results of this extensive investigation already underway. It can discuss the organization of the Hoover files with the FBI and the Hoover Archivist. If at the conclusion of this review, the subcommittee concludes it still needs additional information or materials on specific subjects, individuals, or files, the Trustees can respond to such request. It is our conviction that at that point the subcommittee will find it has already received the information and materials it needs to satisfy its mandates.

The subcommittee found Mr. Fielding's suggestion unacceptable. However, the subcommittee did agree to include language in an

access agreement evidencing a willingness to search any relevant files (including Carter files) if facts were discovered indicating that there were improper acts on the part of Federal employees in the Carter administration to obtain information from the Reagan Bush campaign.

On July 21, 1983, Chairman Albosta convened a meeting of the subcommittee to brief the members on the progress of negotiations with the White House over access to the documents located at the Hoover Institution. His opening statement fully explained the subcommittee's earlier proposals and the reasons for needing direct subcommittee access to those files. [See app. I, p. 185.]

The chairman stated:

The subcommittee has not sought examination of all Reagan Bush campaign files, but only an examination of all relevant files. The subcommittee, of course, would reserve the right to determine what material is relevant.

Secondly, it is not correct that the subcommittee is not examining Carter White House files. To the contrary, it intends to interrogate numerous Carter officials and examine relevant files in their possession.

More importantly, Mr. Fielding's proposal is that the subcommittee accept records gathered by the FBI's search before it requests any further review of the Hoover Institution materials. This proposal ignores the fact that the subcommittee has independent jurisdiction in this matter and has authority to conduct its own investigation. There is no legal requirement that it take on what the FBI provides. Moreover, the FBI's investigation into criminal conduct has a narrower scope than the subcommittee's investigation, which more broadly seeks to discover evidence of ethical violations by Federal employees in the exercise of its oversight responsibilities and to consider whether legislative changes are necessary. The subcommittee can have no assurances that the FBI will isolate and copy all of the documents in which the subcommittee has a legitimate interest.

Following this meeting, Hamilton, on behalf of the subcommittee, wrote Fielding to present a new proposal for direct subcommittee access to relevant files at the Hoover Institution. [See app. I, p. 189.] The major change in this proposal was the subcommittee's offer to accept file searches carried out by professionals from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the Congress. In his letter to Fielding, Hamilton summarized the proposal as follows:

There apparently is a concern that campaign files might contain embarrassing information not related to the subcommittee's investigation. While the subcommittee is seeking only information relating to its present inquiry, it proposes to alleviate this concern by agreeing that the initial search of the files of these individuals will be done only by professionals from the General Accounting Office detailed to the subcommittee. While the GAO professionals will

conduct their search under the supervision and direction of subcommittee employees, the subcommittee and its staff will not initially examine the files of these individuals, but will review only the fruits of the GAO search. GAO professionals, like FBI investigators, are career government employees who can be expected to perform their duties in a nonpartisan fashion. Thus any concerns as to partisan use of materials unrelated to the subcommittee's investigation that might be found in these specific files should be eliminated.

On July 28, 1983, the subcommittee received a favorable response from Fielding to the proposal embodied in Hamilton's letter of July 25, and on July 29 the agreement between the subcommittee and the Trustees was signed by both Chairman Albosta and Fielding. [See app. I, pp. 184 and 201.]

Under the agreement the subcommittee was allowed:

(1) Direct access to documents from the Hoover files initially identified by the FBI as possibly relevant to its investigation.

(2) Direct access to files identified by the Hoover Archivist and the FBI as containing material prepared for the Carter-Reagan debate.

(3) Direct access to any files that indicate improper or unethical transfers of federal records or federal information.

(4) Direct access to any files that may show any intelligence operation organized by the Reagan Bush campaign "devised to improperly or unethically provide federal property or federal information to the Reagan Bush campaign from the Carter Administration."

(5) Access by GAO only to the campaign files of certain individuals (William Casey, Robert Gray, James A. Baker III, Frank Hodsoll, David Gergen, Tony Dolan, Daryl Borgquist, Richard V. Allen, Stef Halper, Robert Garrick, Robert Gambino and Max Hugel).

On August 4, 1983, four staffers from the subcommittee travelled to the Hoover Institution to begin the document review provided for by the above agreement. Of those four, two were from the majority side and two from the minority side. In Palo Alto, they met five General Accounting Office personnel, who ordinarily worked out of GAO's San Francisco office. The FBI had just completed its review of the entire campaign files collection. The FBI's search had taken 2 weeks and involved 15 agents. This search resulted in the identification of 36 documents as relevant.

The congressional investigators spent 1 week reviewing roughly 60 of the over 900 boxes at Hoover. This search resulted in the identification of an additional 24 relevant documents.

a. Second Hoover request

During its initial inquiries at Hoover, the subcommittee obtained only a preliminary index of the entire collection of campaign files as the cataloging of the Reagan campaign collection had not yet been completed. Using that index, however, the subcommittee requested access to 26 additional boxes and specific file folders in 22 additional boxes. This request was made via a letter from the sub-

committee staff director, Micah Green, to White House Counsel Fred F. Fielding. [See app. I, p. 207.]

It became evident, during the subcommittee's initial search of the Hoover files, that files from the campaign period and the post-election transition period were intermingled. The subcommittee's subsequent request for access thus included files that were marked "transition," as well as "campaign." An example of this concerns the files of Edwin Meese III, who had extensive files at Hoover. As chief of staff of the campaign and the director of the transition team, his files included nearly 100 boxes of materials. However, they were all labeled "transition files."

Fielding's August 15 response to Green's letter indicated a concern by the Trustees that the subcommittee would have access to "transition" files. [See app. I, p. 208.] Fielding said:

Obviously, during the transition there was a great deal of exchanging of information and documents between the Carter Administration and the Presidential Transition, all perfectly proper on the part of both parties. Likewise, a reference to a file labeled with a title such as "briefing books" is not inconsistent with transition activity which necessarily included briefings of the President-elect and the Vice-President elect.

To meet the above concern, Fielding proposed instructing the Hoover Archivist to review the files to determine whether any documents that were pre-election and relevant to the subcommittee's inquiry could be located.

Chairman Albosta responded to Fielding's proposal on August 25, explaining how transition and campaign files were intermingled. [See app. I, p. 210.] The chairman objected to the discretion given the Archivist under Fielding's plan. The chairman thus proposed that GAO personnel be present for any file review to "view what the Archivist has pulled as transition material, in a very cursory manner, to ensure that the materials removed are clearly identifiable as transition information and therefore not relevant to this request for access."

Chairman Albosta continued:

We recognized that some documents dated prior to the election may have been sent by the Carter Administration to the transition team in an authorized manner. When there is a clear indication that such an authorized transfer occurred, the documents should be treated as transition materials in the manner described above. Where this is unclear, to any degree, the agreed-on rules for relevancy will still apply to any examination of materials by GAO investigators on behalf of the subcommittee.

Fielding responded to Chairman Albosta's letter on September 9, 1983 [see app. I, p. 213], essentially agreeing to the chairman's counter proposal. Fielding's new plan provided for the following procedure:

- (1) The Archivist will examine each file requested to determine whether it contains any pre-election materials. If

it clearly does not, there will be no further review of the file.

(2) If the Archivist finds that a particular file contains both pre-election and transition materials, the Archivist shall remove all items that are clearly transition materials and any items that were clearly supplied after the election. If there is any question by the Archivist as to whether an item falls into these categories of "transition materials", the Archivist shall review the materials with the GAO investigators. If agreement cannot be reached between the Archivist and the GAO investigators on a particular item, the issue shall be referred to counsel for the subcommittee and a representative of the Trustees for resolution.

On September 15, Chairman Albosta wrote Fielding adding the following phrase to this new agreement for access:

NOTE: With regard to the Archivist's search under No. 1 and No. 2 above, material that post dates the election that relates to events that may have involved the campaign or any pre-election transfer of information from the Carter Administration will be reviewed by the GAO investigators for relevancy. [See app. I, p. 215.]

The second search by the subcommittee of Hoover files was conducted under these terms by GAO professionals.

Special mention must be made of GAO's superb reputation for objectivity. This reputation undoubtedly was a principal reason that the Trustees agreed to grant the subcommittee access to these files without the issuance of a subpoena.

2. Additional Document Review

The subcommittee also reviewed the individual campaign files of numerous individuals. Included in appendix I [pp. 216-275] is a collection of correspondence with various parties about document review. While in most cases review was carried out by both majority and minority staff, on occasion requests that GAO personnel only conduct the search were honored. This effort resulted in the discovery of a number of relevant documents. Throughout this process, the subcommittee met with generally cooperative responses from persons who have been interviewed and whose files were reviewed.

D. DEALINGS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

In his July 11, 1983, letter to Chairman Albosta, White House Counsel Fielding wrote:

... in accordance with your request, the President has directed that representatives of the Department of Justice meet with you to work out procedures to provide you and your subcommittee with access to any such materials located in the Hoover Institution or elsewhere to assist you in your investigation, while assuring the integrity of the Department of Justice investigation. [See app. I, p. 177.]

This view was reiterated in Fielding's July 20, 1983, letter to James Hamilton as follows:

I would also renew the President's request that Mr. Albosta meet with the Department of Justice to work out procedures for providing the subcommittee access to all the materials and information developed in the Justice Department's investigation. We are anxious that the subcommittee have the benefit of that investigation as soon as possible. Delay in the completion of the investigations into the charges of possible misconduct does not serve any legitimate interests, especially those of the public, which deserves to know the facts of this controversy as soon as possible. [See app. I, p. 182.]

On July 22, 1983, negotiations between the subcommittee and the Department of Justice began, pursuant to the Presidential directive. The issues covered included: access to documents accumulated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, access to interview reports (FBI 302's), control of Justice Department information, access by Justice to subcommittee information, and the timing of access.

On August 11, 1983, the subcommittee and the Department of Justice reached an agreement, which is embodied in a letter from Associate Attorney General Lowell P. Jensen to James Hamilton. [See app. I, p. 167.] That letter generally provides that the subcommittee would be given gradual access to all Justice Department information regarding its investigation. Additionally, the agreement provides for subcommittee consultation with the Department before any such information is released. Finally, it provides for Justice Department access to subcommittee information, as provided in the subcommittee's guidelines.

The subcommittee began receiving documents almost immediately. Additionally, on November 22, 1983, the Department granted James Hamilton, and later minority counsel, Steve Hemphill, access to the FBI 302 reports relating to the investigation.

After a complete analysis of the FBI investigative product, the subcommittee believes that, considering its mandate to discover criminal evidence, its investigation was conscientious and intensive. The subcommittee's mandate, however, was far broader than the Department's. The subcommittee's basic jurisdiction deals with the question of ethical standards relating to Government employees, not just the violation of criminal law.

The subcommittee commends the FBI and the Department for their generally cooperative attitude during the course of this investigation. We particularly note that, after the subcommittee concluded that extensive additional fingerprint analysis was needed, the FBI conducted this labwork for the subcommittee at a truly remarkable pace.

III. SUBCOMMITTEE RESOURCES

To conduct its extensive investigation, the subcommittee needed to enlarge its three person staff. Chairman Albosta decided that the subcommittee should utilize existing resources to the greatest extent possible. He accepted the offer of the full committee chair-

man, William Ford, to loan the subcommittee two individuals, Paul Newton and Ed Hugler, to assist in the inquiry. The subcommittee is grateful to the chairman for assigning these talented individuals to the subcommittee.

The subcommittee's minority staff was ably assisted by Steve Hemphill, Anne Simon, Steve Williams, Jean Gilligan and Barbara Broomfield, who were assigned on a part-time basis by the ranking minority member of the full committee for the investigation.

A. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

The subcommittee consulted the General Accounting Office (GAO) to explore the possibility of utilizing its resources to assist in the investigation. Committees of both the House and Senate frequently utilize GAO professionals, who work out of committee offices, for specific projects. This arrangement maximizes utilization of GAO resources and minimizes the overall expense of a project. In response to subcommittee inquiries, GAO detailed for eight months three individuals to the subcommittee: F. Marvin Doyal, James Wiggins and David Clark. Additionally, the subcommittee utilized the services of GAO investigators in conducting file reviews of the Reagan Collection at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California. The following GAO professionals from the San Francisco office were assigned to assist the subcommittee in that endeavor: Donald Miller (Team Leader), Thomas Cox, Valerie Lau, James Ohl, Anthony Thayer and Robert Rosenbaum.

B. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Throughout the course of the investigation the subcommittee has sought legal and procedural guidance from the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. That service allowed in-depth analysis of the relevant laws and regulations governing ethics in government and that otherwise would have been difficult to accomplish, given the subcommittee's limited resources.

C. THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S PERMANENT STAFF

The subcommittee's permanent staff is composed of three professionals. These individuals (Micah Green, staff director, John Fitzgerald, counsel and TerriAnn Lowenthal, legislative assistant) should be commended for their extraordinary efforts during the course of this investigation. To the greatest extent possible, the subcommittee pursued other important matters within its jurisdiction while fulfilling its responsibilities to the investigation. Two days of hearings were held in July on the contracting out by Government agencies of certain positions reserved for veterans. Also, during this investigation, the Office of Government Ethics was reauthorized for another five years. This legislation (which was reported by the Subcommittee on Human Resources) made many substantive changes in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. President Reagan signed the bill into law on November 11, 1983.

Ms. Lowenthal, in particular should be complimented for her work in the areas of contracting out of Government services, place-

ment programs, staffing levels at various agencies and reductions-in-force. Copies of the monthly reports of the subcommittee for June 1983 to March 1984, which evidence this fine effort, are included in the appendix of this report [pp. 275-290].

D. APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL COUNSEL

When it became apparent that negotiations were necessary with the White House and the Justice Department to resolve access to information issues, the subcommittee chairman sought out an experienced individual, who was well-respected on both sides of the aisle for his capabilities and not his partisanship. James Hamilton came highly recommended as that person.

During the investigation Mr. Hamilton helped the subcommittee successfully negotiate agreements for access to documents with both the White House and the Justice Department. He also conducted interviews of key witnesses, reviewed the FBI's interview reports (302's) (as only he and Mr. Hemphill were permitted to do), and edited this report.

E. INVESTIGATION BUDGET

At no time during the course of this investigation was the Post Office and Civil Service Committee required to request any increase in funding from the appropriate House committee. In addition, aside from the expenses for Mr. Hamilton's services, the subcommittee was within its 1983 budget.

The low cost of this investigation is significant. Expenses for previous inquiries of a similar nature (requiring hundreds of interviews and extensive document review) have greatly exceeded the entire budget of the subcommittee.

F. STAFF ORGANIZATION

The subcommittee's small investigative staff was organized into three basic teams. One team concentrated on interviewing officials of the Carter administration and the Carter Mondale reelection campaign. A second team interviewed officials of the 1980 Reagan Bush presidential campaign. A final group oversaw document review and established the filing and document retrieval system. The subcommittee wishes especially to thank Ed Hugler of the full committee staff for establishing and maintaining the filing system.

G. CONCLUSION

The subcommittee commends the fine effort by the entire staff during its investigation. Additionally, the General Accounting Office personnel assisting the subcommittee are particularly commended for the thoroughness and objectivity shown by them throughout the investigative process.

This investigation and report should demonstrate to Members of Congress and the American public that the Congress can conduct a bipartisan investigation on a very sensitive issue, do so in a thorough and professional manner, and do so at minimal cost to taxpayers.

CHAPTER 3—CARTER CAMP MATERIALS AND INFORMATION IN THE REAGAN BUSH CAMPAIGN FILES

I. CASEY'S EXHORTATION

Any presidential campaign organization, if it intends to succeed, will gather information about its political opponents and use that information to further the goals of its candidate. There is nothing improper in such activities, so long as the information gathering techniques used do not involve unethical or illegal conduct. Our democratic system cannot condone the use of improper techniques to acquire nonpublic information from an opposing campaign.

The subcommittee found that various components of the Reagan Bush campaign sought to obtain information from the Carter administration and the Carter Mondale campaign. Indeed, as stated by Campaign Director William J. Casey, in the Reagan Bush campaign ". . . everyone has his antenna out. . . ." for relevant information. One result of the campaign efforts in this regard was obtaining materials designed to brief President Carter for his October 28, 1980, debate with Governor Reagan, a subject discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, as the present chapter shows, in addition to the briefing materials, the Reagan Bush campaign also acquired numerous other documents and items of information from the Carter administration and the Carter Mondale campaign.

That the campaign obtained such documents and information appears no accident for the campaign was instructed by its director to seek more information from the Carter camp. This instruction was recorded in the minutes of a September 12, 1980, "Deputies Meeting".

In his affidavit, Casey identifies the campaign's deputies:

After the nomination of the Reagan Bush ticket, I designated as deputy directors: Ed[win] Meese, III, for research and issues, [Richard] Dick Wirthlin for polling and strategy, William [Bill] Timmons for field operations, Peter [Pete] Dailey for media relations, Lyn Nofziger and later Robert Gray for communications, and Drew Lewis for relation with the Republican National Committee; and I appointed James [A.] Baker[, III] as senior advisor initially to assist me in developing a budget for the campaign and subsequently to be responsible for negotiations on and preparation for the debates. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

Each morning, according to Casey, the deputy campaign directors named above plus Vern Orr, deputy campaign director for adminis-

tration, and on occasion, Bay Buchanan, campaign treasurer, met at 8:00 in Casey's office. Casey said this meeting was to air everything that was going on and to have important matters considered by the senior members of the staff. The deputies meetings generally were attended by 8 to 10 persons and lasted 30 to 45 minutes. Minutes were not regularly kept.

The subcommittee, however, found the minutes for a few of these meetings, in the form of memoranda prepared for Meese by his deputy, Robert M. Garrick, who was also the director of policy development and research. The meetings for which minutes were found were those of September 4 and 12, and October 2, 1980. [See app. IV, pp. 1365, 1367, and 1368.] The most significant is the meeting of September 12, 1980.¹ The minutes for this meeting reveal that the campaign has already obtained some information from the "Carter camp". The minutes state that Casey "... wants more information from the Carter camp and wants it circulated."

Casey informed the subcommittee that he does not recall making the statement attributed to him in the memorandum. He stated, however, that if he did make such a statement, he probably was referring to material available through public channels. In his affidavit to the subcommittee, Casey said:

I could have stressed the need for more and faster information about Carter's statements and appearances to help the issues people reporting to Garrick and Meese and the truth squad respond more rapidly and effectively to Carter Mondale campaign statements. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

In an attempt to better understand what this remark meant, the subcommittee interviewed Garrick, who authored the memorandum; Lotus Ann Wagner, the secretary who typed the memorandum; Meese, to whom the memorandum was addressed; Casey, to whom the remark is attributed; and nearly everyone reportedly present at the meetings.

- Garrick at first did not recall the deputies meetings. He then stated that he only attended the meetings when Meese was unable to do so. He stated that he did not recall anything about the comment attributed to Casey.
- Wagner could not recall having typed the minutes of the meeting even though the subcommittee showed her Garrick's draft from which the minutes were typed. She had no memory of the remark attributed to Casey.
- Meese stated that he probably was not at the meeting. Meese told the subcommittee that Garrick would attend deputies meetings and report on them to Meese on those occasions when Meese was unable to attend. He stated that he did not know what was meant by the remark attributed to Casey. He stated that he assumes that Casey meant public information and that the statement does not indicate any clandestine information gathering effort.

¹ Even so, the minutes of the meeting of September 4, 1980 refer to "White House information" that a law firm has been retained to file suit. (See app. IV, p. 1366.)

The others interviewed—including Wirthlin, Timmons, and Gray—could not recall the specific meeting or shed light on the meaning of the statement attributed to Casey.

The subcommittee, however, found documents in Reagan Bush campaign files—which were dated both before and after Casey's statement—that clearly indicate that the campaign's information gathering efforts were not limited to seeking materials that could be acquired through public channels. As the documents and witness statements show, Reagan Bush campaign officials both sought and acquired nonpublic Government and Carter Mondale campaign information and materials. Casey's September 12, 1980, statement must be interpreted in view of this activity and particularly those documents with which he was personally aware. As shown below, by the time the statement was made, he apparently was aware of nonpublic information that had been obtained from both the Carter administration and the Carter Mondale campaign. [See pp. 40 and 44.] The subcommittee thus believes that Casey, on September 12, 1980, was calling for the acquisition of information beyond that in the public domain.

This chapter of the subcommittee's report describes components of the Reagan Bush campaign organization that were engaged in information gathering and the fruits of those efforts and efforts by individuals connected with the campaign.²

II. THE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

On July 15, 1980, Campaign Director Casey told reporters at the Republican National Convention that "an intelligence operation" tracking the President's actions was "already in germinal form". [See app. IV, p. 1370.] According to Casey, the operation was set up in response to the fear that President Carter would spring an "October Surprise" regarding the U.S. citizen hostages in Iran to influence the outcome of the election. Edwin Meese, the Reagan Bush campaign's chief of staff and senior issues advisor, attended the July 15, 1980, press conference with Casey. According to press reports, he stated that the "October Surprise" might be anything from a summit conference on energy, to a development in Latin America, to wage and price controls. While the term "October Surprise" was normally used with respect to the American hostages, it also reflected the Reagan Bush campaign's general fear of the power of the incumbent. Because of Casey's claim and other allegations received, the subcommittee examined the Reagan Bush campaign organization to determine whether there was an operation designed to ferret out nonpublic Government information about the hostage situation or other Government activity.

A. THE OPERATIONS CENTER

The news media are an important source of information about the issues of significance in a presidential campaign and about the activities of the candidates and their surrogates. Timely access to

² For purpose of discussion, certain documents discussed are grouped according to subject. In this report, the term "document" may refer to one or more related pieces of material or information that the Subcommittee has catalogued as a single unit.

all available public information is important to a candidate. The Reagan campaign established an "operations center" at its Arlington, Virginia, headquarters to enable it to monitor and use the news.

The operations center was headed by Stefan Halper, who had come to the Reagan Bush campaign from the George Bush organization. He established four teams headed by watch officers—Davis Robinson, Michael Smith, Montcreif Spears and Robert Gambino—all of whom, like Halper, had been on the staff of the Bush campaign. The subcommittee interviewed these five persons as well as others associated with them.

Before joining the Reagan Bush campaign, Halper had worked as director of policy development and research during Bush's primary campaign. Prior to that he had been a senior manager for international affairs for Price Waterhouse, an international consulting/accounting firm. Halper said the operations center was designed to monitor the news 24 hours a day. The teams worked 8-hour shifts to monitor public information sources (as did the White House operations office.) To do this, the campaign installed radios, televisions and wire service printers. The teams also reviewed major newspapers such as the Washington Post and The New York Times. The center produced a daily news summary that was read out loud each morning by Halper to senior headquarters staff and was sent to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Halper provided the subcommittee with copies of daily summaries produced by the operations center, which met the description he and others provided.

The four watch officers basically confirmed the description of the operations center provided by Halper. All four deny seeing any classified information from the Carter administration. They all deny participating in or knowing about any covert intelligence operation for the Reagan Bush campaign. However, Smith, one of the watch officers, did recall receiving information from John Lenczowski about the Voice of America/Radio Free Europe. The information, which is discussed below, indicated that the writer had access to the VOA and RFE briefing paper prepared for Carter for the October 28 debate with Governor Reagan. The discussion also demonstrates the Reagan Bush campaign's apparent willingness to use Carter administration information.

Halper told the subcommittee that perhaps three or four thousand pieces of paper crossed his desk as head of the operations center. As discussed below, certain Carter Mondale campaign documents and information came into Halper's possession, although he does not recall how. Halper, however, denies that the operations center was a device to discover confidential information from the Carter administration; indeed, he denies in an affidavit, virtually any contacts that might provide such information. And, as discussed later, he denies any involvement with Carter briefing materials. [See app. III, p. 1167.]

1. The Lenczowski Information

During the 1980 campaign, John Lenczowski was a part-time legislative assistant to Representative James Courter, and an unoffi-

cial consultant to the Reagan campaign. He was interested in the United States' effort to promote its ideas overseas, through such agencies as United States Information and Communications Agency and Voice of America. In discussing his campaign role, various documents are relevant:

- a handwritten memorandum from Lenczowski to Sue Johnson, a Reagan Bush campaign worker. [See app. IV, p. 1373.]
- a handwritten paper prepared by Lenczowski, outlining points Carter planned to make during the debate about the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under the Carter administration. [See app. IV, 1374.]
- an October 28, 1980, memorandum from Smith to Jim Brady, forwarding Lenczowski's paper. [See app. IV, p. 1372.]

These three documents were found in Meese's files.

Lenczowski's handwritten note to Sue Johnson indicates that he was passing on the memorandum he prepared on VOA and RFE/RL. Lenczowski wrote that his memorandum is based on the briefing paper prepared for Carter on this subject, and that Lenczowski had the President's briefing paper in his possession. Lenczowski noted that Carter had received the briefing paper "today", but neither his note to Johnson nor the paper he prepared are dated.

Johnson, a volunteer with the Reagan Bush campaign, stated that Lenczowski had been referred to her by Wayne Valis [see p. 63] and that she in turn referred Lenczowski to someone she no longer recalls. However, she recalls that sometime shortly before the October 28, 1980 debate, she saw Lenczowski and Smith at the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters working on matters related to the debate. Although Johnson said she thought it unusual for Smith to be working on debate-related material, Smith confirmed to the subcommittee that he had worked with Lenczowski on the VOA and RFE/RL issue.

Lenczowski's one page paper on VOA and RFE/RL indicates that Lenczowski had access to, or had seen, a briefing paper prepared for President Carter's use in the debate. Lenczowski states at the beginning of his paper that the Carter briefing paper contained "numerous distortions". He then proceeds to set forth what Carter purportedly would say, and how this could be rebutted.

Smith's memorandum to Brady is dated October 28, 1980, at 9:45 a.m. Smith therein stated that he was forwarding the paper prepared for Governor Reagan's use by Lenczowski. Lenczowski, Smith wrote, "apparently has access to the VOA and RFE/RL briefing paper for Pres. Carter for the debate tonight." Smith also noted that Lenczowski had prepared his paper "in a great hurry" that past evening. Smith suggested that Lenczowski's paper be sent to Wexford immediately to the person in charge of foreign affairs.

Even though this material was found in Meese's files, Meese stated in his affidavit that he does not recall seeing it during the campaign. Nor does he know the source of Lenczowski's information. [See app. III, p. 1209.]

Lenczowski told the subcommittee he was given a Carter debate briefing paper on VOA and RFE/RL the day before the debate. Lenczowski said that the undated material was provided to him by Jan Nowak, a consultant to the National Security Council, and the

founder and former director of Radio Free Europe for Poland. Nowak, an old family friend of Lenczowski, confirmed that he provided two documents on international broadcasting to Lenczowski. One was titled "International Broadcasting During the Carter administration"; the other was titled "Radio—VOA and RFE/RL, Carter administration Accomplishments". Both one page papers were provided to the subcommittee by Lenczowski. [See app. IV, pp. 1367 and 1377.]

Nowak received the first paper, he told the subcommittee, from someone associated with the Board for International Broadcasting, which he believes prepared the paper at the request of the Administration. Nowak said he disagreed with the information in this paper, and verbally gave his assessment to Lenczowski. Lenczowski recalls that Nowak indicated the source for the information was within the Carter administration—probably the VOA or the Board.

Nowak received the second paper from Paul Henze, a member of the National Security Council staff, who did not know Lenczowski. Nowak said he did not tell Lenczowski that Henze was his source for the material. Henze said he does not specifically recall giving the documents to Nowak, but stated that both papers were prepared for Zbigniew Brzezinski, then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and did not contain any classified or nonpublic information. He said the papers were not prepared for campaign purposes and that he probably gave similar documents to the press.

When the papers were prepared and received remains unclear. Nowak told the subcommittee he is sure he received the two papers on international broadcasting in the spring of 1980. Henze told the subcommittee he prepared the VOA and RFE/RL paper in the fall of 1980. Lenczowski told the subcommittee he received the material the day before the debate. Lenczowski then prepared his memorandum rebutting various points in the International Broadcasting paper based on Nowak's suggestions that the paper contained inaccuracies.

Although the two papers are in different type-set, there is no clear indication that they were not prepared at roughly the same time. However, it appears Nowak could not have received both papers in the spring of 1980. The VOA and RFE/RL paper, which Henze prepared, mentions broadcasts in an Afghan Persian language, which "were started on September 28, 1980." Therefore, this paper at least was prepared in the fall of 1980, as Henze states, and likely was provided to Lenczowski near the time of the debate.

Lenczowski apparently believed he had been given papers designed to brief President Carter for the debate. The first paper is marked "Carter Briefing" in Lenczowski's handwriting at the top. From Lenczowski's statements to the subcommittee, it appears he may have been given the impression by Nowak that the papers were briefing papers for the President. Both Nowak and Henze stressed to the subcommittee that the information in the papers was not classified or nonpublic. Whatever the actual circumstances surrounding the purpose for this material, it was presented to Smith as inside information from the Carter administration and

Smith recommended that the material be utilized by the Reagan Bush campaign.

2. The Halper Memoranda

The subcommittee located three memoranda from Halper to Meese. These are:

- a memorandum dated September 12, 1980 that begins "The Democrats have put together what they call the Reagan Agenda. I understand it will be used by Carter in the debates, and by their surrogates." Attached to this memorandum is a document titled "The Reagan Agenda" that is printed on paper which bears the legend "paid for and authorized by the Carter Mondale Presidential Committee". [See app. IV, p. 1378.]
- a second memorandum dated September 12, 1980 that states: "The attached paper has been developed by Carter/Mondale for use as attack material against you and Governor Reagan. These quotes may also be used during the debates." Attached is a paper titled "Reagan Talking Points" dated August 1980 which is printed on Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. letterhead. [See app. IV, p. 1385.]
- a September 22, 1980 memorandum that discusses suggestions concerning a Peace Corps initiative made to President Carter by Mary King, Deputy Director of Action, and Peter Bourne. The memorandum states that "Carter is said to have agreed." [See app. IV, p. 1398.]

Each of the three memoranda seem to indicate that Halper had sources inside the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign. However, in his affidavit Halper specifically denies recalling the sources for the three memoranda. He also makes the following statement:

During the 1980 Reagan Bush presidential campaign, I do not recall receiving information from, or having discussions with, Federal employees or officials in the White House, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, or the Department of Defense, including active Armed Services personnel or officers. [See app. III, p. 1167.]

Meese told the subcommittee that he did not know Halper's sources of information for the first two documents, although he may have seen this type of document during the campaign.³ He stated that he has no recollection of the third memorandum.

Marty Franks, research director for the Carter Mondale campaign and author of the two documents attached to the first two Halper memoranda, told the subcommittee that both these documents were given wide distribution inside the Carter Mondale administration and that he would not be surprised if the press obtained them.

³ Meese's admission that he might have seen this type document during the campaign does not agree with his earlier statement in a letter to Chairman Albosta that he had seen no Carter campaign material. (See App. I)

Nonetheless, the subcommittee's ability to identify Halper's source or sources is prevented by his failure of recollection.⁴ Moreover, while it is unclear whether the documents attached to the first two memoranda had become public, the information in the third does not seem to have come from a public source. Questions about the documents thus remain unanswered.

B. POLITICAL OPERATIONS

The Reagan Bush campaign depended in part on "grassroots" campaign organizations at the precinct, county and statewide level. The campaigns also established citizen groups, i.e. the special interest groupings, generally not organized on a territorial basis, such as Veterans for Reagan Bush or Catholics for Reagan Bush. All these operations were under William Timmons, deputy campaign director for campaign operations.

In his interview with the subcommittee, Timmons acknowledged that one of the primary functions of these groups was to gather and disseminate information. He said that the local political operations groups could supply information on the plans of the President and his surrogates because the local groups would be aware when Carter Mondale campaign advance teams arrived to plan for appearances. The citizens groups also would be aware of any special appeals to specific interest groups. The following documents came from the citizens groups:

- A memorandum from Max Hugel, Director of the Citizens Groups, to Meese, dated August 11, 1980, which attached a July 28, 1980 paper from Berry Crawford to senior members of the Carter Campaign Staff summarizing the Carter campaign's rural strategy for both the convention and the general election. [See app. IV, p. 1399.]
- A memorandum dated September 17, 1980, from Jack Kelly, Coordinator for Veteran Affairs, to Max Hugel, concerning a meeting with Governor Reagan "requested by General Ellis, USAF" to discuss the deterioration of the Strategic Air Command. [See app. IV, p. 1403.]
- A memorandum dated October 17, 1980, from Thelma Duggin, a volunteer for Blacks for Reagan, to Art Teele, director of the Blacks for Reagan group, dealing with the "Carter Plan for the Black Vote". [See app. IV, p. 1404.]

1. The Hugel Memorandum

Two copies of an August 11, 1980 campaign memorandum purportedly from Hugel to Meese were located in the Hoover Institution files of Meese and Hugel. That memorandum forwards a three-page Carter Mondale campaign memorandum summarizing the Carter Mondale campaign convention and election strategy for rural areas. The Carter Mondale campaign document is dated July 28, 1980.

⁴ The subcommittee obviously was interested in learning whatever confidential sources existed in the Carter administration or Carter/Mondale campaign, particularly because a source could have provided various items of information.

In the August 11, 1980 memorandum, Hugel states that the Carter Mondale campaign document "fell into my hands". The memorandum also indicates that Casey saw the Carter Mondale document. Hugel writes that Casey had asked him to have Meese review the material and develop a strategy to counter the Carter Mondale campaign efforts in this area.

This memorandum is significant in relation to the September 12, 1980, statement attributed to Casey that he "wants more information from the Carter camp and wants it circulated". Casey appears to have made this statement with knowledge of the July 28, 1980 attachment to the Hugel memorandum. If so, it is reasonable to conclude that his request included the acquisition of nonpublic information from the Carter campaign.

Casey, however, stated in his affidavit that he does not remember seeing the Hugel memorandum or the attached Carter document during the 1980 campaign. He also does not recall asking Hugel to transmit the Carter document to Meese. Casey stated in his interview with the subcommittee that he does not know where the document was obtained. Meese does not recall receiving Hugel's memorandum or seeing the attached document during 1980, and does not know the source of that document.

Hugel told the subcommittee that he does not recall the Carter document; nor does he remember writing the cover memorandum to Meese. He also told the subcommittee that he does not believe the handwritten "Max", found next to his name on one copy of the cover memorandum, was written by him, although he stated he would not have authorized anyone else to sign his name.

The attached Carter strategy paper was a private campaign document. According to Les Francis, campaign manager for the Carter Mondale campaign, the paper would not have been circulated widely and probably no more than 8 to 10 persons would have received a copy. He said the press would not be given a document of this type. The subcommittee, however, cannot determine how it made its way into the Reagan Bush campaign because the persons seemingly involved state that they have no recollections about it.

2. The Kelly Memorandum

The subcommittee located a document in the Reagan campaign files at the Hoover Institution stating that General Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, had requested a meeting with Governor Reagan. The document is a memorandum from Jack Kelly to Max Hugel, dated September 17, 1980, and marked "Sensitive In Nature" and "Confidential".

In the memorandum, Kelly wrote that Ellis could not formally initiate a meeting with Reagan due to his rank and position, but that Ellis would meet with Reagan if the Governor so requested. Kelly purportedly quoted Ellis as saying that he "wants to blow Jimmy Carter out of the water."

Hugel told the subcommittee he believes he received the memo from Kelly, reviewed it, and passed it on, although he does not remember discussing the contents of the memorandum with anyone. When questioned by the subcommittee about contacts between campaign staff and active military personnel, Hugel stated that

Kelly, who reported to him during the campaign, was not authorized to have contact with active military personnel, as this was not part of Kelly's responsibilities. Hugel said that Kelly's task was to put together an organization of retired military personnel.

Kelly, who was responsible for the veterans voter group during the campaign, has no specific recollections about this memorandum. He believes he may have received a phone call, possibly from someone in a veterans organization, and then passed the information on to Hugel for follow-up. After reviewing the memorandum, Kelly stated that it was obvious to him that Ellis wanted to make known his concerns about the strategic structure of the Air Force under the Carter administration.

Hugel passed the Kelly memorandum to Timmons, to whom he reported in the Reagan campaign, as shown by a handwritten note to Timmons from Hugel on the bottom of the memorandum. Timmons then forwarded the memorandum to Meese with his own cover note, which is dated September 25, 1980. [See app. IV, p. 1402.] Timmons told the subcommittee he never received any feedback regarding this memorandum, and he does not know whether a meeting took place between Ellis and Reagan. Meese stated in his affidavit that he does not recall this document, and does not know whether a meeting between Ellis and Reagan took place. Meese also said he does not recall if he took any action regarding the Kelly memorandum. [See app. III, p. 1209.]

The subcommittee questioned Ellis—who currently holds the rank of Ambassador as the U.S. Commissioner of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission—about this document. Prior to reviewing the Kelly memorandum, Ellis told the subcommittee he was not aware of any contact between himself and the Reagan campaign in 1980. He also stated he had never met with, or tried to meet with, Governor Reagan in 1980. Ellis said he is not familiar with Jack Kelly, and that he does not recall any contact with either Meese or Richard Allen, the Reagan Bush campaign's foreign affairs advisor, during 1980.

After being shown the document by the subcommittee, Ellis said the quote attributed to him by Kelly was not something he would have been likely to say about the President. Ellis said his disagreements with the strategic structure of the Air Force were public knowledge, as he had testified publicly before Congress on this matter. Ellis speculated that Kelly was referring to someone's thought that it would be a good idea if Ellis and Reagan met.

The document at issue is another example where professed lack of recall has made it impossible for the subcommittee to answer all relevant questions.

3. The Duggin Memorandum

The subcommittee located an October 17, 1980 memorandum from Thelma Duggin to Art Teele regarding Carter Mondale strategy for the black vote. Copies of this one-page memorandum were found at the Hoover Institution in the files of Meese and Timmons.

The memorandum discusses the funds spent by the Carter campaign for this effort, cities that were being targeted, and plans for a "caravan" through black communities. Also discussed is a video-

tape about the Ku Klux Klan, which was alleged to be in the possession of the Carter Mondale campaign. At the end of her memorandum, Duggin wrote that she had received the information set forth in the memo "from a very reliable Carter aide."

Duggin, who was an unpaid staff member with the Reagan Bush campaign and a consultant to the Republican National Committee, told the subcommittee that she recalls the memorandum, but that its contents were general public knowledge. Duggin stated that she may have discussed this issue with a career State Department employee whom she would not describe as a Carter aide. However, she does not recall discussing the information in her memorandum with anyone else.

The subcommittee contacted the person Duggin identified as a probable source. This person acknowledges that he knows Duggin, but denies ever possessing the information set forth in her memorandum. He also denies providing Duggin any information.

Teele also was shown this document by the subcommittee. During the 1980 campaign, Teele was in charge of the black voting groups for the Reagan Bush campaign and reported directly to Hugel. Teele told the subcommittee that he is not sure he saw the document during the campaign and does not know Duggin's source for the information.

A handwritten note on the document indicates that Timmons saw the memorandum and forwarded it to Meese. Timmons does not recall the memorandum, although he knew that Duggin worked in some capacity for the Republican National Committee. Timmons also stated that he does not know the source of the information set forth in the memorandum. Meese told the subcommittee during his interview that he recalls the memorandum, but does not know the source of Duggin's information. However, Meese later changed the version of his affidavit sent him by the subcommittee to state that he does not recall seeing the document in 1980. [See app. III, p. 1209.]

Duggin's assertion that she did not recall discussing this information with anyone, other than possibly a State Department employee, is not borne out by her references in the memorandum to her sources. Duggin clearly states in her memorandum that the information was obtained from a Carter aide. Moreover, the information on the Carter campaign's plans to initiate a "surrogate caravan" in black communities is set forth in some detail, including the number of persons who will participate in the plan. There is no indication that this was public knowledge. Regarding the references to a video tape on the Ku Klux Klan, Duggin claims in the memo that the information was supplied by "my sources". Duggin also describes the response by Carter aides to the video tape, which, from the content of Duggin's memo, does not appear to have been shown publicly by that time. The subcommittee does not find Duggin's current assertion credible.

C. THE INCUMBENCY WATCH AND DOLAN'S DOCUMENTS

The subcommittee found that the campaign had an incumbency watch group that gathered information on the Carter administration. The incumbency watch, sometimes referred to as "Opposition

Research” or “Negative Research”, was a small group headed by Anthony Dolan, a Pulitzer prize-winning investigative reporter. He was assisted by Daryl Borgquist on a basically full time basis, and by others as needed. Dolan produced a number of documents that the subcommittee had also found in files at the Hoover Institution and the personal files of campaign workers such as Dolan, Borgquist and Casey. Some of these documents make references to unnamed sources in the Carter administration:

- A memorandum, found in Casey's files, from Dolan to Casey and Drew Lewis regarding transfers of personnel from Federal departments to the White House. Although the memorandum is not dated, Dolan believes it was written in June or July 1980. In the memo, Dolan discusses how he obtained information on this subject and proposes a course of action for the campaign to take in response to Carter administration actions. [See app. IV, p. 1405.]
- A one-page memorandum from Dolan to Casey, regarding Federal transfers. The memo is not dated, but Dolan believes it was also written in June or July 1980. It is marked “Confidential” by Dolan. The memo discusses Dolan's efforts to obtain a White House directive to Federal agencies on this subject, which Dolan claims may be available through his “source”. Copies of this memorandum were found in the files of both Dolan and Casey. [See app. IV, p. 1408.]
- An undated memorandum from Dolan to Casey, regarding the “Incumbency Watch”. This memo again refers to transfers from Federal agencies to the White House and mentions the White House directive on this subject, which Dolan hoped to obtain through his “source”. This memorandum was found in Casey's files. [See app. IV, p. 1409.]
- A fourth memorandum from Dolan, this one to Meese, also undated and dealing with “The Opposition Campaign”. While this memorandum refers to the transfer of Federal employees, it also says that Dolan's “. . . sources has sent [him] a copy of [Pat Harris'] planned remarks. . . .” for a press conference planned for the next week. [See app. IV, p. 1412.]
- A fifth memorandum, from Dolan to Casey, which forwarded a “. . . research memo (67 pages) containing facts, dates and carefully constructed accounts of key events (Marston affair, Andy Young incident) in the Carter Administration.” [See app. IV, p. 1416.]

Three of the five Dolan memoranda show an effort by Dolan to obtain the White House directive by using his “source”. In one memorandum Dolan mentioned that his “source” was having lunch with someone involved in the issue who had access to, or a copy of, the White House memorandum. Another Dolan document refers to a Department meeting attended by his “source”, who then, according to Dolan's memorandum, questioned the personnel officer on the number of persons being transferred from this Department.

Dolan stated in his affidavit that a “source” for the information referred to in these memoranda was Richard McGowan, an employ-

ee at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). [See app. III, p. 1137.]

Since March 1980, McGowan has been the Public Affairs Officer for the Office of the Inspector General at HHS. McGowan told the subcommittee he first met Dolan in the middle of the 1980 campaign when he contacted Dolan concerning the daughter of a friend who was seeking a job with the Reagan campaign. McGowan stated that he only met once with Dolan; this was for lunch and was only for the purpose of getting acquainted.

McGowan recalls that he may have relayed office rumors to Dolan, but stated he would not have passed on information of any substance. McGowan, in fact, expressed surprise that Dolan would categorize him as a "source". He states that he was not very familiar with the subject of Federal transfers during 1980. Although McGowan said he vaguely remembers talk about the issue at HHS in 1980, he denies that he would have had any reason to know much about it, or that he was in a position to gain further information about these transfers. Furthermore, McGowan does not recall discussing Federal transfers with Dolan during the campaign. Additionally, McGowan does not recall attempting to obtain the White House directive on Federal transfers for Dolan. McGowan stated that he did not have access to such a document, and did not know anyone who had access.

Dolan informed the subcommittee that the Reagan Bush campaign made attempts to obtain this White House directive, but was not trying to obtain it improperly through a White House source. Dolan stated in his affidavit that he did not have a source in the White House during the 1980 presidential campaign. [See app. III, p. 1137.]

According to one of Dolan's memoranda, the White House memo in question was written by George Moffett, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff during the Carter administration. Moffett told the subcommittee that he does not recall being involved in the issue of Federal transfers during the campaign, but believes that if he wrote any memoranda on this subject, they would not have been circulated outside of the White House. Moffett also told the subcommittee that while McGowan's name is familiar to him, he does not recall specifically who he is or whether he may have had any contact with him. McGowan told the subcommittee that he has never heard of Moffett.

Dolan stated in his affidavit that his memoranda were delivered to their intended recipients. Dolan also told the subcommittee that he did discuss Federal transfers with Casey, and that Casey wanted to be kept informed on the issue. Dolan stated that Casey never directed him to try to obtain information improperly from the White House, but also did not discourage him from following up on the issue.

In his affidavit, Casey stated he does recall receiving the information on Federal transfers from Dolan. He does not remember discussing Dolan's sources and he does not know who Dolan's sources were. Casey also advised the subcommittee in his affidavit that the information gathered by Dolan was submitted, along with other information on alleged incumbency abuses by the Carter Mondale campaign, by Leon Jaworski to the Attorney General,

with the demand that these activities be investigated. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

The Dolan memoranda, along with the Hugel memorandum [see p. 40] discussed earlier, are instructive in concluding what Casey likely meant by the statement purportedly by him set forth in the September 12, 1980 deputies meeting memorandum from Garrick to Meese. There Casey is quoted as saying that he "... wants more information from the Carter camp and wants it circulated." These memoranda show that, when Casey made this statement, he had already received, apparently with interest, nonpublic information from the Carter side. It is thus reasonable to conclude that his statement on September 12 was intended to cover information from the Carter administration that was not publicly available.

III. THE OCTOBER SURPRISE

Tuesday, April 1, 1980, was the day of the primary vote in Wisconsin and Kansas. At about 7:00 a.m. that morning in a statement from the Oval Office, President Carter announced a "positive step" in negotiations for release of U.S. citizen hostages held in Iran. He proclaimed that a recent statement by Bani-Sadr removed the necessity for imposing economic sanctions against Iran. While he did not say the step would lead to release of the hostages, that inference could be drawn from his response to a question.

Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, in their book "Blue Smoke and Mirrors," state:

It certainly sounded like very good news, particularly because the word came directly from the President, from the Oval Office, and at that unusual hour. Americans across the Eastern and Central time zones were just getting up, having their coffee and watching the morning television news shows—Americans in New York and Ohio, and in Wisconsin and Kansas. Many in the latter two states got dressed and went out to vote in their primaries, and an overwhelming majority of those who voted Democratic voted for Jimmy Carter over Edward Kennedy and Jerry Brown. They probably would have done so anyway, but this little early-morning television encouragement surely didn't hurt.

Jody Powell later denied there had been any politics in the timing of the press conference. It was, he said, simply that Carter was up and about, and the news was at hand, so why wait? "It just seemed like the natural thing to do," he said.⁵

Despite Powell's denial, the Reagan Bush campaign saw this as a demonstration of the "... political advantages held by an incumbent President ...". "October Surprise" became the code word for an expected late campaign action by the President to influence the outcome of the election. Two groups within the Reagan Bush campaign met regularly to discuss the "October Surprise" and other developments connected with the hostage crisis.

⁵ Jules Witcover and Jack Germond, "Blue Smoke and Mirrors." The Viking Press, 1981 at 157.

A. THE SKYLINE HOUSE OCTOBER SURPRISE GROUP

During his interview with the subcommittee, Wirthlin acknowledged the concern within the campaign about an "October Surprise". He stated that the following quote from "Blue Smoke and Mirrors" by Germond and Witcover was essentially correct:

Every morning between 6:00 and 6:30 at the Skyline House in the Washington suburb of Falls Church, Virginia, where many of the Reaganites had apartments, a small group of men met. They assessed the latest hostage information and rumors, and planned what to do, in paid ads especially, if the "October Surprise" became a reality. In the group, in addition to Wirthlin, were Ed Meese, William Casey, Pete Dailey and Admiral Garrick. They set aside some \$200,000 for radio ads, reserved television time, and prepared tapes for possible use.⁶

Meese also confirmed the essential correctness of the above quote and told the subcommittee that, during these meetings, senior staff examined all "October Surprise" data they could acquire. However, Meese denied that nonpublic information was supplied to the Skyline House group.

B. ALLEN'S OCTOBER SURPRISE GROUP

Richard V. Allen, the campaign's foreign policy advisor, told the subcommittee about another "October Surprise Group" that operated in connection with the foreign policy and defense advisory group he had established to assist the campaign. He provided the subcommittee with an October 7, 1980, article from the New York Times that announced the formation of his group. This article states:

Ronald Reagan has often warned that President Carter would try to win the election with an "October Surprise" and concern over that possibility has mounted to the point that the Reagan campaign had formed a "working group" to try and predict what foreign policy breakthrough Mr. Carter might attempt.

The working group of 10 foreign policy specialists will begin holding daily meetings by midweek under the supervision of Richard V. Allen, Mr. Reagan's chief foreign policy advisor. [See app. IV, p. 1485.]

Allen told the subcommittee that he had "thinned" his files during a recent renovation of his offices before the subcommittee began its investigation. However, certain records discussed below, indicate that this group did receive and discuss information about the hostage situation. Allen maintains that the discussions were based not on inside information, but on informed speculation by the members of his advisory group, which included a number of senior foreign policy experts such as Dr. Fred Ikle, John F. Lehman and Admiral Thomas Moore.

⁶ Ibid. 273.

C. OCTOBER SURPRISE GROUPS' EFFORTS AND DOCUMENTS

One close observer of the Reagan Bush campaign has indicated that the Reagan Bush campaign did receive closely held information about the hostage situation. Peter Hannaford, a long-time Reagan aide and advisor, in his book "The Reagans: A Political Portrait" stated:

Behind the scenes there were two important developments. Jim Baker was negotiating with the Carter people for a one-on-one Reagan-Carter debate. And, the Reagan camp's intelligence detected that the Carter White House was negotiating for the release of the American captives in Iran. It was the October Surprise!⁷

Hannaford told the subcommittee that this information came to the Reagan Bush campaign in late September 1980. He was, however, unable to identify the source of this information.

Set out below is the evidence gathered by the subcommittee that illustrates the efforts and products of the two October Surprise Groups.

1. Garrick's Network

In their book "Blue Smoke and Mirrors," Germond and Witcover state:

During the fall campaign the Reagan operation signed on a retired naval reserve admiral named Robert Garrick, essentially a public relations and public information specialist. Garrick in turn recruited some old military friends, mostly also retired, who lived at or near four air force bases—Andrews in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, McGuire in central New Jersey, Norton in San Bernardino, California, and March in Riverside, California. It was judged that if there were to be any major movement of troops or material, large numbers of transport planes would come in or out of one or all of these bases. "We wanted to know," Garrick said in military parlance after the campaign, "what kinds of birds they were, and how many," as a possible clue that something unusual was happening, such as an exchange of supplies for the hostages.⁸

The subcommittee interviewed Garrick, a member of the Skyline House October Surprise group, and also obtained an affidavit from him. He told the subcommittee that he set up nothing worthy of the name "network". In his affidavit Garrick stated:

I did not set up a network of military officers—retired, reserve or otherwise—to observe and report on the movement of large aircraft that might indicate a movement of materials to Iran. However, I did call three reservists and asked them to watch for large aircraft movement. I do not remember the names of these persons. One of the bases involved was Norton Air Force Base. I am not certain of the

⁷ Peter Hannaford, "The Reagans: A Political Portrait" Coward-McCann, Inc., 1983, p. 295.

⁸ "Blue Smoke and Mirrors" at 157.

name or names of the other base or bases involved. [See app. III, p. 1152.]

The subcommittee asked others who worked in the campaign what they knew about a network of retired officers such as that described by Germond and Witcover:

- Meese, the man to whom Garrick reported, told the subcommittee that Garrick provided information about hospital planes. Meese said that Garrick received phone calls about these planes from friends who were retired military officers living near the bases where these planes operated.
- Casey stated that Garrick would talk about aircraft movements. He said that Garrick was a self-starter who had his own sources of information.
- Baker stated that Garrick had a military watch group of ex-officers.
- Wirthlin, the campaign pollster, stated that Garrick had a lot of friends in the military who were tracking aircraft in an effort to watch for any unusual movements.
- Robert Gray stated that Garrick headed the "October Surprise" group, provided information and drew on a wide variety of sources.
- Jeanne Winnick, Garrick's secretary, recalled a network like that described by Germond and Witcover in their book.
- Halper, who worked for Garrick, told the subcommittee that he had heard that Garrick had set up a network of retired military men.
- Rita Solon, a volunteer, stated that she was aware that Garrick was keeping up with old buddies who watched for troop movements.
- Kevin Hopkins, a campaign researcher, stated that he knew Garrick was working with some friends who were retired.

In addition to the above testimony, the subcommittee found a short memorandum at the Hoover Institution in a file marked "Hostage", which is evidence of the existence of Garrick's "network" of retired military officers. The memorandum, typed on plain white paper, is not dated. While the memo was from Garrick, it is not addressed to anyone. Written in at the top is the word "Hostages".

The memorandum referred to a telephone call, apparently received by Garrick, from Johnny Grant, a Brigadier General in the California National Guard. The memo mentioned that Grant had passed along information that a large number of military aircraft had been moved to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma "where the spare parts are." Garrick stated in the memorandum that he would try to confirm this information with "our people". The reference to "our people" indicates that Garrick had other sources for this type of information. [See app. IV, p. 1486.]

The subcommittee finds that Garrick's lack of memory about his alleged "network" is not credible. As now shown, Garrick also had suspect memory lapses about other campaign information gathering efforts.

2. Garrick's New Assignment

The subcommittee found two memoranda indicating that Garrick was given a special assignment on October 24, 1980, relating to the hostage situation. In an October 24 memorandum for the senior staff that is marked "CONFIDENTIAL", Meese wrote:

Effective immediately Bob Garrick is assigned a special responsibility for coordinating Campaign Headquarters activities relating to our response to the hostage situation. He can be reached at extension 3701 and will be available at all time either through his office or through the Operations Center (extension 3720).

Upon any change in situation, Bob will notify all of the above addressees so that we can keep key members of the staff advised of the situation at all times. Therefore, it would be appreciated if you will keep the Operations Center notified of your location at all time that you are not in the Headquarters. [See app. IV, p. 1487.]

In a second October 24 memorandum addressed to the Policy Development and Research Division, Meese said:

During the next several days, Bob Garrick will be working on a special project for me. Jim Brady is, therefore, assigned as acting director of Policy Development and Research and will carry out all of the functions normally handled by Bob.

Bob Garrick can continue to be reached at extension 3701. Jim's phone number is extension 3718. This arrangement will continue until further notice.

Please advise the members of your section concerning these assignments. [See app. IV, p. 1488.]

The subcommittee asked Garrick about this new assignment. At first, he was unable to recall anything about it, but after being shown the memoranda by the subcommittee, he stated that his memory had been refreshed. In his affidavit, he said:

Until I was shown the [above] memo from Edwin Meese to senior campaign officials, I did not remember that Jim Brady was appointed Acting Director of Policy Development and Research on October 24, 1980. I do not now recall being relieved of all campaign duties on that date except those related to responding to the hostage situation. I do not now recall that my duties changed in any substantial manner on or after October 24, 1980, or that I took any new assignment as of that date. [See app. III, p. 1152.]

Meese said the memoranda were self-explanatory and simply allowed Garrick to devote full time to his "hostage watch". Meese asserts that no new organization was created. The subcommittee asked Halper what he remembered about Garrick's reassignment because Halper reported directly to Garrick according to the organizational chart. Halper stated that he did not recall Brady's becoming his supervisor and was not sure what Garrick did regarding this special project.

3. The Gray Memorandum

The subcommittee also found another memorandum relating to the Iranian hostage situation, in the same file at the Hoover Institution as the note from Garrick about the California National Guard officer discussed above. This undated, one-page memorandum from Robert Gray to Meese was marked "Confidential" and set forth Gray's suggestions on how the Reagan campaign should handle, or respond to, the hostage crisis. It states:

If we leak to news sources *our knowledge of the Carter-planned events* . . . we can get the press [to] say Carter is politicizing the issue, following his media plan, etc. (emphasis provided.) [See app. IV, p. 1489.]

After reviewing the document, Meese said that the sentence referred to in the previous paragraph does not necessarily mean that the campaign knew of something that had already occurred. Gray told the subcommittee that he did not recall this memorandum from the campaign but had seen it recently in the press. He said that his current reading of the memorandum did not indicate advance knowledge.

At the least, however, this document shows that Gray advocated obtaining information about the hostage crisis not available to the press and the public and using such information for the campaign's advantage.

4. The Allen Papers and Notes

a. *The ABC XYZ memorandum*

At the Hoover Institution, the subcommittee found an October 15, 1980 memorandum from Richard Allen to Governor Reagan, Casey, Meese, and Wirthlin. The memorandum contained information about Carter administration actions regarding the hostages in Iran. Allen stated in the memo that an "unimpeachable source" obtained the information from "ABC XYZ". The use of the term "source" and the code name "ABC XYZ" aroused interest, particularly since the information appeared to relate to possible high-level government actions regarding a very sensitive situation. [See app. IV, p. 1490.]

Although Allen at first would not tell subcommittee investigators the identity of "ABC XYZ", he later informed the subcommittee that the code name referred to then-Secretary of State Edmund Muskie. The "unimpeachable source", Allen said, was John Wallach, a reporter with the Hearst newspapers.

Of the four recipients of the memorandum, only Wirthlin stated that he recalls seeing the document during the campaign, although he does not know the identity of the "source" Allen referred to, or "ABC XYZ". Casey stated in his affidavit that he does not specifically recall the document or the identity of "ABC XYZ". When interviewed by the FBI, President Reagan stated that he had never seen the memorandum; if he had, he said he would have questioned the identity of "ABC XYZ".

Meese also does not recall the memorandum. However, Allen told the subcommittee that he ". . . was 90 percent sure that . . ."

he had told Meese the identity of "ABC XYZ" during the campaign.

In reviewing Allen's telephone logs from the campaign, the subcommittee found an entry on October 15, 1980, for a phone call at 10:35 a.m. from John Wallach. The handwritten notes for this telephone call generally follow the information outlined in Allen's memorandum of the same date. There is also a reference to Muskie in this telephone message. [See app. IV, p. 1493.]

Both Wallach and Muskie were questioned by the FBI about the Allen memorandum and the information contained therein. Wallach stated he covered the hostage situation during 1980 and spoke with State Department personnel concerning news accounts that spare parts would be traded for the hostages. Wallach said that he telephoned Allen to obtain the campaign's opinion of these news accounts. Wallach told the FBI that Muskie was not the source of his information from the State Department, and that he did not tell Allen that Muskie was the source. However, Wallach wrote news stories that provided much of the same information found in Allen's memorandum. [See app. IV, p. 1494.]

Muskie stated that, although he recalls Wallach as being in the State Department press corps after seeing a picture of him, he had no confidential relationship with Wallach. Muskie said that he never provided Wallach with information involving confidential State Department matters. Wallach concurred, saying that he never received classified or nonpublic information from Muskie. While some of the facts about this memorandum are in dispute, the subcommittee concludes that Allen did in fact receive the information from Wallach.

b. Telephone log notes

Allen retained extensive telephone logs that contained various notes regarding the hostage situation. One of these notes reads:

1115 Angelo Codevilla—938-9702. DIA—Hostages—all back in compound, last week. Admin. embargoed intelligence. *Confirmed* [See app. IV, p. 1498.]

Neither Allen nor Codevilla, who was a staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, could provide information concerning the meaning of this note. Codevilla did say, however, that he did not provide the Reagan Bush campaign with information "embargoed" by the Carter administration or information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or any other Government intelligence body.¹

5. The Hansen Documents

Another document of interest was found in Meese's files at the Hoover Institution and was also found in the files of Anthony Dolan. Even though the documents are basically the same, there is evidence that they traveled different paths in coming to the

¹ Codevilla also informed the subcommittee that he was told of people who had been "moles" for the Reagan Bush campaign in many agencies, and about active duty agents for the CIA who worked for the Bush campaign, but that he was not aware of any active CIA agents who worked for the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. III p. 1112.]

Reagan Bush campaign. One of the documents contained a handwritten note from Governor Reagan, the other contained no such note.

The document is an August 2, 1979 letter from Henry Precht, Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs, Department of State, to L. Bruce Laingen, Charge d'Affaires at the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran. The letter, marked "SECRET—EYES ONLY", refers to a cable from then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Laingen, which Precht had the opportunity to see. A copy of this cable was found in the Meese files at Hoover Institution. Precht's letter also forwarded to Laingen a paper entitled "Planning for the Shah to Come to the United States", which is marked "SECRET/SENSITIVE". The files of both Dolan and Meese contained copies of this paper. Also, copies of a statement by Congressman George Hansen, printed in the Congressional Record of March 26, 1980, were found in Meese's files. [See app. IV, p. 1500.]

The contents of the document had been made public through the media several months after it was written. The Washington Post and The New York Times both reported on November 9, 1979, that Islamic students in Tehran had released the Precht correspondence and report, which they claimed to have obtained after the occupation of the U.S. Embassy. Portions of Precht's report on the Shah were quoted extensively in the articles. The report warned about admitting the Shah to the United States and suggested that, if this were allowed, precautions should be taken at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to protect Embassy personnel from possible retaliation.

Congressman George Hansen referred to both the Vance cable and the Precht letter and paper in a lengthy statement on the Iranian hostage situation in the Congressional Record on March 26, 1980. Congressman Hansen quoted from the Precht document in his statement, although the document itself was not printed in the Record.

Congressman Hansen was questioned by the subcommittee concerning his knowledge of the documents located in the files of Meese and Dolan. Hansen stated that he obtained the Precht correspondence and paper during a trip to Iran in late 1979. When he returned from Iran, he showed the documents to officials at the Department of State, including then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. He later showed them to Edmund Muskie, when Muskie became Secretary of State. Hansen said the validity of the documents was never confirmed to him by any State Department officials. According to news reports, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter would not comment on the authenticity of the documents when they were released by the Iranian students in November 1979. Hansen also said he was never told to treat the documents in a confidential manner.

Hansen told the subcommittee that he gave the documents to Governor Reagan in Idaho, in the fall of 1980. He said he did not discuss the contents of the material with Reagan.

The copy of the Precht letter to Laingen found in Meese's files contained a handwritten note to Meese from Governor Reagan. The note, signed "Ron", stated that the information in the document had been in the Congressional Record as part of Hansen's statement, indicating that Meese received his copy of the document

sometime after March 26, 1980. President Reagan told the FBI that he recognized his handwritten note to Meese and believed he must have reviewed all of the documents at the time he wrote it. Reagan was not certain who provided him with the documents.

Meese does not remember the document, but said no action was taken based on it. Meese does not think the document was returned to the State Department, but pointed out that the information in it already has been printed in the Congressional Record.

Dolan also was questioned by the subcommittee about this document, a copy of which was found in his files at the White House by the subcommittee. Dolan's copy does not contain the Reagan note to Meese. Dolan remembers seeing the cover letter from Precht to Laingen but is not sure whether he saw it during the campaign or in the transition period. Dolan said he found the document on his desk, and that a man, whose name Dolan cannot recall, later came in to say that he had left it there. The man told Dolan that he had obtained the material from the media. Dolan told the subcommittee he does not know why he received this material, and that he did not do anything with it.

It also appears that John Coale, a Washington, D.C. attorney who represented the 13 black and female hostages who were released early, gave a copy of the Precht papers to Garrick. Coale stated that he did so in August 1980 because his clients were worried that President Carter was preparing another hostage rescue, or some "October Surprise," before the election. Garrick generally confirms Coale's story. Garrick stated that it is possible he may have given the document to Meese or Dolan.

The copies of the Precht letter and the paper on the Shah found in the files of Dolan and Meese contained markings in Farsi (Persian language) on almost all of the pages. This indicates that these copies were obtained from Iran after being in the possession of Iranians. This conclusion is consistent with the media reports of November 9, 1979, that Iranian students had obtained the "SECRET—EYES ONLY" and "SECRET/SENSITIVE" material from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and with the statement by Congressman Hansen that he had obtained copies of the material while he was in Iran in late 1979. While the documents themselves had been publicized, the classifications had not been changed.⁹

6. The Cohen Reports

The subcommittee found a series of five papers prepared by Herbert A. Cohen at the Hoover Institution in a file marked "Hostages".

- The first report is titled "Negotiating the 'Iranian Crisis' " and contains a handwritten notation on the cover page indicating that it was submitted to the State Department. [See app. IV, p. 1542.]

⁹ Executive Order 12065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949, June 28, 1978, was the law in force at the time and provided procedures for classifying and declassifying such government information. It has since been superseded by Executive Order 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874, April 6, 1982. The subcommittee was informed by the Department of State that these documents had not been declassified. The State Department had no objection to the publication of these documents in the subcommittee's report. [See letter, p. 2413.]

- The second report also is titled "Negotiating the 'Iranian Crisis' ". [See app. IV, p. 1558.]
- The third report is titled "Concluding the 'Iranian Crisis' ". [See app. IV, p. 1572.]
- The title of the fourth report is not known because the cover page is missing. [See app. IV, p. 1587.]
- The fifth report is titled "Negotiating a Conclusion to the 'Iranian Crisis' ". [See app. IV, p. 1595.]

Each report is approximately ten to fifteen pages in length. The papers are dated at approximately one month intervals from November of 1979 through March of 1980. All five reports are labeled "Confidential". Cohen identifies himself on the report cover pages as a consultant to the Justice Department and the FBI in hostage and terrorist negotiations.

The subcommittee also found three letters in James Baker's files that concern Cohen, all from Prescott Bush, brother of the vice-presidential candidate:

- A letter dated August 29 that contains a handwritten note on the bottom referring to Cohen, implying that Bush has already mentioned Cohen to Baker and that he (Bush) is in the process of trying to establish a better relationship with Cohen. [See app. IV, p. 1606.]
- A letter dated September 2 indicating that Bush had lunch with Cohen and that Cohen had some "hot information" on the hostages. This letter also passes along general campaign strategy Cohen discussed with Bush. [See app. IV, p. 1608.]
- A letter dated September 3, a follow-up to the September 2 letter, mentioning that Cohen had called Bush to further discuss his knowledge of the Carter administration's role in the Iranian hostage situation. The letter says that Cohen has reliable sources on the National Security Council and that he would "expose" the administration's handling of the situation if he thought Carter was going to politicize the release of the hostages. In this letter, Bush asks Baker if he would like to meet with Cohen. [See app. IV, p. 1611.]

In his affidavit, Cohen stated that he voluntarily submitted the reports to the Department of State after someone at that Department, whose name or position he cannot recall, told him he had some good ideas and should put them on paper. However, the FBI's summary of its interview with Cohen indicates that Cohen told the FBI that the reports were prepared as his (Cohen's) contribution as a member of a U.S. Government hostage task force and that the reports were furnished to either NSC or President Carter.

Cohen also says in his affidavit that:

The reports were prepared—without benefit of any government documents or information—from my own knowledge of Iran, geopolitics, Shi-ism, negotiating techniques and political realities, as well as contemporary media accounts of the day to day happenings.

To the best of my knowledge, none of these . . . reports contained any information or material that was obtained from Federal Government sources. The designation "Confidential" was made primarily for the purpose of having the

recommendations routed to the designated addressee. [See app. III, p. 1115.]

Cohen informed the subcommittee that, to the best of his recollection, he did not at any time provide any of these five reports to anyone in the Reagan Bush campaign or to anyone associated with the campaign. Cohen does recall providing Casey or another campaign staff person with three other papers. According to Cohen, these papers were furnished to the campaign sometime in October 1980. They included his assessment of the Iranian hostage situation, his recommendations concerning this crisis, and another paper on a related subject that Cohen does not recall. None of the three papers Cohen identifies was located by the subcommittee.

Cohen's relationship with the Reagan campaign apparently was established through Prescott Bush. Bush became acquainted with Cohen through a friend in New York, who presented Cohen as someone who had information on the Iranian hostage situation and was disenchanted with Carter's politicizing of the matter. Bush stated that he did not know whether Cohen was a paid consultant to the Carter administration, but that Cohen had told him he did advisory work for the administration on Iran. Bush said that his first contact with Cohen was at the end of August 1980; Cohen told the FBI that he was first contacted by Bush in July 1980.

The letters from Bush to Baker indicate that Bush believed that Cohen had information on the hostage situation that would be very helpful to the campaign. Baker, however, told the subcommittee that he never followed up on Bush's suggestion that he meet with Cohen.

Cohen disputes the manner in which he was portrayed in Bush's letters to Baker. In his affidavit, Cohen denies that he indicated to Bush that he had sources on the NSC, as Bush stated in his September 3 letter to Baker. Cohen said he knew only one person at the NSC, Captain Gary Sick. [See app. III, p. 1115.]

Sick told subcommittee investigators that Cohen had no special access to the NSC and that he (Sick) never gave inside information to Cohen. Sick also stated that Cohen had called him on several occasions, but that he (Sick) did not feel that Cohen had any new information to offer. Cohen told the FBI that, at Sick's request, the two met in May 1980 regarding the hostage situation, although Sick did not provide him with any information at that time.

Cohen told the subcommittee that, by the time he met with Casey in the fall of 1980, he would not have provided the five reports prepared for Government use to Casey because they were outdated. However, Casey stated in his affidavit that Cohen had, in fact, given him four of the five reports when he visited Casey in Washington in October 1980. [See app. III, p. 1115.] (Casey attended the Skyline House October Surprise group meetings on the hostage crisis.) Casey stated that in September 1980, Bush suggested that he meet Cohen. Bush told the subcommittee that he "may have" suggested this to Casey, although he does not recall whether he actually did. Casey stated that he met with Cohen in New York City at the Plaza Hotel.

Casey also stated that he recalled receiving the reports prepared by Cohen, numbered 2 through 5. These four reports, Casey stated,

contained no indication that they were Government documents or were classified. He does not recall receiving the first report, dated November 24, 1979, which is marked "Submitted to State Dept." on the cover page. To his knowledge, Casey stated, the Reagan Bush campaign did not use the material furnished by Cohen. In his affidavit, Meese said that he recalls seeing the five reports prepared by Cohen in 1980 but he does not know how the reports were obtained by the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. III, p. 1209.]

Questions about the Cohen documents remain. It is not clear whether these reports were submitted to a Government agency at its request and should have been treated as nonpublic documents. It is not clear how the Reagan Bush campaign obtained the documents. What does appear clear is that Prescott Bush, as shown by his own writings, advocated using Cohen because Cohen had access to inside Carter administration information and material.

7. WLS October 15, 1980, News Report

On October 15, 1980 Larry Moore, a reporter for television station WLS (Chicago ABC-owned station), announced on the air that negotiations were taking place between U.S. and Iranian officials for the release of American hostages held in Iran. Moore also reported that the deal being discussed would send spare military parts to Iran for the release of the hostages. According to the memoirs of both President Carter ("Keeping Faith," 1982, Bantam Books) and NSC Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski ("Power and Principle," 1983, Farrar/Straus/Giroux), secret negotiations between Iran and the United States were taking place around that time.

During the course of the subcommittee's investigation, an individual (who requested that his information not be made known to minority members or staff) alleged that the source of the information reported by Moore was a highly placed member of the U.S. intelligence community. This individual alleged that Moore's source provided information to Moore to publicize the secret negotiations and thus prevent consummation of a hostage-spare parts deal that might have involved the U.S. in the Iran-Iraq war.

Allegedly, this source felt that the U.S. public had a right to know this information, whatever the consequences. The subcommittee also received allegations, from the same individual, linking Moore's source to the Reagan Bush campaign. The suggestion was that publicizing the secret hostage negotiations would have delayed a pre-election release of the U.S. hostages in Iran, to the benefit of the Reagan Bush campaign.

The subcommittee interviewed numerous individuals, including Moore, in an effort to locate his source for this information. Moore refused to disclose his source, and despite considerable effort, the subcommittee was unable to locate it. The subcommittee thus was unable to confirm the allegations made. For this reason this report will not disclose those persons interviewed or the other investigative work conducted to pursue this matter.

IV. INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS AND MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

The subcommittee found various other documents and items of information in the files of Reagan Bush campaign staff that were obtained from Carter administration sources by various individuals connected with the Reagan Bush campaign. These findings are discussed below.

A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM ALLEN'S FILES

1. Foreign Service Officers

The subcommittee located in the files of Richard Allen a letter from Allen to Governor Reagan dated April 28, 1980. The short letter refers to a lecture Allen recently had given at the Department of State to a group of Foreign Service officers. [See app. IV, p. 1613.]

In his April 28, 1980 letter, Allen informed Reagan that he had requested persons attending his lecture to contact him privately, and that he had received several responses to this request. Allen told the subcommittee he had invited suggestions from the Foreign Service officers, and had received many.

Allen's letter of April 28, 1980, also forwarded to Reagan a letter he had received from one of the Foreign Service officers. Allen asked that the letter be kept confidential to protect the FSO. Allen also stated in his letter that he believed the campaign would receive information, such as that provided by the FSO, "if we ask for it." The subcommittee did not locate the letter from the particular FSO mentioned in Allen's letter to Reagan.

However, a May 27, 1980 memorandum from Allen to Reagan, with copies to Casey and Meese, indicates that Allen was passing along additional correspondence from Foreign Service officers. [See app. IV, p. 1614.] Letters from two FSO's were found in Allen's files, along with letters from both Allen and Reagan, thanking them for the information. Both FSO's mentioned in their correspondence that they attended Allen's presentation at the State Department, and that they were responding to Allen's invitation to contact him. The correspondence from the FSO's basically contained suggestions on how to improve the Foreign Service, and criticized the Carter administration's management of the Foreign Service. The correspondence does not appear to contain any non-public information.

Allen told the subcommittee that he often was contacted by Foreign Service officers, although he did not recall what type of information he received. The subcommittee notes that FSO's are covered under the Hatch Act¹⁰ and finds Allen's request for informa-

¹⁰ Foreign Service Officers and employees of the Foreign Service are covered by the provisions of the "Hatch Act". 5 U.S.C. 7324(a). The same is true for officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. However, those officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (approximately 160 Ambassadors, Assistant Secretaries, etc.) are restricted only by the provisions of the Act forbidding use of their official positions to interfere with or influence the outcome of any election 5 U.S.C. 7324(a)(1). For further discussion, see Chapter 5. See also, Memorandum From the American Law Division, February 15, 1984, on the "Applicability of the 'Hatch Act' to Foreign Service Officers, Agents of the CIA, and the Military" reprinted in app. VI.

tion from Foreign Service officers troublesome. Allen's actions indicate that he initiated the relationship between the FSO's and the campaign and thus may have encouraged these Government employees to violate the Hatch Act. It is also clear, from Allen's statements to the subcommittee and his files, that there was correspondence from FSO's that the subcommittee does not have. What type of information was contained in this correspondence is not known.

2. The Cuban Interviews

The subcommittee located another document in Allen's files that relates to foreign policy. The document consists of a memorandum, dated July 2, 1980, from Belden Bell to Roger Fontaine, and a six page attachment, purportedly setting forth information on and from three Cubans who came to Miami from Cuba, as well as a handwritten note containing the address and phone numbers for Raymond Molina, a Floridian apparently involved in obtaining the information from the Cubans. [See app. IV, p. 1630.]

During the 1980 Reagan presidential campaign, Bell was executive assistant to Allen and was responsible for coordinating foreign policy and defense working groups. He also acted as Allen's Capitol Hill liaison. Fontaine was a volunteer with the Reagan campaign whose expertise was on Latin American issues. He worked for the American Enterprise Institute from mid-August 1980 until January 1981, and was with the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies prior to that time.

The memorandum of July 2, 1980 refers to contact between Bell and Molina. In that document, Bell stated that he was forwarding a memorandum describing three Cubans who recently had come to the United States, had been interviewed by friends of Molina from Key West, Florida, and were then turned over to the CIA. According to Bell's note, the Cubans were debriefed by the CIA and then let go, perhaps in the Miami area. Molina, Bell wrote, could not confirm the authenticity of the Cubans.

The attachment to Bell's memo contains a description and background material on three Cuban men. The attachment sets forth information on Cuba's military capacity, about which the Cubans were apparently questioned. Much of the information consists of descriptions of military facilities and their locations, and weapon capabilities. Certain missiles and chemical warfare capabilities are described. Cuban military strategy and the role of Soviet troops in Cuba also is discussed.

Bell's cover letter to Fontaine sets forth Molina's theory that, if President Carter could authenticate the information provided by the Cubans, he would "spring this story" and propose a strong military and economic response. Bell states:

Molina feels the campaign should have some sort of similar DIA investigative capability that can also authenticate the matter and then use it ahead of Carter.

The subcommittee questioned several people associated with this document. Allen, in whose files the document was found, said only

that Molina showed up at Reagan functions, and that he (Allen) had tried to stay away from him.

Bell told the subcommittee that he recalls his memorandum to Fontaine, but does not recall the attachment. He cannot explain how the document about the Cubans came to be attached to his memorandum to Fontaine; in fact, he says he is not sure that any document was attached to his memorandum. He said that the note containing Molina's address and phone number is not in his handwriting. According to Bell, he met Molina in Latin America while he was working with the Reagan campaign. Sometime later, Molina called him at Allen's office, and then visited him there. All of the information in the document, Bell said, was provided by Molina.

Bell confirmed that Allen did not want to be involved with Molina, but believes it was Allen who instructed him to pass the information along to Fontaine. After his meeting with Molina, Bell said, he drafted the note to Fontaine and forwarded the same material to him. Bell does not recall what was done with the information after this. He told the subcommittee that some Government "intelligence source" may have provided the information on the three Cubans.

Fontaine was shown the document by subcommittee investigators. Fontaine said he does not remember whether or not he saw Bell's note and the attachment during the campaign, although parts of the material seem familiar to him. He also said he did not write Molina's address and phone numbers on the memo paper. After reviewing the document, Fontaine felt that some of the information in the attachment may be classified or sensitive. He does not think the information was presented in the standard format used in Government intelligence reports. Fontaine stated, however, that if he had seen this type of information, he would have turned it over to the FBI.

Fontaine said he recalls a conversation in July 1980 with Bell, which took place in Allen's office, during which they discussed the three Cubans. He does not recall discussing this information with Molina, but told the subcommittee that both he and Bell thought Molina was not reliable.

The subcommittee interviewed Molina by telephone. Molina told the subcommittee that he did liaison or consultant work for the United States Government, for which he was not paid. Molina said that, through his contacts in the Cuban community and with the U.S. intelligence community, he had access to classified and sensitive information.

In reference to the documents found in Allen's files, Molina said that in 1980 he had discussions with Bell concerning a report Molina was preparing about Cubans coming to the United States. The report included information about Cubans who had defected from Castro's Government. Molina stated he gave his report to someone in Washington. He said that his report could have been the subject of Bell's memorandum to Fontaine.

It is not clear how the information contained in the memorandum about the Cubans was obtained. However, although Reagan Bush campaign staff who had contact with Molina apparently did not trust him, it does not appear that they discouraged Molina

from providing sensitive intelligence information to the campaign, even though he may have had access to Government intelligence sources. In fact, Bell began his note to Fontaine by saying he had had his "long-awaited 'chat'" with Molina. The subcommittee believes this matter should be reviewed by House committees more involved with Government intelligence agencies.

3. The Van Cleave-Welsh Meeting

A one-page memorandum dated June 30, 1980, from Allen to Reagan was located in Reagan campaign files at the Hoover Institution. (A copy also was found in Richard Allen's files.) The memorandum refers to a meeting between William Van Cleave, of the Reagan Bush campaign staff, and General Jasper Welsh, a deputy to Zbigniew Brzezinski on the National Security Council. Attached to this memo is another memorandum from Van Cleave to Allen, dated June 28, 1980, which details Van Cleave's meeting with Welsh. The two basic issues apparently discussed at this meeting were Reagan's position on the MX missile and the advisory groups set up by the Reagan Bush campaign that were working on developing national security and defense programs in anticipation of a new administration. [See app. IV, p. 1638.]

Van Cleave recalls a meeting with Welsh, which he described as a "fishing expedition" on Welsh's part to find out about Reagan's position on the MX missile. Welsh, he said, did not provide him with any confidential or classified information.

Welsh confirmed that he met with Van Cleave, a meeting Welsh said he initiated. Welsh stated that, although the meeting was unusual, it was within the proper realm of his NSC activities, and that David Aaron, his superior at NSC, had been informed of his meeting. After reviewing Van Cleave's memorandum, Welsh said he felt the contents were accurate, but that Van Cleave had inflated the importance of the information discussed at their meeting. Welsh also stated that Van Cleave was the only Reagan campaign staff person with whom he had contact.

Aaron also was shown this document by the subcommittee. He stated that he was unaware that Welsh had met with Van Cleave during the 1980 campaign, and that the contents of Van Cleave's memorandum surprised him. Brzezinski also expressed surprise at the Van Cleave-Welsh meeting.

While the meeting may have been unusual or even unauthorized, the subcommittee has no evidence that Van Cleave received any classified or nonpublic information from Welsh.

B. THE WEIDENFELD DOCUMENT

The subcommittee located a document in the files of Edward Weidenfeld, National Chairman of Lawyers for Reagan, which relates to military issues. The document consists of (1) an October 24, 1980 memorandum from Weidenfeld to Halper and Gergen, entitled "Shortages of Essential Military Medical Supplies"; and (2) an October 23, 1980 memorandum from Tom Patten to Weidenfeld, with attachments, on the same topic. [See app. IV, p. 1640.]

Weidenfeld's one page memorandum to Gergen and Halper forwarded a copy of the paper prepared for him by Patten. Weidenfeld

explained in his memorandum that Patten's document and the attached material demonstrated the Carter administration's "neglect" of defense requirements, which had led to a shortage of medical supplies for the military. Weidenfeld referred to an article in the publication *Defense Week* on this subject.

Patten's memorandum to Weidenfeld also referred to the *Defense Week* article, a copy of which is attached to his memo. A second source for this information, Patten wrote, was an internal memorandum from the Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC), dated October 9, 1980. Patten explained that he was attaching a re-typed version of portions of this internal memorandum, but that he had the original document in his possession. The original document, Patten wrote, was supplied to him in confidence, but did not contain classified information. The data in the DPSC document, according to Patten's memorandum, came from a DPSC computer.

Weidenfeld told the subcommittee that Patten is an attorney who specializes in defense procurement. However, Weidenfeld did not know how Patten obtained the internal memorandum. Although Weidenfeld said he did not inspect Patten's memorandum carefully when he received it, he believed the information was accurate and therefore, passed it along to Halper and Gergen, because he thought they might find it useful for debate preparation. Patten said that the document came from a client who had obtained it by a freedom of information request. But this was not known at the time by Weidenfeld who seemingly was ready for the Reagan Bush campaign to use nonpublic defense information.

C. GARRICK'S MEMORANDUM ON SALT II

The subcommittee located, in Meese's files, a one-page memorandum dated October 16, 1980, from Garrick to a number of Reagan campaign staff personnel. Two Reuter wire service stories, both from October 16, 1980, were found with this memorandum. [See app. IV, p. 1658.]

The subject of the wire stories was the U.S.-Soviet Salt II treaty; statements made by then-Secretary of State Edmund Muskie are the focus of the stories. Although Garrick's memorandum did not specifically refer to the Salt II treaty, it appears from the content of the memo, and the fact that the wire stories were attached, that this was the subject of Garrick's memorandum.

The memorandum stated that "Muskie is the lead off man", apparently in reference to Muskie's statements on ratification of the Salt II treaty to limit nuclear arms. Garrick then wrote that on Monday, October 20, 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown would go to "test the . . . waters". According to Garrick, if the response was favorable, "Carter will do something later in the week." Garrick stated in the memorandum that this scenario was "from a good source".

Garrick wrote that he was passing along this information for any action they deemed necessary. Garrick had no recollection of the document or its source. Meese, in whose files the Garrick memorandum was found, stated that he has no recollection of the document and does not know the source of Garrick's information.

D. HALPER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH TWO 4-STAR GENERALS

Another document relating to national defense was provided to the subcommittee by Daryl Bogquist, a research assistant with the Reagan campaign. The document is a two-page memorandum from Roger Hearn to Richard Williamson, outlining an alternate scheduling meeting of September 11, 1980. The memorandum mentions several issues raised at this meeting, including the Stealth Bomber. In reference to this subject, the memorandum states that Halper was told by two 4-star generals that David Aaron, of the National Security Council, was the contact between the White House and the Department of Defense on the Stealth issue. [See app. IV, p. 1660.]

Halper was shown this document by the subcommittee. Halper then said it was likely that the two generals referred to in the memorandum were retired. He stated that he did not have Defense Department contacts on the Stealth issue, and that he made no effort to acquire information from the Defense Department on this issue or any other issues during the 1980 campaign. In his affidavit, submitted to the subcommittee, he declared that he did not ". . . recall receiving information from, or having discussions with, Federal employees or officials in the . . . Department of Defense, including active Armed Services personnel or officers." Halper also does not recall commenting on the Stealth issue at the September 11, 1980 meeting. [See app. III, p. 1167.]

E. THE WAYNE VALIS DOCUMENTS

Among the documents released by the White House on June 28, 1983 was a one-page paper, entitled "Proposed Carter Tactics for Debate and Campaign Advertising", which sets forth ten points on Carter strategy for the debates and advertising plans for the Carter campaign. This paper is attached to a cover memorandum written by Wayne Valis. [See app. IV, p. 1162.] At the time the memorandum is dated, Valis was working for American Enterprise Institute. He also was doing volunteer work for the Reagan Bush campaign.

The subcommittee located several versions of the Valis cover memorandum in files of Reagan Bush campaign workers. In these memoranda, all versions of which are dated October 21, 1980, Valis indicated that he received the paper from a "very reliable source" who was "intimately connected" with a Carter debate staff member. [See app. IV, pp. 1664 and 1667.] The source, Valis told the subcommittee, was John Lenczowski. [See p. 36.] Valis acknowledged that he may have been "puffing" by using such terms as "source" and "intimately connected".

According to Valis, Lenczowski called him on October 20, 1980, and told him that he, Lenczowski, knew someone in the Carter campaign who had detailed knowledge about the upcoming debate. Valis stated that he then told Lenczowski to put the information he had in a written, point-by-point summary and send it to him. When he received the paper prepared by Lenczowski, Valis said he put his cover memorandum on it and circulated it in the Reagan Bush campaign.

Lenczowski confirmed to the subcommittee that he prepared the paper on Carter strategy for Valis. He stated during an interview

that he received the information on which he based his paper from Robert Leahy, a friend and former classmate. Leahy, however, told the subcommittee that he had no connection with either Presidential campaign during 1980, although most of his business associates were Carter supporters. During the fall of 1980, Leahy said, he sent two separate, unsolicited memoranda he had prepared to Lenczowski. The memoranda contained Leahy's suggestions on how Reagan could improve his public relations image. Leahy stated that the contents of the two memoranda were based strictly on his own opinions, general talk he had heard, and what he read in the media. These are the only two memoranda he sent to Lenczowski, Leahy said. Leahy also said he regularly called Lenczowski to advise him on campaign-related news he gathered from wire service stories.

Lenczowski told subcommittee investigators that he does not know the source of Leahy's information, but he thought it was an insider, i.e., someone associated with the Carter administration or campaign. Valis told the subcommittee that Lenczowski had commented to him in 1981 that Leahy had provided him with a lot of information. Valis said he therefore assumed that Leahy was the source of the information Lenczowski sent him. This comment, of course, is not consistent with the statement in Valis' cover note that the Carter information was based on a brainstorming session involving mid-level Carter debate staff.

As explained previously, Valis circulated his memo and the attached paper around the Reagan campaign. Two separate cover memos were sent to James Baker and David Gergen. In addition, Valis provided a copy of his memo to Baker, with the attachment, to Stu Spencer and William Timmons. Timmons, in turn, forwarded a copy of the documents to Richard Wirthlin, with his own cover note that read, "This is very important!" [See app. IV, p. 1669.]

The latter copy of the document was found in the files of Richard Wirthlin by the subcommittee. Valis' memo to Gergen, with the attachment, was released by the White House on June 28, 1983. Copies of the document that went to Baker were located in the files of Timmons and Meese at the Hoover Institution.

Reagan campaign staff who received or saw a copy of the Valis memo and the attached paper on Carter debate and advertising strategy were questioned by the subcommittee and/or the FBI. Spencer said he does not specifically recall the document. Meese also does not recall seeing the document during the campaign and does not know its source. Baker stated in his affidavit that he vaguely recalls receiving the document, unsolicited, during the campaign, and that he may have passed it on to Meese. Baker said he does not believe he and Valis discussed its contents. Gergen also recalls the document, but does not think he asked Valis at the time about the source of the information. He stated that he believes Valis referred to a "source" in his memo for the purpose of sparking interest, although Gergen said he wouldn't be surprised if Valis had a relationship with someone from the opposing side. Gergen does not believe the document was of any consequence.

Although Timmons said he did not discuss the document with Valis, he said the last item in the attached paper, relating to a Carter advertisement, was of some importance during the cam-

paign. He acknowledged that he probably would have shared the material with Wirthlin and Peter Dailey.

Wirthlin recalls receiving the document from Timmons and remembers thinking the paper was interesting, particularly because there was a mention about proposed Carter Mondale campaign advertisements. Wirthlin acknowledged that he used the information contained in the document to help him prepare two memoranda on strategy for the debate, for Reagan and other campaign staff. These two papers, dated October 21 and 24, 1980, were located in Wirthlin's files by the subcommittee.¹¹ [See app. IV, p. 1672.] Wirthlin told the subcommittee he had no real concern about using the information provided by Valis, because it was "second-hand" information and he had no reason to believe it had been obtained in an illegal manner.

The material provided the campaign by Valis was hardly earth-shattering and he likely "puffed" its importance to elevate his own standing with the campaign. Nonetheless, it appears that some members of the campaign willingly accepted and used what they thought was inside information from the Carter administration. Valis was rumored to have sources inside the Carter administration. Indeed, in 1977 he provided the media with a Pat Caddell memorandum setting forth Carter's 1980 reelection strategy.¹²

F. GRAY'S STEEL INDUSTRY MEMORANDUM

Another document indicating that information may have been obtained from a Carter source was found by the subcommittee in the Hoover Institution files of Robert Gray and Meese. The document is a one-page memorandum, dated September 19, 1980, from Gray to Garrick, with copies to Meese and Casey. The memorandum discusses a scheduled presentation by President Carter before steel industry and labor representatives.

Gray's memorandum sets forth basic facts and figures concerning the steel industry, which he claims knowledge of due to his previous work. However, Gray's memorandum begins, "From an excellent source", and then mentions the planned Carter presentation on September 26, 1980. Regarding this presentation, Gray wrote that, "Drafts of documents are being given to him [Carter] over the weekend. Eizenstat has the ball." [See app. IV, p. 1679.]

Gray stated in his sworn affidavit that he cannot identify the source referred to in his memorandum, although he said in his interview with the subcommittee that he believes the source may have been someone in the steel industry. Gray said he forwarded the information to Garrick because Garrick was the person who generally collected this type of information. [See app. III, p. 1162.] Garrick told the subcommittee that he has no recollection of the memorandum, and he does not know the identity of the "excellent source."

¹¹ The Valis memorandum was used according to Wirthlin to help prepare these documents. Wirthlin points to the words "Alice-in-Wonderland" and "flip-flopped" as indication of the influence of the Valis memorandum.

¹² Valis says the Caddell memorandum was found in the trash by an acquaintance. This person confirms Valis' story.

Meese also was shown the document by the subcommittee. Although he believes he probably saw it during the campaign, he does not know the identity of the source to which Gray referred.

Again, the subcommittee's ability to identify a source is frustrated by an asserted failure of recollection. Given the nature of the information presented, it is unclear whether the "source" involved was in the Carter administration or was located in the steel industry or elsewhere.

G. WILSON'S NUCLEAR POWER DOCUMENT

Another document located in Reagan campaign files at the Hoover Institution is a lengthy paper on issues relating to nuclear power and energy. A cover note is attached to the document, which states that the paper was prepared by Department of Energy (DOE) and Argonne National Laboratory personnel. The undated, handwritten cover note is from William A. Wilson to then-Governor Reagan. Although Wilson had no direct association with the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign, he was a close personal friend of Reagan's. The paper itself is detailed, indicates an in-depth knowledge on the part of the authors of energy issues and nuclear power, and provides specific information about processes associated with nuclear reactors. Wilson wrote in his short note to Reagan that the paper, which dealt with twelve issues, was prepared by "friends of mine" at DOE and Argonne. Wilson said that he can "vouch for the accuracy of the data." [See app. IV, p. 1680.]

Wilson was questioned by the subcommittee about this document. He stated he does not recall the cover note or attached paper, but acknowledged that he had written the note. He told the subcommittee that he does not remember the names of his "friends" who wrote the paper. He stated, however, that during the 1980 campaign, many employees of DOE called him with complaints or criticisms of administration policies. Wilson said he would ask the callers to document what they had to say, which some of them did.

The information set forth in the paper Wilson forwarded to Reagan appears largely to have been publicly available. However, the fact that the paper in part was authored by Federal employees raises questions of Hatch Act violations.¹³ Moreover, Wilson's claim that he cannot remember the names of his "friends" who prepared a detailed, sophisticated treatise on nuclear and energy issues for the Reagan Bush campaign is difficult for the subcommittee to accept.

H. SCOT FAULKNER'S INFORMATION

The subcommittee obtained several documents from Scot Faulkner, a legislative assistant to the late Congressman John Ashbrook until he joined the Reagan Bush campaign in late July 1980. The documents, which indicate that the Reagan Bush campaign had sources of information within the Carter administration, were located by Faulkner in files he had retained from the campaign and the transition period.

¹³ See Congressional Research Service Report found in app. VI at p. 2127.

Faulkner provided the subcommittee with letters located in his files relating to information he gave Richard Allen while he still served as a legislative assistant to Congressman Ashbrook, including a letter, dated April 27, 1980, from Faulkner to Allen. Attached to Faulkner's April, 1980 letter to Allen is a list of the initial materials Faulkner apparently provided to Allen. The majority of material in this first "packet" is from the Congressional Record, according to Faulkner's list. Also listed is a photograph of a "Zil 135 military transport", a Soviet aircraft, and a flow chart on the diversion of United States technology to Soviet Union. [See app. IV, p. 1709.]

Allen responded to Faulkner in a letter dated May 2, 1980, which Faulkner also provided to the subcommittee. Allen's letter indicates that he received Faulkner's letter of April 27, 1980 and the enclosed materials. [See app. IV, p. 1711.]

Faulkner told the subcommittee that he obtained inside administration information and documents, some of which were labeled "Confidential" or "Official Use Only", from a person who was then a civil service employee. In his affidavit Faulkner stated:

I used these documents to prepare statements for the Congressional Record. From April to June of 1980, I passed much of this information and documentation including one classified document whose identity I cannot remember—to Richard Allen and Roger Fontaine for use in the Reagan Campaign. At no time did I provide any other classified materials or information to anyone not authorized to receive them. However, non-classified information continued to flow to me generally from the Carter Administration in the same fashion and from many of the same people as it had when I worked on the Hill, although I did not receive classified information during the campaign. [See app. III, p. 1143.]

In his affidavit, Faulkner also told the subcommittee that on October 23, 1980, he had visited the Old and New Executive Office Buildings to gather information about the complex and the computers located there. He stated:

I spent from about 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. in the Old and New Executive Office Buildings writing down the location of the computers and terminals or work stations. I also recorded computer types and numbers and gathered information about their software. I gave this information to Otto Wolff. I also sent [a] memorandum to Edwin Meese on October 14, 1980, that made reference on page one to "various inside sources at the White House and Executive Agencies". This phrase referred to Paul Reeves and Barbara Yano. [See app. III, p. 1143, and app. IV, p. 1974.]

In an interview Reeves acknowledged that he had provided Faulkner a typical floor plan for the Old Executive Office Building. In his interview, however, Faulkner said he had received "blueprints" from Reeves. Reeves also said he gave Faulkner an outdated White House correspondence manual, and an outdated White House organization book. He also acknowledges giving Faulkner a

10–15 minute walk through tour of the Old Executive Office Building. However, he denies that there was any discussion of computers or that any rooms or offices were entered.

Mitchell Stanley, an aide to Meese during the campaign, acknowledged during an interview that during the 1980 campaign, he had seen the floor plans or blueprints of the Old Executive Office Building. He stated that Faulkner had been the source of these plans or blueprints.

I. DANIEL JONES' DOCUMENTS

Soon after the allegations of unauthorized transfer of materials from the Carter camp to the Reagan Bush campaign were raised in mid 1983, several news stories appeared concerning documents reportedly provided to the Reagan Bush campaign by Daniel Jones. [See p. 12.]

Jones, a part-time Reagan Bush campaign volunteer, was questioned by the subcommittee. Jones furnished various documents to the subcommittee. These documents, he said, were given him by a Washington Post reporter, who obtained them from a souvenir collector who retrieved them from a trash can at the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters. Jones told the subcommittee that he recalls the documents from the campaign. Jones' recollection of his receipt of the documents during the 1980 campaign, which he later confirmed in his sworn affidavit, is set forth below.

In early or mid-October 1980 in the evening, campaign aide John Jessar received a phone call from the person at the security desk in the main lobby of the Reagan Bush headquarters building informing that someone was in the lobby with a package. Jones volunteered to go handle the matter. In the lobby he met someone he believed to be an Air Force sergeant. The "sergeant" handed Jones a large, brown envelope, and said something to the effect that he did not like the Carter administration's military budget and wanted to help the Reagan Bush campaign.

Jones does not recall all the documents contained in the envelope, although he does recall that one was a copy of a handwritten "get well soon" note from President Sadat of Egypt to President Carter. He believes also that the package contained:

- an October 2, 1980 document titled "Analysis of Republican Budgetary Goals" by the Office of Management and Budget. [See app. IV, p. 1998.]
- an October 3, 1980 Inflation Report. [See app. IV, p. 1984.]
- an October 10, 1980 memorandum for The Cabinet from Anne Wexler and Al McDonald. [See app. IV, p. 1712.]

Jones states that he then wrote "Bob Report from White House Mole" on the top of the October 10 memorandum and placed all of the documents from the envelope on Robert Gray's desk. Jones said he later called Gray's attention to the papers. Jones believes Gray commented "... don't tell me, I don't want to know".

Jones told the subcommittee that the "sergeant" called him again on October 24, 1980, at Reagan Bush campaign headquarters and offered to drop off additional information that evening. When the "sergeant" again came to Reagan Bush headquarters as promised, he handed Jones another manila envelope from the car he

was driving. Jones said they did not discuss the contents of the envelope. This envelope, Jones told the subcommittee, contained an October 24, 1980 memorandum to The Cabinet from Anne Wexler and Al McDonald. [See app. IV, p. 1718.]

Jones stated that later that same evening, he ran into Casey in the hall at campaign headquarters. Jones initiated a conversation with Casey who, according to Jones, did not know who Jones was. Jones recalls telling Casey that he had obtained economic information from the Carter Mondale campaign that was useful in preparing an Op/Ed article, which Jones had written during the campaign. Jones stated that Casey said that what the campaign really needed, and had been trying to get, was Carter's campaign schedule.

Jones said he then called the sergeant and asked if he could obtain Carter's campaign schedule. On Monday, October 27 at about 6:30 p.m., the sergeant called and read off the schedule, which Jones then set out in an October 27 memorandum to Gray, Casey and Meese. This memorandum is discussed later in this chapter in the section dealing with presidential schedules. [See p. 76.]

Jones gave, to the best of his recollection, a description of the "sergeant" and the car he drove. The subcommittee pursued this matter based on Jones' description, but was unable to determine the "sergeant's" identity. Jones was shown numerous pictures of military personnel working in the White House in October 1980, but he was unable to identify the individual who provided the documents.

Copies of several of the documents provided by Jones were located by the subcommittee in the files of Reagan Bush campaign staff members. Two of these, both on White House letterhead, are labeled "Memorandum for the Cabinet" and are from Anne Wexler and Al McDonald, Assistants to the President and co-chairs of a task force established to inform administration officials of the President's position on various issues. The subject of both memoranda is "Economic Information". Both memoranda contain the sentence, "These documents are not for public distribution."

The first memorandum is dated October 10, 1980. A copy of this document was found in the files of William Casey. That copy contained Jones' handwritten note about the report being from a "... White House mole." Additionally, the copy located in Casey's files contains a typewritten note, "To: William Casey (for transmittal to Martin Anderson)". [See app. IV, p. 1723.] The five-page attachment to the memorandum sets forth Carter positions and actions on a variety of issues related to the economy, and also discusses Governor Reagan's proposed economic program. A handwritten note on the second page of the attachment (which Jones acknowledges he wrote) reads, "*Bob* Expect this line of attack next week, Dan."

The second memorandum is dated October 24, 1980, and contains the same type of economic information as the October 10 document. A copy of the October 24 memorandum was found in the files of Martin Anderson at the Hoover Institution. Additionally, a copy of this document apparently was forwarded by Jones on Octo-

ber 27, as an attachment to his memorandum about the President's schedule to Casey, Gray, and Meese. [See app. IV, p. 1724.]

Casey acknowledged to the subcommittee that the October 10, 1980 memorandum was found in his files, but stated in his affidavit that he has no recollection of seeing this document during the campaign. Gray also was shown the October 10, 1980 memorandum. He stated in his affidavit that he does not remember receiving the document from Jones, and does not recall the note to him on the cover page regarding a "White House mole". Gray also does not recall routing the memorandum to Casey with a note indicating that the document should be sent to Anderson.

Anderson acknowledged that the October 24 memorandum was found in his files, but he does not know its source. Anderson also commented that he believes the information in the memorandum was old and of little value. As discussed above, however, Jones told the subcommittee he received the memorandum on the evening of October 24, 1980.

Gray stated that he does not recall receiving the October 24 memorandum or the October 27 Carter schedule information. Casey does not recall seeing either of these documents during the 1980 campaign. Meese told the subcommittee he does not specifically recall seeing the documents during the campaign, and does not know Jones' source.

Wexler told the FBI that this type of memorandum was furnished to the Cabinet several times each week. She stated that hundreds of copies were circulated throughout the Government. "Not for public distribution", Wexler said, meant that the memoranda should not be distributed to the press.

McDonald told the subcommittee that the memoranda were provided to all Cabinet members and senior White House staff and their deputies. McDonald expressed surprise that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained copies of the memoranda since the documents were not for public distribution. However, because the memoranda were distributed fairly widely among administration officials, McDonald does not know who may have provided copies to the Reagan Bush campaign.

J. THE SHAHEEN REPORT

The subcommittee found in the files of Anthony Dolan and Daryl Borgquist a lengthy report, entitled "Status Report of the Office of Professional Responsibility on the Investigation Conducted Concerning Various Matters Pertaining to Billy Carter." The report is often referred to as the "Shaheen Report", after Michael E. Shaheen Jr., Counsel on Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice, who directed the preparation of the report and headed the Department's investigation into this matter. [See app. IV, p. 1725.]

The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) also issued a final report on its investigation in April 1981. Dolan and Borgquist could not recall when or how they obtained this status report, which was publicly released on November 1, 1980.

The subcommittee found a one-page memorandum from Mari Maseng to Richard Williamson, dated October 31, 1980, regarding the Shaheen Report. The memo indicates that Maseng had been

warned by a Senate staff member that the Reagan campaign should not pursue an apparent attempt by campaign staff to obtain the Shaheen Report before it was publicly released. This memorandum was found at the Hoover Institution, in the files of Edwin Meese. [See app. IV, p. 1804.]

The investigations by the Senate and the Department of Justice into Billy Carter's connections with Libya were of interest to the Reagan Bush campaign, particularly to those who monitored alleged conflicts-of-interest and unethical behavior in the Carter administration.

Three copies of the report were delivered by the Department of Justice to the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 29, 1980. On October 30, 1980, and thereafter, news stories appeared on the purported contents of the report that focused on the contention that President Carter had not cooperated with the Justice Department's investigation.

The memorandum from Mari Maseng to Richard Williamson, dated October 31, 1980, demonstrates that the Reagan campaign attempted to obtain a copy of the Shaheen Report before it was released on November 1st. Maseng, who had previously worked for Senator Strom Thurmond and reported to Williamson during the campaign, wrote that she had received a call from "a friend in [Senator] Thurmond's office." When questioned by the subcommittee about this memorandum, Maseng stated that she does not recall the identity of the "friend" referred to in her memorandum. She also does not know who was referred to in the last sentence of her memorandum, which reads in part, "another source on the hill has named names in this campaign as having asked for the secret report". Nor does she know the identity of "people [who] have been pretty loose" in trying to obtain this document.

Shaheen stated that immediately prior to delivery of the Status Report to the Senate Judiciary subcommittee, sections containing intelligence information were excised from the report. The copies of the report found in Dolan's and Borgquist's files do not contain the intelligence information, and for this reason Shaheen concludes that the copies of the report obtained by the subcommittee from their files are copies of the report delivered to the Senate subcommittee, and not copies of the unexpurgated Justice Department version.

This incident is chiefly relevant as another example of attempts by the Reagan Bush campaign to obtain a confidential Government document. Maseng's lack of recollection or knowledge has hindered further examination of this matter.

K. THE McCULLOUGH NOTES

The subcommittee located in the Reagan campaign files at the Hoover Institution a document which consists of two related letters, both of which were found in a file labeled "California Headquarters". The first is a brief letter from Governor Reagan to G.W. Hank McCullough, dated July 3, 1980. The letter thanked McCullough for the material he provided to Reagan when they had last seen each other, and in particular mentioned a "report on Iran", which Reagan said "confirmed my suspicions about the role played

by this administration in that whole tragic affair." [See app. IV, p. 1805.]

McCullough told the subcommittee that he is an old friend of Reagan and often sent him material on various subjects, although he recalls few specifics about any such materials. Regarding the material on Iran referenced in Reagan's note to him, McCullough stated that this material was provided to him by U.S. Navy Captain Hugh A. Merrill.

The subcommittee has a letter to McCullough from Merrill, forwarding material or information that "... might be of interest to the folks assisting the governor in foreign policy issues." [See app. IV, p. 1806.] The note is signed "Tony" and Merrill acknowledged that he wrote the note. During the 1980 campaign, Merrill was assigned to the Department of the Navy, Office of Legislative Affairs. Merrill, an old family friend of McCullough, sent McCullough a three page paper incorporating his views on the Iranian hostage situation because he was not pleased with the way the crisis was being handled by the administration. Merrill said he was not directed, or asked, to write this paper, and that he did not tell his superiors or peers about it. Merrill stated that he was never in any direct contact with the Reagan campaign, and that he does not know to whom McCullough gave the material he provided.

The subcommittee did not locate the information from Merrill referred to in these two letters. McCullough and Merrill both told the subcommittee that the material was not classified. When questioned by the FBI about this material, President Reagan did not recall the report on Iran sent to him by McCullough.

L. PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULES

In its reviews of Hoover Institution files and files retained by former Reagan Bush campaign staff, the subcommittee found memoranda setting forth President Carter's—and occasionally Mrs. Carter's—schedules. These documents were found in the files of Gray, Meese, and Garrick at the Hoover Institution and elsewhere in the files of campaign workers Timmons, Borgquist and Jones.

The schedules usually were presented in one or two page memos. Some are very detailed, giving the city, site of event, and time. Others refer to an approximate time (i.e. mid-morning, evening, etc.). Some of the scheduling memos give the city and the nature of the President's stop, while others only outline the dates and cities to be visited.

The amount of lead time from the dates of the memos to commencement of the events listed varies from one day to one-and-one-half weeks. At times, the Reagan campaign was able to obtain more detailed information on the President's schedule as the date of the scheduled event or activity approached.

1. Interest in Schedules

The reasons for the Reagan Bush campaign's interest in President Carter's schedules are fairly clear. The campaign had established teams of surrogate speakers called "Truth Squads". According to Timmons, one team—called "Truth"—would go to a location where the President or one of his surrogates was to speak before

the speaking engagement. This team attempted to comment first on relevant issues or to educate the press as to questions that should be asked the President or his surrogates. The second team—called “Consequences”—went in after the President or his surrogate had spoken. This team’s job was to repair any damage the speech might have done and to shore up the local Reagan Bush organization. Clearly, this effort hinged on the ability of the Reagan Bush campaign to obtain the President’s schedule. According to Timmons, the more detail that was obtainable as to place, time, and subject of the event, the better. Also, the further in advance the President’s schedule could be determined, the better.

2. Are Schedules Public?

The subcommittee sought to determine the manner in which the White House made President Carter’s schedule available to either the press or the public, including when such schedules were released, in what form, and in how much detail. Secret Service agents Buck Lyda and Ed Pollard told the subcommittee that most administrations have treated the President’s schedule as sensitive information, although numerous people had access to the schedule on a need to know basis, such as certain members of the White House staff. They said that the President’s schedule is generally released to the press one day in advance; sometimes the general location of a visit, such as the city, will be announced further in advance. However, the Secret Service is informed of the President’s schedule before either the press or the public. The advance time afforded the Secret Service varies anywhere from one day to two weeks. The Military Aides office for the White House is provided the President’s schedule at the same time as the Secret Service. The agents stated that it is not unusual for the President’s schedule to be printed in the newspaper before he arrives at his destination.

The subcommittee also contacted Jody Powell, Press Secretary to President Carter, to determine the form in which scheduling information was released to the media, and the public or nonpublic nature of scheduling information obtained from the White House. Powell provided samples of President Carter’s schedules during the 1980 presidential campaign period. [See app. IV, p. 1807.] The schedules were distributed from the Office of the White House Press Secretary in the form of Notices to the Press, with the date of release on them. Powell informed the subcommittee that:

A “Notice to the Press” is not a press release. It can be used as the basis of a story about the President going somewhere, but it cannot be quoted. Schedules and summary schedules for the President are for the guidance of reporters and their news desks only. They cannot be published and are not public documents. [See app. III, p. 1216.]

A further indication of the non-public nature of the Presidential schedules was provided by Clifford White, a special advisor to Casey during the campaign. White told the FBI that he had had his staff contact the White House Press Office in an attempt to determine Carter’s campaign itinerary, but the staff was unsuccessful.

ful. He said that they resorted to obtaining Carter's itinerary from the newspapers.

3. Subcommittee Interest

The subcommittee focused attention on the source of the scheduling information (1) because Presidential schedule information was not, as shown above, public information, and (2) because several of the scheduling memoranda prepared by Reagan campaign staff make reference to sources that do not appear to be public. For example:

- a memorandum from Jerry Carmen to Paul Manafort, dated September 6, 1980, begins "Our sources tell us that . . .", and then proceeds to discuss President Carter's scheduled stops for two dates a week and a half away. [See app. IV, p. 1858.]
- an October 3, 1980, memorandum on the President's itinerary, from Garrick, mentions that some of the information on a Carter event was obtained "Through an unconfirmed source . . .". [See app. IV, p. 1854.]
- an October 21, 1980, memorandum from Gray to Timmons pertaining to President Carter's schedule begins, "According to our White House sources . . .". [See app. IV, p. 1855.]
- a memorandum from Jones to Gray, Casey and Meese, dated October 27, 1980, that presented President Carter's schedule through the end of the campaign and reportedly came from ". . . a reliable White House Mole . . .". [See app. IV, p. 1856.]

4. Garrick's Memoranda

The subcommittee questioned Garrick about the references to "sources" in the scheduling documents obtained by the subcommittee. [See app. IV, pp. 1962, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971.] In his affidavit, Garrick states:

I do not know the sources of President Carter's or Mrs. Carter's schedules as set out in my memoranda. . . .

While some scheduling information may have been obtained from newspapers, radio, television and possibly unsolicited call from members of the media to staff under my supervision, I personally did not make arrangements for anyone outside the Reagan Bush campaign to obtain President Carter's schedule or other information from the White House and provide such information to the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. III, p. 1152.]

While reviewing certain of Meese's campaign files, the subcommittee found a one-page memorandum, dated December 10, 1980, from Garrick to Pendleton James, personnel officer for the transition. In the memorandum, Garrick recommended Steve McCormick, formerly with Mutual Broadcasting System and an accredited White House reporter, be considered for a possible position with the new administration, because:

[McCormick] was exceptionally helpful to us during the campaign and provided considerable information out of the White House that we normally would not have been able to obtain.

In building the White House press staff, he is an individual who I would recommend you look at closely. [See app. IV, p. 1857.]

In addition to the above letter, the subcommittee found 29 telephone message slips showing calls from McCormick to Mitchell F. Stanley, an assistant to Meese. [See app. IV, p. 2018.] Stanley acknowledged that he knew McCormick and had met him during the campaign through Garrick. During the campaign, Stanley told the subcommittee, he spoke with McCormick by phone once or twice a week, although the contact was less frequent later in the campaign. He considered these calls annoying and it was his impression that McCormick was interested in a job. However, he was not able to account for the number of messages from McCormick in the phone log. Stanley also stated that he never asked McCormick to pick up any materials for him.

Stanley was shown a notice to the Press, setting forth President Carter's schedule. After reviewing this sample document, Stanley called it "a bible" and stated that he had never seen anything like the notice during the campaign. He felt this would have been guarded closely by the White House. He told the subcommittee that the Reagan Bush campaign could not have obtained a document such as this, and that he would remember if he had seen a press notice of this type. In his affidavit, Stanley states:

I do not remember ever asking Mr. McCormick to obtain materials from the White House for the Reagan Bush campaign. Specifically, I do not remember asking Mr. McCormick to obtain press notices about the President's schedule, issue papers, copies of speeches, press releases or other items out of the White House. [See app. III, p. 1227.]

In interviews with the subcommittee, and later in his affidavit, McCormick stated:

At the request of Mr. Robert Garrick, whom I first met at the Reagan Bush Headquarters, I obtained on several occasions during the 1980 presidential election the public materials . . . from the news-release distribution racks outside the White House Press Office. On these occasions I would notify Mr. Garrick, who would send a messenger to pick up the material. I do not remember how often I obtained material at Mr. Garrick's request, but I believe it was less than a dozen times.

This included notices to the press about the President's schedule, issue papers, copies of speeches, press releases and other items from the press office rack. None of this material was classified, confidential, or secret; all of it had been cleared for distribution and release and was available to anyone who walked by the rack—press, visitors, employees, and others.

Other persons, such as Mitchell Stanley, from the Reagan Bush campaign, also asked me to obtain the same type material that Mr. Garrick requested. On occasion I would telephone the person who made such a request. This is why subcommittee investigators found the 29 . . . telephone message. . . . I have no recollection of making that many calls to Mitchell Stanley, whom I barely knew. However, my primary contact was Robert Garrick. [See app. III, p. 1202.]

After Garrick had submitted his affidavit, the subcommittee staff conducted a second interview in which they confronted Garrick with his memo to Pendleton James recommending McCormick for a job. Garrick admitted that at his request McCormick had given him the White House "handouts" including Presidential schedules. Garrick said that it thus would be fair to say that McCormick was at least one of the sources for the President's schedule. But Garrick stood by his statement in his affidavit that no "arrangement" had been made to obtain the schedules since there was no contract and no payment to McCormick. However, Garrick confirmed that McCormick was seeking a job in the Reagan White House.

5. Gray's Memoranda

Gray does not recall the source of the scheduling information he provided to Timmons in memos he authored during the campaign. In his affidavit, Gray states:

I cannot identify the "White House source" referred to in my memorandum of October 21, 1980.

I cannot identify the "excellent source" referred to in my September 19, 1980 memorandum.

I do not remember the name of the source who provided the schedule attached to my memorandum of October 4, 1980.

I did not arrange for or direct anyone to obtain material or information from the White House on the President's schedules. So far as I know, any such information found in the campaign files came from public sources. [See app. III, p. 1162.]

6. Carmen's Memorandum

Jerry Carmen—when questioned by the subcommittee about the September 6, 1980, memorandum referred to earlier in this section—said that he does not recall the document and would not, in fact, confirm that he was the author of this memo. Paul Manafort, the addressee of Carmen's memorandum, does not know who Carmen's source was for this information.

7. Jones' Memorandum

The subcommittee also obtained a scheduling memorandum, dated October 27, 1980, from Dan Jones and addressed to Casey, Meese, and Gray. The memorandum begins, "According to latest information from reliable White House mole . . .". Jones explained to subcommittee investigators that the information had been pro-

vided to him by a man he believed to be a sergeant in the military who had previously provided other documents to the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters. [See p. 68.]

Jones told the subcommittee that, during a brief conversation he had with Casey at campaign headquarters concerning information previously provided to Jones by the "sergeant," Casey told him that the Reagan Bush campaign would like to have information on President Carter's schedule. Jones stated that his October 27 scheduling memorandum was produced from information he received over the telephone from the sergeant and was hand delivered to Casey. While Jones admitted that Casey probably did not even know his name at the time, Jones states that Casey read the memorandum in front of him and said "Well, we know some of this but not all." Jones does not know the source of the sergeant's information.

When questioned about the Jones' memorandum, Casey stated that he does not recall having seen this document and that he does not recall Jones. When questioned generally about the scheduling documents found in Reagan Bush campaign files, Casey stated that he does not know the source of this information and that he was not really interested in this type of information during the campaign.

Several of the schedule-related memoranda were located in Meese's files. Meese stated that he does not now recall the source of this information, although he may have known the source at the time. Meese said there was no direct effort by the Reagan campaign to obtain the President's schedule from the White House.

8. Corbin's Contribution

The subcommittee found a telephone message in Timmons' file indicating a call from political consultant Paul Corbin¹⁴ concerning the President's schedule. Timmons told the subcommittee that he had returned the call and that Corbin had provided him with the President's schedule for an upcoming trip. Timmons said this was the only occasion on which he received scheduling information from Corbin. He did not ask Corbin the source of information.

9. Conclusions

It appears that persons interviewed by the subcommittee about scheduling documents, particularly Garrick, did not always truthfully state their knowledge about their sources of information about Carter's schedules. It also appears that the campaign sought out and obtained scheduling information which was not public. The White House made an effort to control the release of information on the President's schedule in part for his protection. Unauthorized access to a President's schedule conceivably could jeopardize a President's safety.

¹⁴ Paul Corbin and his role in the campaign are discussed in chapter 4 of the report dealing with Carter debate briefing materials.

CHAPTER 4—THE UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER OF CARTER DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIAL

The first chapter of this report details why the subcommittee began its investigation into the unauthorized transfer of debate briefing materials from the Carter administration White House to the Reagan Bush campaign. This chapter examines the transfer first from the perspective of the Carter White House and then from the perspective of the Reagan Bush campaign.

The subcommittee finds that relatively few steps were taken to protect the debate briefing materials by the Carter administration. Persons who had access to them did not consider them to be classified, although the materials were considered confidential and not widely circulated. In fact, the subcommittee believes that it is likely that a person or persons connected with the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign assisted in the removal of the debate briefing materials. Further, the subcommittee believes it is likely that it has interviewed or contacted the party or parties responsible but did not receive candid answers to its questions. Section I of this chapter details the subcommittee's inquiry into this aspect of the mystery.

The subcommittee, like the Department of Justice, has not been able to determine precisely how the Carter debate briefing materials moved from the Carter White House to the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. IV, p. 1858.] However, the subcommittee strongly believes that not all persons interviewed have been candid with the subcommittee. The reasons why the subcommittee reached these conclusions are recited in section II of this chapter.

I. UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER OF DEBATE BRIEFING BOOKS FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

In late summer of 1980 aides to President Carter began gathering and preparing materials for a potential debate with Governor Reagan. Two separate efforts were undertaken—preparation of a domestic policy debate briefing book [see app. II, p. 1790] and preparation of a foreign policy and national security debate briefing book. The final foreign policy book was a 40-page condensed version [see app. II, p. 961] of an earlier 250-page debate book commonly referred to by Carter officials as the "big book". [See app. II, p. 550.] The domestic book and condensed foreign policy book were both completed the week of October 20, 1980, and sent to President Carter.

Reagan Bush campaign officials have acknowledged seeing and using President Carter's briefing materials in preparation for the

debate. Collectively they recall having seen and used both foreign and domestic Carter briefing materials.

Following public revelations in June 1983 that the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign had obtained President Carter's briefing book, Reagan Bush campaign aides David Gergen and Frank Hodsoll each produced from their files copies of the Carter foreign policy "big book"; Hodsoll also produced a collection of documents that Carter aides had used in preparing that book. In addition to the foreign policy "big book" found in Reagan Bush campaign files, other Reagan Bush campaign workers have indicated that they likely saw the final condensed foreign policy book and some version of the domestic policy briefing materials. Reagan Bush aides have not yet produced the Carter domestic policy materials or the condensed foreign policy book that the campaign apparently had in its possession. As discussed below, it is not at all certain that the debate materials removed from the Carter White House were taken at the same time by the same person.

This section describes the Human Resources Subcommittee's investigation into how the Carter debate materials were transferred from the Carter camp. It is organized and presented in a manner that closely parallels the subcommittee's investigative approach. It: (1) reconstructs the scenarios surrounding the preparation and distribution of each debate briefing book; (2) identifies the Carter officials, staff and campaign workers involved in preparing the materials, as well as those having access to the materials; and (3) isolates those persons and places most likely involved in the unauthorized transfer of debate materials. This section presents the results of the subcommittee's interviews with key persons and the conclusions now available regarding the unauthorized transfer of debate material from the Carter campaign.

In conducting the "Carter side" of the investigation, the subcommittee interviewed, and in some cases reviewed the files of, over 70 persons in the Carter administration and campaign. Persons contacted included individuals who: (1) were involved directly or indirectly in the preparation and distribution of the debate books; (2) had access to the books and briefing materials; (3) received copies of the books; (4) had knowledge regarding the administrative arrangements and support for the briefing books; or (5) otherwise had information relevant to the investigation. The subcommittee later requested 30 Carter aides to sign sworn affidavits. In addition to the more than 70 formal interviews, the subcommittee also sent out over 150 questionnaires that were responded to in writing. [See app. III, p. 1251.] (Persons making false statements to the subcommittee are subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and other provision of law.) [See ch. 5, p. 124-13.]

In 1980, White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, had provided an oral opinion to White House personnel stating that preparation of briefing book material for a campaign debate was official Government business and thus could be performed by White House staff so long as the book dealt with issues involved in the President's official responsibilities. His opinion was that material designed to defend a policy of the administration or the President was Government material and that material designed to attack a position of Governor Reagan was campaign material. Mr. Cutler submitted a

sworn affidavit to the subcommittee affirming that he had rendered the above oral opinion and concluded that the debate briefing materials were lawfully prepared by White House officials on Government time and were Government property to the extent they discussed or defended the President's policies and that the majority of the briefing book materials fell into this category. [See app. III, p. 1132.] Moreover, in another affidavit, the Deputy Counsel to the President, Michael Cardozo, stated that this oral opinion was given to certain Domestic Policy and NSC staff members. [See app. III, p. 1099.]

A. FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE BRIEFING BOOK

The foreign policy debate book preparation was separate from the domestic policy book. David Aaron, as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under Zbigniew Brzezinski, was responsible for arranging the preparation of the foreign policy book. Unlike the domestic book, the foreign policy book was prepared by volunteers from outside the Carter administration. This was done because the National Security Council (NSC) was largely composed of career, nonpolitical staff who, with the exception of Messrs. Brzezinski and Aaron, were subject to Hatch Act provisions that generally restrict nonpolitical overnment personnel from participating in political or campaign activities.

It is not clear whether the decision to seek outside volunteers was made with the knowledge that the Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, had declared the materials to be Government property as stated above, or whether the NSC was simply taking every precaution to avoid exposing any "Hatched" personnel to any elements of the book that might seem political.

Some time during the first week in September 1980, Aaron asked Rick Inderfurth, a former senior NSC staff member, if he would prepare a foreign policy and national security debate briefing book for President Carter. At this time Inderfurth was deputy staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was a logical choice to prepare the book because: (1) he had worked for Brzezinski at the NSC and was familiar with President Carter's foreign policy positions; (2) as deputy staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had current knowledge of foreign policy and national security issues; and (3) he was experienced in handling highly classified and sensitive foreign policy and national security information and materials.

On September 4, 1980, Inderfurth notified Aaron that he was available to work evenings and nights preparing a foreign policy debate book for President Carter. Inderfurth also informed Aaron that Eric Newsom and Richard Davis of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, and Loch Johnson, who was on sabbatical from the University of Georgia and working for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had agreed to assist him in the project.

David Aaron's secretary, Lora Simkus, handled most of the administrative arrangements for the debate book preparation project. She helped: (1) make arrangements for Inderfurth and his assistants to work in room 404 of the Old Executive Office Building (EOB); (2) make arrangements for volunteer secretaries to assist

at night; (3) arrange for OEOB entry clearances; and (4) collected background materials for use in preparing the debate book.

The Carter Mondale Campaign Committee provided volunteer secretarial support for the Inderfurth group. Each evening one or two volunteer campaign secretaries were sent to room 404 to assist Inderfurth. The volunteer secretaries were Anita Meuller, Shirley Campolieto, Ann Matikan, Nancy Ohlson and Martha Brannan.

On Friday, September 5, 1980, Aaron provided Inderfurth with background materials to use in preparing the debate book. On Monday evening, September 8, Inderfurth and his staff reported to room 404 OEOB to begin work on the briefing book. Preparation of the debate book was divided up among the group by issue; there were approximately 60 separate issues. A short paper was prepared for each issue and was dated when completed.

At some point around mid to late September, Denis Clift of Vice President Mondale's staff gave David Aaron a notebook containing a collection of foreign policy materials he had collected for a possible Vice Presidential debate. [See app. II, p. 293.] Some of these documents had been prepared or collected previously to aid Mondale in his role as Vice President. Clift states that the materials were in a black binder and that he personally gave the only copy to Aaron. Aaron states that he recalls receiving the "Mondale papers" from Clift and remembers having a copy made for Inderfurth's. He said that he may have given the "Mondale papers" to his secretary, Lora Simkus, for copying. Aaron said he kept the original copy of the Mondale materials in his office. (But is now unable to locate them.) Inderfurth recalls having some Mondale materials when preparing the debate book, and Newsom recalls Inderfurth mentioning the Mondale materials to him.

On Saturday, September 27, 1980 Eric Newsom completed and dated his final papers, leaving only about six issues for Inderfurth to complete.

There is an important conflict in statements as to when the "big book" actually was completed, copied, placed in binders and delivered to David Aaron. Inderfurth states in a sworn affidavit that this was done September 29, 1980. However, he could not recall which, if any, of his assistants worked that night. Nor could he remember which, if any, of the volunteer secretaries were present that night. He could not remember who typed, copied, hole punched and placed the copies in binders on September 29, nor could he remember if he or someone else delivered the books to David Aaron. [See app. III, p. 1178.]

Loch Johnson stated that he worked with Inderfurth on Monday night, September 29, and also on Tuesday night, September 30. Johnson stated that the book was actually completed on Tuesday night and that the two night NSC secretaries in the White House West Wing did the final typing and presumably the copying.

Determining exactly which night the book was completed is critical because it helps establish who did and did not have access to the final "big book". Secret Service logs show that Monday night, September 29, was the last night that volunteer secretaries worked on the "big book". Volunteer secretaries Ann Matikan and Martha Brannan signed in to room 404 on Monday night, September 29.

[See p. 1861 and 1862.] If the book was not completed until the 30th, Matikan and Brannan would not have had access to it.

Aaron stated that he received several copies of the foreign policy debate book in late September 1980. However, he could not recall exactly how many copies he received, or how and from whom he received the book. He does not recall whether he had additional copies made or to whom he gave copies. He thinks that Brzezinski received a copy, but doubts that a copy went to the President. Brzezinski recalls receiving a "catch all" book that appears to have been the "big book".

Inderfurth stated that, after completing the "big book" on September 29, he was not involved with the book again until around mid-October, 1980, when he was asked to condense the "big book". Inderfurth and Newsom returned to room 404 of the OEOB the following week to condense the book. On October 20-21, 1980, Inderfurth and Newsom worked through the night and completed condensing the "big book" to an approximately 40 page version. It was this version that was sent to President Carter.

Even though the "big book" apparently did not go to President Carter, it does not appear correct to refer to it as a "rough draft", as the Department of Justice has done in its report. Inderfurth apparently believed the book to be final when it was delivered to David Aaron. Moreover, given White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler's opinion that the debate books were presidential and governmental in character, the Department's conclusion that "no government materials were among the briefing materials that were obtained by the Reagan Bush campaign" is questionable. This is especially so since the "Mondale papers" were composed mostly of documents that clearly had been prepared by Government employees on Government time for official use.

1. Persons and Places Involved

As stated earlier, Reagan Bush campaign officials have described having both Carter foreign and domestic policy materials during the 1980 campaign. Two Reagan Bush campaign aides have produced from their files copies of the Carter foreign policy "big book"; one of these aides also found the "Mondale papers" used in preparing the "big book". In addition, the statements of several Reagan Bush campaign workers indicate that the final condensed foreign policy debate book likely was at the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in 1980. This section examines the persons and places most likely involved in the unauthorized transfer of the two foreign policy debate briefing books and the "Mondale papers".

The subcommittee focused primarily on those persons having access to both the "big book" and the "Mondale papers", on the assumption that the same person or persons were involved in the unauthorized transfer of both documents. Since these two documents were available together only in room 404 OEOB, the secured National Security Council space where David Aaron's office was located, and possibly the White House Situation Room, the investigation centered on those persons having access to these places.

The subcommittee, as part of this investigation, asked the FBI to compare the fingerprints of 17 selected persons that worked in or

had access to these areas against the 148 unidentified fingerprints the FBI found on the Carter debate materials in Reagan Bush campaign files. [See app. V, p. 2121.] As discussed below none of the fingerprints of the persons compared matched the unidentified prints. The absence of fingerprints alone, however, is not proof of noninvolvement.

a. Room 404 OEOB

David Aaron's secretary, Lora Simkus, made arrangements through Hugh Carter's Administration Office for use of room 404 by Inderfurth to prepare the debate book. The reason for not using the more secure National Security Council offices on the third floor OEOB, or the White House NSC offices, appears to be a strong desire to insulate the nonpolitical and "Hatched" NSC staff from politically related activities.

Rick Inderfurth and assistants worked in room 404 most evenings and some weekends during September 1980 preparing the debate book. Inderfurth stated that no other locations were used. (The subcommittee was informed by a former NSC Situation Room staff member that Inderfurth worked on at least one occasion in the Situation Room conference room.) Both Inderfurth and Newsom stated that nonsensitive materials used in preparing the debate book were left out overnight and during the day in room 404. Inderfurth stated, however, that he always took completed debate book portions home with him at night and that a copy or near-completed copy of the book was never left in room 404 overnight. Inderfurth did not specifically remember what was done with the Mondale materials when he completed the debate book, but he recalled throwing away a lot of material he used in room 404. He explained that they prepared the book by cutting and pasting materials.

Room 404 was an unsecured office occupied during the day by Robert Earl Bender, an interest group liaison, and his assistant Alan Witt. Both were assigned to Presidential assistant Sarah Weddington. Robert Bender stated that, during the day, room 404 was very open and accessible, and that a number of people visited it each day. He also said the room was left unlocked at night. Both Bender and Witt stated that they never saw the debate briefing book. Nor do they have any knowledge as to how it may have been removed.

(1) Volunteer secretaries working in room 404

The subcommittee staff interviewed the five volunteer secretaries from the Carter Mondale Reelection Committee who worked on the debate book in room 404. Secret Service building clearance records indicate that Anita Mueller worked the initial nights beginning September 8, 1980, followed by Ann Matikan who worked the week of September 13, 1980 and possibly several days during the week of September 21, 1980. Shirley Campolieto and Nancy Ohlson were cleared for Friday, September 26, 1980. Martha Brannan and Ann Matikan worked September 29, 1980, the night Inderfurth stated that the "big book" was completed and delivered. All of the volunteer secretaries recalled typing parts of the briefing book. Anita Mueller and Ann Matikan recalled making copies of what they

typed. Each of the secretaries stated that they did not remove any debate materials.

Ann Matikan, who worked Monday night, September 29, stated that she recalls typing the briefing book table of contents, making copies of what she had typed and possibly punching binder holes in the material. She stated that she was never advised that the debate material was confidential and that she could have removed copies of the materials at any time, but did not. Martha Brannan, who also worked the night of September 29, 1980, states that she did not make any copies of the material she typed or any other material in the OEOB. She also stated that she did not remove the book or any other material when she departed that night.

Both Matikan and Brannan stated that they did not distribute the final "big book" on September 29, 1980. Rick Inderfurth stated that he could not recall who made the copies of the book that night, but stated that he did not.

(2) Rick Inderfurth and assistants in room 404

As noted, also having direct access to the "big book" were Rick Inderfurth and his assistants Eric Newsom and Richard Davis, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Loch Johnson from the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Moreover, these men most likely had access to the "Mondale papers". However, it is possible that Davis's participation had ended before the "Mondale papers" arrived in room 404.

Neither Newsom nor Davis were present the night the debate "big book" was completed and copied. However, according to Inderfurth they, along with Johnson, were later given souvenir copies of the "big book". Davis states, however, that he does not recall receiving a copy of the book, and does not even know if his work product actually was used in the debate book. He stated that he has no idea who removed the debate books.

Eric Newsom, who aside from Inderfurth worked the most on the book, recalled Inderfurth's mentioning that he had received the "Mondale papers", but he does not remember specifically seeing or using them. Newsom stated that he last worked on the "big book" on Saturday, September 27, 1980. He stated that he was not present when the book was completed, copied and delivered to David Aaron on September 29 or 30. Newsom said that he later received a copy of the "big book" from Inderfurth. He stated that he has no knowledge regarding how or by whom the book was taken.

Loch Johnson stated that he assisted Inderfurth in room 404 on the following evenings: Monday, September 8, through Monday September 15; Friday, September 26; Monday, September 29; and Tuesday, September 30. Johnson remembers having a lot of background materials to work from, but does not specifically recall the "Mondale papers".

As mentioned earlier, Johnson stated that the final "big book" was completed on Tuesday night, September 30, 1980. He said that the two NSC night secretaries who sat just outside Brzezinski's office did the final typing. Johnson said the secretaries were working on the materials when he and Inderfurth departed at about 1:00 AM. Johnson stated that he later received a souvenir copy of the "big book" from Inderfurth; he still has his copy. Johnson said

he had no idea who took the book or made it available to the Reagan Bush Campaign Committee.

Because he headed the foreign policy debate book preparation project, Rick Inderfurth was the person most closely involved and knowledgeable about the events surrounding the preparation, typing, copying and delivery of the book. Inderfurth, however, has little recollection of certain of those events and some of what he does remember is inconsistent with other testimony the subcommittee has received. Inderfurth stated that he does not remember: (1) who typed the final sections of the big book; (2) where the final sections were typed; (3) who made the final copies; (4) how many copies were made; (5) where the copies were made; or (6) who punched the holes and put the copies in binders. Inderfurth also could not recall whether he personally delivered the completed books to David Aaron's office or had them delivered. If he did deliver the books, he cannot remember if he personally gave them to Aaron, left them on his desk, or gave them to his secretary. If he had the books delivered, Inderfurth cannot remember whom he asked to do this.

Inderfurth stated that the books were completed and delivered on Monday, September 29, 1980. This is inconsistent with the recollection of his assistant, Loch Johnson. However, Inderfurth said that he does not recall the events of September 30, 1980 as described by Johnson, and that he stands by his September 29 date.

Inderfurth stated that, with the exception of Newsom, Davis, Johnson and Aaron, he did not provide copies of the debate "big book" to anyone. He did take briefing materials from room 404 home at night, and to work at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee office, but he says he never: (1) worked on the book at his committee office; (2) had any of the material typed or copied by committee staff; or (3) made debate material available to any members of the committee staff.

Inderfurth stated that background materials given him to prepare the book were either cut up and used in drafting the "big book", or were thrown away in room 404. In a sworn statement, Inderfurth said he had no knowledge as to how the debate materials were transferred outside the Carter administration. [See app. III, p. 1178.]

(3) Condensing the "big book" in room 404

As stated, Inderfurth and Newsom returned to room 404 in mid-October and condensed the "big book" to a 40-page version. In an interview with the subcommittee and later in a sworn affidavit, Mark Ashworth a Reagan campaign worker, described copying the final condensed foreign policy debate book. He specifically recalled seeing the names Inderfurth and Newsom on the cover page of the book he copied. [See app. III, p. 1080.] There was no cover page including these names on the final "big book". Alden Lang, another Reagan Bush campaign worker, stated in her interview with the subcommittee, and later in a sworn affidavit, that she gave materials similar to the condensed foreign policy book to Ashworth to copy. [See app. III, p. 1196.]

Inderfurth said that a copy of the "big book" would have been available and used in preparing the final condensed debate book.

Since Inderfurth could not recall exactly when he received the "Mondale papers" or what he did with these papers, it is possible that a copy of the "Mondale papers" was also in room 404 at this time.

Secret Service logs show that Nancy Ohlson and Ann Matikan were cleared to assist Inderfurth and Newsom on Monday, October 20, 1980, the night the condensed version was completed. As previously discussed, Inderfurth, Newsom, Matikan and Ohlson have all stated that they have no knowledge as to how or by whom the briefing book was transferred to the Reagan Bush campaign.

(4) Room 404 conclusion

Room 404 is one of two places where the foreign policy "big book" and the "Mondale papers" were jointly located. Accordingly, those persons working on or having access to those materials in room 404 on or after September 29, 1980, must be considered possible suspects. Assuming that the final "big book", dated September 29, 1980, was never left overnight in room 404, as sworn to by Inderfurth, the list of suspects is reduced to the two volunteer secretaries, Ann Matikan and Martha Brannan, and Inderfurth and his assistants—Newsom, Davis and Johnson. Newsom and Davis were not present the night the "big book" was completed, but they later were sent a copy. Both have stated that they have no knowledge as to how or by whom the debate materials were stolen. In addition, the subcommittee asked the FBI to compare Newsom's fingerprints with the 148 unidentified prints on the Carter debate materials found in Reagan Bush campaign files. There were no matches.

As noted, Loch Johnson stated that he worked on the debate book on September 29 and 30, and that the book was completed on September 30 with the assistance of the NSC night secretaries in the White House West Wing. This account is consistent with statements by Matikan and Brannan, who worked on the book on September 29 in room 404. Given this evidence and Inderfurth's lack of recollection of events on the 29th, the subcommittee believes it is probable that the "big book" was not completed until September 30, 1980. Since Matikan and Brannan did not work the night of September 30, they would not have had access to the final book. For this reason, together with Matikan's and Brannan's statements that they never removed any debate materials, the subcommittee does not consider either of them to be culpable.

This leaves Inderfurth and Johnson, who had access to the debate books, and persons with access to the NSC offices and the Situation Room in the White House West Wing as possible suspects. The subcommittee finds no basis to suspect that Inderfurth or Johnson deliberately leaked the debate materials to the Reagan Bush campaign. The subcommittee speculates that anyone knowledgeable about the contents of the "Mondale papers" likely would have realized that much of this material, unlike the debate book, would have been of limited value to the Reagan Bush campaign. Both Inderfurth and Johnson had access to much more sensitive foreign policy and national security materials than the information contained in the "Mondale papers". Furthermore, Inderfurth's fingerprints were not found on the Carter debate materials found in

Reagan Bush campaign aides files. (Johnson's prints were not compared.)

Because of the above findings and conclusions, the subcommittee believes that various persons having access to the NSC offices and Situation Room in the White House West Wing are the most likely suspects.

b. Debate materials in White House NSC offices

As stated, after completing the foreign policy debate "big book", Inderfurth either delivered, or had delivered, several copies to David Aaron's office. David Aaron already had possession of the original "Mondale papers" provided by Denis Clift of Vice President Mondale's staff. Aaron stated in his interview with the subcommittee, and later in a sworn affidavit, that about four copies of the "big book" were brought to his office, but he does not recall who actually delivered the books. Aaron thinks National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski received a copy, but he does not recall if he had additional copies made and distributed. [See app. III, p. 1073.]

Aaron's office was located in a secure enclosed area that included the offices of Brzezinski and his special assistant, Leslie Denend. Outside of these offices, but still inside the enclosed area, were four secretaries—Lora Simkus, Trudy Werner, Florence Gantt and Patricia Battenfield. This space was also occupied by the two night secretaries, Wilma Hall and Kathy McGraw. This secure enclosed area will be referred to as the "NSC front office".

The subcommittee questioned each of these persons, as well as: (1) other NSC staff who may have had access to Aaron's office or may have been involved with the debate books; (2) Situation Room personnel who had access to Aaron's office and were sometimes given custody of NSC materials for overnight keeping; (3) Secret Service guards who had access to the area; and (4) White House messengers who may have been involved.

(1) Investigation of NSC front office staff members

David Aaron has acknowledged receiving both the "Mondale papers" and the foreign policy "big book". He said these materials were kept in his office.

The subcommittee interviewed the NSC front office staff to determine: (1) who saw or had the materials; (2) who copied or typed the materials; (3) who delivered the materials to Aaron; and (4) who may have transferred the materials outside the Carter administration.

The subcommittee was informed that the two NSC night secretaries assisted in preparing the debate "big book". In his sworn statement to the subcommittee, Rick Inderfurth stated that some typing and photocopying of the debate book was done by NSC night secretaries Wilma Hall and Kathy McGraw. Eric Newsom also recalled getting assistance from the two NSC night secretaries. Loch Johnson stated that the two NSC night secretaries typed the final parts of the "big book" on the night of September 30, 1980 and were still working on the book when he departed about 1:00 AM. Inderfurth states that he does not recall who copied the book or who delivered the final copies to David Aaron. However, if the two

secretaries did type the final night, they also may have copied, or know who copied, the "big book" and delivered it to Aaron the next morning.

In an interview with the subcommittee and later in a sworn affidavit, Wilma Hall stated that she did not recall typing or copying anything for Rick Inderfurth after he left the NSC staff. She does not think Inderfurth ever asked her to type parts of the debate book. Hall also stated that she did not copy anything as large as the "big book". She said that she frequently typed question and answer material, but did not specifically recall being told that any of this material was for the debate book. She said she may have typed parts of the book if Aaron gave it to her, but she does not recall doing so. [See app. III, p. 1165.] Wilma Hall is currently an assistant to President Reagan's National Security Advisor, Robert McFarland.

Kathy McGraw initially stated that she did not work on the debate briefing book and was unaware that Rick Inderfurth had returned to the OEOB to prepare a debate book. She also initially stated that she never saw any briefing materials. In a later interview, however, the subcommittee presented McGraw with evidence of her involvement including the statements by Inderfurth, Newsom and Johnson. This evidence refreshed McGraw's memory and enabled her to recall her involvement in preparing the "big book". In an interview, and later in a sworn affidavit, McGraw stated she typed several sections of the final "big book", including the two-page cover statement and the table of contents. She recalled that, on at least one occasion, she went to room 404 to pick up materials to type from Inderfurth. She stated that she did not type in room 404, but took the materials to her desk at the NSC front office.

McGraw stated that it is possible that she typed the final sections one night and left them for Inderfurth to proofread the next day. The next night she could have made any necessary changes or corrections and then made copies and punched holes in the copies. She remembered staying late one night and doing a lot of photocopying and hole punching. She stated that, if there was room, she would have locked the materials she worked on in one of three front office safes when she departed that evening. She said, if there was not enough room, she would have taken the materials to the Situation Room for overnight keeping. McGraw explained that each night a cart of classified material that could not fit into the NSC safes was taken to the Situation Room when she and Wilma Hall locked up the NSC front office. She said Situation Room personnel had a key to the NSC front office and would bring such materials up early in the morning and unlock the safes. [See app. III, p. 1206.]

Lora Simkus was David Aaron's principal assistant and controlled the paper flow in and out of Aaron's office. The subcommittee obtained documents showing that Simkus was heavily involved in making the administrative arrangements for Inderfurth to prepare the debate book. These included: (1) arranging for work space in room 404 OEOB; (2) arranging for volunteer secretarial support; (3) gathering background materials for Inderfurth's use in preparing the debate book; (4) arranging for daily OEOB entry clearances

for the volunteers; and (5) arranging for thank you letters to the volunteers. [See app. IV, pp. 1862, 1863, 1866, 1870.]

Simkus initially told the subcommittee that she did not remember an Inderfurth group working on the foreign policy debate book, but after being shown the documents demonstrating her involvement, she remembered helping make some arrangements. She stated that she never actually saw or had a copy of the briefing book but does recall receiving the "Mondale papers". She also stated that she did not knowingly type or copy any parts of the debate book and has no knowledge of how the debate materials were transferred to unauthorized persons. Simkus is currently an assistant to the Secretary of State.

Florence Gantt was one of the NSC front office day secretaries. She stated that she was well aware that Rick Inderfurth was working on the debate briefing book and recalls seeing Inderfurth a few times when she worked late. Gantt said she typed a lot of question and answer material and did a lot of photocopying in the normal course of her work. She does not recall copying anything as large as the debate "big book", although she often typed and copied press briefing books. Gantt stated that she does not know who leaked the debate briefing book. Gantt stayed on as an NSC secretary with the Reagan administration.

Patricia Battenfield worked for Leslie Denend in the NSC front office. She also had worked for Inderfurth when he was at the NSC in Denend's position. Battenfield stated that she: (1) did not know that Inderfurth worked on a foreign policy debate book in the evenings at the OEOB; (2) never saw the debate book; and (3) was not aware of anyone working on the debate book. She also stayed on as an NSC secretary with the Reagan administration.

Trudy Werner was Zbigniew Brzezinski's secretary. Werner stated that she has no recollection of seeing, or even hearing discussion about, a foreign policy and national security debate briefing book. She was confident that she neither typed nor made copies of the debate briefing book. Werner is currently Brzezinski's secretary.

Leslie Denend was chief assistant to Brzezinski and sat in an office just outside Brzezinski's office. Denend stated that most of the material flowing into and out of the NSC went through him. Denend said he was not aware that Rick Inderfurth was preparing a debate briefing book in the OEOB at night. Denend said he never saw the debate book, and added that he and other NSC staff members were careful not to become involved with anything political.

Zbigniew Brzezinski knew very little about the foreign policy debate book preparations. He said that his role in the debate book was limited. He recalled that a large catch-all book was sent to him for approval, and that Inderfurth was asked to condense it.

As stated, David Aaron received copies of the foreign policy book and had the original copy of the "Mondale papers". He does not recall who delivered the "big book" to his office, or how many copies were delivered. He does not recall whether or not he had the debate "big book" copied and distributed. Nor does he recall whether his secretary, Lora Simkus, or anyone other than Brzezinski received copies of the debate "big book".

In a sworn statement to the subcommittee, Aaron stated that he had no knowledge of how the debate materials were transferred outside the Carter administration.

The subcommittee asked the FBI to compare the fingerprints of Aaron, Simkus, McGraw, Hall, Gantt, and Denend with the 148 unidentified prints on the Carter debate materials found in Reagan Bush campaign aides files. None of their prints matched the unidentified prints.

(2) Conclusions regarding NSC front office staff

The subcommittee's inquiry into the NSC front office was hampered because the persons responsible for the debate materials, Inderfurth and Aaron, could not remember critical events in the preparation, handling and distribution of these materials. The inquiry also indicated that persons having access to and use of some of this nation's most highly classified and sensitive materials appeared to have handled politically sensitive debate materials in a careless manner. The possible removal of the debate materials from the NSC front office raises troublesome questions regarding the protection of the highly classified materials found in that office.

The subcommittee was confronted with conflicting statements as to whether the two night secretaries typed and possibly copied the debate "big book". Inderfurth and his assistants, Newsom and Johnson, have independent recollections of receiving typing assistance from the two NSC night secretaries. Both secretaries initially denied providing such assistance, but as discussed above, the recollections of one NSC night secretary, Kathy McGraw, was subsequently refreshed. The inconsistencies could be attributed to faulty memories, or might also reflect the deep concern NSC staff members had regarding potential Hatch Act violations.

The subcommittee cannot rule out the possibility that the briefing book was improperly removed by someone on the NSC front office staff.

2. Investigation of persons having access to the NSC front office

In addition to focusing on the NSC front office staff, who had direct access to David Aaron's office and presumably to the debate materials, the subcommittee also investigated persons working outside the front office who may have had access to that office and these materials.

a. NSC Security Officer

Jerry Jennings, as the NSC Security Officer, had access to the NSC front office. The investigation revealed that: (1) Jennings had been given his NSC job by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration; (2) he reportedly possessed and expressed strong political views that differed in some respects from those of the Carter administration; (3) during the Ford administration, he had been a Republican candidate for Congress; (4) he was a long-time friend of Reagan Bush campaign aide Tony Dolan and was seen associating with Dolan shortly after the election; (5) he had a CIA, FBI and military intelligence background as did several key Reagan Bush

campaign aides, (6) he had access to the NSC offices; and (7) he had been accused by former Reagan Bush campaign aide Richard Allen of providing NSC documents to the Reagan Bush campaign.

During his interview with the subcommittee, and later in sworn affidavit, Jennings stated that he did not provide information to the Reagan Bush campaign nor did he provide confidential information to anyone outside the Carter administration. Jennings said: (1) he did not have access to the NSC front office after it was locked at night, but he did occasionally visit with the two NSC night secretaries late in the evening; (2) he did not inspect offices for security violations, but he did receive reports from the Secret Service guards who did; (3) he was unaware that Inderfurth was preparing a debate briefing book and never saw the debate book until shown it by the FBI; (4) he did not see or provide information to Tony Dolan during the campaign; (5) he had frequent contacts with Robert Gambino while Gambino was at the CIA, but had no contact with Gambino after he left the CIA and joined the Reagan Bush campaign; (6) he had never met Richard Allen prior to the Carter/Reagan transition, and (7) Allen's accusations against him were absolutely false. [See app. III, p. 1182.]

Richard Allen stated that he was given some NSC documents by an aide who told him they had been provided by Jerry Jennings. However, Allen could not recall who that aide was. The subcommittee conducted interviews with various Allen aides, but could not corroborate Allen's allegations.

The subcommittee interviewed Reagan Bush campaign aides Tony Dolan and Robert Gambino regarding their connections with Jennings. Both confirmed Jennings' statements that he did not contact them or provide any information or materials to them during the 1980 campaign. (Dolan did state that he had seen Jennings once in early June 1980.)

The subcommittee investigation did find that Jennings: (1) held conservative political views that were not always compatible with Carter administration policies, (2) had Republican Party associations, and (3) may have had access to the debate briefing materials. The subcommittee, however, did not find any conclusive evidence that Jennings provided information or materials to the Reagan Bush campaign. An FBI analysis of 214 fingerprints on the Carter debate materials found in the files of Reagan Bush campaign aides Gergen and Hodsoll did not identify any of the prints as belonging to Jennings.

b. NSC Situation Room

The White House Situation Room is a secured area on the West Wing ground floor that serves as the communications and intelligence center for the President and the National Security Advisor. There are about 20 persons assigned to the Situation Room, most of them detailed from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the White House Communications Agency. The Situation Room operates 24 hours a day.

Situation Room staff had access to the debate briefing materials in the NSC front office. They also received and assembled the classified NSC staff evening reports each night. As observed, Richard Allen, the Reagan Bush campaign national security advisor, stated

that he received unclassified portions of NSC evening reports during the campaign. Accordingly, the subcommittee investigated the possibility that someone from the Situation Room removed the debate, and possibly other, materials.

Manuel Rubio, the Director of the Situation Room, stated that a key to the NSC front office was kept in the Situation Room. The Director or his deputy used this key to open the NSC front office in the mornings. Rubio explained that each morning the Situation Room staff prepared a briefing report on information received overnight. They also assembled the NSC staff evening reports. Early each morning the Director or his deputy opened the NSC front office and placed the reports on Brzezinski's desk. Staff members also returned NSC materials kept in the Situation Room overnight and opened the NSC safes. Rubio stated that the key was accessible to all Situation Room staff.

Situation Room staff were also involved in closing the NSC front office at night. Rubio stated that an NSC night secretary would call the Situation Room when she was ready to leave. The Situation Room duty officer would go to the front office and help secure it. If there were classified materials that could not fit into the safe, they were taken to the Situation Room for overnight storage.

The 1980 Director and Deputy Director of the Situation Room, both stated that, to the best of their knowledge, no one assigned to the Situation Room was involved in any way in copying or handling the debate briefing materials.

The subcommittee also requested each of the 1980 Situation Room staff members to respond in writing to a prepared questionnaire. The questionnaire asked the following four questions:

(1) Did you, or anyone you know of who worked in the Carter administration or the Carter campaign, have contacts directly or indirectly with anyone in the 1980 Reagan or Anderson campaigns?

(2) Did you, or anyone you know of, at any time take possession of Carter administration or campaign material and transmit it either directly or indirectly to someone outside the administration or Carter campaign in an unauthorized fashion?

(3) Do you have any knowledge or information that to your knowledge has not been reported in the media regarding the possibly unauthorized transfer of documents or information from the Carter administration or Carter campaign to persons not connected with the Carter administration or campaign?

(4) Did you ever see or have in your possession any materials that appear to you to be portions of either the foreign or domestic policy briefing materials prepared for President Carter during the 1980 campaign?

These questions were sent to the 22 Situation Room staff members through the office of the Counsel to the President on January 20, 1984. The subcommittee has received responses from all but one of the Situation Room staff members. The one nonrespondent has retired and could not be located by the White House staff. All those responding answered "no" to all four questions and signed the questionnaires, certifying the truthfulness of their responses. Two of the questionnaire respondents, however, did add caveats to their answers to question No. 4 regarding whether they had ever seen the debate briefing materials. One respondent noted:

I was aware that Rick Inderfurth was preparing the book in the [Situation Room] conference room and assume that it remained in the Sit Room while he was working on it. I cannot say for certain that I ever saw it, however.

The other staff member noted:

It is possible that I saw portions of the briefing materials prepared for President Carter stored overnight in the White House Situation Room, but I cannot be positive.

The subcommittee also requested the FBI to compare the 148 unidentified fingerprints it found on the Gergen and Hodsoll copies of Carter debate materials with those of five Situation Room staff members selected by the subcommittee. The results of this analysis were negative.

The subcommittee concludes that Situation Room staff members had access to the debate materials obtained by the Reagan Bush campaign and the opportunity to take possession of these materials. Although the certified responses to the subcommittee's questionnaire and the FBI fingerprint analysis of several Situation Room staff members proved negative, the subcommittee cannot rule out the possibility that the briefing materials were transferred in an unauthorized manner by a Situation Room staff member.

c. Secret Service guards

Uniformed Secret Service guards, assigned to several White House West Wing posts, had access to the NSC front office. Similarly, certain guards in the OEOB had access to room 404.

Guards working the evening and night shifts were responsible for escorting cleaning and maintenance personnel to the secured NSC areas and for checking these areas for possible security violations. The guards also checked to insure that all classified material was secured in locked safes. The guards also assisted in locking the NSC front office when the NSC night secretaries departed; this involved locking the door and setting the alarm.

The subcommittee questioned certain Secret Service guards because (1) they had access to the debate materials; (2) they may have acquired information useful to the subcommittee investigation while on duty; and (3) they could have participated in the unauthorized transfer of materials.

The subcommittee interviewed the six Secret Service guards who had the greatest access to the NSC front office and room 404 in the OEOB during the evening and night shifts. None of the guards had any recollection of seeing the debate materials nor did they have any knowledge about anyone else having contact with those materials.

In addition to these interviews, the subcommittee requested each of the six guards, and 60 other White House and OEOB guards, to respond to the same questionnaire sent to Situation Room personnel, discussed above. The six guards with the greatest and most frequent access to the briefing materials and 48 other guards having lesser access responded to the questionnaire. None of their certified responses indicates any knowledge of, or involvement in, the unauthorized transfer of materials from the White House or OEOB. The

subcommittee has not received, but is seeking, responses from 2 guards sent the questionnaire. No responses were obtained from 10 guards no longer employed by the Secret Service and could not be located by the Secret Service.

The subcommittee asked the FBI to compare the fingerprints of the two guards having the most frequent access to the NSC front office with the 148 unidentified prints found on the Carter debate materials obtained by the Reagan Bush campaign. None of the guards prints matched the unidentified prints.

Based on the guards' responses to the subcommittee's questions and the lack of any information to the contrary, the subcommittee cannot conclude at this time that a Secret Service guard was involved in the unauthorized transfer of Carter debate briefing materials.

d. White House Garage

As discussed in chapter 3, Reagan Bush campaign aide Daniel Jones stated that a person wearing a military uniform delivered what appeared to be nonpublic Carter White House materials to Reagan Bush campaign headquarters on two different occasions. The messenger/drivers assigned to the White House Garage are mostly active-duty military personnel. Since NSC materials are often handled by White House messengers it is at least possible that the messengers had access to the debate materials or were given them to deliver. Accordingly, the subcommittee sent the questionnaire described above, to the 47 military persons assigned to the White House Garage during September and October 1980.

The subcommittee has received responses from 40 of the 47 persons sent questionnaires. None of the certified responses indicates any knowledge of, or involvement in, the transfer of debate materials. The subcommittee through the White House Counsel is currently attempting to obtain questionnaire responses from the remaining 7 messengers assigned to the White House in 1980. However, many of the messengers have since been reassigned or discharged from the military service.

3. Conclusion Regarding Transfer of Carter Foreign Policy Materials

The foreign policy "big book" and the "Mondale papers", copies of which were found in the files of two senior Reagan Bush campaign aides, had been located in the secured NSC front office. The subcommittee has learned that the final portions of the "big book" were typed in the NSC front office by one of the night secretaries. The secretary believes she may have made several copies of the book and after punching binder holes in them either placed them in one of the three NSC safes or sent them down to the Situation Room for overnight safekeeping.

The subcommittee believes it is most likely that these debate materials were taken from the NSC front office or possibly the Situation Room. Both of these places are secured areas with limited access.

The subcommittee interviewed all persons working in the NSC front office and several working in the Situation Room. The sub-

committee also obtained certified questionnaire responses from all but one of the Situation Room staff, as well as most Secret Service guards having access to areas where the briefing materials were located.

No one has admitted having any knowledge as to how the briefing materials were removed. These denials, along with the inability of key persons involved to recall events that took place, make it impossible for the subcommittee, at this time, to determine conclusively how the materials were taken. The subcommittee believes, however, that its staff has likely spoken to a person or persons involved in or knowledgeable about the transfer of foreign policy debate materials, but that this person or these persons have not been candid.

B. DOMESTIC POLICY BRIEFING BOOK

David Rubenstein, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, orchestrated the preparation of President Carter's domestic policy debate briefing book. He had prepared debate briefing books for candidate Carter during the 1976 campaign and in 1980 for a proposed Carter/Kennedy/Brown debate. He began preparing the Carter/Reagan book in mid-August 1980. One of his first acts was to solicit ideas and inputs from about 35 middle level domestic policy staffers. This request generated a large amount of material from the staff, most of which was in a question and answer format. Rubenstein synthesized, revised and edited the material, and in some cases circulated it back to the staff.

Carter political advisor Pat Caddell stated that he and Sam Popkin received a draft copy of the domestic policy questions and answers on October 16 or 17, 1980. Caddell stated that on October 21, 1980, he provided Rubenstein, among others, with a 50- to 60-page debate strategy paper. Rubenstein stated that he took Caddell's themes and worked them into the questions and answers. The finalized question and answer papers formed the first part of the domestic policy debate briefing book. The second part of the book consisted primarily of backup materials for the questions and answers.

Secretarial support for the debate book preparation was provided by Rubenstein's secretary, Georgia O'Connor, and Donna Firkin, a night secretary assigned to Rubenstein from the correspondence office. Firkin typed about three-quarters of the final book during the week of October 20, 1980. She typed the briefing book in the correspondence office located in the the Old Executive Office Building. O'Connor typed portions of the book at her desk outside Rubenstein's office on the second floor of the White House West Wing.

Rubenstein stated that the domestic policy debate book was completed on Thursday night, October 23, 1980. He gave the completed book to Jim Rowland, a messenger for the domestic policy staff, at about 9:00 or 10:00 that night and asked him to make 13 copies. Rowland reproduced the original and returned it to Rubenstein. Rowland then took the reproduced book to a copier on the second floor of the OEOB where he worked through the night until about

8:00 or 9:00 Friday morning, making 13 or 14 copies. He then took the copies to room 208 of the OEOB to assemble. Rowland stated that he left the books in the room for about an hour to go eat breakfast. The room was occupied by Ann McGlinn and Ann Cavanaugh, who were Domestic Policy Staff secretaries for Richard Neustadt and Robert Malson, respectively. Rowland stated that, after assembling the copies, he took them to Rubenstein's West Wing office for a cover memo. Rowland stated that he does not remember distributing the books after giving them to Rubenstein, but he did "stash away" an extra copy, which he often did with items he had copied.

Rubenstein stated that Messrs. Stuart Eizenstat, Bert Carp, Jerry Rafshoon, Hamilton Jordan, Pat Caddell, Marty Franks, Jack Watson and Jody Powell all received a copy of the domestic policy debate book. Rubenstein retained a copy; the original went to the President. Several extra copies were retained by either Eizenstat or Rubenstein.

On Friday afternoon, October 24, 1980, Georgia O'Connor took the extra copies to Camp David for review. Messrs. Marty Franks, Stuart Eizenstat, Sam Popkin, Hamilton Jordan, Jerry Rafshoon, and Pat Caddell were all present at Camp David that night. Late Friday night O'Connor started typing the revisions to the domestic policy book dictated by Eizenstat. She spent most of Saturday typing changes to the domestic policy book as they were being given to her. At about 3:30 Saturday afternoon the President and Mrs. Carter, Jody Powell, Powell's secretary, Carolyn Shields, David Rubenstein and Charles Kirbo gathered at Camp David to rehearse for the debates. They rehearsed until about 2:00 AM Sunday morning.

Kathy Reid, Stuart Eizenstat's assistant, arrived at Camp David Sunday afternoon to relieve O'Connor. O'Connor returned to Washington, D.C. Sunday afternoon in the same White House car that brought Reid. Reid assisted Jody Powell's secretary, Carolyn Shields, in typing revisions to questions and answers until about 2:30 AM Monday. On Monday, October 27, the group at Camp David departed for the Tuesday debate in Cleveland, Ohio.

The preparation of the briefing book involved a number of Domestic Policy and other White House staff. However, David Rubenstein was informed by the Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, and his staff that the debate briefing materials were presidential and governmental in character and that persons working on them were not subject to Hatch Act restrictions. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this advice indicates that the domestic policy book may well have been a Government document.

1. Persons and Places Involved

This section focuses on the persons and places principally connected with the debate book. As discussed earlier, Reagan Bush campaign officials have not produced the Carter domestic briefing materials from their files. However, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter statements by several Reagan Bush campaign employees clearly indicate that the campaign had Carter domestic policy debate materials prior to the debate on October 28, 1980. It

is not clear, however, whether they had the domestic policy book or possibly an earlier draft question and answer portion of the book.

The subcommittee's investigation focused on those Carter administration persons who possessed or had access to the debate book both before and after it was completed on Thursday night, October 23, 1980. The staff interviewed and later received sworn affidavits from: (1) David Rubenstein, who prepared the book; (2) his secretary Georgia O'Connor, who typed parts of the book and handled administrative matters; (3) Donna Firkin, the night secretary who typed most of the book; (4) Jim Rowland, the domestic policy staff messenger who copied and assembled the books; (5) Ann McGlinn, who had access to the books the morning they were copied; (6) various senior White House and campaign officials who received the book; and (7) several members of the domestic policy support staff who may have had access to the book. All of these persons stated that they had no conclusive knowledge as to how the debate book was removed or who was involved in its transfer.

Rowland was interviewed because: (1) he reportedly held very conservative political beliefs that were not always compatible with those of the Carter administration; (2) he previously had worked for the very conservative Human Events magazine; (3) he previously had supported conservative Republican candidates; (4) he was a relatively new and unknown White House support staffer; and (5) as a messenger and copier of the debate book, he had the greatest opportunity to take a copy. Rowland stated under oath that he did not provide copies of the book to anyone who was not authorized to have the book and that he has no knowledge as to how the book was obtained by the Reagan Bush campaign. Rowland said he delivered the debate books he had copied to David Rubenstein's office on Friday morning, October 24, 1980, but he could not remember whether he later delivered them to the designated recipients. He stated that he often made an extra copy of material he reproduced and kept it in a filing cabinet by his desk. When the story broke about the debate books, Rowland searched his files and found a copy of the domestic debate book. The subcommittee did not find any conclusive evidence to refute Rowland's statements that he did not improperly transfer the debate book. [See app. III, p. 1220.]

Ann McGlinn was interviewed because of: (1) McGlinn's previous employment and association with the Nixon and Ford administrations; (2) statements that her father was prominently involved in President Nixon's reelection campaign; (3) allegations that she was dating a Reagan Bush campaign official; (4) reports that McGlinn told several persons that she was the White House mole; (5) her access to the domestic policy debate briefing books; and (6) her employment following the Reagan election by Ed Gray, who was deputy chief of staff and director of policy communications for the Reagan Bush campaign. (McGlinn worked under Gray at the White House following the election, was later his secretary in California where he was first vice-president of a savings and loan association, and then returned to Washington as Gray's secretary when he was appointed Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.)

When interviewed by the subcommittee, and in an affidavit, McGlinn categorically denied providing any documents or information from the Carter White House to the Reagan Bush campaign.

She had no recollection of Rowland using her office to collate the final Carter domestic policy debate book. She said her father was not actively involved in the Reagan Bush campaign and she denied passing any Carter debate material from the White House to her father. McGlinn stated that she did not have an intimate relationship with anyone connected to the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. III, p. 1205.] The subcommittee did not find sufficient evidence to refute McGlinn's statement.

2. Domestic Debate Book Conclusions

The manner in which the domestic policy briefing book was prepared, controlled, copied, and distributed created an almost unlimited number of opportunities and possibilities for its unauthorized transfer.

The subcommittee was unable conclusively to determine whether the domestic policy material described by Reagan Bush campaign employees was the final debate book prepared by Rubenstein or was an earlier draft of the question and answer section prepared before the addition of the Caddell themes. When shown the final domestic book, David Stockman stated that the question and answer section was familiar, particularly several of the items. Stockman stated, however, that elements in the final book appeared tighter and more closely written than the material he remembers having in his possession. Stockman also stated that the Carter domestic materials he had did not contain any strategy or themes.

The subcommittee focused its investigation on those persons and places with the greatest connections with domestic briefing materials. Its staff interviewed the 14 persons that either were directly involved in the preparation and distribution of the debate book or had the greatest access to the book. All Carter aides who received the domestic book were contacted. These aides submitted sworn affidavits denying any knowledge as to how the domestic materials were removed. Despite the efforts described above the subcommittee could not determine how domestic policy debate materials were transferred outside the Carter administration.

II. CARTER BRIEFING MATERIALS IN THE REAGAN BUSH CAMPAIGN

Debate briefing materials prepared for President Carter and Vice President Mondale were in the possession of Reagan Bush campaign workers before the October 28, 1980 debate between Reagan and Carter. Two senior Reagan Bush campaign workers saved some Carter debate briefing materials and, in June 1983, turned the retained materials over to the Department of Justice. One saved Mondale briefing materials that he had apparently received during the campaign. [See p. 100.]

This section presents what is known as to how the briefing materials came into the possession of Reagan Bush campaign workers and were circulated and used by them. While every fact is not known, the subcommittee has been able to reach some important conclusions. Moreover, the subcommittee strongly believes that it has questioned a person or persons connected with the Reagan

Bush campaign who knew the source or sources of the briefing materials and failed to provide candid answers to the subcommittee's inquiries.

A surprisingly large number of persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign admit receiving, seeing or hearing about the Carter briefing papers. At least two persons indicate that they used these papers to help prepare Governor Reagan for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter. Other Reagan Bush campaign workers deny any connection with the Carter papers. In summary:

- Thirteen persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign admit receiving and/or seeing Carter debate materials. Six others allegedly received or saw these materials, but deny this.
- Seven other campaign workers, and two persons from outside the Reagan Bush campaign, admit that they heard that Carter briefing materials were in the Reagan Bush campaign before the matter surfaced in the press in June 1983. Eight of the nine admit hearing about it before the 1980 debate.
- Two campaign workers indicate that they used the Carter debate materials—one to help Candidate Reagan practice for the debate, the other to revise Candidate Reagan's debate briefing book. Statements by others indicate that they reviewed the materials long enough to determine whether they might be useful.

This section begins with a description of the Carter briefing materials actually found in the Reagan Bush campaign. Also described are Carter briefing materials not found in the Reagan Bush campaign.

A. CARTER BRIEFING MATERIALS FOUND IN REAGAN BUSH FILES

On June 28, 1983, the White House released the Carter Mondale briefing materials found by David Gergen and Frank Hodsoll in their campaign files. Chapter 1 of this report discusses the events leading to this release. The Carter Mondale briefing materials released on that date are described below:

1. Mondale Papers

These materials, found by Hodsoll in his personal files, were assembled initially to help prepare Vice President Mondale for a proposed Vice Presidential debate that was never held. The materials—

- were compiled in part by using the Vice President's regular foreign policy and national security briefing book.
- contained only information on foreign policy and national security.
- had no index or table of contents.
- included issue papers, speeches, news releases, lists of quotes, news analyses and policy papers.
- contained no classified documents.
- had no cover letter, cover page or introductory section.

The materials found in Hodsoll's files and turned over to the Department of Justice contained 274 pages. [See app. II, p. 293.]

2. The Foreign Policy Debate Briefing Book

This book is titled the "Presidential Debates: Foreign Policy and National Security Issues," and is referred to in this report as the "big book". The book's cover page is dated September 29, 1980, and its first sentence states:

This briefing book is designed to assist the President in debates with Governor Reagan on foreign policy and national security issues.

The copies of this book found in Hodsoll's and Gergen's personal files were both 249 pages in length. While Hodsoll's book contained the two cover pages, Gergen's book did not. Gergen's book, however, had two other pages that Hodsoll's version did not contain.

The covering pages from Hodsoll's book contain two sections, one titled "Purpose" and the other called "Content and Format". The "Purpose" section is quoted from above. The "Content and Format" section contains suggestions regarding the President's responses to criticism of his record and notes that the first portion of the book entitled "Overview" provides a comprehensive rebuttal to such criticism.

Following the covering pages is a table of contents which lists the 15 sections and numerous subsections into which the document is divided. The subsections usually contain a series of questions that might be asked by a newsperson, followed by suggested detailed responses that outline Carter's positions. The last section contains backup materials on "Candidate Positions and Platforms". [See app. II, p. 555.]

B. CARTER DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIALS THAT WERE NOT FOUND IN REAGAN BUSH FILES

As discussed below, other Carter debate briefing materials in addition to the "big book" and the "Mondale papers" likely were in the Reagan Bush campaign before the 1980 debate. These were:

1. Condensed Foreign Policy Book

This is a 40-page condensed version of the "big book" described above, and is entitled "Presidential Debate Briefing Papers: Foreign Policy and National Security." This version was completed on October 20, 1980; this date, along with the names of the authors—Rick Inderfurth and Eric Newsom—appear on the book's cover sheet. The book contains 12 sections each of which is generally divided into subsections that deal with (1) a possible question, (2) themes for Carter's response, (3) the Carter record, (4) the Reagan record, and (5) concluding remarks for President Carter. [See app. II, p. 961.]

2. Domestic Policy Briefing Book

This book is entitled "Debate Briefing Material—Domestic." The first two sections of the book—"Answer and Rebuttal Objectives"

and "Answer and Rebuttal Themes" contain debate strategy. Section 3 is titled "Carter Questions and Answers" and deals with such issues as economy, energy and environment, overview, government, and human needs. This section is similar in format to the Condensed Foreign Policy Book described above. The remaining sections of the book are debating aids for the President and include such topics as "questions for Carter to ask Reagan" and "key lines". [See app. II, p. 790.]

C. KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF CARTER DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIALS BY PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THE REAGAN BUSH CAMPAIGN

This section examines the evidence relating to the knowledge and use of Carter debate briefing materials by persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign. As will be demonstrated, the evidence is conflicting; not all these conflicts can be explained by mere failures of memory.

1. Thirteen Admit Seeing or Receiving Carter Materials

Thirteen persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign admit seeing or receiving Carter debate briefing material prior to the debate between President Carter and Governor Reagan. Those thirteen persons, their campaign roles and current positions, what they saw, and/or how they may have used the material, are discussed below.

a. James A. Baker

(A Senior Advisor to the Reagan Bush campaign who directed preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President.)

Baker says that his primary campaign responsibility was negotiating arrangements for the September 21, 1980 debate between John Anderson and Reagan and the October 28, 1980 debate between Carter and Reagan. As part of that responsibility, Baker generally supervised the people who prepared the books. However, he says he did not have responsibility for the policy content of the debate materials on which they worked.

David Gergen and Frank Hodsoll, who headed up the Reagan debate briefing team, corroborate Baker's description of his campaign role. Gergen says that Baker left the development of issues for Reagan's briefing books to the debate briefing team but that he did review them before they went to Reagan. Hodsoll says Baker participated with the debate briefing team in identifying the issues for Reagan's briefing book and then delegated the drafting of the book to the debate briefing team.

Baker believes that, during the campaign, he could have seen the "big book." He says that both the "big book" and the "Mondale papers" are similar to the material he saw prior to the debate. He did not see the final foreign policy book or the domestic policy book. He apparently saw the "Mondale papers" because his fingerprints are on the copy of those papers found in Hodsoll's files. [See app. IV, p. 1876.]

Baker is not sure whether he only saw foreign policy material. He believes that the material covered a wide range of issues and

does not remember whether the issues involved were foreign, domestic, or both. He says that he never saw the final foreign policy book or the domestic policy book. [See app. I, p. 145.]

Baker recalls that he received the Carter material from William Casey in a black loose-leaf binder. Baker does not remember when he received the Carter materials, although it was sometime before, but not close to the debate on October 28, 1980.

He believes, but cannot be sure, that he received the material prior to the date the Reagan Carter debate was agreed upon (October 21, 1980).

Baker says that when he received the Carter debate briefing material, he reviewed it for a period he does not believe exceeded two hours and probably was not more than one hour. After reviewing the material, he believes he passed it to either David Gergen or Frank Hodsoll. He says he did not make further use of the material. [See app. III, p. 1085.]

Baker does not believe that the material he saw contained tactical information, debate strategy, or sensitive debating points. He does not recall that the material was identified as debate material. He states:

I recall it being more of a compilation of Carter Administration positions on a wide range of issues. . . . It did not seem to be close-in briefing material, but rather a compendium of Carter Administration positions.

Baker recalls that, after passing the material to either Gergen or Hodsoll, he had no further discussions about the material in 1980 other than telling Margaret Tutwiler that he had received Carter debate briefing material from Casey and had passed the material to the Reagan debate briefing team. He says it is also possible that he may have discussed receiving the Carter material with Dean Burch, the Chief of Staff to George Bush during the campaign. [See app. III, p. 1085.]

b. David R. Gergen

(A resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; until January 5, 1984, Assistant to the President for Communications; currently at AEI and the Institute of Politics at Harvard University.)

Gergen headed up the Reagan Debate Briefing Team. He was first deeply involved with preparation for the September 28, 1980 debate between John Anderson and Reagan. Following that debate, he returned to the American Enterprise Institute. On October 15, 1980, he took a leave of absence from AEI and returned to the Reagan Bush campaign to help prepare for the October 28, 1980 Presidential debate. [See app. III, p. 1156.]

By Frank Hodsoll's account, Gergen was involved in all aspects of debate strategy. Hodsoll says Gergen made sure that the products of the debate briefing team were consistent with the campaign's political strategy.

Gergen saw the foreign policy "big book" and found it in his files in 1983. He does not remember seeing the "Mondale papers", the final foreign policy book, or the domestic policy book. However, his

fingerprints appear on the "Mondale papers" but it is not clear when he handled those documents.

On June 22, 1983, Gergen wrote Subcommittee Chairman Donald J. Albosta that:

I do not recall ever receiving or seeing a "Carter debate book" or any other notebook from the Carter campaign. Had that occurred, I believe that I would remember it. [See app. I, p. 142.]

On June 28, 1983, Gergen wrote a second letter to Chairman Albosta correcting his June 22, 1983 letter. He stated:

Since responding to your letter last week, I have found that I made a mistake, and I want to correct the record with you and to convey to you my personal apology.

I wrote that letter to you before completing a thorough search of my files. [See app. I, p. 149.]

In his files, Gergen found a copy of the "big book," less the first two pages. On June 28, 1983, Gergen wrote: "Upon seeing the material again, I do have a recollection of looking through it." [See app. IV, p. 1886.] He does not remember, however, the form in which he received it, e.g., whether it was received in a binder or notebook. He does not remember the date that he received it, but says it was before the October 28, 1980 debate. He does not remember from whom he received it. [See app. III, p. 1156.]

Gergen does not remember seeing Carter domestic policy material. He stated, however, "I cannot remember it, but if it were there, I must assume that I saw it." [See app. IV, p. 1886.]

Jackie Tillman, a researcher who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the Carter debate, says that she has a "vague and uncertain" recollection that Gergen informed her on October 25, 1980, that someone recently had come over by taxi from the Carter Mondale campaign to the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, with Carter debate briefing material. According to Tillman, Gergen did not describe the person who delivered the material. [See app. III, p. 1234.] Gergen, however, said that he does not recall anything about the delivery of the Carter material to the Reagan Bush campaign. Nor does he recall making any statement to Tillman about the campaign's obtaining Carter material. [See app. III, p. 1155.]

Gergen disparages the usefulness of the Carter debate briefing material. He states:

After reviewing the [Reagan] briefing book . . . it remains my view that while materials received from the Carter camp were of interest, to my knowledge, they did not play any significant role in the preparation of materials for Governor Reagan. [See app. I, p. 149.]

An objective evaluation of [the Reagan briefing] book will show, I believe, that it does not bear a significant relationship to the materials from the Carter camp. To be sure, some of the same issues and the same points appear in both—but that's because those were the major issues of the campaign and it was obvious they might arise in the debate. [See app. IV, p. 1886.]

c. Francis S.M. Hodsoll

Staff Coordinator for the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts.

Hodsoll saw and received the "big book" and the "Mondale papers". In 1983 he found both in his 1980 campaign files. He says he did not see the final foreign policy book. He says that he saw Carter domestic policy material that was similar to the Carter foreign policy material he received; however, he is not certain whether that domestic policy material he saw was similar to any of the material contained in the domestic policy book. [See app. IV, p. 1894.]

Hodsoll indicates that he received both the "big book" and the "Mondale papers" in the same time frame. He does not remember the date he received the material, although he believes it was toward the end of October 1980.

Hodsoll does not believe the Reagan Bush campaign used the material extensively. He states:

Review of the material reflects that they may have influenced the briefing book preparation in two or three instances, but did not impact significantly on debate preparation. [See app. IV, p. 1894.]

Hodsoll, however, has reviewed the "big book" and the "Mondale papers" to identify any similarities with the Reagan debate briefing book [see app. II, p. 1001] and thereby to determine if the Carter debate briefing materials influenced the preparation of the Reagan book. Based on that review, he has identified three instances where this may have occurred. [See app. IV, p. 1898.]

The first instance identified by Hodsoll concerns the arms race and conventional military forces. The Carter debate briefing material states:

[Reagan's position] would mean an uncontrolled, open-ended, and enormously expensive arms race. . . . It would mean that we would have to skimp on conventional forces, where we need to improve. . . .

The Reagan briefing book states:

Carter claims RR [Ronald Reagan] position on military superiority will lead to all out arms race, skimping on conventional forces.

The second instance of similarity between the two sets of material is the sequence and some of the language concerning strategic defense programs. The third instance is the sequence and some of the language used in discussing arms control and SALT. While Hodsoll notes that Carter's positions were a matter of public record, an examination of the three instances Hodsoll cites leaves a firm conclusion that the Carter "big book" did influence the preparation of the Reagan briefing book.

d. Hayden G. Bryan

(A researcher who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently Chief Economist for the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources.)

Sometime after President Carter and Governor Reagan agreed to debate, Bryan saw two stacks of paper approximately 150 pages each. He was told that the stacks of paper were Carter briefing material. (FBI records indicate that he informed the FBI that he received this information from either David Gergen or Frank Hodsoll.) Bryan says he reviewed only one or two pages from one stack that dealt with foreign policy. After reviewing the one or two pages, he removed the stack from his work area and never saw or discussed the material again.

e. Leslie Sorg

(A researcher who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently a program officer at the U.S. Information Agency.)

Sorg believes she saw the "big book". She does not believe she saw the "Mondale papers". It does not appear that she saw the condensed foreign policy book or a Carter domestic policy briefing book.

Sorg says she reviewed Carter debate briefing material prior to the October 28, 1980 debate for about five to ten minutes. She believes she received the material from Frank Hodsoll and returned it to Hodsoll. She describes the material she saw as unbound and one and one-half to two inches thick. She believes she saw the material sometime within one week prior to the October 28, 1980 debate.

Sorg describes the material she saw as "embryonic". She points out, however, that she was a campaign researcher and was not involved in developing issues. She does not remember whether the material she saw included domestic policy material.

f. William Van Cleave

(An assistant to Richard V. Allen, the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Reagan Bush campaign; currently a Professor and the Director of the Defense and Strategic Studies Center, University of Southern California.)

Van Cleave saw either the "big book" or the condensed foreign policy book. He is certain that he did not see the "Mondale papers". It does not appear that he saw domestic material.

Van Cleave says he saw Carter debate briefing material on only one occasion during the campaign. When shown both the "big book" and the condensed foreign policy book, he said he seemed to recognize the formats of both books. He could not say with certainty which book he had seen during the campaign. [See app. III, p. 1240.]

Van Cleave saw the Carter foreign policy material in Richard Allen's Washington, D.C., office. He does not remember who provided the material to him or to whom he gave the material after he reviewed it. Van Cleave said the material was in a black binder and was about one to two inches thick. He says he glanced over the material. In an interview with the subcommittee, he characterized

some of the material as "sophomoric and dumb" and said that he did not make further use of it.

g. Doug Bandow

(A senior policy analyst for the Reagan Bush campaign; until May 1982 the Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development; currently editor of *Inquiry* magazine.)

Bandow may have seen Carter domestic policy material. He informed the subcommittee that Stefan Halper, the director of policy coordination for the Reagan Bush campaign, showed him a one-page document relating to energy issues. Bandow believes the document was in a question and answer format, or in a format that presented what Ragan said about certain energy issues and what Carter's response should be. According to Bandow, Halper said the document came from the "other side".

h. Mark A. Ashworth

(Operator of a photo copy machine at the campaign headquarters; currently a college student.)

Ashworth believes that, prior to the debate, he saw all of the condensed foreign policy book, but none of the "big book". He indicated that he may have seen part of the "Mondale papers". He believes that he saw part of the domestic policy briefing book. (See app. III, p. 1080.)

Ashworth believes that he saw all of the condensed foreign policy book because he remembers the names (Rick) Inderfurth and (Eric) Newsome on the foreign policy materials he saw. (Inderfurth and Newsome's names appear on the cover page of the condensed foreign policy book, but do not appear anywhere in the "big book".) He does not recall seeing any of the material contained in the "big book".

Ashworth identified three documents included in the "Mondale papers" that appeared similar to material that he remembers seeing prior to the debate. One of those documents, however, was a press conference transcript initially prepared by the Reagan campaign, which he may have seen at the time it was first prepared.

Ashworth believes that he saw 20 to 25 percent of the domestic policy briefing book prior to the debate. He identified several parts of the domestic policy briefing book as familiar because of their structure and format. He remembers seeing Carter domestic policy material during the Reagan Bush campaign on at least four occasions. He states in his affidavit that he was given such material to copy by campaign workers Emily Ford, Alden Lang and Charles Crawford.

FBI laboratory reports state that certain copies of documents found by Hodsoll and Gergen in their files and turned over to the Department of Justice had been copied on a Kodak copying machine. This is the type of copying machine that Ashworth operated for the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. III, p. 1080.]

i. Elizabeth Alden Lang

(An administrative aide at the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; currently a White House secretary.)

Mark Ashworth informed the subcommittee that on two occasions during the 1980 campaign, Lang asked him to copy material that Ashworth says was domestic policy material from either the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign. He said the material he copied for Lang on one of the two occasions totaled 40 to 50 pages. [See app. III, p. 1080.]

Lang says that she occasionally gave material to Ashworth to copy during the 1980 campaign. However, she has no recollection of copying, or asking Ashworth to copy for her, material she knew to be Carter debate briefing material. [See app. III, p. 1196.]

Lang, however, reviewed Carter debate briefing material with the subcommittee and informed the subcommittee that certain sets of the material were similar in format to material she recalls seeing during the 1980 campaign. She says it is highly possible that she saw some of the Carter debate briefing material during the 1980 campaign.

Lang says that the condensed foreign policy book is similar in format to material she recalls seeing during the 1980 campaign. Specifically, Lang says that the condensed foreign policy book is similar to material she recalls seeing in the following respects:

- The book starts out with the subject of "leadership."
- The tops of several pages have underlined titles.
- Names are in all capital letters.
- There are side captions in all capital letters.
- There is no underlining in the body of the text.

Lang also believes it is possible that she saw the "Mondale papers". Lang said the "big book" and the Carter domestic policy book were not similar to anything she recalls seeing during the 1980 campaign. [See app. III, p. 1196.]

Lang spent an extensive amount of time in October 1980 traveling with Ambassador Bush and his campaign staff. She says that material she recalls from the 1980 campaign could include Reagan Bush campaign material she saw while traveling during the campaign.

j. Justine Marks

(A receptionist at the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; currently residing in Maine.)

Marks saw what she believed was Carter debate briefing material prior to the October 28, 1980 debate. However, she is not certain whether any of the sets of Carter debate briefing books shown her by the subcommittee contain the material that she saw prior to the debate.

Marks informed the subcommittee that sometime prior to the October 28, 1980 debate, a young clean-cut male delivered Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. She does not remember the date the material was delivered. She believes the material was in a black loose-leaf notebook and was less than one and one-half inches thick. She says she quickly reviewed the material.

Marks cannot identify the young male who delivered the Carter material. She had never seen him before the delivery, nor has she seen him since. She did not recognize him from numerous pictures

shown her by the subcommittee and the FBI. Marks recalls that he was of average stature, but cannot remember any other physical characteristics. She remembers that the person appeared to be eager and excited and that he wanted to see a senior member of the Reagan Bush campaign. He informed her that the material he was delivering came from someone in the Carter White House. Marks does not know whose office he subsequently visited at the campaign headquarters, but believes she would have directed him to either Casey or Baker. [See app. III, p. 1199.]

Marks was shown several sets of Carter debate briefing material by the subcommittee and was asked to identify whether any of the sets were the same as, or similar to, the material the unidentified young male delivered to campaign headquarters. She described the "big book" as thicker than the material delivered to the campaign headquarters. After examining the "Mondale papers", Marks said that she did not think she had seen that material. When Marks was shown the condensed foreign policy book, Marks said it was similar to the material delivered to the campaign headquarters. (However, after she was later told what the book was, i.e. the condensed foreign policy book, Marks said that she did not think it was similar to the material delivered to the campaign headquarters.) Marks was also shown the domestic policy briefing book, which has markings on both sides of the pages. After reviewing that book, Marks informed the subcommittee that she does not believe the material she saw had markings on both sides of the pages.

k. David A. Stockman

(A Michigan Congressman who played the role of President Carter in debate rehearsals with Governor Reagan; now Director of the Office of Management and Budget.)

Stockman believes he saw the "big book" and he could have seen the "Mondale papers". He does not recall seeing the condensed foreign policy book. He saw domestic material, some of which is similar to that contained in the domestic policy briefing book, but he does not recall seeing that document.

Stockman describes the "big book" as "consistent—both as to content and format . . ." with the material that he saw prior to the debate. With respect to the "Mondale papers", he does "not have a distinct recollection of the vast bulk of [the "Mondale papers"] . . ." However, he believes that the "Mondale papers" resemble the material that he saw prior to the debate.

The domestic material that Stockman saw is "similar" to the material included in the domestic policy briefing book, Part I(3), entitled "Carter Questions and Answers" on the "Economy", "Energy and Environment", "Overview", "Government" and "Human Needs". However, Stockman says that part of the domestic policy briefing book is "more tightly written and organized, and more addressed to specific debating points . . ." than the material he saw. The remainder of the domestic policy briefing book is not similar to the material he saw. [See app. I, p. 153.]

Stockman first saw the Carter material on October 23, 1980, when it was delivered by messenger from the Reagan Bush campaign to his Washington, D.C. office. The material was a "thick, unbound set of pages . . ." wrapped in a rubber band. It came with

other papers sent him by the Reagan Bush campaign. [See app. I, p. 140.] Stockman used Carter debate briefing material to assist him in preparing to play the role of President Carter in the Reagan Bush campaign debate rehearsals in Wexford, Virginia. In his affidavit, Stockman stated:

I used the papers among many others to prepare for my role as Carter's stand-in, in which I spoke during debate practice sessions for approximately two minutes per topic. As a Member of Congress, I had been a vocal critic of the Carter Administration on many of these issues and knew the arguments pro and con, I was somewhat less familiar with other issues. I found the short issue papers, written from the Carter Administration, perspective, useful in preparing outlines of the possible debate answers representing the Carter position. As noted, these papers were but one part of the material provided to me by the Reagan Bush campaign. I also made much use of the material prepared by the Reagan campaign in carrying out my debate role of challenging Governor Reagan's positions. [See app. III, p. 1231.]

William Van Cleave says that Stockman told him after a debate rehearsal session that the Carter material was of "great use" in preparing for the practice sessions. [See app. III, p. 1240.]

The Elkhart Truth (Elkhart, Indiana) and the Dowagiac Daily News (Dowagiac, Michigan) reported on October 29, 1980—the day after the debate between President Carter and Governor Reagan—that at a luncheon on the day of the debate Stockman had informed sixty five to seventy members and guests of the Cassopolis (Michigan) Optimist Club that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained a "pilfered" copy of President Carter's debate briefing book. Both papers reported that Stockman informed the audience that Carter would use five "white lies" to attack Reagan.

The Elkhart Truth stated:

Stockman outlined the "white lies" Carter was going to center on during the debate. Apparently the Reagan camp's "pilfered" goods were correct, as several times both candidates said almost word for word what Stockman predicted. The line of attack was exactly like the Michigan representative said it would be. [See app. I, p. 127.]

1. David Gerson

(The Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Stockman; currently Associate Director for Operations and Communications, Office of Management and Budget.)

Gerson saw the Carter debate briefing material that David Stockman received prior to the debate. Gerson reviewed the material on Stockman's desk for approximately five minutes after Stockman had already gone through the material. Gerson described the material as "a sheaf of papers . . . not in the original folder." The material was about two inches thick. He said the material covered a wide variety of subjects, both domestic and foreign, and came with other material.

m. George Will

(A syndicated columnist and news commentator who assisted Governor Reagan in preparing for his October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently a syndicated columnist and news commentator.)

Will saw the Carter debate material David Stockman received prior to the debate. Will says he reviewed the material for approximately thirty seconds in Stockman's Washington, D.C., home on October 25, 26, or 27, 1980. Will has no recollection as to whether the material he saw was domestic or foreign. He characterized the material as "political rhetoric" and "boilerplate statements".

2. Six Others Deny Seeing Carter Materials

Information received by the subcommittee indicates that six other persons connected with the Reagan Bush campaign saw Carter debate briefing material prior to the debate. These six, however, deny this. Those six persons, their campaign roles and current positions, who identified them as seeing, and their denials are discussed below.

a. William J. Casey

(The Director of the Reagan Bush campaign; currently Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.)

James Baker says that it is his "best recollection" that he received Carter debate briefing materials from Casey in Casey's campaign office in Arlington, Virginia. Baker states that he has "... absolutely no recollection" of receiving it from anyone else. Baker's account is confirmed by Margaret Tutwiler, who in essence says that Baker informed her several weeks prior to the October 28, 1980 debate that he had received Carter debate briefing material from Casey. [See app. III, p. 1236.] Baker confirms that he informed Tutwiler that Casey gave him the material. Baker does not know from whom Casey obtained the Carter debate briefing material. He says he did not ask Casey, or anyone else, this question during the 1980 campaign. [See app. III, p. 1085.]

Casey denies that he saw Carter debate briefing material during the Reagan Bush campaign. He states in a June 22, 1983 letter to Chairman Albosta:

I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make. [See app. I, p. 148.]

In his March 2, 1984 affidavit, he says:

Indeed as far as I can recollect, until June 1983, I did not know that materials prepared for President Carter's use in preparing for the debate had been in the possession of or been used by Reagan Bush campaign workers. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

With specific reference to the "big book" and the "Mondale papers", Casey stated in a June 28, 1983 memorandum to the President's Counsel, Fred Fielding:

I do not recognize them as anything I have seen before. A great many papers came to my desk during September and October of 1980. Any pile of papers two inches high would almost certainly have been set aside to be passed along to others in the campaign. However, if papers headed "Presidential Debates, Foreign Policy and National Security Issues" came in, I believe they would have caught my eye or would have been brought to my attention and I would not have forgotten, nor would I have forgotten if anyone came in and handed them to me. [See app. IV, p. 1905.]

Casey specifically denies that he received Carter debate briefing materials from Paul Corbin, a Washington consultant who performed services for the Reagan Bush campaign. Corbin's role is discussed below.

Casey says that during the campaign a large volume of papers came to his office "from all directions." After incoming documents were reviewed and screened by his campaign assistants and secretaries, he would sometimes read, but "more frequently look at" such documents to determine their nature and to direct them to the appropriate campaign staff for their use. Casey retained "general oversight" over the debate process, but relied on Baker and his staff to conduct the debate preparations. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

Casey said that when he was informed that Baker recalled receiving Carter debate briefing material from him, he checked with several of his campaign assistants and others who might be able to "refresh" his recollection or provide information about Carter debate briefing material. Casey says he did this because he recognized that he "routinely" passed along to Baker incoming material relating to the debate "frequently without reading or looking closely at them myself." In his affidavit he says:

Having made inquiry of the persons as set forth . . . above, to the best of my recollection I did not receive or pass on the Briefing Materials nor did I authorize or direct any person to obtain the Briefing Materials. [See app. III, p. 1103.]

Casey informed the New York Times in July 1983 that he would not have touched Carter debate briefing material during the 1980 campaign with a "ten-foot pole." He also said to the Times that the existence of Carter debate briefing materials in the Reagan Bush campaign could have "destroyed" that campaign and that those that knew about them were "remiss" for not bringing them to his attention. [See app. I, p. 161.]

b. Paul Corbin

(A consultant to the Reagan Bush campaign; currently owner of a Research Service.)

Tim Wyngaard, the executive director of the House Republican Policy Committee, has submitted an affidavit to the subcommittee. In it Wyngaard states that, in April 1983, he was informed in substance by Paul Corbin that Corbin had obtained briefing materials intended for President Carter's use in preparing for the debate

with Governor Reagan and provided these materials to William J. Casey, director of the Reagan campaign.

Wyngaard said that shortly thereafter he informed Representative Dick Cheney, chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, about his conversation with Corbin and did so again in June 1983 after the matter surfaced in the press. Wyngaard said he did not tell anyone else prior to June 1983 about his April 1983 conversation with Corbin. [See app. III, p. 1249.]

Cheney confirms the June 1983 conversation with Wyngaard. He does not specifically recall the May 1983 conversation, but acknowledges that such a conversation is possible.

In his affidavit, Corbin denies any involvement in the transfer of Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan Bush campaign prior to the October 28, 1980 debate. Further, he denies making any statement to Wyngaard that he was involved in the transfer of Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan Bush campaign. Corbin informed the subcommittee that, until June 1983, he had no knowledge that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. [See app. III, p. 1127.]

According to Baker's affidavit:

On June 20, 1983, Casey indicated to me that Corbin might have been a source of material from the Carter Administration or the 1980 Carter Mondale presidential campaign. [See app. III, p. 1085.]

Several days later Casey learned from Baker that a congressional staff member had said that Corbin claimed he had provided Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan Bush campaign. Casey subsequently contacted Corbin and asked him whether he had provided Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan Bush campaign. According to both Casey and Corbin, Corbin denied any involvement in the transfer of such Carter material to the Reagan Bush campaign.

Corbin had worked on various Kennedy and other Democratic campaigns before his involvement in the Reagan Bush effort. According to his account, he made telephone calls to encourage labor leaders and others to support Reagan and Bush in 1980, gave advice to campaign members, and went to Florida to assess the political situation and pass out campaign literature.

Mike Balzano, a labor coordinator for the Reagan Bush campaign, confirms that Corbin contacted union members in the Northeast region of the United States to encourage them to support the Reagan Bush ticket. The evidence also demonstrates that Corbin made a trip to Florida.

Records for the Reagan Bush campaign show that the campaign paid Corbin \$2,860 in 1980. A payment of \$1,500 was made on October 24, 1980, and a payment of \$1,360 was made on November 3, 1980. [See app. IV, p. 1913.]

Corbin submitted a November 3, 1980, bill for \$2,860 to the Reagan Bush campaign. The bill showed that \$1,500 had already been "paid on account." Neither Corbin nor the campaign provided a copy of a bill for \$1,500. Corbin's November 3, 1980 bill, however, requests \$2,700 for "research reports" regarding Florida and \$160 for telephone calls. [See app. IV, p. 1912] The subcommittee has not

located, and members of the Reagan Bush campaign do not remember, any research reports provided by Corbin. According to campaign records filed with the Federal Election Commission, the \$1,500 payment was for a "field trip" and the \$1,360 payment was for "professional services and telephone". [See app. IV, p. 1908.] During his interview, Corbin said that the payments he received from the Reagan Bush campaign were for reimbursements for the expenses he incurred while passing out campaign literature in Florida. His affidavit states that "\$2,700 was for political assessments and field trips and \$160 was for expenses." [See app. III, p. 1127.]

Corbin visited the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, on at least four occasions—September 29, 1980, October 11 and 25, 1980, and November 3, 1980. [See app. IV, p. 1914.] In addition, there were meetings scheduled for September 25, 1980, and October 10, 1980, that apparently never took place. [See app. IV, pp. 1919, 1920.]

Corbin met on September 29, 1980, first with Baker then with Casey. According to both Corbin and Casey, Corbin offered to contact labor leaders and unions and ask them to support Reagan and Bush.

Corbin visited the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters on October 11, 1980, for approximately one hour. Campaign records do not show whom Corbin visited on that date. These records do show that Corbin visited Casey's office on October 25, 1980, perhaps to pick up the check for \$1,500 dated October 24, 1980.

Corbin visited the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters on November 3, 1980, for approximately two hours. Campaign records show that Corbin visited Casey's office. According to Corbin, he gave Casey his November 3, 1980 bill on that date. Campaign records indicate that Corbin was paid \$1,360 on November 3, 1980.

Campaign records and other evidence also show that Corbin called William Timmons on several occasions. On one instance at Timmons' request, Corbin provided Timmons with information as to where Carter was scheduled to be at a certain time. This evidence should be compared to Corbin's affidavit where he states:

The only campaign officials at the Reagan Campaign headquarters for whom I performed any services were Mr. Casey, Mr. Baker, and a campaign labor coordinator whose name I cannot recall. [See app. III, p. 1127.]

Precisely what Corbin did in Florida for the campaign is unclear. In his affidavit he states:

At Mr. Bartlett's suggestion, I talked in Florida with Mr. Earl E. T. Smith, former ambassador to Cuba, who was associated with the Reagan Bush Campaign and who directed me to the Reagan Campaign headquarters in Palm Beach where I was provided with Reagan Campaign literature.

Yet Earl Smith and various officials from the Reagan Bush campaign headquarters in Palm Beach recall no contact with Corbin during the 1980 campaign. During FBI interviews, several Florida campaign officials expressed surprise that Corbin would have been

paid to distribute campaign literature because sufficient unpaid volunteers were available for this task.

Moreover, a social friend whom Corbin met while in Florida, Thomas O'Rourke, said that his impression was that Corbin was not really serious about distributing campaign material for the Reagan Bush campaign. In fact, Corbin asked O'Rourke to dispose of some relatively full boxes of Reagan Bush bumper stickers and campaign posters that were in Corbin's rental car.

Finally, as noted above, Corbin's November 3, 1980 bill was for "research reports" done in Florida. No such reports can be located.

C. Richard V. Allen

(The Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Reagan Bush campaign; later National Security Advisor to the President; currently head of the Richard V. Allen Company.)

On July 8, 1983, Carl Bernstein of ABC News reported on the ABC News "Nightline" program that Allen turned over Carter debate briefing material to William Van Cleave prior to the October 28, 1980 debate between President Carter and Governor Reagan. Bernstein reported that his source was Van Cleave and that Van Cleave was "positive" in his recollection that it was Allen who provided him with the material.

Bernstein also reported that Allen "... vigorously denies Van Cleave's assertions." Bernstein quoted Allen as saying "Mr. Van Cleave's recollection is in error. My memory is ironclad."

Van Cleave also contests Bernstein's report. He claimed that he informed Bernstein that he had probably received it from Dick Allen.

In his March 20, 1984 affidavit, Van Cleave said:

In October of 1980, while in my office at 905 16th Street NW, I received a black binder containing materials about one or two inches thick, in question and answer format which I understood to be debate briefing material prepared for President Carter.

I do not remember who delivered the material to me or to whom I gave it after I had received it. [See app. III, p. 1240.]

However, the Media General News Service reported in the Richmond Times-Dispatch on September 25, 1983, that:

In an interview with Media General several months ago, Allen said he saw the Carter briefing material.

"It was a silly thing," he said. "I saw it. It was of no practical consequence."

He added, "I didn't know if it was authentic . . . I didn't think it was cricket . . . it didn't dominate the preparation for the debate."

Mr. Allen's present position is that he did not have Carter debate briefing materials in his possession during the 1980 campaign. In his affidavit he says:

I did not see any briefing materials designed to be used by President Carter or Vice President Mondale at any time during the 1980 campaign.

I have no knowledge of any "intelligence operation" or any other effort on the part of the Reagan Bush campaign that was designed to obtain from the Carter Administration before the election information that was not duly authorized for release to the public or to the campaign. [See app. III, p. 1026.]

d. Stefan A. Halper

(The Director of Policy Coordination for the Reagan Bush campaign; later Deputy Director of the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; currently Chairman of the Palmer National Bank in Washington, D.C.)

In June 1983, Halper discussed his role in the 1980 campaign and the subject of Carter debate briefing material with Richard Darman, an assistant to the President. According to notes taken by Darman of that discussion, Halper appears to have claimed that he saw Carter debate briefing material during the 1980 campaign.

Included in Darman's notes are comments and phrases such as "seemed handled through a very private channel . . . it wasn't a big deal . . . we knew where Carter was coming from . . . no major revelation . . . weren't used in any extensive way . . . no surprises . . . I can't remember who gave it to me . . . I don't believe we reviewed the books in any great detail . . . there were 3 books . . . Carter was provided with whatever we had". Darman's notes, however, also include the sentence, "If they came to us, they were plopped in our lap." Another phrase says, "never saw any Carter . . ." an apparent reference to Carter foreign policy material. [See app. IV, p. 1922.]

Darman informed the subcommittee that his notes are a "fair representation" of what Halper stated. However, Darman also pointed out that his notes omit the questions to which the recorded comments respond, and may omit qualifying comments by Halper. Darman also said that the notes may contain his own conclusions. For example, he says that the phrase, "There were 3 books," may have been Darman's conclusion not Halper's.

Halper informed the subcommittee that he had told Darman that he did not remember seeing Carter debate briefing material during the campaign. After being read Darman's notes by the subcommittee, Halper said his discussion with Darman was hurried and that it was possible that Darman may have misunderstood him. With respect to the number of briefing books, there likely would have been three books, foreign policy, domestic policy, and economic policy.

As discussed earlier, Doug Bandow says that Halper showed him a one-page document relating to energy issues. According to Bandow, Halper said the document came from the "other side." Halper says he has no recollection of showing Bandow such a document.

The Media General News Service reported in the Richmond Times Dispatch on June 23, 1983, that Halper had seen the Carter debate briefing material. The article stated:

Stefan Halper, a researcher in the campaign, has said the briefing book passed through his hands.

Halper said he didn't now where the book came from or what he did with it. [See app. I, p. 159.]

The Media General News Service also reported in the Winston-Salem Journal on July 14, 1983, that Halper had informed the Media General several weeks earlier that:

Halper was sure he had had the material.

"I don't know if it came from the Republican National Committee, the Democratic National Committee or some secretary," Halper said at the time. "There was nothing in there that we didn't know."

"We had tons of material being offered to the campaign," he said. "I don't believe I spent two or three minutes with it."

"I doubt I was the first person (in the Reagan campaign) to see it," He added. "I don't know where it came from."

Halper said during that interview that he didn't know what he did with the material.

"I probably put it in the out box." He said he could have sent it to people involved in preparing Reagan for the debate. He said that the material "might have been useful" to then-Rep. David Stockman. Stockman, now the administration's budget chief, has said that he used the Carter papers in rehearsal debates with Reagan.

In a subsequent interview, Halper was less certain about the briefing material.

"I believe that I saw some typewritten 'Q and A' type pages," he said. "I think that I saw some typewritten pages, but I cannot swear to you that I did."

Halper denies seeing Carter debate briefing material or making statements to Darmon or a reporter that he had. In his February 10, 1984 affidavit he states:

During the 1980 Reagan Bush presidential campaign, I do not recall seeing any information or material designed to be used to brief President Carter for his October 28, 1980 debate with Governor Reagan. I have never made any statements to anyone . . . that in 1980 I received or saw information or material designed to be used to brief President Carter for his October 28, 1980 debate with Governor Reagan. [See app. III, p. 1167.]

e. Charles S. Crawford III

(An assistant to Robert Gray, the Reagan Bush campaign's Deputy Director for communications; currently Executive Vice President of Gray and Company in Washington, D.C.)

Mark Ashworth informed the subcommittee that, during the second or third week in October 1980, Crawford asked him to copy what Ashworth described as Democratic material on domestic and economic issues. According to Ashworth, the material was approximately 60 pages and was from either the Carter administration or the 1980 Carter-Mondale campaign. [See app. III, p. 1080.]

Crawford denies seeing Carter material during the 1980 campaign and denies asking Ashworth to copy material from either the

Carter administration or the Carter-Mondale campaign. When he met with the subcommittee, Crawford initially did not remember Ashworth. He later recognized Ashworth when shown Ashworth's picture. He is certain that he did not ask Ashworth to copy Carter briefing material as Ashworth claims and has so stated in an affidavit submitted to the subcommittee. [See app. III, p. 1130.]

Carol Darr, who was assistant counsel to the Carter Mondale campaign, says that Crawford informed her approximately seven to ten days before the October 28, 1980, debate that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. According to Darr, Crawford described the material as a debate book. [See app. III, p. 1135.] Darr and Crawford had known each other for several years prior to 1980. Darr, however, does not know why Crawford informed her that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained the Carter material. Darr says that she indicated her disbelief to Crawford and he "reaffirmed this statement".

Approximately seven days prior to the debate, Darr informed Tim Smith, the Counsel to the Carter Mondale campaign, of what Crawford had said. Darr did not identify Crawford to Smith. According to Darr, Smith did not believe the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material, and indicated to Darr that he believed her source was "pulling her leg."

Smith recalls the conversation with Darr regarding the Carter debate briefing material. He does not recall what he said to Darr, but believes that his reaction would likely have been to disbelieve that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material.

In his affidavit, Crawford denies making the statement reported by Darr. He states:

It is not true that I told her during the campaign that the Reagan Bush campaign had Carter's debate briefing book because I had no such knowledge. [See app. III, p. 1130.]

f. Emily Ford

(A scheduler for George Bush in the Reagan Bush campaign; currently Executive Assistant to John Rogers, the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration.)

Mark Ashworth informed the subcommittee that, sometime during October 1980, Ford asked him to copy approximately 20 to 40 pages that Ashworth says was domestic policy material from either the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign. [See app. III, p. 1080.]

In an affidavit, Ford denies asking Ashworth to copy material from either the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign. She says that on a number of occasions she asked Ashworth to make copies of George Bush's schedules that often ranged from five and forty pages in length. [See app. III, p. 1147.]

3. Seven Admit Hearing About Carter Briefing Material

Seven members of the Reagan Bush campaign admit hearing prior to the October 28, 1980, debate that the campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. The seven campaign staff-

ers, their campaign roles and current positions, and what they heard are discussed below.

a. Richard Allen

(The Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Reagan Bush campaign; later National Security Advisor to the President; currently head of the Richard V. Allen Company.)

While at rehearsals for the October 28, 1980, debate, Allen heard an unidentified person blurt out that the Reagan campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. [See app. III, p. 1076.] Allen stated, “. . . it was loud enough for a number of people to hear.” None of the persons interviewed by the subcommittee and the FBI remembers hearing such a remark.

b. Fred C. Ikle

(A Foreign Policy Advisor to Richard V. Allen; currently Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.)

Ikle heard reference from an unidentified source sometime prior to the October 28, 1980 debate that the campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. He believes he heard about this while in Richard Allen's office in Washington, D.C.

c. Myles Martel

(A debate consultant to the Reagan Bush campaign; currently heads Martel & Associates, executive communications consultants.)

Martel was told by Frank Hodsoll on October 26, 1980, that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. Martel says that Hodsoll did not describe the material, nor did he discuss the source of the material.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported on June 23, 1983, that Martel said that Hodsoll claimed that the campaign had “hundreds of pages” of Carter's debate briefing material. The same article also reported that Martel was told by Hodsoll that the material was “fed” to the campaign. [See app. I, p. 159.]

Martel says that he does not remember if Hodsoll stated the material was hundreds of pages in length and he denies making such a statement to a reporter for the Richmond Times-Dispatch. Martel also says that the word “fed” was his and not Hodsoll's.

d. Dean Burch

(Chief of Staff to George Bush during Reagan Bush campaign; currently in the practice of law in Washington, D.C.)

Burch heard prior to the October 28, 1980 debate that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. Burch does not know from whom he heard about the material, but believes that he learned this from James Baker.

e. Margaret Tutwiler

(Director of Scheduling for George Bush during the Reagan Bush campaign; currently Special Assistant to the President.)

Tutwiler was informed by James Baker several weeks prior to the October 28, 1980, debate that he had received Carter debate briefing material from William Casey. Baker remembers telling

Tutwiler about the material about one day after he received the material from Casey.

In her affidavit Tutwiler states:

During the 1980 campaign I had a conversation with James A. Baker, III, during which he told me, in essence, that he (Baker) had received Carter campaign or briefing materials from William J. Casey, which he (Baker) passed on to the Reagan debate people. However, I do not recall Mr. Baker's exact words.

I do remember that he and I were wearing casual clothing during the discussion so I think that the conversation took place on a weekend rather than during the work week. I also remember that the conversation took place in Mr. Baker's 4th floor office. I was in Mr. Baker's office on normal routine business probably having to do with the travel of Ambassador George Bush. I was not called to Mr. Baker's office to specifically discuss the briefing book. The part of our meeting that was devoted to discussing the briefing book could have lasted anywhere from five to fifteen minutes in length. I do not remember the exact amount of time that I was in Mr. Baker's office on this day. I did not see the materials he referred to.

I do not remember the sense of heightened expectation that I associate with the period immediately preceding the debate. For this reason I think the conversation took place several weeks before the debate.

I did not attach great importance to the conversation and I remember Mr. Baker disparaging the value of the Carter materials. However I did consider the information to be a campaign secret. [See app. III, p. 1236.]

f. Ben Eshleman

(A researcher who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for the October 28, 1980 debate; later with the Department of Energy and currently in private enterprise in Texas.)

Eshleman heard "numerous rumors" from unidentified sources that the Reagan Bush campaign had obtained Carter debate briefing material. He heard no characterizations of the material except that it had been "given" rather than "stolen."

g. Jackie Tillman

(A researcher who assisted in the preparation of Governor Reagan's briefing book for his October 28, 1980 debate with President Carter; currently an executive assistant to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.)

Tillman says that she has a "vague and uncertain" recollection that David Gergen informed her on October 25, 1980, that someone had come over from the Carter Mondale campaign by taxi to the Reagan Bush headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, bringing Carter debate briefing material. [See app. III, p. 1234.] According to Tillman, Gergen did not describe the person who delivered the material.

Gergen informed the subcommittee that he does not recall anything about this purported delivery of the Carter material. Nor

does he recall making any statement to Tillman about the Reagan Bush campaign obtaining Carter material.

D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CARTER DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIALS IN THE REAGAN BUSH CAMPAIGN

It is difficult to reach definitive conclusions as to how the Carter debate briefing materials entered the Reagan Bush campaign and to determine precisely who had access to them. This is so for a variety of reasons.

First, the subcommittee cannot be certain as to exactly what Carter debate briefing materials were in the Reagan Bush campaign. To be sure, the Reagan Bush campaign had the "big book" and the "Mondale papers"; these documents were found in Ger-gen's and Hodsoll's files and were released by the White House in June 1983. It also appears, however, that the Reagan Bush campaign had some version of the Carter domestic briefing book—perhaps not the final effort, but at least an earlier draft. Stockman in his affidavit affirms that he saw domestic materials; so do Hodsoll and Ashworth. Moreover, some evidence indicates that the condensed foreign policy briefing book was in the campaign. The statements of Ashworth and Lang lead to this conclusion. Van Cleave in his affidavit indicates that he saw either the condensed foreign policy briefing book or the "big book", but he is not certain which.

As this chapter indicates, the subcommittee has proceeded on the reasoned assumption that the "big book" and "Mondale papers" were taken from the Carter White House at the same time. Indeed, Hodsoll, who found both in his files, does not recall receiving these sets of materials at different times. However, if the condensed foreign policy briefing book and some version of Carter's domestic briefing book were in the Reagan Bush campaign, as seems possible, it is by no means certain that those documents arrived at the same time as the "big book" or the "Mondale papers".

Other evidence appears to indicate that Carter debate briefing materials came into the Reagan Bush campaign at different times. There is evidence (1) that Corbin delivered briefing material to Reagan Bush Campaign Director Casey, (2) that a "clean-cut young man"—a description not fit by Corbin—delivered Carter debate briefing materials to Marks, a receptionist in the executive offices of the Reagan Bush campaign, and (3) that Carter debate briefing materials were brought to the Reagan Bush campaign in a taxi shortly before the October 28 Carter Reagan debate.

Secondly, definitive conclusions are difficult to reach because of the welter of contradictions in testimony the subcommittee has faced and because of the failure by many Reagan Bush campaign aides to recollect any information or conversation about the source of the Carter debate briefing materials. The subcommittee respectfully disagrees with the Department of Justice that "[a]ny seeming inconsistencies [in testimony] could be explained by differences in recollection or interpretation." For example, Baker clearly remembers receiving Carter materials from Casey. Casey says he doesn't recall seeing the materials, but in a June 28, 1983 memorandum to the President's Counsel, Fred Fielding, he stated:

[I]f papers marked Presidential Debates, Foreign Policy and nation Security Issues¹ came in, I believe they would have caught my eye and would have been brought to my attention and I would not have forgotten, nor would I have forgotten if anyone came in and handed them to me." [See app. IV, p. 1905.]²

The subcommittee believes that Casey, as he says, would remember seeing Carter materials. The conflict between Casey and Baker thus cannot be dismissed as a mere failure of recollection by one party or the other.

Moreover, the subcommittee does not find it credible that none of the numerous Reagan Bush campaign aides who admit seeing the Carter debate briefing materials can remember any conversation or information about the source of those materials. The subcommittee also considers it difficult to believe that the Carter debate briefing materials would have been accepted and used unless the Reagan Bush campaign aides involved had confidence as to the authenticity of the documents and the source's ability to keep a confidence. Casey himself told the New York Times that the presence of the Carter debate briefing materials in the Reagan Bush campaign "could have destroyed the campaign."³ Campaign workers, he said, were "remiss" for not bringing the presence of the materials to his attention.

It is also clear, despite some protestations to the contrary, that the Carter debate briefing materials were used by the Reagan Bush campaign in an important way. As examination of a memorandum prepared by Hodsoll for his attorney⁴ indicates that the Carter debate briefing materials influenced the final content of the Reagan debate book. [See app. IV, p. 1898.] In addition, Stockman has said that he found the Carter debate briefing materials "useful" in preparing under time pressures for his role as a Carter stand-in. Indeed, Van Cleave stated under oath that Stockman told him that the Carter debate briefing materials were of "great use" in this regard.

In summary, the subcommittee believes that it has not fully resolved the question of the source or sources of the Carter debate briefing materials because at least one Reagan Bush campaign aide—and perhaps more—has provided untruthful answers to its inquiries.

However, despite the obstacles encountered by the subcommittee, it does believe that the available evidence supports several important conclusions.

The subcommittee finds that the better evidence indicates that Carter debate briefing materials—probably the "big book" and the

¹ This was the title of the "big book" found in Hodsoll's files.

² Casey made similar statements to the New York Times which are recorded in an article published on July 6, 1983. [See app. I, p. 161.]

³ Also relevant is Casey's purported speculation to Baker in June 1983 that Corbin might have provided him some Carter debate briefing materials. Casey also spoke with Tony Dolan about Corbin and called Corbin in Aruba in June 1983, allegedly to determine if Corbin had provided him with Carter debate briefing materials.

⁴ The FBI found Baker's fingerprints on the "Mondale papers" located in Hodsoll's files. Casey's prints did not appear on the "big book" or "Mondale papers" found in Hodsoll's and Gergen's files. As noted previously, the absence of fingerprints does not prove that a document was not handled by the individual in question.

"Mondale papers"—entered the Reagan Bush campaign through its director, Casey. This conclusion is not lightly reached but seems appropriate for several reasons.

Baker stated under oath that he received Carter debate briefing materials from Casey. Baker is corroborated by the testimony of another witness, Tutwiler, who has stated under oath that Baker in essence told her before the Carter-Reagan debate that he had received Carter debate briefing materials from Casey. Although Tutwiler is admittedly a loyal Baker aide, the subcommittee finds her a credible witness who provided significant support for Baker's testimony.

Moreover, another witness, Wyngaard, executive director of House Republican Policy Committee, has said under oath that—in April 1983 before the briefing book story broke in the press—Corbin, a Washington consultant, told him that he had provided Carter debate briefing materials to Casey. While Corbin vigorously denies saying this to Wyngaard, and further denies that he provided any information or materials from the Carter White House to the Reagan Bush campaign, the subcommittee finds Wyngaard's testimony credible. Wyngaard is a respected congressional aide to the House Republican leadership, whose honesty and veracity are held in high repute. No reason appears why Wyngaard would want to testify falsely about this matter. Indeed, considering the awkward position his testimony might place him in, he had good reason to remain quiet rather than to provide relevant information to appropriate authorities.

Although a Kennedy Democrat for many years, Corbin performed services for the Reagan Bush campaign. Apparently, his affiliation with that campaign was prompted in part by his animus toward President Carter. He admits providing some memorandum by former Robert Kennedy aide, Adam Walinsky.

Statements by various people contacted by the subcommittee indicated that Corbin's reputation for veracity is uneven. Moreover, the subcommittee received evidence demonstrating a lack of candor on his part regarding the matters under investigation. Corbin told the subcommittee in a sworn affidavit that he only performed services for Casey, Baker and a campaign labor group coordinator whose name he cannot recall. Yet the telephone logs of William Timmons, the campaign's deputy director for political operations, indicate that Corbin provided Timmons information about Carter's schedules.

Other evidence also called into question the accuracy of Corbin's statements to the subcommittee and FBI about the matters under investigation. The Reagan Bush campaign paid Corbin \$2,860. The invoice for his services indicates that the sum was for "research reports" and \$160 was for telephone calls. No written research reports have been found, none are recalled, and it appears that Corbin prepared none.

In his affidavit Corbin says the sum paid was for "political assessments and field trips." In his interview with the subcommittee and the FBI, he said he was paid to travel to Florida to pass out leaflets in condominiums around Palm Beach. Corbin did go to Florida, but appears to have done little work for the Reagan Bush campaign. Various Republican leaders in South Florida interviewed by the subcommittee and the FBI, who likely would have known about his campaign activities, have never heard of him or did not know he was in Florida at that time. These persons ex-

pressed surprise that anyone would be paid to pass out leaflets in their areas since numerous volunteers were available. One individual Corbin did meet with socially in Florida, Thomas O'Rourke, said that Corbin asked him to dispose of Reagan Bush bumper stickers and campaign posters in Corbin's rental car that had hardly been touched. It appears to the subcommittee either that Corbin was paid for something else by the Reagan Bush campaign or that he neglected to perform the services for which he was paid.

Because of the above facts and reasoning, the subcommittee cannot dismiss the possibility that Corbin gave Carter debate briefing materials to Casey. The subcommittee makes this statement although it is unable to state how Corbin may have obtained those materials himself.

The evidence also suggests that Casey may have received Carter debate briefing materials from other sources. Marks said she sent a "clean-cut young man" with what she now believes were Carter debate briefing materials to either Casey or Baker. [See app. III, p. 1199.] Also interesting are the close relationships between Casey and Dolan and between Dolan and Jennings, the Security Officer for the National Security Council. Jennings had access to the "big book" and the "Mondale papers" and was accused by Richard Allen of providing the campaign with portions of National Security Council evening reports.⁵ As shown in chapter 3, during the campaign Dolan made efforts to obtain another confidential document from the White House (but not apparently from Jennings). The subcommittee hastens to add however, that there is no direct evidence showing that Carter debate briefing materials moved from Jennings to Dolan to Casey. Additionally, all three of these persons have denied this scenario.

A final element of evidence leading the subcommittee to believe that Carter debate briefing materials entered the Reagan Bush campaign through Casey is that Casey was seeking material from the Carter camp. The minutes of a September 12, 1980 "Deputies Meeting" state that Casey then said that he "wants more material from the Carter Camp and wants it circulated." As shown in chapter 3, this statement came after Casey already had received nonpublic Government information from campaign aide Dolan and apparently learned about nonpublic Carter Mondale campaign material from Hugel.⁶ Casey's statement on September 12 should be compared to his statement in his June 28 memorandum to Fielding:

Until recent disclosures, I did not know that the campaign had any material from the Carter camp that was not publicly available.

As I have already written to Congressman Albosta, the campaign management never contemplated, directed or authorized seeking any inside information from the Carter camp.

Given the evidence presented above, the subcommittee has difficulty accepting these statements.

⁵ See ch. 4, p. 92.

⁶ See pp. 40.

CHAPTER 5—LEGAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE TRANSFERS OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION DISCOVERED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT ETHICS PROGRAMS AND OTHER LAW

I. SYNOPSIS

The Human Resources Subcommittee has jurisdiction over, among other things, the Standards of Conduct that govern Federal employees and the Ethics in Government Act. This chapter examines the facts found by the subcommittee's investigation to determine whether the standards of conduct have been transgressed and to determine how the Ethics in Government Act applies in these circumstances.

The facts discovered by the subcommittee's investigation are set forth in great detail in preceding chapters of this report. In summary, the facts show that:

1. Carter briefing materials were transferred in unauthorized fashion from the Carter White House to the Reagan Bush campaign.

2. Other Carter administration and Carter Mondale campaign documents and information were transferred in unauthorized fashion to the Reagan Bush campaign.

3. Officials in the Reagan Bush campaign received and used briefing and other materials from the Carter administration or the Carter Mondale campaign, which had been transferred to the Reagan Bush campaign in an unauthorized manner. These materials and information were received and used with knowledge of their origin.

From these facts the subcommittee has reached several principal conclusions:

1. The Standards of Conduct that govern Federal employees were violated by the unauthorized transfer of Carter administration documents and information to the Reagan Bush campaign. This appears so not only because specific provisions in relevant Standards of Conduct were contravened, but also because criminal laws specifically incorporated by the standards may have been violated.

2. The subcommittee cannot agree with the Department of Justice that the facts regarding the briefing materials present no "specific, credible information of a federal crime". In this regard, the subcommittee also disagrees with the Department's conclusion that the briefing materials did not include Federal Government property. Both the taking and the receiving of

Federal property, or other property entrusted to Federal employees, may constitute a Federal crime.

3. The subcommittee believes—as is indicated by the opinion regarding this matter by District Judge Harold Greene—that the Department of Justice ignored the Ethics in Government Act by refusing to initiate a “preliminary investigation” into the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the Carter briefing materials to the Reagan Bush campaign.

4. Moreover, the subcommittee finds that further investigation of possible crimes relating to this matter is warranted. The subcommittee also concludes that the appointment of an Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act is necessary to conduct the additional investigative work, to evaluate the evidence ultimately discovered, and to make independent, objective decisions as to prosecution. The Independent Counsel should examine, among other things, whether false statements were made to the subcommittee and FBI during their investigations.

5. Several changes are needed in existing law, and in the administration of existing law, to ensure that the Standards of Conduct that govern Federal employees are fully understood and obeyed.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

While the term “ethics in government” refers to an ideal, there are statutes and regulations that mandate ethical conduct by Federal employees. These laws establish Standards of Conduct, penalties for violations of those standards, and procedures for taking action against violators. At the center of this set of statutes and regulations is the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Public Law 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).

The Ethics in Government Act was a result of Congress’ determination that the unethical behavior of the Watergate episode must not be allowed again. The act created an Office of Government Ethics, a system for the disclosure of potential financial conflicts of interest, and a process for the appointment of a special prosecutor, now referred to as an Independent Counsel, to investigate allegations that high government or former campaign officials had committed crimes and to prosecute those crimes if necessary.

The Ethics Act gave the Office of Government Ethics the responsibility and powers to ensure that the ethics program of each executive branch agency functions properly. This includes the duty to see that the Standards of Conduct for Federal officials and employees are understood and enforced.

The Standards of Conduct are regulations that embody in objective and legally binding terms the ideals declared in the Code of Ethics for Government Service.¹ These regulations set out the

¹ Established by Concurrent Resolution, H. Con. Res. 175, 72 Stat. B12, July 11, 1958; originally reported from the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and reaffirmed by Public Law 96-303, 94 Stat. 855 (1980), which provided for the code to be displayed in Federal buildings. See H.R. No. 1073 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980). The Code of Ethics follows:

Continued

duties of Federal employees and officials. They are quite specific concerning the obligations of Federal employees with regard to Government documents and information. The standards also refer specifically to certain criminal laws and other statutory prohibitions that place additional duties and obligations on Federal employees and officials. The statutes listed include the criminal prohibitions against stealing, converting or embezzling Government property, or using or receiving stolen or converted Government property.

The jurisdiction of the Human Resources Subcommittee covers the Standards of Conduct that govern Federal employees and the Ethics in Government Act.² This jurisdiction gives the subcommittee both the authority and the responsibility to inquire into how Carter briefing materials and other Federal Government property and information were transferred to the 1980 Reagan Bush campaign.

III. THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

The law controlling the conduct of Federal Government employees and officials is a fairly wide body of law. It includes the regulations of specific agencies, general standards of conduct covering most Federal employees, numerous civil statutes and regulations adopted under those statutes, and criminal statutes. These laws also affect persons who are not Federal employees as these persons interact with the Government and its employees and officials. Within this broad body of law are specific standards concerning misuse of Government information and property.

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11222

In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11222, prescribing standards of ethical conduct for Government officers and employees. The order also established a system for reporting financial interests, and vested in the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for issuing, in conjunction with each agency head, ap-

ANY PERSON IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHOULD

I. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or Government department.

II. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and regulations of the United States and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.

III. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving earnest effort and best thought to the performance of duties.

IV. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.

V. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept, for himself or herself or for family members, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be constructed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of governmental duties.

VI. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a Government employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty.

VII. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly, which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of governmental duties.

VIII. Never use any information gained confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as a means of making private profit.

IX. Expose corruption wherever discovered.

X. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust.

² Under this jurisdiction, the subcommittee approved amendments to the Ethics in Government Act and the reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics in the spring of 1983. These amendments were signed into law on Nov. 11, 1983, Public Law 98-150, 97 Stat. 959 (1983). See H. Rept. 98-89 pt. 2, 1st sess., May 16, 1983.

propriate regulations to implement both the standards and the financial reporting system.³

This Executive order is still in force. The Office of Government Ethics has assumed the responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission for purposes of the order.

B. THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

Some of the most important legal standards for Federal employees are found in the general standards of conduct in Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 735, entitled "Employee Responsibilities and Conduct." These regulations, originally issued by the U.S. Civil Service Commission (Office of Personnel Management) establish certain standards and refer to others found in regulations and in specific statutes, both civil and criminal. These regulations also establish procedures for informing employees about the requirements of these laws.

Under these regulations, each agency issues its own regulations covering its employees to implement part 735.⁴ The regulations of the agencies must be consistent with part 735, other laws generally, and Executive Order 11222.⁵

These regulations include the following provisions:

§ 735.201a Proscribed actions.

An employee shall avoid any action, whether or not specifically prohibited by this subchapter which might result in, or create the appearance of:

- (a) Using public office for private gain;
- (b) Giving preferential treatment to any person;
- (c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
- (d) Losing complete independence or impartiality;
- (e) Making a Government decision outside official channels; or
- (f) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government.

§ 735.205 Use of Government property.

An employee shall not directly or indirectly use, or allow the use of, Government property of any kind, including property leased to the Government, for other than officially approved activities. An employee has a positive duty to protect and conserve Government property, including equipment, supplies, and other property entrusted or issued to him.

§ 735.206 Misuse of information.

For the purpose of furthering a private interest, an employee shall not, except as provided in § 735.203(c), directly

³ May 11, 1965, 30 F.R. 6469.

⁴ This process allows the agencies to take into account more specific Executive orders and other laws which pertain to that agency's particular functions. (Secs. 735.101, 735.104 (1983).)

⁵ 5 CFR 735.103 provides that these standards of conduct are not directly applicable to members of the uniformed services, but that "each agency having jurisdiction over members of the uniformed services shall issue regulations covering those members . . . in a manner consistent with the Executive Order (11222) and this part (part 735)."

or indirectly use, or allow the use of, official information obtained through or in connection with his Government employment which has not been made available to the general public.⁶

§ 735.209 General conduct prejudicial to the Government.

An employee shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government.

§ 735.210 Miscellaneous statutory provisions.

Each employee shall acquaint himself with each statute that relates to his ethical and other conduct as an employee of his agency and of the Government. An agency shall direct the attention of its employees, by specific reference in the agency regulations issued under this part, to each statute relating to the ethical and other conduct of employees of that agency and to the following statutory provisions:

- (a) House Concurrent Resolution 175, 85th Congress, 2d session, 72A Stat. B12, the "Code of Ethics for Government Service".
- (b) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code, relating to bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest, as appropriate to the employees concerned.
- (c) The prohibition against lobbying with appropriated funds (18 U.S.C. 1913).
- (d) The prohibitions against disloyalty and striking (5 U.S.C. 7311, 18 U.S.C. 1918).
- (e) The prohibition against the employment of a member of a Communist organization (50 U.S.C. 784).
- (f) The prohibitions against (1) the disclosure of classified information (18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 783); and (2) the disclosure of confidential information (18 U.S.C. 1905).
- (g) The provision relating to the habitual use of intoxicants to excess (5 U.S.C. 7352).
- (h) The prohibition against the misuse of a Government vehicle (31 U.S.C. 638a(c)).
- (i) The prohibition against the misuse of the franking privilege (18 U.S.C. 1719).
- (j) The prohibition against the use of deceit in an examination or personnel action in connection with Government employment (18 U.S.C. 1917).
- (k) The prohibition against fraud or false statements in a Government matter (18 U.S.C. 1001).
- (l) The prohibition against mutilating or destroying a public record (18 U.S.C. 2071).
- (m) The prohibition against counterfeiting and forging transportation requests (18 U.S.C. 508).

⁶ A similar regulation prohibits the use of inside information by special Government employees who are temporary and/or part time employees. (Sec. 735.303.) The Office of Personnel Management recently has added a paragraph to its own regulations to point out that this prohibition may not be used against good faith "whistleblower." (5 CFR 1001.735-302.)

(n) The prohibitions against (1) embezzlement of Government money or property (18 U.S.C. 641); (2) failing to account for public money (18 U.S.C. 643); and (3) embezzlement of the money or property of another person in the possession of an employee by reason of his employment (18 U.S.C. 654).

(o) The prohibition against unauthorized use of documents relating to claims from or by the Government (18 U.S.C. 285).

(p) The prohibitions against political activities in subchapter III of chapter 73 of title 5, United States Code and 18 U.S.C. 602, 603, 607, and 608.

(q) The prohibition against an employee acting as the agent of a foreign principal registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (18 U.S.C. 219).

The first section of the regulations is in some ways the most important. Government employees and officials have an affirmative duty to avoid actions that create the appearance of unethical conduct or affect adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government.

However, since it appears that Carter briefing materials and other administration documents were removed from the White House or the Executive Office complex, the regulations prohibiting the misuse of Government property and information (subsecs. 205 and 206) are the most specifically relevant.⁷

The Standards of Conduct for White House employees are of particular interest. Essentially the same Standards of Conduct that apply to the employees of executive branch agencies apply to the Executive Office of the President. However, these standards for White House employees and officials are presented in somewhat greater detail in title 3 of the Code at section 100.735.

The identities of the Federal employees involved in the transfer of Carter briefing materials are not known. The "sergeant" who transferred White House documents to Daniel Jones is not known. Nonetheless, it clearly appears from the evidence that:

1. These transfers were unauthorized, and
2. The applicable Standards of Conduct were violated by these unauthorized transfers.⁸

C. CRIMINAL STATUTES CITED IN THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

The Standards of Conduct state: "An employee shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government."⁹ Moreover, the regulations specifically incorporate a number of statutes "... relating to the ethical and other conduct of employees ..." and direct that:

Each employee shall acquaint himself with each statute that relates to his ethical and other conduct as an employ-

⁷ Due to the fact that there is no readily available index of cases involving violations of the standards set out in pt. 735, it is difficult to determine exactly how these have been generally applied.

⁸ As discussed below, the briefing materials were in large part Government property.

⁹ 5 CFR 735.209.

ee of his agency and of the Government. An agency shall direct the attention of its employees, by specific reference in the agency regulations issued under this part, to each statute relating to the ethical and other conduct of employees of that agency and to the following statutory provisions . . .

As noted above, the regulations then cite several specific criminal statutes, a number of which are relevant to the unauthorized transfer of documents and information during the 1980 Presidential campaign.

The subcommittee must thus ask whether the transfer of the Carter briefing papers was a violation of criminal law since, to the extent any Federal employee was a party to such a violation, that employee acted in violation of the Standards of Conduct as well. While the subcommittee has no intentions of ruling that a specific individual committed a crime, the issue of whether a crime was committed, and thus ethical violations occurred, is clearly within its oversight jurisdiction and worthy of comment.

1. 18 U.S.C. 641: Theft, embezzlement or conversion of Government property

The Standards of Conduct specifically refer to statutes prohibiting the embezzlement, stealing, purloining or conversion of Government property (18 U.S.C. 641) or the property of another person in the possession of an employee by reason of his Government employment (18 U.S.C. 654).¹⁰

Section 641 provides:

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or

Whoever receives conceals or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted—

Shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of \$100, he shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, whichever, is greater.

A copy or a Government document or record, even a photocopy made on Government paper and equipment, is Government property for purposes of section 641. *United States v. DiGilio*, 538 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1976) cert denied, 429 U.S. 1038. In *United States v. Hubbard*, 474 F. Supp. 64, 80 (D.D.C. 1979), the court found that copies made from Government resources are owned by the Govern-

¹⁰ 5 CFR 735.210(n).

ment. The *Hubbard* court took pains to distinguish between the unauthorized copying or removal of Government documents and the mere discussion of Government information outside the employment context, which generally would not come within the scope of section 641.¹¹

There is no evidence that the documents received and used by the Reagan Bush campaign were copied on private machines from Government documents that were then returned to their rightful places. The Presidential briefing documents transferred apparently were produced on White House copying machines.¹² Therefore, a distinction between property and information as it pertains to the briefing papers and other transferred documents is not determinative here. Moreover, other cases indicate that even information developed for and presented to the President, or other Government information, could be considered Government property, or "thing of value," for purposes of section 641. See in particular *United States v. Lambert* 446 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1978), *aff'd sub nom. United States v. Girard*, 601 F. 2d 69, (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 871, which was decided 2 months after the *Hubbard* case.¹³

As discussed in the chapter on the preparation of the briefing papers, there are a number of facts indicating that the Carter briefing papers were Government property:

(1) They were prepared and kept in the Old Executive Office Building and/or the White House.

(2) Their preparation was supervised in part by Government employees acting in their official capacity and they were typed in part by Government employees working on Government time.

(3) White House Counsel's opinion was that they were in large part Government documents on which the White House staff could work as part of their regular jobs. More specifically, his contemporaneous opinion was that the portions of the papers defending the President's positions and policies were Government property.

(4) The Mondale foreign policy briefing papers, which were received by the Reagan Bush campaign and released in 1983 by the White House, were in part copies made from the Vice President's working briefing book, which was maintained and updated throughout his years in office. These were not re-worked especially for the debate.

However, there are also facts indicating that some persons of the National Security Council staff thought the briefing books would be primarily political as opposed to governmental. In addition:

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² See FBI lab report reproduced in app. V. This report concludes that some of the materials found in the files of former Reagan Bush debate team members were reproduced not on the copy machines of the type used at the Reagan Bush campaign but on the type of machine used in the Carter White House.

¹³ See also, *United States v. May* 625 F. 2d 186 (8th Cir. 1980); *United States v. Friedman*, 445 F.2d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied sub. nom., *Jacobs v. United States*, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). Cf. *United States v. Bottone*, 365 F.2d 389, (2d Cir. 1966) cert. denied 385 U.S. 974 (1966) applying this rationale to private information in Government custody. For a thoughtful analysis of the application of sec. 641 to the briefing papers, the development of the "Information Rationale," and the effect of the Standards of Conduct on its application, see memorandum by Frederick W. Ford, Esq., for the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 1983, reprinted in app. VI, pp. 2171-2196.

(1) The condensed foreign policy book and the earlier, larger version ("foreign policy big book") were written primarily by Senate staff and typed partially by volunteers who worked after hours.

(2) The briefing materials were used to prepare the President for a debate designed to inform the voters in the Presidential election.

Even if there were portions of the books prepared purely for political reasons, this would not necessarily mean that the rest of the books were not governmental in nature. An incumbent President's statements in a debate on foreign and domestic policies are listened to around the world and serve purposes beyond their impact on voters. The Government has a legitimate interest in seeing that the President is as well informed as possible for any statements he will make.

The Presidential Records Act of 1978 declares that the United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession and control of all Presidential records.¹⁴ The provisions of the act did not take effect until January 20, 1981. However, the act was an expression of the Federal property interest in Presidential papers asserted during the Watergate era and since then. The Presidential Records Act was not enacted to reverse the law, but to settle questions that had not been adequately addressed in the courts or the legislative branch.¹⁵

In declaring all Presidential records to be Federal property, the act includes documentary material involving political activities related to, or having a direct effect upon, the President's official duties.¹⁶ The legislative history declares, "... almost all of the President's political activities relate to or have a direct effect on his official duties and, as such, records reflecting these activities would be included within the scope of what constitutes a Presidential record."¹⁷ The legislative history concludes that records pertaining to all activities of the President, except those in the category of "actions involving the exercise, as a private citizen, of his political preferences by voting or making campaign contributions," would appear generally to fall within the ambit of Presidential records.¹⁸

On the basis of the evidence and the above reasoning, the subcommittee concludes that the briefing materials found in the Reagan Bush campaign files were at least in part Government property. It thus respectfully disagrees with the contrary conclusion reached by the Department of Justice in its report on the briefing book matter.

¹⁴ Public Law 95-591, sec. 2(a), Nov. 4, 1978, 92 Stat. 2524, 44 U.S.C. 2202.

¹⁵ H. Rept. 95-1487, pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d sess. 7-8 (1978).

¹⁶ H. Rept. 95-1487, pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d sess. 11 (1978).

¹⁷ *Id.*, at 12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Witnesses testifying on the legislation agreed that material "which is generated, created, produced, or kept by a public official and [in] performance of the powers and duties of a public office belongs to the Government and may not be considered private property of the individual." *Id.*, at 8. The Government, of course, also has an interest in seeing that material prepared on Government paper, on Government machines, by Government workers, in Government offices, for the President, is not taken and distributed without authorization. (See *United States v. DiGilio*, 538 F.2d 972, at 977 (3d Cir. 1976).) Even if Government material and time were used improperly by the Carter campaign, that improper use does not reduce the interest of the Government in the material.

Besides the briefing materials there were various papers received by Reagan Bush campaign personnel that were White House documents. Two documents on official stationery contained typewritten statements that they were not to be released.¹⁹ These documents were Government property and nonpublic, and were also labeled as having been received from a "mole."

The subcommittee has discovered no facts showing that the transfers of briefing materials or other Government records found in Reagan Bush campaign files were properly authorized. The presumption, therefore, is that these materials were improperly taken for use by the opposition campaign. Indeed, direct evidence that the transfer was unauthorized comes from those who prepared the books who assert that the materials were for use only by a limited number of the President's advisors.

One contemporary reference concerning the nature of the transfer is the statement of David Stockman to about 65 members of the Cassopolis, Mich., Optimist Club on the afternoon of October 28, just hours before the debate. Stockman said that the Reagan Bush campaign had received and used a "pilfered" (i.e., stolen) copy of the President's briefing book. Two reporters who were present recorded that statement in their notebooks and filed stories about it that ran the next day. (See articles reprinted in app. I, pp. 127-129.) In his affidavit, Stockman says: "My statement was colorful, not descriptive, and was meant only to convey that I assumed that the material had not been delivered to the campaign by the Carter camp." (See app. III, p. 1232.)

It is useful to analyze the known facts in light of the case law concerning section 641. The statute is a unified theft statute and generally requires an unauthorized taking contrary to the rights of the Government. Embezzlement, as the term is used in the statute, is the appropriating to one's own use money or property that one possessed lawfully for the primary benefit of another.²⁰ Any Carter staff member who without authorization handed over the briefing books after working on them may have committed embezzlement.

Conversion may be accomplished by depriving authorized Government officials of the power to exercise control over Government property in such a way as to prevent their carrying out their responsibilities. *United States v. Tijerina*, 407 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 843, 867 (1969).²¹

The Supreme Court has noted that conversion reaches some actions not covered by the term "steals" or "embezzles."

Conversion may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's custody for limited use.

Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, at 272 (1952).²²

¹⁹ See chapter 3 for discussions of Wexler/McDonald memos received by Daniel Jones and by several officials.

²⁰ *United States v. Powell*, 294 F. Supp. 1353, (E.D. Va. 1968) aff'd, 413 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1969).

²¹ But cf. *Pearson v. Dodd*, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).

²² See also, *United States v. May*, 625 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1980). *United States v. Truong Dinh Hung*, 629 F.2d 908, 924 (4th Cir. 1980).

Section 641 requires a finding of intent to appropriate property to a use inconsistent with the owner's rights and benefits. *United States v. Jones*, 449 F.Supp. 42 (D.C. Ariz. 1978), rev'd on other grounds 607 F. 2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). However, while intent to use is necessary, knowledge that the stolen property used belonged to the Government is not necessarily required for conviction. *United States v. Speir*, 564 F. 2d 934 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978). It is a fair assumption that whoever took the briefing materials and the other Government records involved in this investigation intended their use by the Reagan campaign.

The crime of illegal receipt of converted or embezzled property requires the receipt, use or retention of the property with the knowledge that the property was converted or embezzled. *Teel v. U.S.*, F. 2d 604 (8th Cir. 1969). The defendant need not have been specifically informed that the property was stolen or converted in order to have known this fact. *U.S. v. Boyd*, 446 F. 2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1971).

The general rule is:

In determining the existence of guilty knowledge, both the circumstances surrounding the accused and his own conduct then and immediately thereafter may be considered. *It is not necessary to the requisite guilty knowledge that the accused know from whom the property was stolen, or when and where it was stolen, or the circumstances under which it was stolen, but it is sufficient that he knows that it was stolen.* Actual and positive knowledge is usually not necessary. *Constructive knowledge, through notice of facts and circumstances from which guilty knowledge may be inferred, will suffice,* and the existence of guilty knowledge may generally be regarded as established where the facts and circumstances surrounding the receipt of the property leave no doubt that the receiver must have known, without further inquiry, that it was stolen property.²³

The fraudulent intent accompanying guilty knowledge may also be inferred from such circumstances such as the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, especially where accompanied by contradictory or evasive statements and unusual manner of acquisition.²⁴

It is no defense to claim that a particular person was unaware of the unlawful character of the acts if he is shown to have deliberately closed his eyes to what he otherwise would have had reason to believe was illegal. *United States v. Jacobs*, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).^{24a}

²³ 66 Am Jur 2d, Receiving Stolen Property, sec. 9, p. 301.

²⁴ Id., sec. 25.

^{24a} In *Jacobs*, the court approved of charge to the jury that allowed them to find that the defendants "had manifested by their conduct that they were deliberately shutting their eyes to what they had every reason to believe to be the fact [that the items were illegally obtained]." The actual charge to the jury included the summary: "Thus if you find that a defendant acted with reckless disregard of whether the bills were stolen and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth the requirement of knowledge would be satisfied unless the defendant actually believed they were not stolen." (475 F.2d 270, fnnt. 37, at 287.)

Various Reagan Bush campaign members—e.g., Baker, Gergen, Hodson, and Stockman—who admittedly handled the Carter briefing materials denied knowledge of how they were obtained. Indeed, Mr. Baker apparently indicated to author Laurence Barrett, who wrote “Gambling With History,” that he was grateful not to know.²⁵

The law discussed indicates that lack of precise knowledge as to how briefing materials were obtained might not serve as a defense for those who knowingly used briefing materials that clearly came from the Carter administration.

2. Property in the Government's possession

Section 654 of title 18 makes criminal the embezzlement or conversion of the property of another that comes into the possession of a Federal employee by virtue of his or her Federal position.²⁶

If a Federal employee passed to the Reagan Bush campaign material that was campaign or personal property that came into his possession in the execution of his employment, section 654 may have been violated.

3. Disclosure of classified and defense information

The Standards of Conduct at 5 CFR 735.210(l) refer to criminal statutes prohibiting the disclosure of certain classified and confidential information (18 U.S.C. 798, 783, and 1905). A closely related

²⁵ “Gambling With History—Ronald Reagan in the White House,” Lawrence I. Barrett, Doubleday & Company, Inc. Garden City, New York 1983. On pp. 382-383, Barrett writes:

“Apparently a Reagan mole in the Carter camp had filched papers containing the main points the President planned to make when he met Reagan for the debate. . . . Now, as senior advisor to the Reagan campaign, he [Baker] looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it. Months later he was still sensitive enough to be embarrassed when I mentioned the incident during a private conversation. And he was relieved that the matter had remained a secret.”

²⁶ Sec. 654 of title 18 provides:

“Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, embezzles or wrongfully converts to his use the money or property of another which comes into his possession or under his control in the execution of such office or employment, or under color or claim of authority as such officer or employee, shall be fined not more than the value of the money and property thus embezzled or converted, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the sum embezzled is \$100 or less, he shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”

This provision has been interpreted in *United States v. Rippon*, 537 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Ill. 1982). There the court stated that

“an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 654 must allege facts to support the following propositions: (1) the defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or an agency of the United States; (2) the accused embezzled or wrongfully converted the money or property of another; and (3) the money or property came into the accused's possession in the execution of his employment, or under color or claim of authority as such employee.”

Id., 790.

The court observed further:

“The cases decided under 18 U.S.C. § 654, and under the similarly worded 18 U.S.C. § 1711, indicate that an employee must gain possession of the converted property either while properly performing his employment or while pretending to carry out the duties of his employment.

“ . . . [T]he phrase “in the execution or under color of his office, employment, or service” includes only (1) the performance of actual employment duties, and (2) the execution of acts under the guise of properly carrying out the duties of employment. The statute is not broad enough to encompass all of an employee's actions while at work. Moreover, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Moore v. United States*, 160 U.S. 268 . . . (1895), indicates that the statutory requirement that the accused by an officer or employee of the United States in turn requires that the embezzled property have come into the accused's possession in the actual or purported discharge of his duties of employment.”

Id., at 791-92.

statute is the section forbidding the unauthorized release or receipt of certain defense information (18 U.S.C. 793).

In addition to the statutes mentioned above, there are other detailed prohibitions against disclosure of classified information by Federal employees established by Executive order. The latest concerning national security information is Executive Order 12356, April 2, 1982. This order provides that officers, employees, contractors, grantees, and licensees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they disclose classified information or violate provisions of the order.²⁷

There are indications that the Reagan Bush campaign received information from the National Security Council. Richard Allen said he received unclassified portions of daily reports sent to the President's National Security Advisor. Zbigniew Brzezinski, however, informed the subcommittee that these reports were classified. There was also an entry in Allen's personal telephone log referencing "embargoed" intelligence concerning the location of the hostages in Iran. The entry suggests that the information came from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The Reagan Bush campaign also received copies of classified documents concerning Iran. These documents had been released by Iranian students, referred to in the Congressional Record, and published elsewhere, but they had not been declassified.²⁸

4. *False statements*

The Standards of Conduct refer at 5 CFR 735.210(k) to the general statute prohibiting fraud and false statements in a Government matter (18 U.S.C. 1001). The statute provides:

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or use any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Also relevant is section 1505 that provides criminal penalties for anyone who corruptly influences, obstructs, or impedes the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry of any committee of either House of the Congress.²⁹

As indicated in chapters 3 and 4, the subcommittee believes that certain statements to it have not been credible. Moreover, in other instances there have been failures to recall that are suspect. The subcommittee has reason to doubt some persons who are now Government employees and are covered by the Standards of Conduct, as well as the laws just discussed that are applicable to all persons making statements to a congressional body.

²⁷ Order, sec. 5.4.

²⁸ See ch. III, discussion of Hansen documents, p. 52.

²⁹ In *United States v. Alo*, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971), the defendant was convicted of a violation of sec. 1505 after claiming a memory lapse some 134 times.

IV. OTHER RELEVANT LAWS

In addition to the criminal laws cited in the Standards of Conduct, there are others that conceivably could be relevant to the unauthorized transfer of property and information from the Carter administration to the Reagan Bush campaign.

A. CONSPIRACY

One Federal statute that may be relevant is 18 U.S.C. 371.

§ 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 701.

This statute applies to:

(1) A conspiracy to commit any offense specified in the Federal criminal laws.

(2) A conspiracy to defraud the United States or any Federal agency.

(3) A conspiracy to violate the criminal laws of the District of Columbia. *Arnstein v. U.S.*, 296 F. 946, 948-49, (D.C. Cir. 1924), cert. denied 264 U.S. 595 (1924); *Gilstrap v. Clemmer*, 284 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1960); *Story v. Rives* 97 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1938).

The conspiracy to defraud section has been interpreted to cover:

(1) A conspiracy to defraud the United States of its rights to have official business conducted honestly and impartially. *U.S. v. Smith*, 496 F. 2d 185 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974); reh. denied, 419 U.S. 694 (1974).

(2) A conspiracy to impede the normal functions of government. *Hass v. Henkel*, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); *U.S. v. Del Toro*, 513 F. 2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975); *U.S. v. Pan-American Petroleum Co.*, 6 F. 2d 43 (D.C. Cal. 1925), modified on other grounds 9 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff'd 273 U.S. 456 (1927).

(3) An agreement whereby a Federal employee acts to promote a private benefit in breach of his duty in a way that significantly affects the proper functioning of the Government. *U.S. v. Peltz*, 433 F. 2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 955 (1971).

While it is unclear how the briefing materials left the Carter White House, any conspiracy to obtain them might well fall under the provision. As shown above, however, even if the materials came

“over the transom” without prior agreement, other criminal statutes might nonetheless be implicated.

B. FEDERAL ELECTION LAW

In the wake of the Watergate investigations, the Congress adopted a number of recommendations to reduce both “dirty tricks” in campaigns and the abuse of Government power by incumbents. One of these statutes was intended to reduce “dirty tricks” by persons acting for one candidate but claiming to act for another. (Public Law 94-283, 2 U.S.C. 441h (1974).) While this statute may not reach activities that took place during the 1980 campaign, in light of the documents and references to moles and inside sources discovered during the course of this investigation, the subcommittee recommends below that the Congress consider other specific recommendations of the Senate Watergate Committee concerning changes in the criminal law.³⁰

C. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND VIRGINIA LAW

The Standard of Conduct, 5 CFR 735.209, define conduct prejudicial to the Government to include not just the commission of Federal crimes but any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct. A violation of District of Columbia or Virginia law by a Federal employee would appear to be prohibited by the standards, particularly if the violation involves a Federal interest.

The District of Columbia Criminal Code prohibits larceny, larceny after trust (that is, the taking of property after being entrusted with it), and receiving stolen property. Each of these provides for a penalty of at least a year in jail.³¹ A violation of a District of Columbia criminal statute could trigger the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics Act, which are discussed below.³² Since copies of Carter briefing books were received, and used to some degree, by Reagan Bush campaign officials in the Reagan Bush headquarters in Arlington, Va., similar Virginia statutes might also apply.³³

³⁰ 18 U.S.C. 600 provides:

“Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part of any Act of Congress, or any special consideration in obtaining any such benefit, to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in connection with any general or special election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”

See ch. 3 regarding efforts of Garrick, Stanley, and McCormick to obtain Carter schedules.

³¹ In 1980, the relevant sections were D.C. Code Ann. 22-2201, 2, 3, and 5.

³² The courts have consistently held that a violation of District of Columbia law is also a violation of Federal law. *Arnstein v. United States*, 296 F. 946, 948-9 (D.C. Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 595 (1924); *Gilstrap v. Clemmer*, 284 F.2d 804, 807 (4th cir 1960); *Story v. Rives*, 97 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1938) *Cosgrove v. Smith*, 697 F. 2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983). *United States v. Greene*, 489 F.2d 1145, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, reh. denied, 419 U.S. 694 (1974).

³³ Relevant statutes might include Virginia Code 18.2-95, 96, 108, and 111.

D. THE "HATCH ACT": PROHIBITED PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

The Standards of Conduct also refer specifically to the "Hatch Act" prohibitions against political activities by certain Federal employees. (5 C.F.R. 735.210(p).) The act and related laws provide administrative, civil, and criminal penalties for its violation.³⁴

As described by the Congressional Research Service:

The Hatch Act contains two basic restrictions: (1) executive branch officials and employees are prohibited from using their official authority to affect the result of an election (5 U.S.C. 7324(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. 595); (2) in addition, most rank and file executive agency employees are prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns, both as Government employees and as private citizens (5 U.S.C. 7324(a)(2)). The latter restriction in effect bars any partisan campaign activity on the part of the employees who are subject to it.

Foreign Service officers (and Central Intelligence Agency officials and employees) generally are covered by the Hatch Act.³⁵ Military personnel are covered by restrictions similar to those in the Hatch Act.³⁶

Moreover, the regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management provide that:

No person occupying a position in the competitive service shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns, . . . (5 CFR pt. 4, at 4.1.)

In addition, various guidebooks have been developed for civil servants that describe the activities that are prohibited.³⁷

During the 1980 Presidential campaign a paper for Ronald Reagan was prepared at the request of William Wilson, now U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican, by friends of Wilson at the Department of Energy and at the Argonne National Laboratory. This paper attacked President Carter's energy policies and refers to DOE material that had not yet been published. An analysis by the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service concludes, in essence, that preparation of this document appears to have violated the Hatch Act.³⁸

³⁴ Public Law 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147, 5 U.S.C. 7324. Sec. 7321-8 establish related requirements and procedures for rulemaking and enforcement. Related criminal provisions include 18 U.S.C. 602, 3, and 7.

³⁵ 5 U.S.C. 2105, 105, 101; see generally, Department of State regulations on employee conduct, 22 CFR 10.735-211(h). However, an FSO who is directly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate may engage in partisan politics, but may not use his or her *office* to influence an election.

³⁶ Defense Department Directive 1344.10, applicable to persons on active duty for more than 30 days. This coverage is more fully detailed in a memorandum by Jack Maskell of the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service dated Feb. 15, 1984. (See app. VI, pp. 2135-2138.)

³⁷ The Office of Personnel Management's "Fed Facts 2" is an example of a guidebook concerning election activities by Federal employees.

³⁸ The CRS memorandum is reprinted in app. VI, p. 2127.

V. A WHISTLEBLOWER IS NOT A MOLE

There is an important difference between unauthorized transfers of information and documents to gain an advantage in an election and reports by Federal employees of official wrongdoing.³⁹

Sections 2301 and 2302 of title 5 of the U.S. Code direct that whistleblowers be protected against reprisal and make reprisal a prohibited personnel practice. Protected conduct includes:

(A) a disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—

- (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or,
 - (ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,
- if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; or

(5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A).)

The policy of protecting “whistleblowers” rests on the long-standing principle that a person should not be punished or liable for a statement revealing what he or she believes to be a violation of the law if the revelation is made to an official or other person in a position to correct the abuse.⁴⁰ However, provision of information to a campaign for partisan use seems to be in a different category and unprotected.

VI. THE ETHICS ACT

The Ethics in Government Act establishes a process to insure that the various statutes and regulations discussed above are adhered to by Federal officials and employees. The act also establishes procedures for appointing an objective and unbiased Independent Counsel to investigate alleged crimes by certain Government and campaign officials and to prosecute when necessary. This section discusses the Ethics Act and its application to the facts involved in this investigation.

A. THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS

The 1978 Ethics Act (Public Law 95-521) established the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) to provide a central office to oversee the conduct of Federal officials and employees. This Office inherited certain functions of the Civil Service Commission, including the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Standards of Conduct. Until 1983, the OGE recommended to the Office of Per-

³⁹ Although no one has asserted that the inside sources assisting the Reagan Bush campaign were good faith whistleblowers, Federal employees and the public should be aware of the protections that are available for those who are in fact “whistleblowers” in the sense intended by Congress.

⁴⁰ Such authorities are not limited, even for purposes of protection from defamation liability, to Government officials. For example, the League of Women Voters was held to be such an authority for purposes of protecting a whistleblowing private citizen in a libel case in Pennsylvania. *Dempsey v. Double*, 386 Pa. 542, 126 Atl.2d 915 (1956).

sonnel Management any changes in regulations it deemed appropriate. In Public Law 98-150 (sec. 3), the Office was given the power and responsibility to promulgate and interpret its own regulations pertaining to ethics in the executive branch.

The act as amended also vests in OGE the responsibility:⁴¹ to order corrective action on the part of agencies and employees that the Director deems necessary; to require reports from executive agencies as the Director deems necessary; to evaluate, with the assistance of the Attorney General and the Office of Personnel Management, the need for changes in rules and regulations issued by the Director and the agencies regarding conflict of interest and ethical problems; and to provide information on, and promote the understanding of, ethical standards in executive agencies.

As amended, section 403 of the act directs each executive agency to make its services, personnel, and facilities available to the OGE for the performance of functions under the act. This includes agency Inspectors General.

The OGE thus has the legal responsibility and power to ensure that the Standards of Conduct are understood and enforced. This responsibility vested in OGE does not, however, relieve agency heads from the responsibility to see that the ethics standards are understood and enforced within their agencies.

The coordinated system of designated agency ethics officials working with the Office of Government Ethics was designed in part to inculcate the code of ethics and to identify and eliminate any potential conflicts of interest or other ethics violations before they rise to the level of criminal violations. However, if there is reason to believe that a crime may have been committed, those allegations must be reported.⁴² The Ethics Act requires that the OGE Director cooperate ". . . with the Attorney General in developing an effective system for reporting allegations of violations of the conflict of interest laws to the Attorney General . . ." (Sec. 402(b)(13).)

Title VI of the Ethics Act sought to prevent conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the investigation and prosecution of charges concerning employees and officials at the highest levels of Government. The subcommittee recognized this in its guidelines when it voted to determine the full facts and circumstances here involved and to continue its review of the act as an organic whole.⁴³

B. AN INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

Title VI of the 1978 Ethics Act established a process for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor.

⁴¹ The word "responsibility" is used in sec. 402(b) of the act to indicate that the powers enumerated there are not to be interpreted as inchoate or passive powers that might some day be used but instead reflect on-going duties for which OGE is affirmatively responsible.

⁴² 28 U.S.C. 535 requires such reporting.

⁴³ The guidelines provide in part:

"The subcommittee has continued its work on the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which was the result of bills reported from the Post Office and Civil Service Committee among others. This year, we have reviewed the Act as an organic whole to determine whether the Act is operating as anticipated to ensure the ethical operation of the government at all levels.

"The same transactions that may be a violation of civil law or regulations concerning Federal officials or employees may also rise to the level of a violation of criminal law."

The first recommendation in the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Senate Watergate Committee) was that Congress enact legislation to establish a *permanent* Office of Public Attorney to act as both a "special prosecutor" and an ombudsman with the power to inquire into the administration of justice as to criminal matters in the executive branch. The recommended Public Attorney would have had "discretionary jurisdiction in any situation where there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a conflict of interest exists". (S. Rept. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, 96-97.) This Public Attorney also would have exercised exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases referred to him by the Federal Elections Commission.⁴⁴

While the Ethics in Government Act allowed for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor, it did not establish a permanent Public Attorney with a fixed term and discretionary authority to take over an investigation or prosecution when necessary. In order to prevent conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts, or other unethical behavior in the investigation, evaluation and prosecution of criminal charges by the Attorney General or other officials of the Justice Department, Congress provided in the Ethics Act for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor (now Independent Counsel) in situations presenting such potential conflicts. In certain situations the appearance of conflict is deemed to exist and the appointment of an Independent Counsel is required where the evidence warrants. In others, an Independent Counsel may be appointed if the Attorney General determines that a needed investigation by an officer of the Justice Department may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest (28 U.S.C. 591(ff)).

The act mandates a "preliminary investigation" by the Attorney General in certain circumstances. As stated in a recent district court decision:

That statute unambiguously directs the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation for a period not to exceed ninety days upon receiving specific information from a credible source that a federal criminal law has been violated by designated federal executives. (*Dellums v. Smith*, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (N.D. Cal. 1983))

The provision requiring a preliminary investigation is triggered whenever the Attorney General receives specific and credible information that any of the designated persons has committed a violation of any Federal criminal law other than a petty offense (28 U.S.C. 591(a)). The legislative history indicates that "a petty offense is . . . a misdemeanor, a penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of more than \$500 or both." (S. Rept. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 52 (1978).) In other words, the offense need not be a felony to activate this provision.

1. Officials covered

The Federal officials that the law specifically covers include the President and the Vice President, the Director of the Central Intel-

⁴⁴ The establishment of the Office of Public Attorney was also recommended by the Senate Watergate Committee, id. at 97.

ligence Agency, the Attorney General, the Cabinet, and the top echelon of the Executive Office of the President (28 U.S.C. 591). Others included by virtue of their executive level positions (Executive Level II positions in the Executive Office of the President) include the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.⁴⁵

Also designated for coverage are:

the chairman and treasurer of the principal national campaign committee seeking the election or reelection of the President, and any officer of the campaign exercising authority at the national level, such as the campaign manager or director, during the incumbency of the President.

28 U.S.C. 591(b)(8).

Amendments signed into law on January 3, 1983, reduced the number of executive appointees automatically covered.⁴⁶ The 1983 amendments also reduced the number of designated campaign officials to those exercising authority at the national level. The amendments and accompanying reports made it clear that "these officials are covered during the incumbency of the President in whose campaign they serve. This coverage would address instances where an official violates a Federal law during his tenure in the campaign and then leaves his post."⁴⁷

2. Specific and credible information

The act provides that the Attorney General shall first determine whether the information received is sufficient to constitute grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation. (592(a)(1).) This involves a determination of whether the information is sufficiently specific and, since the January 1983 amendments, is from a credible source.⁴⁸ (28 U.S.C. 592(a)(1).) In *Nathan v. Attorney General*, 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983), the court considered the specificity requirement in light of the legislative history and observed:

Congress recognized that more than wild rumor was needed to trigger the Act but Congress was careful to note

⁴⁵ For list of those persons included, see app. VI, pp. 2139-2143.

⁴⁶ Within the Executive Office of the President, the designated positions were reduced from 93 to 36.

⁴⁷ These persons are covered for 2 years after they leave their positions. The Senate report points out that "Coverage should not exceed the incumbency of the President, however, because it is the relationship between the campaign official and the Administration which he helped place in office which brings conflict of interest problems." S. Rept. 97-496, 97 Cong., 2d sess., 8 (1982).

⁴⁸ When discussing the credibility requirement added by the amendments to title VI, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee wrote:

"The first criterion, already required by present law, is retained so that the provisions of this chapter will not apply to generalized allegations of wrongdoing which contain no factual support. The legislative history of the present law provides a good example of what is meant by specificity:

"If the Attorney General receives a letter saying that a particular member of the President's cabinet is a 'crook', but the letter provides no further information or factual support regarding alleged criminal activity, such a letter would not constitute specific information and the Attorney General would therefore not be required to take any action under this chapter."

The Committee also noted:

"The new standard should not be interpreted to mean, . . . that an accuser must expressly recite the precise violation of criminal law alleged prior to triggering a preliminary investigation. . . . [I]f facts or suspicious circumstances suggesting that a covered person may have engaged in criminal activity come to the attention of the Department of Justice, these would qualify as 'information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate,' thus triggering a preliminary investigation."

S. Rept. 97-496, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, pp. 12-13.

that investigation should proceed if the information was sufficiently pointed to focus the direction of the inquiry. . . . It would be unreasonable to require more than the submission of data creating a reasonable basis for inquiry . . . (Id. at 1188)

In conducting preliminary investigations the Attorney General has no authority to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpoenas. (Sec. 592(a)(2).)

If the Attorney General, upon completion of the preliminary investigation, finds reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted, or if 90 days elapse from receipt of the information without a determination by the Attorney General, then the Attorney General must apply to a special division of the Court of Appeals for the appointment of an Independent Counsel to pursue the investigation and, if necessary, to prosecute. (Sec. 592(c).) The 1983 amendments also added the following:

In determining whether reasonable grounds exist to warrant further investigation or prosecution, (after an official preliminary investigation has been conducted) the Attorney General shall comply with the written or otherwise established policies of the Department of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws.

(Sec. 592(c)(1).) ⁴⁹

If the Attorney General, upon completion of the preliminary investigation, finds that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted, the Attorney General must so notify the division of the court charged with appointing an Independent Counsel. The notification must be by memorandum containing a summary of the information received and a summary of the results of any preliminary investigation. (Sec. 592(b).) ⁵⁰

The Senate report noted that the provision quoted above requires that the Attorney General justify his decision not to seek the appointment of a special prosecutor by a showing to the court that the Department of Justice does not, as a matter of established practice prosecute this violation, or that the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the violation was alleged to have occurred does not prosecute in comparable circumstances.⁵¹ This amendment could allow the Attorney General to decline to seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel even where violations of the criminal law are present. But it also requires explanation of the reasons for not seeking an Independent Counsel once a preliminary investigation has begun. Moreover, the Senate report cautioned that "[a]ny case where there is no clear policy against prosecution or any arguably exceptional circumstances are present should be sent to special prosecutor."⁵²

⁴⁹ S. Rept. 97-496, pp. 14-15 explaining subsection 4(d) of S. 2059.

⁵⁰ Even after the filing of this memorandum, the Attorney General is required to consider, and, if warranted, act upon any additional information he or she receives about the matter. (Sec. 592(c)(2).)

⁵¹ This amendment ". . . directs the Attorney General to comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws." S. Rept. 97-496, p.15.

⁵² Id.

3. Current litigation regarding Carter papers

Two private plaintiffs are currently pursuing, in Federal District Court, their application for an investigation by an Independent Counsel of the alleged unauthorized transfer and receipt of Carter administration briefing and other materials in the 1980 Presidential election campaign. On October 25, 1983, John F. Banzhaf, a law professor at George Washington University Law School, and Peter H. Meyers, an attorney in private practice, filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief directing the Attorney General to make application to the Court of Appeals for the appointment of an Independent Counsel. Previously, on July 22, 1983, these attorneys had filed a petition seeking this relief with the Attorney General, which included a section entitled "Specific Information Requiring the Appointment of an Independent Counsel Under 28 U.S.C. 591-592 et seq." Since June 29, 1983, the Justice Department has been conducting a criminal investigation of the transfer of the Carter briefing materials to the Reagan Bush campaign, the transfer of other papers and information from the Carter administration to that campaign and other related allegations.

The Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the grounds (1) that Messrs. Banzhaf and Meyers did not have standing to sue, (2) that "Congress did not intend for private citizens to compel the enforcement of investigative or prosecutorial discretion under the Ethics in Government Act," and (3) that plaintiffs had "not submitted specific and credible information sufficient to trigger an Ethics Act investigation."⁵³

On February 29, 1984, Judge Harold H. Greene issued a ruling denying the motion to dismiss.⁵⁴ The court concluded that the information of criminal law violations plaintiffs had submitted was sufficiently specific and credible to trigger a preliminary investigation under the Ethics Act. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing based on their submission of such specific and credible information. The court ruled that the Department appeared to have ignored the act in conducting its own extensive investigation.

Before Judge Greene ruled, the Justice Department had concluded in a 3-page report issued on February 23, 1984, that there was no specific, credible information of a federal crime by any covered officials. Particularly in light of the evidence the subcommittee has uncovered, the subcommittee believes that Judge Greene was correct in determining that specific, credible evidence warranting a preliminary investigation was present. It believes that the Justice Department's contrary conclusion is erroneous.⁵⁵

In determining whether to recommend an Independent Counsel, the Attorney General must look to the Department of Justice standards used to determine whether to prosecute for the possible crimes at issue. Since the standards utilized by the current Attorney General are not all public, it is difficult for the subcommittee

⁵³ Department of Justice Motion to Dismiss, at i, January 3, 1984.

⁵⁴ The entire opinion is reproduced in app. VI, pp. 2147-2170.

⁵⁵ Opinion, p. 10 and p. 22; the report of the Department is reproduced in app. VI, pp. 2144-2146. Note: On May 14, 1984, Judge Greene ordered the Attorney General to seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel in the "briefing papers" issue. This report was already in advanced publishing stages when that decision was issued.

to reach a firm conclusion as to how they would be applied. Nonetheless, on the basis of the evidence discovered, the subcommittee believes that there are reasonable grounds to warrant the appointment of an Independent Counsel, particularly in a matter as sensitive as the one at hand. The jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel should include, in addition to the events that took place in 1980, the issue of whether false statements were made to the subcommittee and FBI during their investigations.

The only other two cases considering the Special Prosecutor/Independent Counsel provision of the act before 1984 also had decided that the act is enforceable through private plaintiffs who have supplied specific information. *Nathan v. Attorney General*, 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983) and *Dellums v. Smith*, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The District of Columbia Circuit has heard oral arguments on the Justice Department's appeal of the *Nathan* case.⁵⁶

VII. THE ETHICS PROGRAMS

The subcommittee's investigation came shortly after its review of the Ethics in Government Act that produced a report noting the need for better ethics education.⁵⁷

The subcommittee's investigation included an inquiry into the effectiveness of ethics programs. As part of this review, the subcommittee asked witnesses who had served in any administration about the education they had received concerning the Standards of Conduct, including the methods of instruction used and the level of detail presented. For example, the subcommittee attempted to determine whether employees and officials had been made aware of the specific standards concerning misuse of Government property and information, and whether they had been informed, as regulations require, of the particular criminal statutes to which the Standards of Conduct refer.

The responses were generally disappointing. While most witnesses believed they understood their general obligations under the law, relatively few could recall specific ethics education focusing on the Standards of Conduct. When asked directly about the standards concerning misuse of Government property and information, many were unaware of the regulations forbidding misuse of unpublished Government documents or information for private gain. Many thought they might have been given written material on the Standards of Conduct, along with numerous other materials such as pay, insurance, tax and other forms when they entered the executive branch. However, few indicated that they actually read the materi-

⁵⁶ Title VI of the Ethics Act also provides that a majority of the members of either party who serve on either the House or the Senate Judiciary Committee may require a report by the Attorney General about a possible criminal violation by a covered official. This requirement is invoked when a sufficient number of the committee members request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. (Sec. 595(e).) For example, 5 of the 8 Democratic members of the Senate Judiciary Committee or 6 of the 11 Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee could invoke this provision and require a report. The use of this provision does not trigger a preliminary investigation, however, but only requires a report to the committee by the Attorney General.

⁵⁷ H. Rept. 90-89, Pt. 2, 98th Cong. 1st sess., 10 (1983). The subcommittee suggested there that: "... all officials and employees, at or about the time they assume their official positions, attend a briefing on the general conflict of interest laws and standards of conduct and the particular ethics regulations of their agency. Written information should be provided at such briefings to cover the ethics provisions in full detail."

al carefully.⁵⁸ On the positive side, some witnesses indicated that in recent weeks they had received briefings on ethics issues or memoranda on such issues unlike any they received before. These did not appear, however, to be part of a Government-wide initiative to improve the ethics programs.

The subcommittee also asked the Office of Government Ethics (as well as each agency) a number of questions about the ethics programs and the enforcement of ethics regulations.⁵⁹ Their response indicated that a considerable amount of preventative action has taken place due to the ethics program. For example, during transition year 1981, 354 or 58 percent, of the 615 nominee reports reviewed by OGE required some type of action—resignation, recusal, divestiture, or blind trust agreement—in order to bring the nominee into compliance with existing conflict of interest statutes and regulations.⁶⁰ However, a considerable number of significant problems were not prevented. (See report on the subcommittee's Amendments to the Ethics in Government Act, H. Rept. 98-89, pt. 2, pp. 9-10, 16-21, and 46-52.)

The OGE and many agencies were unable to inform the subcommittee how many adverse personnel actions or other disciplinary actions had been taken against officials and employees based on violations of the standards.⁶¹

OGE also stated that it was forced by an administration reduction-in-force to discontinue its computerized system for keeping track of annual disclosure statements of Presidential appointees already in office. An amendment first approved by this subcommittee in the spring of 1983 greatly improves the tracking system. This amendment requires affirmative notice of actions taken to comply with disclosure requirements or agreements to divest. It also requires that agreements to recuse or abstain from certain official actions be in writing to provide notice to agency coworkers and others (Public Law 98-150, 97 Stat. 959, Sec. 9. Notice of Actions Taken To Comply With Ethics Agreements). It is, however, particularly inappropriate for the administration to impede the office that keeps track of ethics compliance by officials currently in office.

Throughout its history, OGE has never received its full authorization in appropriations. This is largely because the administration has requested only about half of the \$2 million per year authorized for the OGE. In fact, budget requests are projected to decline rather than rise from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 1986, and the upward adjustment for the transition year 1985 is a minimal figure considering the amount of turnover that occurs even with the re-

⁵⁸ The standards require that each employee be furnished with a copy of the agency ethics regulations "... at the time of his entrance on duty." (Sec. 735.104(b)(3).) They also require that these regulations be brought to the attention of each employee annually. (Subsec. (b)(4).)

⁵⁹ See app. VI for agency responses, pp. 2213ff.

⁶⁰ OGE Letter of Feb. 24, 1984, to Chairman Albosta, reproduced in app. VI, p. 2200.

⁶¹ A number of agencies were able to provide figures, but it is clear that there is no consistent system for tracking violations. Such a system could help warn against future violations by providing anonymous case histories illustrating how the standards have been applied. A recent study of Federal advisory committees by Common Cause indicated that Federal agencies are often lax in their application of the conflicts of interest and related standards to those advisors who are Special Government Employees. *Public Advisors/Private Interests*, February 1984, Common Cause, pp. 16-20. Common Cause is, at this writing, preparing a study of agency ethics programs, scheduled for release later this spring.

election of an incumbent President.⁶² The subcommittee recommends, in light of the large burden upon the OGE and its small staff, that the administration request the full appropriation authorized by the Congress and that the capabilities of the Office be substantially increased. The subcommittee will consider greater authorizations and the recommendations listed below during hearings it plans this year.

The subcommittee's recommendation that the OGE receive a greater appropriation should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of its work. There apparently are instances in which the Office could have done a more rigorous job of conducting or overseeing the investigation of apparent problems. The entire executive branch, with the OGE in the lead, should strictly apply the applicable standards and realize that the standards Federal officials are expected to meet are intended to be higher than criminal standards.⁶³

⁶² The line item in the Budget required by the 1983 Amendments to the Ethics Act reveals that the budget request is just over \$1 million per year when the authorization is for \$2 million for each of the next 5 years, the maximum being \$1,120,000, which is the administration request for fiscal year 1985. (Budget of the United States Government FY85, app. I-V2.)

⁶³ On at least one occasion, OGE has issued statements to the effect that an official has not violated the law when there are still substantial questions to be answered in that regard. For example, on Mar. 26, 1984, The Federal Times quoted OGE Director David Martin as saying that "... [Edwin] Meese had not violated the [financial disclosure] law ... since he [unlike Rep. Hansen] is voluntarily updating his disclosure form." This comment involved transactions as to which on Mar. 27, 1984, the Attorney General sought an Independent Counsel under the Ethics Act. See article by Winston Wood, p. 11.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Subcommittee recommendations include suggestions for changes in the law and for changes in administration of the law. Generally, the subcommittee feels that the basic problem is not the lack of appropriate laws, but the failure to comply with the ethics laws now in effect.

1. The evidence shows that campaign-related documents were transferred in unauthorized fashion from both the Carter White House and the Carter Mondale campaign to the Reagan Bush campaign. To the extent these documents were Government documents or were private documents converted by Federal employees, Federal criminal statutes may provide sanctions for this conduct.

However, the subcommittee believes that any theft of campaign documents or information known to be confidential from a candidate for a Federal office should be a Federal crime, as should the receipt of such campaign documents or confidential information. It thus adopts the following recommendation (as amended) of the Senate Watergate Committee that has never been enacted into law:

The committee recommended that Congress enact new legislation which prohibits the theft, unauthorized copying, or the taking by false pretenses of campaign materials, documents, or papers or *information* not available for public dissemination belonging to or in the custody of a candidate for Federal office or his aides.

(S. Rept. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 212 (1973))

In the interest of completeness, the subcommittee also recommends that the appropriate committee of Congress reconsider, as amended, the following recommendation of the Senate Watergate Committee concerning campaign activities:

The committee recommends that Congress enact criminal legislation to prohibit anyone from obtaining employment, voluntary or paid, in a campaign or *office* of an individual seeking nomination or election to any Federal office by false pretenses, misrepresentations, or other fraudulent means for the purpose of interfering with, spying on, or obstructing any campaign activities of such candidates. Furthermore, such legislation should make it unlawful for anyone to direct, instruct, or pay anyone to join any such campaign by such means or for such purposes as are outlined above.

(S. Rept. 93-981, p. 211)

The Congress should also consider whether such legislation should cover one who is not initially planted but who, already having a legitimate position, agrees to act as a spy or a "mole" to

accomplish the same end as one who had sought employment by false pretense.⁶⁴

2. Currently, there are cases in the federal courts that likely will resolve the question of whether a private plaintiff who presents specific, credible information that a Federal crime has been committed may sue to force a preliminary investigation and the appointment of an Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act. If that question is answered in the negative, the subcommittee recommends that the Congress provide by statute that such private plaintiffs may sue to seek these results under the act.⁶⁵ Moreover, the law should provide that plaintiffs who are successful in triggering the appointment of an Independent Counsel should be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.⁶⁶

3. The subcommittee recommends that the Congress carefully consider legislation introduced on March 19, 1984, by Senator Byrd (S. 2446) to increase the role of the Office of Government Ethics in the investigation and presentation to the Senate of financial and other background information concerning Presidential nominees.⁶⁷

4. The subcommittee recommends that the administration request, and the Congress appropriate, the full amount authorized for the Office of Government Ethics so that it can carry out more fully its responsibilities under the Ethics in Government Act. The subcommittee also recommends: mandatory briefings on ethics law and the Standards of Conduct for all Federal officials; restoration of staff required to maintain full and current records of compliance with disclosure and other ethics requirements and agreements; the establishment of a system for publishing anonymous case histories of how the Standards of Conduct have been applied; a full review of all ethics programs by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics and a report to Congress of his recommendations for improvements in the ethics programs.

The subcommittee will consider in the near future, these and other recommendations for improving the ethics laws and the Federal Government's programs to ensure that ethical standards are adhered to by all Federal officials and employees.

⁶⁴ See also S. Rept. 93-981, 213; 2 U.S.C. 441h.

⁶⁵ The Government argued in the *Banzhaf* case that a statute of this character would be unconstitutional.

⁶⁶ The Ethics Act already provides for awards of attorneys' fees for those investigated by an Independent Counsel if no indictment is brought. (28 U.S.C. 593(g).) A large number of Federal statutes provide attorneys' fees awards to plaintiffs who vindicate the public interest.

⁶⁷ See Senator Byrd's description of the bill and his introduction of a related measure requiring reconfirmation of certain officials for service in a second term. (130 Cong. Rec. S4273 (Daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984).)

MINORITY VIEWS

After more than ten months of investigations and over 2000 pages of report, the best that the Subcommittee can conclude is, "it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions as to how the Carter debate briefing materials entered the Reagan-Bush campaign and to determine precisely who had access to them." (Page 121)

There is a modicum of good news about this report. The authors were not paid by the word. The bad news: taxpayers will be asked to pay the printing bill for a 2,412-page report that is a stultifying melange of excessive narrative, mind-numbing citations and assorted documents. Simply stated, the authors confused quality with quantity.

At this point, we cannot state with any certainty what the final printing bill will total, but we can provide some estimates. Based on the printed House Appropriations Committee hearings on "Legislative Branch Appropriations for 1985," which estimated costs of committee prints at \$71 a page, the printing of this 2,412-page will cost in excess of \$170,000.

Nearly one year after the Subcommittee set sail on a wide-ranging exploration into the alleged unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter administration to the Reagan-Bush 1980 campaign, there is nothing in the final product that we have not read in the media or viewed on television. Without benefit of any solid evidence, the Subcommittee report predictably concludes that CIA Director William J. Casey, in his role as the Director of the Reagan-Bush campaign, was the conduit for the purloined papers. Casey's involvement, which was covered extensively by the press, is still denied by him.

If the Subcommittee had found any evidence implicating Mr. Casey, the obvious conclusion in the report would be to recommend prosecution. Instead, the Executive Summary of the report "finds that the better evidence indicates" Casey was the culprit. Elsewhere in the report attention is called to a memorandum in relation to a September 12, 1980 statement attributed to Casey that he "wants more information from the Carter campaign and wants it circulated." From that statement the authors arbitrarily concluded that his request "included the acquisition of non-public information from the Carter campaign." We think it falls far short of "best evidence."

If we were to accept the Casey inference, for which there is no substantive evidence, we would expect a revelation of who in the Carter administration or Carter campaign made the material available in the first instance. The authors found it impossible to answer that question, but imply they do have their suspicions. They tell us "it is likely" the Subcommittee has interviewed or received written statements "from a person or persons connected with the Carter administration or the Carter-Mondale campaign who knew how the briefing materials were removed from the Carter White House to the Reagan-Bush campaign." We agree that this claim has some credence.

The Subcommittee interviewed 250 persons, contacted 50 more and sought an additional 150 signed replies to questionnaires from persons employed by the U.S. Secret Service, the White House Motor Pool and the National Security Council Situation room during the Carter administration. The investigators

attempted to undertake a broad survey, but we were unable to discover any substantive evidence from their contacts. Apparently their exercise was a needless expenditure of Committee funds despite their assertion that it was a low-cost production.

We were not surprised by the recommendation calling for the appointment of a special prosecutor. It is an admission by the Majority that it had failed to find a culprit. Just prior to the release of this report, a Federal judge, in a private action brought by John F. Banzhaf, a George Washington University law professor, ordered the appointment of a special prosecutor. The Justice Department has announced its intention to appeal the judge's ruling.

In addition to the printing costs, the Subcommittee expended \$50,000 for a special counsel. It had the full time services of a Committee investigator, at an annual salary of \$50,000. It also employed another special employee from July 11, 1983 to early December 1983 who was paid at the rate of \$4,583 a month for a five month period. A public relations specialist was added to the staff on July 13, 1983 at a monthly salary of \$2,083. In Washington, the Subcommittee also had the services of three General Accounting Office Staff members. When the subcommittee determined that an excursion to the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California was necessary, it brought in a six-member GAO team from the agency's San Francisco office.

The Subcommittee's special counsel was brought into the investigation under a \$20,000 consultant's contract. To meet that contractual arrangement, the Full Committee had to utilize

\$20,000 of a \$100,000 authorization made available to the Full Committee as an initial installment on its contract with a firm providing expert assistance in designing a new supplemental civil service retirement program. When the special counsel's services exhausted available contract funds, he was placed on the Subcommittee's payroll and thereafter his services as special counsel were terminated at the end of April 1984.

Despite all of this expertise, the final product leaves much to be desired. For example, how can this report be taken seriously when the Subcommittee leaves unanswered the critical question of "exactly what Carter debate briefing materials were in the Reagan-Bush campaign." If we cannot ascertain exactly what has taken and who took it, then how can we determine what laws were broken?

The Table of Contents contains such intriguing subheadings as "Room 404 conclusion," the "'Big' book," "Thirteen admit seeing or receiving Carter materials," "Six others deny seeing Carter material," and "Seven admit hearing about Carter briefing material." However, the substance in those chapters answers few of the leading questions and none of the critical ones.

When Minority members received draft copies of the report, it was accompanied by a covering letter from the Subcommittee Chairman stating the foot thick report was "understated." We shudder to think what an "overstated" report would have looked like.

The Subcommittee Chairman also noted in his submission letter that the report did not discuss any documents that were "not germane

to the investigation."

But we were at a loss to ascertain the relevance of a particular set of documents that consumed sixteen pages of monthly reports of activities of the Human Resources Subcommittee from June 1983 through March 1984. We find it difficult to understand how the following Subcommittee activity reports are linked to this investigation:

---Staff Director Micah Green traveled to Bellaire, Michigan to speak before the Michigan Postmasters. (Page 275)

---The Subcommittee staff will miss Tom Trabucco, who has worked with the Subcommittee for five years. We wish him much success in his new job at the National Association for Retired Federal employees. (Page 275)

---Subcommittee staff represented the Subcommittee Chairman at the opening of the National Headquarters Building of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees. (Page 277)

---Staff Director Micah Green spoke before the Society of Federal Labor Relations Professionals on contracting out of government services and activities. Micah discussed the Subcommittee plans to hold a series of hearings on the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, which sets forth Executive Branch policy on contracting out. (Page 282)

---Chairman Albosta joined other Committee Members in writing to Office of Personnel Management Director Donald Devine regarding a GAO report on the classification and qualification standards for Federal librarians. The letter to Mr. Devine urged OPM to withdraw its proposed standards until questions

raised by the GAO report had been resolved. (Page 277)

We question the relevance of an abundance of inconsequential information included in this report. Take the case of the "ABC XYZ Memorandum." The report focuses on how a memorandum was found at the Hoover Institution on October 15, 1980 from Richard Allen to then Governor Reagan and some of his top campaign aides. Allen said in the memo there was information about administration actions regarding the hostages in Iran. Allen said the information was from an "unimpeachable source" who obtained it from "ABC XYZ." Allen told the Subcommittee "ABC XYZ" referred to then Secretary of State Muskie. Allen said the unimpeachable source was John Wallach, identified as a Hearst reporter. Both Wallach and Muskie were questioned by the FBI, and according to the report Wallach told the FBI Muskie was not the source of his information. The Subcommittee concluded Allen did in fact receive the information from Wallach. What manner of transgression was this? By its own account the Subcommittee said Wallach covered the hostage situation in 1980 and spoke with State Department personnel concerning news accounts that spare parts would be traded for the hostages. Additionally, the report tells us that Wallach's news stories provided much of the same information found in Allen's "ABC XYZ" memorandum. Mr. Wallach is a well-known, trusted, veteran newsman whose recollection of events would be valid, if not superior, to the Subcommittee's Majority. We accept this young man at his word.

In addition to the "ABC XYZ" incident, the Subcommittee took another run at Allen. The Subcommittee discovered that Allen passed along to the Reagan-Bush campaign information in correspondence from some Foreign Service Officers containing suggestions on how to improve the Foreign Service and criticizing the Carter administration's management of the Foreign Service. While the Subcommittee concluded the correspondence did not appear to contain any non-public information, it did find "troublesome" an earlier effort initiated by Allen to obtain information from Foreign Service Officers. The Subcommittee suggests Allen may have encouraged these government employees to violate the Hatch Act. In fact, Richard Allen received many laudatory letters from the officers in reaction to a speech he delivered at the State Department. That's fan mail, not political espionage.

It is apparent that the only purpose served by many of the documents referred to and included in the report is to augment the page volume.

There is also Robert Gray's steel industry memorandum which contains basic facts and figures concerning the steel industry which purportedly was obtained from an "excellent source." But the Subcommittee concludes it was unable to identify the "source" and then concludes rather weakly that "it is unclear whether the 'source' involved was in the Carter Administration or was located in the steel industry or elsewhere."

Then there is the "Shaheen Report." Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. was the Department of Justice official who directed the

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Department's investigation into the activities of Billy Carter and his associates concerning their dealing with Libyan officials, representatives and businessmen. The Subcommittee found a status report on the investigation in the files of Anthony Dolan and Caryl Borgquist. Dolan and Borgquist could not recall when or how they obtained the status report, but it was released publicly November 1, 1980. Since the incident is covered fully in the report it mercifully will not be repeated here. The Subcommittee said it was another example of relevant material which focused on attempts by the Reagan-Bush campaign to obtain a confidential document. Anyone who may have missed the status report when it was publicly released will find all 78 pages in this report.

Then there is the matter of Presidential Schedules. The Subcommittee riveted on the source of scheduling information because it is convinced it is not public information. Anyone even remotely connected with a Presidential campaign knows that when a President plans a trip to one or more communities, days, if not weeks, of advance preparation are required. Local party dignitaries and police are part of the advance planning, and in short order local newsmen are made aware of the fact that there is a Presidential visit in the offing. What may start out as non-public information quickly moves into the public domain. While we agree with the Subcommittee's conclusion that unauthorized access to a President's schedule conceivably could jeopardize his safety, the risk factor would depend upon the extent of detail available.

That section of the report dealing with Carter's debate briefing books talks about a 250-page "Big Book" on foreign policy and a final 40-page condensed version. There also was a domestic briefing book. If you follow the Subcommittee's scenario on the domestic book, one has to wonder how anyone in the Reagan-Bush campaign could have tracked the finished product.

Working back from the October 28, 1980 Presidential debate, follow this timetable: The domestic briefing book was completed Thursday night, October 23. A messenger for the domestic policy staff worked through the night until about 9 a.m. Friday, October 24, producing 13 or 14 copies. On Friday afternoon, October 24, copies were taken to Camp David for review by Carter White House officials and campaign aides. That same night, typed revisions were made. At approximately 3:30 p.m. Saturday, October 25, President Carter arrived at Camp David to rehearse for the debate. The rehearsals lasted until 2 a.m. Sunday, October 26. Additional typing revisions to questions and answers continued until about 2:30 a.m. Monday, October 27. Later in the day the group at Camp David departed for the debate in Cleveland on October 28. We have been unable to determine which version or part of the domestic briefing book was at issue in the investigation. It is hard to believe that a final version completed about 24-hours before the debate could have been made available to or made use of by the Reagan-Bush campaign. Even allowing for such a swift transfer, it is difficult to imagine how the material could be assimilated and beneficial. The Subcommittee concedes "it cannot be certain as to exactly

what Carter debate briefing materials were in the Reagan-Bush campaign." However, the Subcommittee was quick to jump to the questionable conclusion that said some version, "perhaps not the final effort," was in the opposite camp.

It is standard practice that the appendix of an investigative report should be limited to a cataloguing of documents and materials that are relevant to the investigation. We fail to understand how the relevancy of a list of monthly Subcommittee activities, duplicates of form letters and questionnaires and reams of other extraneous material meets or even approaches that yardstick.

As noted earlier, the Subcommittee sent out investigative questionnaires, requesting replies to four questions which could be answered by a checkmark in front of "yes" or "no." Of the 110 responses, 107 answered all four questions in the negative. We question why it was necessary to make each of these responses part of the report? Was that part of the Subcommittee's apparent effort to create an illusion of thoroughness for this poorly organized, irrelevant report.

On February 1, 1984, the Subcommittee unleashed a barrage of letters on official Washington. Agencies ranging the alphabet from ACTION to the Veterans Administration were asked to tell the Subcommittee about in-house ethics programs. The replies are set forth in pages 2,216 through 2,412.

The size, shape and effectiveness of ethics programs in government agencies certainly is worthy of attention, but are not relevant to this report. It is a subject which more

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appropriately should be considered in legislative or oversight hearings by the Subcommittee.

The lightest part of the Majority's report is Chapter Five, the conclusions and recommendations on the legal issues and the Subcommittee's jurisdiction. In a lengthy recitation and uneven analysis of most of the statutes that appear in the Code of Federal Regulations at 5 C.F.R. §735.210, the Majority continually concludes that the Standards of Conduct and relevant criminal laws may have been violated. Yet they have failed to take their analysis to the final step. If the Standards were violated, we submit that it is federal employees of the Carter Administration who are in violation. The Code of Ethics, the Standards, and the regulations refer to "any employee", not "any person". The criminal laws generally address "whoever" commits the proscribed activity. Thus, the person who will fall into the reach of the criminal statutes is the federal employee who embezzles government property, discloses classified information, conspires, or makes a false statement. Some of the laws also take into account those who receive stolen property, or classified documents. However, the point which the Majority fails to acknowledge is that many as yet unknown Carter administration employees will be subject to prosecution for violation of the Standards and criminal laws for their actions in the unauthorized transfer. It is not only the people in the Reagan-Bush campaign who potentially could be liable under the law.

This investigation has inadvertently shown how the Carter administration abused the power of incumbency. If the definition

of "government document" does not include campaign materials, and we do not think that it does, then the preparation of the domestic and foreign policy briefing books for the campaign by Carter White House employees in governmental offices on government time is a serious violation of the Hatch Act. The Majority continually states that White House employees wrote and prepared much of the briefing material. See p. 124-8 for a list of facts supporting their argument that the material was government property. The Majority selectively mentions one Hatch Act violation in its discussion of 5 U.S.C. §7324 which was allegedly traced to the Reagan-Bush campaign. Yet we predict a number of other Hatch Act violations will be found to have occurred under President Carter if the campaign materials are found not to be government property.

Briefing materials do not become government documents simply because the Majority claims they are. The Majority's reasoning also argues that the briefing books were really campaign materials. They were compiled, written, and typed by volunteers; non-Hatched White House employees supervised and helped prepare the materials; career federal employees believed they were political; and they were used for a debate between candidates for the office of President. The fact that one candidate was an incumbent President does not make him any less a candidate. Even the Majority cannot conclude that the briefing materials were pure government documents. They say weakly that they are "at least in part Government property" and avoid discussing the applicability of the criminal laws to

quasi-Government documents.

Yet, the Majority does not hesitate to wade into gray areas when they claim "non-public" information must be protected as Government property. They cite as an example of this type of information a paper on the Iranian hostage situation found in the Reagan-Bush files which was voluntarily given to the Reagan campaign by its author, Herbert Cohen. Cohen was not a government employee and did not use any classified information or information from government sources to write his personal assessment. There was nothing illegal about the Cohen paper, but the Majority infers there was because information about an international incident of great national concern has the character of non-public information in which the Government necessarily has a proprietary interest.


The legal conclusions drawn by the Majority show a surprising lack of originality. The adoption of two recommendations of the 1973 Senate Watergate Committee show that the high-priced legal talent available to the subcommittee was underutilized. While we might agree that the Office of Government Ethics could be better staffed and better funded, it does not take a long, expensive investigation to reach this conclusion. The subject could have been routinely handled in a legislative or oversight hearing. Coupled with poor organization, shoddy citations, and unclear explanations of precedent and the current case law, the Legal Conclusions chapter of the Majority report cannot be utilized as an accurate, competent discussion of the application of the Ethics in Government Act or an authoritative analysis of the

regulations and statutes.


At the outset of this investigation, the Minority argued that in order to reform the Ethics in Government Act, we did not need any extensive investigation to point the finger at a culprit. We suggested at that time to proceed with the Ethics Law Reform, assuming the worst case possible.

Now, many months later and many hundreds of thousands of dollars later, we still have no culprit and we still lack reform of the Ethics Act.

We in the Minority recommend that we now get on with the job of Law Reform.



DANIEL B. CRANE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

APPENDIX I
CORRESPONDENCE AND STATEMENTS

(125)

'Hello, My Name is...Jimmy Carter?'

Stockman Readied Reagan for Debate

(Related stories, pages 1, 2 and 6)

CASSOPOLIS — It was like reading the last chapter of the book first. You already knew the outcome so the rest of the story was anticlimatic.

Michigan's 4th District Rep. David Stockman, R-St. Joseph, previewed Tuesday night's presidential debate to a group of 70 people at the Diamond Harbor Inn here Tuesday afternoon. The luncheon was sponsored by the Cassopolis Optimist Club.

Over the weekend, Stockman was GOP presidential nominee Ronald Reagan's verbal sparring partner at Reagan's rented Middleburg, Va., estate. Stockman roll-played President Carter as Reagan prepared for the debate.

"I'm glad to see there are so many optimists left in Cass County," Stockman said. "I felt you might have dwindled to only three or four after four years of Carter."

Almost totally ignoring his own congressional race with Democrat Dr. Lyndon Furst, Stockman has spent many hours advising Reagan.

"I spent the weekend as Carter. That's why I'm so confused and disoriented," Stockman quipped.

Utilizing a "pilfered copy of the briefing book he (Carter) was going to use," Stockman deviated from the usual "discouraging view of where the country is going" and keyed in on the debate.

Stockman outlined the "white lies" Carter was going to center on during the debate.

Apparently the Reagan camp's "pilfered" goods were correct, as several times both candidates said almost word for word what Stockman predicted. The line of attack was exactly like the Michigan representative said it would be.

Inflation was what Stockman called the first white lie. "A lot of other countries that use oil have held their inflation rate steady. Giving West Germany as an example, they import 85 percent of their oil (the U.S. imports 40 percent) and their inflation rate is much lower than ours," Stockman said.

Number two on the list was the Reagan-Kemp-Roth Tax Plan. "Carter will say it will only aggravate inflation and reduce the taxes of the rich." During the broadcast, Carter called it "voo-doo economics," adding that it was "ridiculous."

Stockman predicted Reagan would reply, "Why is it wrong for individuals to have increased buying power and not the government?" He did.

Thirdly, Stockman said that Carter will accuse Reagan of being an extremist, although the president did so more gracefully than in some of his hard-hitting "campaign attacks. Pollution was an issue the Reagan people were expecting.

Stockman told Reagan, "If Carter brings up your attitude toward trees, you can compare your attitude toward trees to his attitude toward rabbits." Reagan had received political heat after he said trees caused pollution; Carter once said he was attacked by a rabbit.

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Dowagiac Daily News

Established in 1897, Dedicated to the growth and progress of Dowagiac and Cass County

Dowagiac, Michigan, Wednesday, October 29, 1980

Reagan's 'sparring partner' previews the debate

By JOHN EBY
Daily News
Staff Writer

CASSOPOLIS—Tuesday night's debate in Cleveland between President Carter and Ronald Reagan should not have contained any surprises for 63 members and guests of the Cassopolis Optimists Club.

They were given a preview of the debate over lunch Tuesday noon at Diamond Harbor Inn by the Michigan man who coached the former California Governor.

Congressman Dave Stockman (R-St. Joseph), who is himself seeking reelection in Michigan's 8th District Nov. 4, spent the last four days of the Reagan retreat in Virginia acting as the Republican presidential nominee's "sparring partner."

"I was Jimmy Carter," Stockman said in his preview of the League of Women Voters debate.

"After that, you can understand why I was confused and disoriented."

Stockman said he studied four years of the President's speeches and used a "jittered copy" of the Democrats' own briefing book to run Reagan through "eight or nine mock rehearsals" of what he called an "historic debate."

"I think (the debate) will decide the election," Stockman said of the clash, the

first between the two front-runners.

Stockman outlined for the Optimists the "five major white lies" the Carter camp would be attacking the Republican nominee with.

Carter would say the 11 percent inflation rate "wasn't my fault," Stockman claimed. The silver-haired congressman said the president would blame the increase from the 4.5 percent he inherited from President Ford in 1975 to the high of 20 percent last winter on uncontrollable "external factors," such as OPEC price hikes in oil.

That argument is "invalid, wrong," Stockman said, because "a lot of other countries use OPEC oil" and "they have been able to hold the line on inflation."

As an example, Stockman used West Germany, which imports 95 percent of its crude, compared to 40 percent for the United States. But, Stockman charged, the difference between the two Western industrial powers is that the Germans "have had a different kind of monetary and fiscal policy" when it comes to expanding the money supply. The Germans don't print more money, Stockman said.

Under Ford, the government spent \$100 billion in

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Carter's 1981 budget. Stockman said the president has added billions to the national debt and to "reverse these deficits, they run the printing presses overtime at the federal reserve." To blame OPEC for the inflation is a "tactic of scapegoating and finger-pointing," Stockman said.

The Carter administration has inflation upside down, according to Stockman, because it believes "wet streets cause rain," rather than "wet streets are a symptom of rain."

The Democrats cannot blame the private sector for inflation the congressman said, because it does not print money. The federal government has a monopoly on this.

Stockman also spoke of the Republicans' Kemp-Roth plan to cut taxes by 30 percent over three years.

The president has said that will increase spending and drive prices even higher.

Stockman said the president will hammer his challenger that a three-year tax cut is "simphala" and performed with mirrors.

Reagan's response, Stockman said, will be to tell Carter that if it's inflationary to have the fruits of their own efforts, then why does the government keep printing?

Stockman said there is a "collision course" coming between double-digit inflation and the progressive income tax, which he said was not designed for a "wildly inflationary economy."

As government taxes the increases in income due to inflation, Stockman said it constitutes a "massive unvoted tax increase." This year, this "windfall" would amount to \$20 billion, just from inflation driving taxpayers into higher brackets.

Scheduled federal increases will put the tax bill for a family of four up to \$3,700 by 1985, while Carter is offering an eight-percent rebate on the social security tax, or \$280.

This "bracket creep" will take a family making \$25,000 in this election year up to \$42,000 by 1985, placing them in a 30 percent tax bracket, Stockman explained.

The government will collect \$4.1 trillion over the next five fiscal years, according to Stockman, including \$1.1 trillion in 1985.

"We're at the edge today of a breakdown of incentives," Stockman claimed. He said the government is "taxing the middle class out of existence" and destroying the American economic system.

Stockman told the Optimists that after four years of the Carter administration, he thought they would have "dwindled to a club of three."

Carter will also try to convince voters that Reagan is an "extremist" who will abolish the environmental laws, Stockman said. The president

will tell TV viewers that the former actor is "simplistic" and "ill-informed" and that his remark that "pollution comes from trees" will bear that out.

Smiling, Stockman said he told Reagan to go right back after Carter by saying something about rabbits being less dangerous than they appear, a reference to Carter being attacked by a bunny a couple of years ago during a canoe trip.

Reagan's point in the remark, which Stockman said was twisted by the press, was that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air-quality guidelines are unnecessarily strict. "They would even have Mother Nature in violation," Stockman added.

A 1961 car will be equipped with \$850 worth of gadgets to control pollution and Stockman maintains that "50 percent of it is overkill" that provides wasteful "excess control."

Stockman said the money could better be used to overhaul antiquated facilities to make them more productive.

Carter will claim that Reagan is a "warmonger" according to Stockman, and that he "wants to start an arms race."

Referring to the SALT II arms limitation treaty, Stockman said, "Carter is not being honest about that treaty he signed."

As proof, Stockman said his candidate will point out that the Democrat-controlled Congress has not ratified it and the specialists of the Armed Services Committee turned it down 10-0. Stockman said

the new SALT treaty with the Soviet Union would "undermine national security."

The last point of battle between the two candidates for the White House would be energy, Stockman predicted.

Stockman, a member of the federal energy committee in Congress commented that, "The 16,000 people that work there (in the United States Department of Energy) and the \$12 billion spent could just as easily be wiped off the face of the earth."

"We would not suffer," Stockman added. He assured his audience that the country has an abundance of energy reserves, which are being held from development by governmental "impediments." Stockman said Reagan's idea would be to "trust in the marketplace to mobilize the investments."

Stockman charged that Carter spent Tuesday closeted in his Cleveland hotel room, memorizing "every incautious remark Gov. Reagan has made in the last 25 years." Stockman said, "They sound pretty gruesome," but he added, "Really they're a diversion, a distraction from the issues."

Carter is using the ploy of providing the bad things that Reagan has said, Stockman pointed out, "But the bad things have already been done to the American people."

Stockman is seeking reelection against Democrat Lyndon "Jerry" Furst, an Andrews University professor from Berrien Springs.

Gambling with History

RONALD REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Laurence I. Barrett

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1983



Democrats would nominate a liberal, allowing Baker to pitch for Tory Democratic support. But the liberal prospect lost the Democratic primary, leaving Baker to face an opponent indistinguishable from him on the issues. "We did our crying on primary night," Susan Baker recalled. They still had to run hard because Baker suspected that he might try again in the future; he needed a reputation as a game campaigner. He and Susan divided Texas' twenty-two media markets between them. He took the larger ones, she the smaller.

"We really did it," Susan said three years later. "We worked our bones off. Three speeches a day with Mary Bonner in a porta-cub." When they appeared together, Baker would identify himself as the "candidate who brings his own baby to him." The voters smiled indulgently and elected the Democrat. Soon afterward advances planning started for the Bush campaign. The old friends and tennis partners began their long zigzag trek to the White House, where one would be a heartbeat away from the presidency, as the old saw goes, but the other would be much more influential as a member of the small privy council.

Baker earned that spot by his performance during the general election. Though outshined by Meese, Quay, Denver and others, he showed a cool head as an administrator. Further, he argued strongly that Reagan should debate Anderson and then Carter while some of the others had reservations. Baker represented the Reagan camp in negotiations over ground rules, and did well. Because of his experience in the Ford-Carter debates of 1976, Baker also took charge of preparing Reagan for these crucial encounters on network television.

Here Baker had to face something of an ethical problem. In gathering research that Stockman would use when impersonating Carter in the sparring sessions, a member of the campaign staff somehow acquired an unusual prize: briefing material that the other side was using to get Carter ready for the confrontation. Apparently a Reagan mole in the Carter camp had fished papers containing the main points the President planned to make when he met Reagan for the debate. Stockman, hustling to Washington from his own campaign chores in Michigan, was delighted to find most of his homework done for him as he outlined his own script for the dry run. Later, after the real thing was over, the Reaganists realized that the papers provided by their informant had included every important item Carter used on the air except one: his reference to his daughter, Amy, in connection with nuclear arms control. The Carter people then, as later, apparently were unaware of this hole in their security.

Baker was fastidious about propriety. Early in his legal career he was interested in trial work but he quickly gave up litigation when he real-

ized that sharp practices were common in that branch of the profession. Now, as a senior adviser to the Reagan campaign, he looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it. Months later he was still sensitive enough to be embarrassed when I mentioned the incident during a private conversation. And he was relieved that the matter had remained a secret.⁶

Soon Baker would face a more serious, enduring test of his long-held style and strength. For the first time in his adult career, Baker now lived in a world in which his motives and loyalty were frequently attacked. Not only did he have to manage the regged subsidiary that makes up the Chief of Staff's man—everything from legislative strategy to personnel selection to a quarrel between the White House barber and the official beautician—but he had also to contend with the never-rest accusation that he was undermining Reaganism. This constant sniping was not only a distraction; it became an inhibition as Baker attempted to maneuver around Meese's role in White House operations. Since Meese was a certified Reaganist more concerned than most of the other advisers with the tenets of Reaganism, despises over jurisdiction and tactics had a way of becoming muddled with philosophy—though the latter usually was not at issue within the White House staff.

Aware of the problem from the outset, Baker initially took some precautions that protected his flank for a short time. He brought in other non-Reaganists suspected of outside views—Dorman, Gergen and Friedlander—were the most prominent—but he balanced such additions on the other side. It was Baker who recalled Noddy to the Reagan tent and put him in the sensitive job of chief of political liaison. The point of that was to give the right wing a sympathetic ear in the White House.⁷ As contact men with the governors and senators, another significant job, Baker selected Rich Williamson, who had strong conservative credentials as a longtime strategist for Congressman Philip Crane. Baker also found openings for a few New Right operatives in the subcabinet.

Those efforts were enough, in early 1981, to earn him favorable mention in *Human Events* as an authentic conservative.⁸ He also received kudos from the columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak.

At least a couple of reporters became aware of the bridge-burner super months after the event. The story did not make it into print, however. The article I did for *Time* in February 1981 was crowded out by other news and remained in the event.

⁶ Noddy earned only limited influence and resigned at the end of the first year. He was replaced by Ed Ballin, a protégé of Me, who was also in the "neo-conservative" style. But Ballin also was on the fringe of influence.

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

June 15, 1983

The Honorable James Baker
 Assistant to the President and
 Chief of Staff
 The White House
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Baker:

The Human Resources Subcommittee, in carrying out its responsibilities to act on the reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics, has undertaken extensive oversight into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. As a result of that oversight, we have identified problems that have arisen since passage of the original Act. This Subcommittee has attempted to address many of those problems through statutory changes currently awaiting final House action in H.R. 2717, the OGE reauthorization bill.

Recently, printed reports stemming from the release of Laurence Barrett's new book, Gambling With History: Reagan in the White House, have come to the attention of the Subcommittee. They refer to the purported use of "filched" documents that had been prepared by President Carter's White House staff by the Reagan Presidential campaign staff in preparation for the 1980 general debates. Specifically, Mr. Barrett's book and the attached news reports suggest that you, Mr. Stockman, and Mr. Gergen received and acknowledged these to be White House documents and proceeded to use them to prepare for the presidential debate. It is in the Subcommittee's continuing effort to review agency ethics programs and the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 that I am writing to you to request your response to those allegations.


In light of your current leadership position in Government, I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value. However, if Mr. Barrett's accounts, and the attached news items, are accurate, there may be possible violations of criminal law because of any theft that may have occurred, or for the failure to report such a theft. There are also additional potential violations, such as theft and receipt of U.S. Government property. Every employee and official of the Federal Government is obliged to report possible violations as well. There are institutional concerns, such as the concern that all executive branch employees, including White House staff, appreciate and understand the prohibitions in the ethics and conflicts laws, regulations, and standards of conduct, and the responsibility of the Office of Government Ethics to promote such understanding, as provided in 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(14). Also, Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act dealing with special prosecutor investigations may come into play.

I have expressed the concern in the past that every employee and official be made aware of the ethics requirements of service in the Federal Government. The Subcommittee also has a general responsibility to see that all sections of the Ethics in Government Act are operating in a reliable and well-coordinated manner, so that matters which should be addressed within agencies or offices are properly handled and that matters which rise to a level requiring attention of the Attorney General receive both the requisite attention of the Attorney General and the appropriate consideration by the officials in the agency or executive office involved.

I would therefore appreciate having an explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the reported transactions, as described in Mr. Barrett's book and the news articles. I would also request on behalf of the Subcommittee that, for the protection of all parties involved, you preserve all documents, records, and logs of meetings and conversations which have a direct bearing on, or relation to, the events described above, and the preparation for the Presidential debates of 1980. Your response to these issues by June 23rd would be appreciated.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
CHAIRMAN

DA/tal
Enclosures
cc: The Attorney General

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

June 20, 1983

The Honorable William Casey
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

The Human Resources Subcommittee, in carrying out its responsibilities to act on the reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics, has undertaken extensive oversight into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. As a result of that oversight, we have identified problems that have arisen since passage of the original Act. This Subcommittee has attempted to address many of those problems through statutory changes currently awaiting final House action in H.R. 2717, the OGE reauthorization bill.

Recently, printed reports stemming from the release of Laurence Barrett's new book, Gambling With History: Reagan in the White House, have come to the attention of the Subcommittee. They refer to the purported use of "filched" documents that had been prepared by President Carter's White House staff by the Reagan Presidential campaign staff in preparation for the 1980 general debates. Specifically, Mr. Barrett's book and the attached news reports suggest that Mr. Baker, Mr. Stockman, and Mr. Gergen received and acknowledged these to be White House documents and proceeded to use them to prepare for the presidential debate. It is in the Subcommittee's continuing effort to review agency ethics programs and the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 that I have written to the above gentlemen to request their responses to those allegations.

As you were campaign manager of the Reagan Presidential campaign with chief administrative responsibilities, I would like your response to the allegations made. I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value. However, if Mr. Barrett's accounts, and the attached news items, are accurate, there may be possible violations of criminal law because of any theft that may have occurred, or for the failure to report such a theft. There are also additional potential violations, such as theft and receipt of U.S. Government property. Every employee and official of the Federal Government is obliged to report possible violations as well. There are institutional concerns, such as the concern that all executive branch employees, including White House staff, appreciate and understand the prohibitions in the ethics and conflicts laws,


regulations, and standards of conduct, and the responsibility of the Office of Government Ethics to promote such understanding, as provided in 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(14). Also, Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act dealing with special prosecutor investigations may come into play.

I have expressed the concern in the past that every employee and official be made aware of the ethics requirements of service in the Federal Government. The Subcommittee also has a general responsibility to see that all sections of the Ethics in Government Act are operating in a reliable and well-coordinated manner, so that matters which should be addressed within agencies or offices are properly handled and that matters which rise to a level requiring attention of the Attorney General receive both the requisite attention of the Attorney General and the appropriate consideration by the officials in the agency or executive office involved.

I would therefore appreciate having your response to these charges and an explanation of your knowledge of and participation, if any, in the reported transactions, as described in Mr. Barrett's book and the news articles. I would also request on behalf of the Subcommittee that, for the protection of all parties involved, you preserve all documents, records, and logs of meetings and conversations which have a direct bearing on, or relation to, the events described above, and the preparation for the Presidential debates of 1980.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
CHAIRMAN

DA/TALmg
Enclosures
cc: The Attorney General

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
June 23, 1983

The Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Don:

This will answer your letter of June 16.

My recollection of the "document" referred to in Mr. Barrett's book begins with a package of material that was delivered to my office by messenger from the Reagan campaign committee one day before the first debate rehearsal at Wexford, Virginia. I believe this was October 23, 1980.

It was included in a larger batch of debate preparation papers forwarded by the Reagan campaign in order to assist me in my role as the stand-in debater for President Carter. My recollection is that the balance of the material consisted of debate background papers prepared by the Reagan committee.

The "document" in question appeared to be a "policy issues" compilation covering dozens of topics from Afghanistan, to SALT, to solar energy. It was a thick, unbound set of pages containing approximately one issue per page. I recall that it had no index or particular organizational format.

To the best of my recollection, none of these pages contained markings indicating that they were official government business. Nor were they in any way classified.

The documents dealt entirely with policy issues, including "Carter Administration Achievements", and contained standard arguments in support of Carter Administration initiatives and policies. To the best of my recollection, they contained no points challenging positions taken by Governor Reagan or providing contrast between the Carter and Reagan stands on the topics covered. Nor did they contain discussions of campaign strategy, debate tactics or a debate "game plan".

Thus, my recollection is that the set of pages I received was an "issues primer" quite different in character from the internal Reagan debate strategy papers that I had seen at the same time.

Due to the advocacy character of these issue briefs it was apparent to me at the time that they had in some way come from the Carter campaign. I have no recollection of asking about or being informed as to how. More importantly, since they only dealt with matters of public record I felt no reason to be concerned about having access to them.

The published reports you refer to indicate that these documents were useful to the Reagan campaign. This is true -- but in a very particular and unique sense.


To prepare Governor Reagan for the debate, the campaign conducted mock debates over the weekend of October 24-27, 1980, in which I was the Carter stand-in. Since I had been a vocal critic of the Carter Administration on many issues, I found the documents, written from a Carter Administration advocacy point of view, useful as I prepared outlines of possible debate answers representing the "other side". I might note that I also made extensive use of the material prepared by the Reagan campaign staff on controversial prior statements by candidate Reagan in carrying out my debate role of challenging Governor Reagan's answers.

I doubt that the Carter advocacy materials that I used were or could have been of significant value to others in the Reagan campaign. For example, I recall no mention of them during the many hours of debate rehearsals and preparation, which included all key campaign aides, over the weekend of October 24-27, 1980.

In summary, I had no reason to believe that the documents in question were anything other than a compilation of the public record and position of the Carter Administration on the whole range of issues relevant to the 1980 campaign. My perception today remains as it was then.

I hope these recollections will be useful to you. If I can cooperate in any other way, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "David A. Stockman", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David A. Stockman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1983

Dear Congressman Albosta:

This letter is in response to your inquiry of June 15 regarding my role in preparations for the Reagan-Carter debate during the 1980 Presidential campaign. I welcome this opportunity to address the issues you have raised.

The facts are these:

- My role in the Reagan campaign at the time in question was to act as general coordinator and editor of the debate materials prepared for Governor Reagan and, in conjunction with others in the campaign, to coordinate the pre-debate briefing sessions with the Governor.
- I do not recall ever receiving or seeing a "Carter debate book" or any other notebook from the Carter campaign. Had that occurred, I believe that I would remember it.
- It is possible that I did see some pages of "Carter material" for a brief period, but I do not recall it.
- I do recall hearing that some material from the Carter campaign was present in the Reagan campaign. To the best of my recollection, the material was not described to me as important or dramatic; as a result, I never paid much attention to it.
- I did not know then nor do I know now whether such material was prepared by the Carter campaign staff, the Carter White House, the Democratic National Committee or by a related organization. I also have no idea how the material may have come into the possession of the Reagan campaign. To this day, I am not aware of any evidence that the Reagan campaign engaged in unethical or illegal practices to obtain this material.

- In my role of preparing written materials for Governor Reagan, I can tell you that I never studied nor drew upon any private or sensitive materials from the Carter camp. To the best of my knowledge -- and I was in a reasonable position to know -- the so-called Carter debate book was inconsequential in the preparation of debate materials used by Governor Reagan.
- The face-to-face debate briefings with Governor Reagan were conducted at a private home in northern Virginia. To the best of my recollection, there was no discussion in any of these sessions of the so-called Carter debate materials. Moreover, there was never, to the best of my knowledge, any hint or suggestion that we had inside information about what approaches President Carter's advisers were urging him to take in the debate.
- As you can well understand, the passage of nearly three years' time leaves me a little hazy about all the many details of the debate preparations. But I do remember the main events of that period, and the presence of the Carter materials in the Reagan campaign never left an impression that such materials were significant to the debate.

May I also mention an additional set of facts that I believe offer a relevant perspective on these events? This incident occupies some three paragraphs plus a footnote on pages 382-383 of Mr. Barrett's book. I am told that his publisher never took it seriously enough to include it in the original promotional materials, and so far as I can tell, he has not included a specific reference to it in the book's 15 pages of index. Mr. Barrett did apparently write up a note for *Time* magazine the month after President Reagan was inaugurated, but his editors never thought it significant enough to publish anything about it. Mr. Barrett also writes: "At least a couple of reporters became aware of the briefing-book caper months after the event. The story did not make it into print, however."

It is instructive, I believe, that those who have known about this event in the past -- and that includes the press -- have apparently concluded that it did not play a significant role in the debate. It is also worth asking whether there are some people who are now seeking to promote this story for reasons that are at least partly political.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I appreciate your statement in your letter that it is not your intention "to accept these allegations at face value." I hope this letter helps to address the concerns you have raised; like others in the administration, I want to be fully cooperative with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "David R. Gergen". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "David" and last name "Gergen" being more prominent than the middle initial "R.".

David R. Gergen
Assistant to the President
for Communications

The Honorable Donald Albosta
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: The Attorney General

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1983

Dear Congressman Albosta:

This letter is to respond to your letter of June 15.

I am pleased to give you my recollection of the matters referred to in the second and third sentences of paragraph two of your letter.

First, I would like to note two things which I know you appreciate: 1) almost three years have passed since these matters are alleged to have occurred; and 2) while there may conceivably be some legitimate basis for concern, there is obviously high political content in the efforts by some to foster press interest in this matter in the hopes of embarrassing the Reagan Administration.

I have no recollection that I ever received or saw any debate strategy or sensitive debating points prepared by the Carter campaign or Carter White House.

In 1980, sometime after the Reagan-Anderson debate and before the Reagan-Carter debate, I do remember briefly seeing a large looseleaf bound book (I believe in a black binder) that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter campaign. But I do not believe this was strategic material. It is my best recollection that I was given the book by William Casey, with the suggestion that it might be of use to the Debate Briefing Team. I should note, however, that I have recently checked this recollection with him, and while he has not contested my recollection, he has no such recollection of his own. It is my further recollection that after briefly thumbing through the binder, I passed it on to the Debate Briefing Team, headed by David Gergen and Frank Rodsoll.

I did not know then, nor do I know now, how that book was obtained by the Reagan campaign. I never, directly or indirectly, asked anyone in or out of our campaign, or in the Carter campaign or White House, to provide or acquire that book from the Carter campaign or White House. As best I recall, the book I saw contained position papers on various issues. I do not believe there was anything about it or its contents that would have identified it as coming from the White House. I do not recall that it contained any strategic or tactical information relating to a forthcoming debate. I recall it being more of a compilation of Carter Administration positions on a wide range of issues. I don't remember whether the issues were foreign, domestic, or both. As best I recall, the material in the book was not unlike information that a campaign of an incumbent President might supply its surrogate speakers. It did not seem to be close-in briefing material, but rather a compendium of Carter Administration positions.


I do not remember exactly when I saw this book but it could have been before a Carter-Reagan debate had even been agreed upon. We were preparing for one because the Carter camp had been challenging Governor Reagan to a one-on-one debate since early in the campaign. I believe (but cannot be sure) that the book I saw was not something developed in the few days preceeding the debate -- the period during which former Carter campaign officials now say their key strategic debate briefing material was developed. I do not recall sending the book or a copy to David Stockman, but apparently he received some such material from the Reagan campaign.

It is correct that, after seeing the book, I did not undertake to find out how our campaign had obtained it. There was nothing on its face that suggested it may have been an official document or a document sufficiently sensitive to have been controlled or closely held. In any case, I would submit that, unfortunately, it is not uncommon in campaigns -- just as it is not uncommon in the ordinary business of the press and the Congress -- for such material to be given or sent for a variety of reasons by a host of people, including people whose contribution may be in conflict with their current or prior affiliations. Further, as I have suggested above, I had no reason to believe that the book was illegally acquired. And even now, I am not aware of any evidence that it was.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter you say, "I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value." I appreciate your approaching your oversight responsibilities in this manner. In this same spirit, I trust you will note the established record of those Presidential campaigns which I ran. In 1976, I was Chairman of the President Ford Committee for the general election. The Federal Elections Commission, and I believe Common Cause, complimented the conduct of that campaign as far as compliance and propriety are concerned. I was also Chairman of the George Bush for President Committee in 1979 and 1980 during the contest for the nomination, and the record of that campaign also reflects full compliance with election laws and high standards of propriety. This record, I trust you will agree, demonstrates that I share your concern for assuring proper conduct in the management of electoral campaigns.

I hope you will be able to dispose of this matter quickly and would be pleased to cooperate in any way that would be helpful.

Sincerely,



James A. Baker, III
Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President

The Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: The Attorney General

June 22, 1983

The Honorable Don Albosta
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Albosta:

Thank you for your letter of June 20, 1983.

I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make as described in Mr. Barrett's account.

Upon receiving your letter I checked with my secretary during the campaign, two of my special assistants and five of the deputy campaign directors and none of them have any knowledge that the campaign ever received or had any paper or information resembling that described by Mr. Barrett.

I can assure you that the campaign management never contemplated, directed or authorized any effort to obtain information of this kind nor, to my knowledge, did the campaign ever use or have the kind of information described in Mr. Barrett's book.

If I can be of any further assistance, let me know.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Casey

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1983

Dear Congressman Albosta:

Since responding to your letter last week, I have found that I made a mistake, and I want to correct the record with you and to convey to you my personal apology.

In my letter to you of June 22, I said in part:

"It is possible that I did see some pages of 'Carter material' for a brief period, but I do not recall it.

"I do recall hearing that some material from the Carter campaign was present in the Reagan campaign...

"As you can well understand, the passage of nearly three years' time leaves me a little hazy about all the many details of the debate preparations."

Mr. Chairman, that letter was written to you in good faith, based upon my best recollections plus those of a few other close colleagues with whom I consulted. Unfortunately, I wrote that letter to you before completing a thorough search of all of my files. I just didn't think I had anything there of relevance. That was a mistake I very much regret. In completing that search with the help of a member of my staff, I found yesterday two items that should properly and promptly be brought to your attention:

-- A set of materials clearly prepared by the Carter camp relating to foreign policy and national security issues. These materials have various dates ranging from September 10 through September 29, 1980, several weeks before the debate was formally scheduled. It appears they were an early draft of materials that were later summarized, refined and included in many parts of the final briefing materials on this subject, dated October 20, 1980. (A copy of materials being released by the White House today shows that the pages in my files are a subset of those that another member of the campaign team found in his files over the weekend.)

-- Second, I found an unsolicited note sent to me on October 21, 1980 by a Mr. Wayne Valis with a one-page attachment. Valis describes the attachment as "notes ... based on a Carter debate staff brainstorming session -- middle level types -- nothing spectacular, but interesting -- from a source intimately connected to a Carter debate staff member..." After seeing this material again, I can remember that I read it at the time

received. I cannot remember my reaction, but it strikes me now as a second or third-hand account of what was already well known (e.g., Carter planned to attack Reagan on so-called flip-flops) and some random notes on Carter advertising plans.

(Both of these materials, as well as others, are being forwarded to you today by the Counsel to the President.)

There were no other items in my files that appear to have come from the Carter camp. I definitely read the second item noted above, though I did nothing with the information provided. Having my memory refreshed, I can now advise you that I still do not recall studying or spending any time with the materials in the first item above, but clearly I must have looked through these materials sometime prior to the debate in October.

If I might, I would once again like to emphasize that my memory of these events has been dimmed by the passage of nearly three years' time. In searching my files, I also found several hundreds of pages of material generated within the Reagan campaign that I did not recall until I saw them again. I can only say that, like others in this Administration, I am trying to make a good faith effort to reconstruct events of that period. After reviewing the briefing book submitted on our side, it remains my view that while materials received from the Carter camp were of interest, to my knowledge, they did not play any significant role in the preparation of materials for Governor Reagan.

As noted in my letter of June 22, I am eager to be fully cooperative with you in this matter, and regret any inconvenience caused you by my failure to review all of my files before tendering my previous response.

Sincerely,



David R. Gergen
Assistant to the President
for Communications

The Honorable Donald Albosta
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 28, 1983

The materials listed below are today being released to the public. They were provided to the White House Counsel's Office by the parties, and on the dates, indicated herein. The Counsel's Office, in turn, provided all these materials promptly to the Department of Justice, with the concurrence of those who provided them.

(1) Letter of Transmittal from Patrick Caddell to Richard Hauser, dated June 27, 1983, enclosing:

(1)(a) "a copy of the briefing book used by President Carter in his preparations for the October 28, 1980 debate"; and

(1)(b) "supplementary foreign policy questions and answers"

NOTE: Mr. Caddell's letter notes that "all concerned agree that the enclosed materials are the only issue briefing materials prepared for and sent to President Carter for that debate." The materials were received by the Counsel's Office on June 27, 1983 and transmitted to Justice on the same date.

(2) "Presidential Debates: Foreign Policy and National Security Issues" (September 29, 1980)

NOTE: This document was provided to the Counsel on June 25, 1983 by Francis S.M. Hodson, and transmitted to Justice on the same date. The document -- minus the first two pages -- was also provided to the Counsel on June 27, 1983 by David R. Gergen, and transmitted to Justice on the same date.

(3) Miscellaneous Foreign Affairs and Defense Issue Materials

NOTE: This collection was provided to the Counsel on June 25, 1983 by Francis S.M. Hodson, and transmitted to Justice on the same date.

(4) Handwritten note from Myles Martel to Frank Hodson (undated) with attachments by Sam Popkin.

NOTE: These materials were provided to the Counsel's Office by Francis S.M. Hodson on June 25, 1983, and transmitted to Justice on the same date. Mr. Martel reported to the Counsel on June 28, 1983 that the Popkin attachment was given to him after the debate, and that he forwarded it to Mr. Hodson at a subsequent point.

(5) Handwritten note from Wayne Valis to Dave Gergen (dated October 21, 1980) attaching a one-page typewritten note (dated October 20, 1980).

NOTE: This note and attachment were provided to the Counsel's Office by David Gergen on June 27, 1983, and transmitted to Justice on the same date.

(6) Reagan Campaign debate briefing book commencing with Table of Contents, prepared by the Debate Briefing Group under the supervision of Messrs. Gergen and Hodsohl, dated and delivered to candidate Reagan on October 24, 1980.

NOTE: Separate copies of this document were retrieved from their respective files by Messrs. Gergen and Hodsohl and delivered to the Counsel's Office on June 27, 1983, and transmitted to Justice on June 28, 1983.

(7) Individual statements concerning the above materials by Messrs. Stockman, Casey, Baker, Gergen, and Hodsohl.

NOTE: The following selected summary points can be drawn from these statements:

- None of the parties recalls having seen the Carter documents as such ((1)(a) and (1)(b)) prior to June 27, 1983.
- None of the parties recalls having seen at any time prior to June 27, 1983 the type of material in Part I, Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of document (1)(a). Nor do they recall having seen any of the Sections of Part II of document (1)(a).
- Some (Messrs. Stockman, Baker, and Gergen) believe that documents (2) and (3) contain some or most of the material described in their letters to Chairman Albosta.
- Some of the issue material in documents (2) and (3) appears to have been edited, consolidated, and refined in the preparation of document (1)(b).
- Document (4) was seen only by Messrs. Hodsohl and Gergen prior to June 25, 1983. They do not have a clear recollection as to when they first saw it. Mr. Martel reports that he did not receive or provide it until after the Carter-Reagan debate.
- Only Mr. Gergen recalls having seen document (5) prior to June 27, 1983. Mr. Baker notes it was possible he was given a copy of the attachment, but does not recall having seen it.
- Obviously, all saw and used document (6).



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

June 28, 1983

TO: FRED FIELDING
FROM: DAVID A. STOCKMAN *DAS*
SUBJECT: CARTER CAMPAIGN MATERIALS

I have reviewed the documents designated #1 - #6. The following are my recollections and observations.

Document #1-A. "Debate Briefing Materials"

To the best of my recollection, I have not previously seen this document. The only section of this document that appears to be similar to the material I received and described in my letter to Chairman Albosta is Part I(3) entitled "Carter Questions and Answers" on "Economy", "Energy and Environment" "Overview", "Government" and "Human Needs". While this section appears to be in a different format, more tightly written and organized, and more addressed to specific debating points than I recall, I would conclude that the substantive content of Section 3 of Document 1-A is similar to material made available to me prior to the debate rehearsals.

The remainder of the document consists of numerous succinct lists of "Key Lines" "Accomplishments", "Promises", "Challenges", "Rebuttals", "Platform Comparisons", "Quotes", and related matters. To the best of my recollection, this type of material was not included in the large volume of xeroxed pages made available to me by the Reagan campaign.

Thus, while my recollection of specific sections and headings is necessarily limited after two and one-half years, it is my strong impression that the material in Part I (1) - (2), and (4) - (9), as well as all of the material in Part II, was not among that which I received on October 23, 1980.

Document #1-B: "Presidential Debate Briefing Papers: Foreign Policy and National Security Material"

This document consists of policy issue materials relating to a variety of foreign policy and defense topics. To the best of my recollection, I have not previously seen this document. However, the individual policy sections are quite similar to the materials I recall having received from the Reagan campaign, described in my letter to Chairman Albosta. This document appears to contain fewer topics, less redundancy and better editing and organization than I recall, but its content is otherwise consistent with my recollections.

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

June 29, 1983

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


On behalf of the Subcommittee on Human Resources, I want to thank you for providing us with copies of materials released Tuesday.

I noted that in your press conference you indicated that all materials sent to the Justice Department are available to the public. That is also appreciated.

I am hereby requesting that you provide copies of any additional material that may have been or may be in the future provided by the Administration or its officials or personnel to the Justice Department in regard to the monitoring or investigation of the Debate Briefing matter and the possible unauthorized acquisition of White House or Carter Campaign material.

Your response by July 11 would be appreciated.

Best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Don Albosta", with a large, sweeping flourish extending from the end of the signature.

Don Albosta
Member of Congress

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

June 29, 1983

The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
 United States Representative to the United Nations
 United States Mission to the United Nations
 799 United Nations Plaza
 New York, New York 10017

Dear Mrs. Kirkpatrick:

The Human Resources Subcommittee, in carrying out its responsibilities to act on the reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics, has undertaken extensive oversight into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. As a result of that oversight, we have identified problems that have arisen since passage of the original Act. This Subcommittee has attempted to address many of those problems through statutory changes currently awaiting final House action in H.R. 2717, the OGE reauthorization bill.

Recently, printed reports stemming from the release of Laurence Barrett's new book, Gambling With History: Reagan in the White House, have come to the attention of the Subcommittee. They refer to the purported use of "filched" documents that had been prepared by President Carter's White House staff by the Reagan Presidential campaign staff in preparation for the 1980 general debates. Specifically, Mr. Barrett's book and the attached news reports suggest that certain members of the Reagan campaign staff, who now serve in the Reagan Administration, received and acknowledged these to be White House documents and proceeded to use them to prepare for the presidential debate. In the Subcommittee's continuing effort to review agency ethics programs and the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I wrote to several gentlemen serving in the Administration to request their responses to those allegations.

Because of your role in assisting then-Governor Reagan in preparing for the 1980 debates, I would like to request your response to the allegations made. I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value. However, if Mr. Barrett's accounts, and the attached news items, are accurate, there may be possible violations of criminal law because of any theft that may have occurred, or for the failure to report such a theft. There are also additional potential violations, such as theft and receipt of U.S. Government property. Every employee and official of the Federal Government is obliged to report possible violations as well.

I have expressed the concern in the past that every employee and official be made aware of the ethics requirements of service in the Federal Government. The Subcommittee also has a general responsibility to see that all sections of the Ethics in Government Act are operating in a reliable and well-coordinated manner.

I would therefore appreciate having a thorough explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the reported transactions, as described in Mr. Barret's book and the news articles. I would also request on behalf of the Subcommittee that, for the protection of all parties involved, you preserve all documents, records, and logs of meetings and conversations which have a direct bearing on, or relation to, the events described above, and the preparation for the Presidential debates of 1980. Your response to these issues by July 11th would be appreciated.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
CHAIRMAN

DA/TALmg
Enclosures
cc: The Attorney General

Urged return of debate data, Reagan campaign aide says

By Steve Goldberg
Media General News Service

WASHINGTON — A Reagan campaign aide for the 1980 presidential debates said he had asked that secret briefing materials obtained from the Carter campaign be returned.

"When I was told they were (being used) in the campaign, the first thing I said was I thought they should be shipped back," said Myles Martel. "My basic feeling was that it violated a sense of fair play."

Martel said he was told by Frank S. Hodsoll, who was in charge of research for the debate, that the Reagan campaign apparatus had hundreds of pages of Carter's briefing material.

When he raised his objections, Martel said that Hodsoll "said something to the effect that I had an interesting position on the subject." Martel said the matter was never again discussed with him.

Hodsoll, now chairman of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities, said the propriety of having the Carter material was never raised with him.

The ethics question "wasn't raised one way or the other," he said.

Martel said Hodsoll told him about the material at a Sunday dinner at Martel's home two days before the debate.

"I was told it was fed to the campaign, and the word 'mole' might have been used," Martel said. "I was told it was fed to us by someone in the Carter campaign."

Hodsoll has said he did not know how the Carter briefing material reached the Reagan campaign.

Martel said Hodsoll told him the material was of low quality and of little value.

"I feel very confident that whatever we had didn't amount to a hill of beans," Martel said.

Martel, a communications consultant, was brought into the campaign

to assist in preparing Republican candidate Ronald Reagan for the debate.

A subsequent book he wrote, "Political Campaign Debates," doesn't even mention the Carter material because Martel regarded it as inconsequential.

Moreover, Martel never saw the material, which former Carter campaign aides said contained Carter's entire game plan for the debate.

The Reagan campaign staff was so secretive about the debate book that some Reagan campaign staff members apparently were given copies of the book without being told that others had it.

The material was in the form of questions that might be posed to Carter during the debate and suggested answers. It was obtained by the Reagan campaign within two weeks of the debate.

It included both foreign and domestic briefing material. Former Carter officials said yesterday that foreign and domestic material was compiled in separate White House offices, suggesting the documents were obtained through a high-level leak or an enterprising theft by a low-level employee.

Then-Michigan GOP Rep. David Stockman had the material when he impersonated Carter during a series of mock debates held at an estate in Middleburg, Va., in the days before the debate.

According to a new book, "Gambling With History" by Laurence I. Barrett, after the real debate was over, "The 'Reaganists' realized that the papers provided by their informant had included every important item then-President Carter used on the air except one: his reference to his daughter, Amy, in connection with nuclear arms control."

In addition to Hodsoll and Stockman, Stefan Halper, a researcher in the campaign, has said the briefing book passed through his hands.

Halper said he didn't know where

the book came from or what he did with it.

His superior on the campaign staff, Robert Garrick, said yesterday that Halper had no cause to ever possess the material.

"He had no reason to have it if it related to the debates. There was no reason (for him) to have it. We didn't have a responsibility in that area," Garrick said.

Meanwhile yesterday, Robert Strauss, former Carter campaign chairman, called for a special prosecutor to determine how the material was obtained by the Reagan camp.

"The public interest would be well served by the appointment of a special prosecutor, which as I understand the law is clearly mandated," Strauss said.

The Justice Department has said, however, that it has no evidence yet of a violation of law.

The matter is under investigation by a House subcommittee, which is expecting responses today from at least three top White House aides on their roles in the incident.

Associated Press Dispatch, Thurs., June 23, 1983

JULY 1, 1981

Casey Operated An 'Intelligence' System in 1980

By Lori Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

Ronald Reagan's campaign manager, William J. Casey, set up what he called an "intelligence operation" in 1980 to monitor whether President Carter would spring an anticipated "October surprise" near the end of the campaign, according to former Reagan campaign officials.

They said that Casey, who now runs the CIA as President Reagan's director of central intelligence, feared a dramatic move on the eve of the election that would free the U.S. hostages held captive in Iran and produce a surge of voter support for Carter.

Casey used the term "intelligence operation" to describe the monitoring when he and Reagan campaign chief of staff Edwin Meese III met with reporters at a breakfast during the July, 1980, Republican National Convention in Detroit. One Republican official said use of this term "alarmed" Meese and others in the campaign and was not repeated.

Yesterday, Robert Garrick, who was in charge of plans and policy for the Reagan campaign, said the campaign intelligence group's information came chiefly from a network of retired military officers who monitored the movements of U.S. troops and transport planes at various air bases across the country.

Garrick, a retired reserve admiral now in the public relations business in Pasadena, Calif., said in an interview that he did not receive information from the Carter White House or the Carter campaign.

But a former high-level Reagan campaign adviser told The Washington Post yesterday that Reagan campaign official Richard V. Allen received copies of portions of daily staff reports that were sent to Carter national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski by his senior aides.

Several other Reagan campaign officials said they had never heard of any such incidents.

The former Reagan campaign adviser described the material received by Allen as "mostly atmospherics . . . stuff about poor morale at the NSC [National Security Council]. That sort of thing."

Brzezinski said yesterday, however, that the reports to him from NSC staff members on each day's activities were "sometimes extraordinary sensitive material of the highest nature . . . Any unauthorized distribution to anyone outside the White House would be very serious."

Most presidential campaigns attempt to monitor the activities of their opponents. However, a former Reagan campaign official said there was "a particular priority" to the Reagan effort because of the belief that Carter would "try to manipulate the hostage situation to his benefit as he had done against Sen. [Edward M.] Kennedy in the Democratic primaries."

Garrick's recollection was supported by a higher-level Reagan campaign official, pollster Richard Wirthlin, who said information about the potential "October surprise" was regularly assessed by top campaign officials, including Casey, Meese and advertising specialist Peter Dailey in a series of meetings held in Wirthlin's apartment in Falls Church.

"I never saw even a scrap of paper that came from the White House or the Carter campaign," Wirthlin said. He said "the most valuable informa-

tion I had during the campaign" appeared in Washington Post stories about Carter campaign strategy memos prepared by Hamilton Jordan, Carter's White House chief of staff.

Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Ed Gray, who was director of policy in the Reagan campaign office and worked with Garrick, also said he knew nothing of information coming from the Carter White House. "Absolutely not," he said. "I feel kind of left out."

As the Justice Department and a congressional subcommittee stepped up investigations into how Carter campaign documents turned up in the Reagan campaign, some administration officials expressed concern about the intelligence-gathering efforts of the presidential campaign.

"There were so many layers at Arlington and so many corners that anything was possible," said one former campaign official. Arlington was the location of Reagan campaign headquarters.

The pressure of the investigation and the uncertainty about where it will lead has resurfaced old tensions among White House officials and Reagan supporters.

Some administration officials said they particularly resent what they call "stonewalling" by Casey, who has said he does not have any recollection of having seen the Carter staff documents that wound up in the files of Reagan campaign aides.

White House chief of staff James A. Baker III said last week that, to the best of his recollection, the Carter materials were given him by Casey and turned over to the Reagan debate preparation team headed by David R. Gergen, now the White House communications director.

David A. Stockman, now Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget, who has described the material as "filched," said the

campaign materials were of use to him in preparing for his role as Carter's stand-in during rehearsals with Reagan of the 1980 presidential debate.

Baker, Gergen and Stockman have pledged cooperation with a congressional investigation headed by Rep. Donald J. Albosta (D-Mich.). After refusing comment for a day, Casey issued a statement through a CIA spokesman saying he, too, "intends to cooperate fully with Congressman Albosta."

Casey, 70, who officials said was traveling yesterday in Central America, has been a frequent target of

criticism in the Reagan campaign and in his CIA post. He has been criticized by some in the White House who say they believe his much-investigated stock dealings are an embarrassment to the president.

But Casey, whose lack of recollection about the Carter campaign materials was defended by the president at his news conference Tuesday, is widely supported by conservative Republicans and administration officials who have been critical of James Baker and Gergen. Yesterday, one official said a "whispering campaign" had been launched against Baker, charging that he was trying to pin the blame for the Car-

ter documents on Casey. Other officials said that White House aides were trying to forge "a united front" against the accusations but that it was difficult to do so because of Casey's lack of recollection.

"We're trying to provide all the information that's been requested and to make certain that the White House genuinely cooperates with the Justice Department investigation," one official said.

"But it's difficult because Casey isn't talking The best thing for the president and all of us is an FBI investigation that swiftly solves the mystery."

[FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES]
JULY 6, 1983

Casey Says He 'Wouldn't Touch' Papers From the Carter Campaign Disputes a Recollection by Other Reagan Aide on Presidential Race

By FRANCIS X. CLINES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 5 — William J. Casey said today that it would have been "totally uncharacteristic and quite incredible" for him to have obtained President Carter's debate strategy plans for use by the aides who prepared Ronald Reagan for the 1980 campaign debate with Mr. Carter.

"It could have destroyed the campaign," Mr. Casey, who was Mr. Reagan's campaign manager and is now Director of Central Intelligence, declared in an interview.

Mr. Casey differed in his strongest terms thus far with the recollection of the White House chief of staff, James A. Baker 3d, that the private Carter debate papers used to rehearse Mr. Reagan had come directly from Mr. Casey.

"I Know That's Dynamite"

"After being involved in seven Presidential campaigns, I know that's dynamite," Mr. Casey said emphatically in denying any knowledge of the Carter papers. "I wouldn't tolerate it. I wouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."

Mr. Casey's comments on the campaign controversy heightened the difference between his version and Mr. Baker's account, which is the focus of investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a House committee.

The decision by Mr. Casey to discuss the controversy underlined the Reagan Administration's increasing anxiety over the matter. In recent days, staff feuding at the White House has flared anew, with partisans of Mr. Casey and Mr. Baker criticizing one another and blaming the rival factions for the debate incident. President Reagan finally ordered a Justice Department inquiry rather than first dismissing the affair as "much ado about nothing."

Possible 'Setup' Seen

Mr. Baker's office said this evening he was on his way from Texas to Washington and could not be reached immediately to comment on Mr. Casey's statements.

Mr. Casey faulted the debate preparation team that was headed by Mr. Baker as "remiss" in not telling the Reagan hierarchy, he said, of the use of secret Carter material so that the political risks of a possible "setup" by the opposition could have been assessed.

Mr. Baker said last week that he was given some Carter debate material "by William Casey with the suggestion that

it might be of use to the debate briefing team."

In commenting on this today, Mr. Casey said that he was not directly contradicting Mr. Baker. It was possible he might have handed on some papers to Mr. Baker without studying them, he said, but highly unlikely that he would have overlooked the hundreds of pages of Carter materials that were found in Reagan campaign files and that are currently being investigated by the Justice Department.

"It would be totally uncharacteristic and quite incredible that I would hand anybody a book I knew to be from the Carter campaign and say this might be helpful to the debate," Mr. Casey said. "I would have said to myself, 'What a setup this would be to hand us something from the Carter White House that could blow us out of the water a week later.'"

Aides to Mr. Carter, charging that the Reagan campaign had obtained a steady flow of secrets from the Carter White House, have contended that the Reagan campaign officials' ready acceptance and use of the campaign material is evidence that they had great confidence in their informer's reliability.

Papers Termed Innocuous

Thus far, the Reagan Administration has not offered a full explanation of how the Carter materials were obtained. Those Reagan officials who concede the materials were used in the debate preparation contend they were generally innocuous, and President Reagan, denying any knowledge of the papers, has speculated they came from a "disgruntled" Carter official.

Mr. Casey said he agreed to repeated requests for an interview in order to reassure "the thousands of Reagan campaign workers around the country that the campaign was properly and honorably conducted."

In describing the Reagan campaign operations, Mr. Casey said that Mr. Baker's debate team was operating on its own in using the Carter materials. Mr. Baker and other Reagan officials, in minimizing the value of the Carter papers, have denied that they had any active informer, or "mole," in the Carter White House.

David A. Stockman, the Reagan Administration's director of the budget, confirmed last week that in 1980 he had casually acknowledged using "pilfered" material from the Carter camp in his role of playing Mr. Carter's part in debate rehearsals with Mr. Reagan. Mr. Stockman said that he had used that term colorfully and lightly and that while the material was useful, it involved no information not widely known on the campaign's public record.

'Jim Baker's Mistaken'

In the interview today, Mr. Casey said all this was news to him as it was disclosed last week.

"The campaign had no intelligence organization as such," he said. "Except the whole organization had their antennae out."

He said that that while the campaign was inundated with "hordes" of information from various individuals looking to be helpful and self-serving, he recalled no mention of the campaign's possessing material that might give

Mr. Reagan the advantage in anticipating President Carter's debating thrusts and parries.

He said that after checking with various strategy aides and office assistants, "I have to believe Jim Baker's mistaken."

Carter veterans have charged that Mr. Casey, as an expert in both politics and intelligence-gathering, might have run a campaign project directed at obtaining not only political secrets from the Carter camp, but also important Government information. In denying this, Mr. Casey conceded that the the Carter Administration's attempts to free the American hostages in Iran was of particular concern to Reagan strategists.

But he denied that any nefarious or unethical attempts were made to obtain White House secrets. He said one campaign aide, Robert Garrick, a retired admiral now in public relations, had talked of how some retired military officers friendly to the campaign were watching for the dispatch of special military hospital planes that might be used for the hostages' release. But Mr. Casey said that nothing valuable came of this.

Mr. Casey also indicated that the campaign had heard from others concerned with the Iranian issue, including American banking officials. None of this, Mr. Casey stressed, was beyond the bounds of normal campaign intelligence.

Attempts to track the conflicting accounts and the missing explanation of how the Reagan camp obtained the Car-

ter information have been compounded by Washington's status as the capital of Governmental leaks and political backstabbing. Some Republicans, for example, have speculated that a Kennedy Democrat might have chosen to betray Mr. Carter.

Security Council Material

Mr. Casey confirmed that he recently telephoned Paul Corbin, a onetime aide to Robert F. Kennedy, about the incident. He said that in an effort to refresh his memory he inquired whether Mr. Corbin might have supplied some Carter information. Mr. Corbin, who supported Mr. Reagan in the 1980 campaign, denied offering any such help, and Mr. Casey agreed with this account.

In a statement issued today, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, complained about "the disturbing development" that Richard V. Allen, Mr. Reagan's former national security advisor, acknowledged receiving unsolicited material from the Carter White House during the campaign.

Mr. Allen, who served as Mr. Reagan's foreign affairs adviser in the campaign, said on the ABC News program "Nightline" that he had not solicited the material but rather that it had been thrown "over the transom."

He said he received such material from a National Security Council source on perhaps three occasions and that it was innocuous and unclassified. He described it as relating to morale at the security council.

[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, JULY 7, 1983]

Reagan Volunteer Got Memos From A Carter 'Mole'

By Martin Schram
Washington Post Staff Writer

A volunteer in Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign provided top campaign officials with information and documents from inside the Carter White House that he described as coming from a "reliable White House mole," according to material from Reagan campaign files provided to The Washington Post.

The information included White House memos on economic policy written by Carter presidential aides Anne Wexler and Alonzo L. McDonald, documents from Carter Office of Management and Budget Director James T. McIntyre Jr. and Council of Economic Advisers Chair-

man Charles L. Schultze, and Carter's planned travel itinerary for the final week of the 1980 campaign.

This is the third disclosure of Carter White House information being obtained before the November, 1980, election by the Reagan campaign. In the earlier instances, two Reagan campaign officials found in their files hundreds of pages of Carter briefing papers for the October, 1980, presidential debate, and a third campaign official said he received excerpts of daily National Security Council staff reports from inside the Carter White House.

These new documents also indicate that Reagan campaign officials were told about a "mole" in the Carter White House.

In one covering memo addressed to Reagan campaign officials "Bob Gray, Bill Casey, Ed Meese," the Reagan volunteer, Daniel Jones, wrote: "According to latest information from reliable White House mole [at] 6:30 on Oct. 27, the following is President Carter's itinerary for the remainder of the campaign."

Jones added at the bottom of the page: "Attached is recent White House memo re: certain economic information." What followed, written on White House stationery,

was a memo for the Carter Cabinet, dated Oct. 24, 1980, from Wexler and McDonald, outlining the line that administration officials were to follow in discussing the latest economic statistics.

At the top of another document, an Oct. 10, 1980, memo from Wexler and McDonald for the Carter Cabinet, providing economic "talking points and guidance on response to questions," was the handwritten notation: "Bob—Report from White House mole." Added in a notation on the second page was: "Bob—Expect this line of attack next week, Dan."

Daniel Jones, a stockbroker in Washington, confirmed in an interview that he had sent the memos to Reagan campaign officials and wrote the notations on them.

"You found the author," he said. "I can't deny it . . . You've got the documents." Asked about the handwritten, blue-inked notations, he said, "That's my handwriting." He declined to identify the person he had referred to as a "White House mole."

Jones said the notations were written to his campaign superior, Robert Keith Gray, who was then Reagan's deputy campaign manager for communications. Gray, now a Washington public relations executive, said he did not doubt the authenticity of the documents and believed he had probably received them during the campaign.

"I don't have any doubt," Gray said when asked if he received the documents. But he added that he did not remember them. "I attribute that to the speed of the campaign," he said. "It made such a slight impression on me that I didn't even recall it."

Edwin Meese III, then Reagan's campaign chief of staff and now counselor to the president, said, "I don't have any recollection of having received it . . . The term 'mole' is known to anyone who reads John le Carré novels . . . I don't remember any information from inside the Carter White House."

William J. Casey, then Reagan's campaign chairman and now director of the CIA, said when asked about the memos, "That's all new to me." He added that material with

his name on it in the Reagan campaign would not necessarily have come to him, "any more than it would in my present job."

A photocopy of the Oct. 10 Wexler-McDonald White House memo, complete with Jones' handwritten notations to Gray, also carried a typed notation across the top of the page: "To: William Casey (for transmittal to Martin Anderson)."

Gray said it is probable that the document was passed on by his office to Casey for transmittal to Anderson, Reagan's top domestic policy adviser who was traveling with the Republican presidential nominee aboard his campaign plane. Anderson, now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, said in an interview, "I don't recall any memos from the Carter White House . . . But I got an awful lot of stuff in that airplane."

The documents from the Reagan campaign files were made available to The Washington Post by a collector of campaign memorabilia who said he went to Reagan's campaign headquarters in Arlington, Va., several days after the November, 1980, election and asked if campaign staff workers had any old bumper stickers, buttons or other souvenirs.

The collector, who did not want to be identified, said he was told by a campaign worker that they had just been thrown out and that he was welcome to look in the trash "dumpster" behind the headquarters. There he found some Reagan advertising layouts, which he took as souvenirs, and large amounts of documents apparently discarded from campaign files. He filled a carton with a batch of the papers and took them home, where they remained for more than two years.

Included were documents addressed to Casey and others addressed to Gray, apparently from the campaign files of the two officials. They ranged from major matters like a memo to Casey from chief campaign counsel Loren A. Smith on "Carter Administration's Abuse of Incumbency and Potential Criminal Violations Involved," to lesser matters like Gray's memo to Casey on how television producer David Sus-

skind had planned to endorse Reagan at a news conference, but "unfortunately [GOP press aides] . . . were unable to encourage the media to attend."

Gray was shown a number of the documents given to The Post and he recognized some as having come from his files. He particularly recalled the Susskind memo, noting that "it is especially embarrassing to have that get out."

The typewritten memo from Jones to Gray, Casey and Meese, which referred to a "reliable White House mole" carried a blue ink check mark beside Gray's name, apparently indicating that the document came from his campaign files.

Gray said he did not regard the use of the word "mole" as a particularly startling disclosure because "Dan Jones was the kind of fellow who'd love to elevate his importance. He liked to use the term 'White House mole' to build his sense of drama, and to show he had contacts."

Gray added that he knew Jones only slightly, remembering him as a volunteer who "liked to come early and would be there late at night—very eager . . . always eager to help."

One of Gray's public relations firm associates, John Jessar, who also served under Gray in the campaign, recalled that Jones had indicated to him on several occasions during the 1980 campaign that he "dealt with moles. I never asked him from where. His reference was always to 'my mole' or something like that."

Gray added: "I may have seen all of this in the campaign—I may have—but I don't remember it . . . It [the campaign] was a cram course. A sleepless terror, the speed of things."

Gray said one piece of inside information he did recall coming to the Reagan campaign from the Carter camp was about the president's planned travels. "I do remember we had information as to what his itinerary would be. I do remember that," Gray said. "We'd . . . in our meetings, 'The president's going to Pittsburgh. Steel is obviously an issue."

Let's see if we can get someone to meet him at a plant and cause a ruckus or something."

Gray added that, while he recalled the Reagan campaign's having advance information on Carter's travel plans, "I am not sure if it was in advance of you all receiving it or not."

In the case of one of Jones' memos to Gray, Casey and Meese, the Carter White House apparently passed on to reporters essential details of the president's travel plans for the final week of the campaign two days before Jones wrote that he received the information from his "mole."

On Oct. 25 the White House gave reporters guidance outlining Carter's itinerary for the final week, according to a check of the records by an aide to former Carter press secretary Judy Powell. It was two days later that Jones made his report.

Jones said in an interview that he met with his "mole" only once and had obtained the Carter itinerary in a subsequent telephone call from the same man.

"I literally never knew his name, I never knew it," Jones said. He added that the information he received was offered to him and that he had not bought it. "It was given to me voluntarily," he said.

After being given a chance to inspect the memos provided to The Post, he said, "I really had forgotten the content and extent of the memos . . . But my memo stands by itself. I can't deny that."

Jones strongly denied that he had anything to do with obtaining Carter debate briefing documents for Reagan officials, or excerpts of National

Security Council staff reports that former Reagan adviser Richard V. Allen has said he received.

"This is all I had—in total," Jones said. "I don't know anything about any other papers having to do with debate briefing or national security . . . I know nothing of campaign briefing papers, I know nothing of national security papers, I know nothing about anything else. Don't consider me Mr. Big."

Jones said he is an attorney and was employed by a trade association when he worked as a Reagan campaign volunteer.

In the Oct. 24, 1980, memo to the Carter Cabinet, Wexler and McDonald dealt with three economic topics: guidance on what to say about the September consumer price index, information on a new program to reduce housing costs and an update on the latest economic indicators.

The update included this observation: "The administration forecast presented in mid-July calls for the recession to level off in the fourth quarter of 1980, with recovery in 1981 . . . Early data suggested to some that the recession might be worse than our forecast."

The Wexler-McDonald memo also said, "These documents are not for public distribution, but should be given to your key appointed officials. It is important that these materials be followed closely when talking about economic matters." On the copy that went to his campaign superiors, Jones had drawn an arrow to the sentence saying the document was not for public distribution.

In the memo to the Carter Cabinet dated Oct. 10, Wexler and McDonald presented "economic talking points" that outlined positive things to say about Carter's policy and negative things to say about Reagan's.

It was at the head of this second section that Jones had written, "Bob—Expect this line of attack next week, Dan."

An Oct. 2 memo to the Carter senior staff by McIntyre and Schulze provided an "update" of the OMB analysis of the effects of "Republican economic proposals." Along with it was an Oct. 3 guidance sheet prepared by Schulze's Council of Economic Advisers, noting that "there is a possible fluke" in producer price index statistics because new car rebates were factored into the computations.

When Reagan charged on the campaign trail that Carter was "jimmying" the producer price index by adding new car rebates, Schulze called Reagan's charge "absolutely false, irresponsible and based on a zero acquaintance with the relevant facts."

All of this, including the economic guidance about a "possible fluke," was included in a document written by Jones, entitled "Little White House Lies" and signed "Dan Jones for appropriate signature." What that meant, Jones said, was that this was a letter to the editor he had written, to be sent out over some other signature, as part of his campaign job.

TO: Bob Gray, Bill Casey, Ed Meese ✓
 FROM: Dan Jones
 RE: Jimmy Carter's Schedule October 28-November 3
 DATE: October 27, 1980

According to latest information from reliable White House mole # 6:30 on October 27, the following is President Carter's itinerary for the remainder of the campaign.

October 29	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania Rochester, New York Newark, New Jersey Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
October 30	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania New York, New York

Addressing it to three Reagan campaign aides, Jones wrote memo "from reliable White House mole" on Carter's final travel plans The Washington Post

The Oct. 10, 1980, economic document prepared for the Carter Cabinet is sent to Reagan campaign aide Gray by volunteer Jones.

Bel. Report from
White House note
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *AW*
AL McDONALD *AM*

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC INFORMATION

Because the Congress is not in session, there is no Inflation Report this week. Enclosed are Economic Talking Points and guidance on response to questions on the President's comments on the Federal Reserve's policies. These documents are not for public distribution, but they should be given to your key appointed officials. It is important that these materials be followed closely when talking about economic matters. Your assistance with this will be greatly appreciated.

and subsequent version with new line typed on top of the copy addressing it to Reagan campaign manager William J. Casey.

To: William Casey (for transmittal to Martin Anderson)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1980

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The Washington Post



U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Associate Attorney General

The Associate Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530
August 11, 1983

James Hamilton, Esquire
Special Counsel
Human Resources Subcommittee
Ginsburg, Feldman and Bress
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

Set forth below is the understanding reached between the Department of Justice ("Department") and the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House of Representatives ("Subcommittee") concerning the exchange of information between the Department and the Subcommittee regarding our respective investigations of allegations involving the unauthorized transfer of Carter Administration documents and information to the Reagan-Bush presidential campaign and attendant matters.

(1) The Department will provide the Subcommittee all documents from the Hoover Institution identified by the FBI as relevant to its investigation. These documents will be provided as soon as the FBI completes any follow-up investigation occasioned by these documents which will be on an expedited basis. This understanding is independent of any other arrangement the Subcommittee may make for review of Hoover Institution documents.

(2) The Subcommittee can review all video tapes in the Department's possession of President Reagan's practice sessions for his debates with President Carter.

(3) The Department promptly will provide the Subcommittee all documents provided by the White House to the Department regarding this matter after any follow-up FBI interviews occasioned by those documents are completed. The Department anticipates that any such follow-up interviews will be conducted expeditiously, and that all such documents will be available prior to completion of the entire FBI investigation. To accommodate the interests of the Subcommittee, prior to the completion of the follow-up investigation on this entire class of documents, the Department promptly will make available to the Subcommittee on a periodic basis those documents upon which the

FBI has completed its assessment and any follow-up investigative activity.

(4) In a manner that will maintain the integrity of the criminal investigative process and the privacy concerns of the document source, the Department promptly will provide the Subcommittee on a periodic basis those documents gathered by the FBI during the course of its investigation upon which the FBI has completed its assessment and any follow-up investigative activity. The Department anticipates that any such assessment and investigative activity will be pursued expeditiously.


(5) Consistent with longstanding Department policy, the Subcommittee will not be given FBI interview summaries (302's) prepared in connection with this investigation. At the conclusion of the FBI's investigation, the Department will promptly provide the Subcommittee with the content of each individual 302.

(6) The Department understands that the Subcommittee will disclose to the Department documents and any other information gathered during the Subcommittee's inquiry which may be relevant to the Department's investigation; we understand any such disclosure will be accomplished expeditiously consistent with the integrity of the Subcommittee's inquiry.

(7) The Department understands that the Subcommittee and/or its staff will not publicly release or use in public session any documents or portions thereof obtained from the Department without first providing the Department with reasonable notice and opportunity for consultation.

We believe the above points accurately state the understanding between the Department and the Subcommittee regarding this matter. We trust the Subcommittee appreciates the Department's need to maintain the integrity of our criminal investigation regarding this matter as we recognize the Subcommittee's interest in maintaining the integrity of its inquiry. Consistent with the need to maintain the integrity of our investigation, the Department will, on a cooperative and expeditious basis, provide the Subcommittee documents and information in its possession that the Subcommittee believes may be of assistance to its inquiry.

Sincerely,


D. Lowell Jensen
Associate Attorney General

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

July 7, 1983

The Honorable Michael K. Deaver
 Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the
 President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Deaver:

The Human Resources Subcommittee, in carrying out its responsibilities to act on the reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics, has undertaken extensive oversight into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. As a result of that oversight, we have identified problems that have arisen since passage of the original Act. This Subcommittee has attempted to address many of those problems through statutory changes currently awaiting final House action in H.R. 2717, the OGE reauthorization bill.

Recently, printed reports stemming from the release of Laurence Barrett's new book, Gambling With History: Reagan in the White House, have come to the attention of the Subcommittee. They refer to the purported use of "filched" documents that had been prepared by President Carter's White House staff by the Reagan Presidential campaign staff in preparation for the 1980 general debates. Specifically, Mr. Barrett's book and numerous news reports suggest that certain members of the Reagan campaign staff, who now serve in the Reagan Administration, received and acknowledged these to be White House documents and proceeded to use them to prepare for the presidential debate. In the Subcommittee's continuing effort to review agency ethics programs and the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I have written several persons serving in the Administration to request their responses to these allegations.


Because of your role in the Reagan campaign and your current position in the White House, I would like to request your assistance in providing answers to questions that remain outstanding. As a first step in this process, I would appreciate having a thorough explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the transactions, involving material prepared for President Carter, including the mechanisms for obtaining that material and a description of the use of that material by yourself or other persons. I would also request on behalf of the Subcommittee that, for the protection of all parties involved, you preserve all documents, records, audio and video recordings, and logs of meetings

and conversations which have a direct bearing on, or relation to, the events described above, and the preparation for the Presidential debates of 1960.

I have expressed the concern in the past that every employee and official be made aware of the ethics requirements of service in the Federal Government. The Subcommittee also has a general responsibility to see that all sections of the Ethics in Government Act are operating in a reliable and well-coordinated manner.

Your response to these issues by July 18th would be appreciated. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
CHAIRMAN

DA/TALmg

cc: The Attorney General

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

July 7, 1983

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
 Counsel to the President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

As part of our continuing investigation of the unauthorized release of Presidential material, I would like to request your assistance in providing additional information for the Subcommittee.

In particular, the Subcommittee would appreciate a copy of the memorandum you are reported to have sent to former Reagan campaign personnel requesting their assistance in locating documents or evidence pertaining to this matter. The Subcommittee would also appreciate a list of the persons to whom the memo was sent. In addition, we would like a list of the people that you interviewed in regard to this matter.


Recent press reports also indicate that Hoover Institution personnel are searching the Reagan library for material that may be useful in this investigation, such as material that appears to have been prepared for President Carter. The Subcommittee would also appreciate copies of all material that you have received or may receive in the future from the Hoover Institution's Reagan collection in regard to the investigation.

In the area of current interpretations of White House ethics regulations or policies, the Subcommittee would also appreciate a copy of any guidelines or regulations issued by the White House, for the White House, concerning Executive Order 11222 or 5 C.F.R. 735, and your explanation as Designated Agency Ethics Official for the White House of any changes that have been made in these guidelines or their implementation since the previous Administration.

I have also enclosed a copy of my letter of June 29th to the President. I trust that you will assist him in responding to it.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
 CHAIRMAN

DA/TAL:mg
 Enclosure
 cc: The Attorney General

TELETYPE SERVICE CENTER
MIDDLETON, VA, 22645
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1 7038928698 HGM TDMT ARLINGTON VA 07-09 1119A EST

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RESOURCES J M FITZGERALD
511 HOUSE ANNEX 1 C ST AND NJ ST SE
WASHINGTON DC 20515

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

7038928698 TDMT ARLINGTON VA 60 07-09 1119A EST
PHS HOLLY TUTTILL, CURATOR REAGAN COLLECTION RPT DLY HGM, DLR
2529 SWANSON RD
MENLO PARK CA 94025
1. HEREBY REQUEST YOU MAKE ARRANGEMENTS BY 7-11 FOR INSPECTION AND
COPYING OF REAGAN COLLECTION MATERIALS BY INVESTIGATORS FROM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES.
2. THIS TELEGRAM IS ALSO TO CONFIRM YOUR STATEMENT OF 7-1-83 BY
TELEPHONE TO SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL THAT ALL ORIGINALS HAVE BEEN AND
WILL BE RETAINED AT HOOVER.

PLEASE CONFIRM PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 IN WRITING BY 7-11
MICHAEL GREEN STAFF DIRECTOR JOHN FITZGERALD COUNSEL FOR CHAIRMAN DON
ALBOSTA SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE ANNEX 1 C ST AND NJ ST SE
WASHINGTON DC 20515

11120 EST

HGMCOMP



THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

July 8, 1983

The Honorable
Don Albosta, Chairman
Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service
House of Representatives

Dear Congressman Albosta:

Concerning your request of June 29, 1983, I have checked my memory and my files relative to my participation in the preparations for the debates of October, 1980.

As an academic I did not keep telephone logs, and I do not remember who asked me to participate in the Wexford simulated debates of Sunday, October 26. Clearly, someone associated with the Reagan campaign inquired about whether I would be willing to serve as a questioner in these simulated debates. I agreed.

At Wexford a good many top campaign advisers were present. The "panel" which was to question the President consisted of columnists George Will, Patrick Buchanan, and a Stanford University economics professor whose name I no longer remember, and me.


I was asked to pose questions on foreign affairs and matters of special concern to women. I myself wrote the questions that I posed and did so without any special preparation.

Candidate Reagan responded to our questions, as did David Stockman who was "standing in" for President Carter. After a simulated "debate" we (the panel) discussed Candidate Reagan's replies with him--pointing out how they could be sharpened or otherwise improved. In this fashion we spent a rather relaxed Sunday. To the best of my recollection, we had three simulated debates in the course of the day.

At no time, either during the preparation of materials for the simulated debate or during the questioning, or at any time thereafter during the course of the campaign, did I notice any activity which might have even remotely suggested use of Carter campaign materials.

I trust this is fully responsive to your inquiry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jeane J. Kirkpatrick". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jeane" and last name "Kirkpatrick" clearly distinguishable.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983


Dear Mr. Chairman:

The President has requested that I respond to your letter to him dated June 29, 1983.

In that letter you acknowledge receipt of the materials we provided to you on June 28, and request that we provide you with any additional materials that we supply to the Department of Justice in regard to its investigation of the possible unauthorized acquisition of Carter White House or Campaign material.

As you may be aware, on July 1, 1983, we directed the Hoover Institution to forward the product of its file search directly to the Department of Justice. Thus, the White House has not received and will not be receiving any documents found as a result of that search. However, in accordance with your request, the President has directed that representatives of the Department of Justice meet with you to work out procedures to provide you and your Subcommittee with access to any such materials located in the Hoover Institution or elsewhere to assist you in your investigation while assuring the integrity of the Department of Justice investigation.

Sincerely,


Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

The Honorable Donald C. Albosta
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: The Attorney General

FOR RELEASE: Wednesday,
January 18, 1984, 9:30 A.M.

For further information:
Micah Green 202-225-2821

STATEMENT
of
CHAIRMAN DON ALBOSTA
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

JANUARY 18, 1984

Since June, the Human Resources Subcommittee has been investigating, pursuant to its jurisdiction over Standards of Conduct for Federal employees, the alleged unauthorized transfers of material and information from the Carter Administration to the 1980 Reagan/Bush campaign. This inquiry has been thorough, extensive and, in my view, conducted in a most professional fashion. Moreover, it has born considerable fruit, as will be demonstrated when the Subcommittee's findings are released.

Sometime ago, I tentatively scheduled hearings into the matters under investigation for January 26th. However, recently I have become concerned that holding public hearings on the highly charged issues involved in a Presidential election year could have unwanted, undesirable and possibly counter-productive, consequences. Because of the issues and the persons involved, there is potential for public hearings to degenerate into partisan bickering and a media extravaganza. If this occurred,

the ultimate goals of the hearings -- an objective presentation of the Subcommittee's factual findings and the development of proposals for administrative or legislative solutions -- would be seriously impeded, if not defeated.

I have thus concluded that, to further its legislative purpose, the Subcommittee should now attempt to conclude the investigative phase of its work without the potentially circus atmosphere of public hearings. However, I believe that to ensure that the Subcommittee adequately meets its investigative responsibilities and utilizes the tools at its disposal, it is still necessary, as I have stated previously, to place certain witnesses under oath.

As is publicly known, there are still serious unresolved conflicts in testimony between certain important witnesses. Such persons have already been extensively questioned by the Subcommittee staff, some more than once. But it appears that not all of the unsworn statements to the Subcommittee and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been truthful. I believe it is important that the principal witnesses be required to state their positions under oath. When under oath, the burden is on them to state truthfully and fully what they know.

To accomplish this, the Subcommittee has decided to postpone, until further notice, the January 26th public hearings. The principal witnesses referred to above will be asked, instead, to sign sworn statements regarding their activities in the matters under investigation. The statements, which will be prepared by Subcommittee staff, will be based upon the testimony

given to the staff during the course of the investigation. These statements will be submitted promptly to the witnesses. This procedure, if complied with by the persons involved, will help avoid the potential for partisan wrangling and a media extravaganza that could be detrimental to the fulfillment of the Subcommittee's goals.

I have been assured by the President's Counsel that the President will encourage the members of his campaign organization and administration promptly to submit appropriate sworn statements to the Subcommittee.

At the successful conclusion of that process, the Subcommittee intends to issue a detailed, comprehensive report of its findings in this matter. While this report will cover some matters that have already been discussed publicly, many documents and events not previously disclosed will be made public through this report.

Once the report has been filed, the Subcommittee will set out to complete its legislative responsibilities in this matter. The Subcommittee will analyze the discovered facts in light of the current body of law on the Standards of Conduct relevant to Federal employees. If it becomes clear to the Subcommittee that some changes in either statute or regulation are necessary, I intend to push for those changes as soon as possible so that the unauthorized or improper transfers of government information will not occur again. This is one step in restoring credibility to our electoral process and national elections.

It is difficult, however, to legislate successfully without

an adequate consensus between the Administration, the House and the Senate. Because of the bipartisan procedures followed to date by the Subcommittee, I am hopeful that such a consensus can be built to ensure that the Standards of Conduct for Federal employees are sufficient to discourage the type of activities that appear to have taken place during the 1980 Presidential campaign.

To this end, I will actively seek the support of the Administration and all interested parties on Capitol Hill to complete in the near future the Subcommittee's legislative goals in an entirely bipartisan manner.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1983

Dear Jim:

When you called me on July 12 on behalf of Mr. Albosta, I agreed to work with you to see if we could facilitate an agreement between the Subcommittee on Human Resources and the Trustees of the Reagan-Bush campaign materials located at the Hoover Institution as to the Subcommittee's desired access to certain of those campaign materials in conjunction with its present inquiry.

As the President has stated, it is his desire to get to the bottom of allegations about the possible unauthorized transfers of Carter White House or campaign materials to members of his campaign. To that end he directed the Department of Justice to investigate these charges thoroughly. He directed all members of the White House Staff and members of his former campaign staff to cooperate fully with the investigation of these charges and to provide any relevant information and materials directly to the Department of Justice. He further directed that the Hoover Institution (Hoover) send the results of its file search directly to the Department of Justice, and the FBI has also undertaken a search of those files.

In response to Mr. Albosta's request for materials supplied to the White House from Hoover, on July 11 the President directed the Department of Justice to meet with Mr. Albosta to work out procedures to provide him and the Subcommittee with access to any materials that relate to these charges, whether located at Hoover or elsewhere. It is my understanding that pursuant to the President's direction the Deputy Attorney General contacted Mr. Albosta that date, but was advised that Mr. Albosta did not desire such a meeting until the matter of the Subcommittee's direct access to Hoover was resolved. To my knowledge, neither Mr. Albosta nor any representative of the Committee has yet agreed to meet with the Department of Justice to work out procedures for access to materials.

In addition to our offer to make the materials resulting from the FBI investigation available to the Subcommittee, you and I have discussed several other options for providing direct access. I think we have also worked out a set of procedures for implementing such access that may be satisfactory to both parties.

As I understand it, the Subcommittee says it wants to have direct access to all records of the Reagan-Bush campaign, in order to look for information relating to possible

improper or unethical transfers of federal information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush campaign. It also wants to search the Hoover files for any records that may show an intelligence operation of any type devised to provide federal property or information to the Reagan-Bush campaign.

We have offered to provide you complete access to the product of the FBI file search, as noted above. The Trustees have also offered to respond favorably to a request for specific materials and information on specific subjects related to the Subcommittee's investigation. Since these offers are apparently not acceptable, the conclusion reached by the Trustees is that what is desired is Subcommittee access to all files of the Reagan-Bush campaign at Hoover, including files that are beyond the scope of the Subcommittee's professed interest. The Trustees feel that such access would go far beyond that needed to provide all relevant information. As such, the Subcommittee's request is unprecedented. Nonetheless, the Trustees have said they would agree to such a review, but only if -- in fairness -- the Subcommittee would agree to conduct such a review of the Carter White House and campaign files. However, I understand that at this point Mr. Albosta will not agree to make a commitment to the Subcommittee's review of any Carter files.

Please understand, as we have discussed previously, the Trustees do not mean to dictate any limitations to the powers of the Subcommittee. What has been discussed is only a possible resolution to the Subcommittee's request. Nor is this an attempt to limit the Subcommittee's access to materials and information it may deem relevant to its jurisdiction. Such information and materials have been offered. But if the request is for a wholesale review of a campaign's files, it should not be limited to only one contestant's. Indeed, given that the Subcommittee's principal stated interest is in the conduct of government officials, it seems not only fair but logical that the files of the Carter Administration be subject to whatever broad review is intended for the Reagan campaign.

It appears that the parties have reached an impasse on this point. If I can respectfully make a suggestion on behalf of the President and the Trustees:

A file search of the Hoover files such as the Subcommittee proposes will in fact expend a great deal of Subcommittee investigators' time and public funds. It will cover the same materials already being reviewed by a large number of FBI investigators. This FBI investigation, I am advised, is already well underway. The product of this FBI search


can be made available to the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee can review the results of this extensive investigation already underway. It can discuss the organization of the Hoover files with the FBI and the Hoover Archivist. If at the conclusion of this review, the Subcommittee concludes it still needs additional information or materials on specific subjects, individuals, or files, the Trustees can respond to such requests. It is our conviction that at that point the Subcommittee will find it has already received the information and materials it needs to satisfy its mandates. If the Subcommittee still perceives a need to have direct access to review all files at Hoover relating to the Reagan-Bush campaign, we can renew our discussions on that subject at that time.

This suggestion is offered in the hopes that the allegations of misconduct can be resolved in the most expeditious manner possible. Thus, its careful consideration by the Subcommittee is earnestly urged. I am concerned that while you and I are discussing terms of possible direct access to all files at Hoover, the Subcommittee may be losing valuable time by its failing to accept promptly opportunity to review such materials as may have been found there by the FBI.

I would also renew the President's request that Mr. Albosta meet with the Department of Justice to work out procedures for providing the Subcommittee access to all the materials and information developed in the Justice Department's investigation. We are anxious that the Subcommittee have the benefit of that investigation as soon as possible. Delay in the completion of the investigations into the charges of possible misconduct does not serve any legitimate interests, especially those of the public, which deserves to know the facts of this controversy as soon as possible.

I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,


Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

James Hamilton, Esquire
Ginsburg, Feldman, Weil and Bress
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN DON ALBOSTA

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

JULY 21, 1983

I WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TODAY, IN THE SPIRIT OF BIPARTISANSHIP AND TO COMPLY WITH OUR RECENTLY PASSED GUIDELINES, TO ADVISE ALL MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND SPECIFICALLY THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE OVER ACCESS TO RELEVANT MATERIALS IN FILES AT THE HOOVER INSTITUTION.

THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED PUBLICLY THAT HE AND HIS STAFF WILL FULLY COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO DETERMINE WHETHER INFORMATION WAS TRANSFERED IN AN UNAUTHORIZED MANNER INVOLVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO THE REAGAN-BUSH CAMPAIGN.

I TOOK AT FACE VALUE THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO FULLY COOPERATE, SO ON JULY 9TH I INSTRUCTED THE SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF TO SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE CURATOR OF THE REAGAN RECORDS FOUND AT HOOVER. THIS TELEGRAM REQUIRED ACCESS TO FILES RELEVANT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF UNETHICAL CONDUCT BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. ON JULY 11TH, UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THOSE FILES WAS GRANTED TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BY MR. MEESE, ONE OF THE TRUSTEES OF THOSE FILES. THE FOLLOWING DAY, I ASKED JAMES HAMILTON, NOW OF THIS STAFF TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH MR. FRED FIELDING, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, ACTING FOR THE TRUSTEES IN AN ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT THE TERMS OF ACCESS UNDER WHICH THE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXAMINE HOOVER INSTITUTION FILES CONTAINING REAGAN-BUSH

CAMPAIGN MATERIALS. VARIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY MR. HAMILTON AND MR. FIELDING. WHILE I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS ALL THE ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, I HAVE PLACED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE A DOCUMENT THAT EMBODIES THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S LAST PROPOSAL MADE BY MR. HAMILTON ON TUESDAY, JULY 19TH, 1983, WHICH WAS SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS TO A COUNTER PROPOSAL EARLIER SUBMITTED BY MR. FIELDING.

MR. FIELDING RESPONDED TO THIS PROPOSAL YESTERDAY WITH A LETTER WHICH IS ALSO BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE. I FIND MR. FIELDING'S RESPONSE DISTURBING IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. FIRST OF ALL, IT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S LATEST PROPOSAL. THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS NOT SOUGHT EXAMINATION OF ALL REAGAN-BUSH CAMPAIGN FILES, BUT ONLY AN EXAMINATION OF ALL RELEVANT FILES. THE SUBCOMMITTEE, OF COURSE, WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT MATERIAL IS RELEVANT.

SECONDLY, IT IS NOT CORRECT THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE IS NOT EXAMINING CARTER WHITE HOUSE FILES. TO THE CONTRARY, IT INTENDS TO INTERROGATE NUMEROUS CARTER OFFICIALS AND EXAMINE RELEVANT FILES IN THEIR POSSESSION.

MORE IMPORTANTLY, MR. FIELDING'S PROPOSAL IS THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE ACCEPT RECORDS GATHERED BY THE FBI'S SEARCH BEFORE IT REQUESTS ANY FURTHER REVIEW OF THE HOOVER INSTITUTION MATERIALS. THIS PROPOSAL IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS INDEPENDENT JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION.

THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT THAT IT TAKE ON WHAT THE FBI PROVIDES. MOREOVER, THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION INTO CRIMINAL CONDUCT HAS A NARROWER SCOPE THAN THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION, WHICH MORE BROADLY SEEKS TO DISCOVER EVIDENCE OF ETHICAL VIOLATIONS BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO CONSIDER WHETHER LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ARE NECESSARY. THE SUBCOMMITTEE CAN HAVE NO ASSURANCES THAT THE FBI WILL ISOLATE AND COPY ALL OF THE DOCUMENTS IN WHICH THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST.

I ALSO FIND MR. FIELDING'S PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT HE WISHES TO COOPERATE WITH ALL INVESTIGATORS. I WOULD HOPE THAT MR. FIELDING AND THE PERSONS FOR WHOM HE SPEAKS WOULD RECONSIDER THE LAST OFFER MADE BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND ALLOW ACCESS TO THE HOOVER INSTITUTION FILES THAT IT REQUIRES TO FULFILL ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION. WITHOUT SUCH ACCESS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE FORCED TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. I WOULD HOPE WE HAVE A RESPONSE FROM MR. FIELDING BY NEXT TUESDAY MORNING.

A SUBPEONA IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. IT IS JUST NOT THE QUESTION YET. I WANT TO EXHAUST EVERY POSSIBILITY TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THOSE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS THROUGH COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE, IF NECESSARY, A PERSONAL MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHO AS A TRUSTEE OF THE HOOVER FILES COULD GRANT

THE SUBCOMMITTEE THE ACCESS IT NEEDS.

I WANT TO ASSURE THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT DESPITE ROADBLOCKS THAT SOME HAVE PLACED IN ITS WAY, THE SUBCOMMITTEE IS INTENT ON FULFILLING SUCH OBLIGATIONS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS INTERVIEWED APPROXIMATELY A DOZEN WITNESSES AND HAS MADE PLANS TO INTERVIEW MORE THAN FIFTY ADDITIONAL WITNESSES, WITH THESE INTERVIEWS BEGINNING IMMEDIATELY.

WE HAVE NOT YET NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY WITH THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO GAIN ACCESS TO OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION THEY MAY HAVE. WE HAVE WAITED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE OF THE MOVEMENT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE. THAT PROCEDURE CAN WAIT NO LONGER. I WILL CONTACT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTLY TO BEGIN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE ITS INQUIRY WITH ALL DISPATCH. WE ASK THE PRESIDENT TO LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES OF COOPERATION AND ALLOW THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO FINISH ITS TASK QUICKLY AND AVOID UNNECESSARY DELAYS AND DISPUTES.

DAVID GINSBURG
 HYER FELDMAN
 J. W. ROSENTHAL
 E. WILLIAM HENRY
 LEE R. HARRIS
 JOHN H. ZENTAY
 MARTIN JACOBSS
 JAMES E. WEBSTER
 FRED W. DROOGULA
 MICHAEL J. SANDERS, P.C.
 JOEL S. BURTON
 JAMES HAMILTON
 ALFRED J. EICHENLAUB
 RICHARD P. BILLS, P.C.
 PETER H. RODGERS
 ALAN S. WEITZ
 ANDREA JILL GRANT
 PATRICIA N. BLAIR
 JACOB DWOREC
 MARTHA JANE SHAY
 GARY J. KLEIN
 PHILIP M. BATTLES, III
 ROBERT W. HAWKINS
 CELIA RODY
 DAVID G. BRESS 0908 (1974)

LAW OFFICES
GINSBURG, FELDMAN AND BRESS
 CHARTERED
 1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEX
 69-2422

CABLE
 "LEGIS"

TELECOPIER
 (202) 637-9195

EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT OFFICE
 1, AVENUE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
 75008 PARIS, FRANCE

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 EDWARD J. TOLCHIN
 DANA H. FOX
 ROBERT L. DEITZ
 JONATHAN GINSBURG
 DIANE HOLT FRANKLE
 SEVERLY J. RUDY
 JOHN C. GRABOW
 JERROLD S. KLEIN
 HARVEY J. SHULMAN
 MARY L. GRAUHN
 GRACE JANELLE SHERY
 JAMES E. WEAVER
 BRENT A. WEGNER
 DANIEL T. WARD
 JAMES L. RITZENBERG
 LYNN BONDE
 SHERIE B. GUMER
 JOSEPH B. HOFFMAN
 JOSEPH BLUM
 CRAIG A. EMDEN
 PAUL J. FEGLERSON
 JAMES R. HUGENT, JR.
 LINDA B. BLAIR
 ROBERT D. SCHACHAT
 JERALD PASTERNAK

*ADMITTED IN NEW YORK ONLY

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

July 25, 1983

(202) 637-9150

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
 Counsel to the President
 The White House
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Fred:

The Human Resources Subcommittee has reviewed your July 20, 1983 letter to me in which, on behalf of the Trustees of the Reagan-Bush campaign materials at the Hoover Institution, you made certain proposals regarding access by the Subcommittee to those files. Set forth below are the terms of a proposed agreement that, after speaking with Chairman Albosta, I believe would be acceptable to the Subcommittee and would resolve the differences between it and the Trustees. This agreement also should alleviate the concerns about broad access to campaign files that have been expressed.

1. The Subcommittee will be allowed promptly to review and copy those documents initially identified by the FBI for further analysis during its search at the Hoover Institution.

Comment:

The Subcommittee now understands that the FBI will complete its initial review this week and that the Hoover documents identified by the FBI would be available to the Subcommittee by August 2. It thus appears that the Subcommittee would not be significantly delayed if it relies to some degree upon the FBI search. We understand that the FBI is proceeding in two stages. In the first stage, it will isolate all documents that appear relevant to its investigation. In the

GINSBURG, FELDMAN AND BRESS
CHARTERED

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
July 25, 1983
Page two

second stage, it will analyze the documents and determine which ones will be copied and returned to Washington. The proposal is that the Subcommittee be given access to the documents isolated and identified in the first stage for further analysis by the FBI.

2. Subcommittee representatives shall be allowed to examine all files containing the following items:

- a. Materials that were prepared for, or relate to, the Carter-Reagan debate or a possible Mondale-Bush debate;
- b. Any records that may show an intelligence operation of any type devised to provide federal property or federal information to the Reagan-Bush campaign;
- c. Improperly or unethically transferred federal records and federal information -- for example, national security records or information -- or any records that discuss or relate to such transfers.

Comment:

We assume that this request will present no problem since in your letter to me you stated: "The Trustees have also offered to respond favorably to a request for specific materials and information on specific subjects related to the Subcommittee's investigation." The specific files here requested obviously relate to the Subcommittee's investigation.

3. The Subcommittee, using investigators from the General Accounting Office, will review all the campaign files of the following specific individuals found at the Hoover Institution: William Casey, Robert Gray, James Baker, Frank Hodsoll, David Gergen, Tony Dolan, Daryl Borgquist, Richard Allen, Stef Halper, Robert Garrick, Robert Gambino, and Max Hugel.

GINSBURG, FELDMAN AND BRESS
CHARTERED

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
July 25, 1983
Page three

Comment:

There apparently is a concern that campaign files might contain embarrassing information not related to the Subcommittee's investigation. While the Subcommittee is seeking only information relating to its present inquiry, it proposes to alleviate this concern by agreeing that the initial search of the files of these individuals will be done only by professionals from the General Accounting Office detailed to the Subcommittee. While the GAO professionals will conduct their search under the supervision and direction of Subcommittee employees, the Subcommittee and its staff will not initially examine the files of these individuals, but will review only the fruits of the GAO search. GAO professionals, like FBI investigators, are career government employees who can be expected to perform their duties in a nonpartisan fashion. Thus any concerns as to partisan use of materials unrelated to the Subcommittee's investigation that might be found in these specific files should be eliminated. Moreover, since the GAO will examine only specific, limited files, this request is consistent with the Trustees' offer, quoted above, to respond favorably to a request for specific materials or information.

4. Subcommittee investigators shall review the organization of the Hoover files with the Hoover Archivist and the FBI and shall be supplied an index or description of the files located at the Institution.

Comment:

We assume this request will be satisfactory since your letter to me states that the Subcommittee "can discuss the organization of the Hoover files with the FBI and the Hoover Archivist."

5. The Subcommittee reserves the right, after reviewing the documents specified above, to make additional requests to the Trustees for specific categories of information or specific files.

Comment:

We also assume that this proposal is agreeable since your letter to me stated: "If at the conclusion of [review of docu-

SINSBURG, FELDMAN AND BRESS
CHARTERED

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
July 25, 1983
Page four

ments identified by the FBI], the Subcommittee concludes that it still needs additional information or files, the Trustees can respond to such requests."

6. Information will be provided to the Subcommittee in accordance with the procedures specified in the Subcommittee's last proposal to you -- as to which I believe we basically concur -- except as those procedures are modified by the paragraphs above. I quote the statement as to these procedures found in that proposal:

The Hoover Institution file search will take place in cooperation with the resident Archivist or his designee and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is already examining the files. Representatives of the Archivist shall, and the FBI may, be present at Hoover during any file search by the Subcommittee, but they will not participate in the Subcommittee search except upon request of Subcommittee investigators. Both majority and minority Subcommittee staff investigators shall be present at all times, unless they choose not to participate. Staff investigators will identify documents they desire to be copied. The resident Archivist will see to the prompt copying for the Subcommittee of documents the copying of which is permitted by this agreement, and will also provide a copy of each such document copied to the FBI, in order that the FBI can advise the Subcommittee of any particular sensitivity of any document to the integrity of the FBI's investigation. The Hoover Institution will be entitled to recover from the recipients the costs of copying documents. The Subcommittee will not request copying of any documents that are not within the scope of the file search as set forth herein.

The Subcommittee will store all copies of materials in its safes, with sign-in/sign-out procedures for access by Subcommittee members or designated staff members. The Subcommittee will not publicly release or use in public session any documents or portions thereof obtained from the Hoover Institution without providing the FBI with reasonable notice and opportunity for consultation."

GINSBURG, FELDMAN AND BRESS
CHARTERED

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
July 25, 1983
Page five

The Subcommittee shares the hope expressed in your letter to me that "the allegations of misconduct can be resolved in the most expeditious manner possible." This goal can be furthered by the Trustees' agreeing to the proposal set forth above. This result also will be promoted if the Department of Justice promptly provides "the Subcommittee access to all the materials and information developed in the Justice Department investigation," as your letter states the President has instructed.

I appreciate your cooperation in attempting to resolve this matter.

Best regards,



James Hamilton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1983

Dear Jim:

Enclosed is a draft proposed Memorandum of Understanding which I feel will meet the concerns of both parties in regard to access to the Hoover files by the Subcommittee. I am fully prepared to urge its acceptance by the Trustees and believe it will be acceptable.

I await your advice. I know you are going to be out of the office for a great deal of the day; if you are late getting back, please call me in the office or through the switchboard (456-1414).

Sincerely,



Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

James Hamilton, Esquire
Ginsburg, Feldman, Weil and Bress
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

/Enclosure

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RESOURCES, POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE
TRUSTEES OF THE REAGAN-BUSH CAMPAIGN MATERIALS LOCATED
AT THE HOOVER INSTITUTION

The overall purpose of the Human Resources Subcommittee's inquiry is to determine, in the exercise of its oversight and legislative authority, whether the Ethics in Government Act and the various codes of ethics that relate to federal employees, particularly White House employees during the Carter Administration, have been working effectively, have been abused, or require modification or enforcement. To fulfill its responsibilities, the Subcommittee will investigate activities that occurred in both the Carter Administration and the Reagan-Bush campaign during the 1980 Presidential Campaign to develop a full understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding any unauthorized or unethical transfers of federal property or federal information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush campaign. In the event that facts or materials are located or brought to its attention which indicate that there may have been improper or unethical transfers of information or materials from the Reagan-Bush campaign to federal employees in the Carter Administration or to others with the knowledge or at the direction of the federal employees in the Carter Administration, the Subcommittee will investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding any such transfers.

In connection with its present inquiry, the Human Resources Subcommittee desires to review certain Reagan-Bush campaign materials located at the Hoover Institution (Hoover) to ascertain the existence of any records improperly or unethically transferred from the Carter Administration and any information or any records that discuss or relate to any such transfers. Pursuant to the direction of the President of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is currently undertaking a search of the said files at Hoover.

Access to Reagan-Bush campaign documents located in files at Hoover will be made available to the Subcommittee by the Trustees of such documents at Hoover as follows:

1. The Subcommittee will work out procedures with the Department of Justice in order that the Subcommittee investigators will be allowed promptly to review and to copy, as the Subcommittee desires, any of those documents from the Hoover files initially identified by the FBI as possibly relevant to its investigation.

2. The Subcommittee investigators will be provided, as per its request, any particular files identified by the Archivist of Hoover and the FBI as containing materials prepared for the Carter-Reagan debate or a possible Mondale-Bush debate, or which relate to the preparation of such debates, which have been located in the said Hoover files.

3. Subcommittee investigators shall meet and discuss the organization of the Hoover files with the Hoover Archivist and the FBI, and shall be supplied with an index or a description of the files located at Hoover.

4. Thereafter, in addition to the documents and files related to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Subcommittee investigators will be provided for their review pursuant to the Subcommittee's request:

(a) any additional documents located by the Archivist of Hoover and the FBI which may have been improperly or unethically transferred federal records or federal information -- for example, national security information records or information -- or any documents that discuss any such improper or unethical transfers or contain indicia of such an unethical or improper transfer; and

(b) any additional files which contain documents which may show any intelligence operation organized by the Reagan-Bush campaign devised to improperly or unethically provide federal property or federal information to the Reagan-Bush campaign from the Carter Administration.

5. Upon Subcommittee request, career professional investigators from the General Accounting Office (GAO), specifically designated and authorized by the Subcommittee, will be permitted to perform an initial review of any of the campaign files of the following individuals

located at Hoover: William Casey, Robert Gray, James A. Baker III, Frank Hodsoll, David Gergen, Tony Dolan, Daryl Borgquist, Richard V. Allen, Stef Halper, Robert Garrick, Robert Gambino and Max Hugel. It is specifically acknowledged that such files for any particular individual so named may not exist at Hoover. The initial review of these files will be performed only by professionals from the GAO who are detailed to the Subcommittee, who will conduct their search consistent with the constraints of relevancy as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 above. The Subcommittee and its investigators will not initially examine the files of these individuals, but will review only the documents identified from the GAO search; copying of any documents identified by the Subcommittee as a result of this review will be completed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7.

6. The Subcommittee reserves the right, after reviewing the documents specified above, to make additional requests to the Trustees for specific categories of information or specific files.

7. In all file reviews provided for herein, the GAO and the Subcommittee will exclude from examination, note-taking and copying any documents that upon a brief inspection are clearly unrelated to the the referenced scope of inquiry as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.

The subject reviews of Hoover files will take place in cooperation with the resident Archivist or his designee and the FBI, which is already examining the files. Representatives of the Archivist shall, and the FBI may, be present at Hoover during any file review by the GAO or Subcommittee, but they will not participate in these file reviews except upon request of Subcommittee investigators. During any such review both majority and minority Subcommittee staff investigators shall be present at all times, unless they choose not to participate.

Staff investigators will identify documents they desire to be copied to the resident Archivist, who will see to the prompt copying for the Subcommittee of documents which are permitted to be copied by this Agreement, and will also provide a copy of each such document copied to the FBI in order that the FBI can advise the Subcommittee of any particular sensitivity of any document to the integrity of the FBI's investigation. Hoover will be entitled to recover from the recipients the costs of copying documents. The Subcommittee will not request copying of any document that is not within the scope of the file search as set forth herein.

8. The Subcommittee will store all copies of materials in its safes, with sign-in/sign-out procedures for access by Subcommittee members or designated staff

members. The Subcommittee and/or its staff will not publicly release or use in public session any documents or portion thereof obtained from Hoover without providing the FBI with reasonable notice and opportunity for consultation.

9. The Trustees of the Reagan-Bush campaign records at the Hoover Institution agree to provide access and copying consistent with the terms set forth above. For its part, the Subcommittee agrees to such terms; it also agrees that it will seek access to all records that become relevant to its investigation, wherever they may be found.

For the Human Resources
Subcommittee

For the Trustees of the
Reagan Documents Deposited
With the Hoover Institution

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 10, 1983

The Honorable Fred F. Fielding
 Counsel to the President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

Under Number 6 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Subcommittee on Human Resources and the Trustees of the Reagan Collection held at the Hoover Institution, there are additional files that have been deemed relevant to the Subcommittee's inquiry. The Subcommittee would like to request immediate access to that material. I have attached a list of specific file folders within the Reagan Campaign/Transition Collection that are included in that request. Also, there are some complete boxes of material that are needed by the Subcommittee. These have also been indicated on the attached list.

Since all of these files originate from the files of specific individuals, it would be the Subcommittee's intention to review these files under Number 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for initial review by investigators of the General Accounting Office. The Subcommittee's own investigators would limit their review to the product of the General Accounting Office search. Finally, the rules for relevancy and for the copying and releasing of information will remain consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding.

Since the Subcommittee's investigators are still at the Hoover Institution, it would be most helpful if the above conditions of access could be resolved and communicated to the Acting Archivist at Hoover as quickly as possible.

Thank you for your immediate attention to this matter. Jim Hamilton may have already called your office concerning this additional request for information. Please call me directly if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


 Micah S. Green
 Staff Director

MG/tal
 Enclosure

AUG 16 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1983

Dear Mr. Green:

Reference is made to your letter to me dated August 10, 1983, with enclosures, which sets forth the Subcommittee's request to review additional files located at the Hoover Institution, pursuant to the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Subcommittee on Human Resources and the Trustees of the Reagan-Bush Campaign materials located at the Hoover Institution dated July 29, 1983.

In regard to the requested files denominated "Edwin Meese transition files", I must express the Trustees' and my concern as to this request. The Memorandum of Understanding between Mr. Albosta and the Trustees clearly relates to campaign files, not transition files. You have asserted in our recent conversation that Mr. Meese's campaign files are mixed with his transition files at Hoover. Assuming that to be a fact, the real question is how can you determine which documents or files are, in fact, from the campaign as well as being relevant? Obviously, during the transition there was a great deal of exchanging of information and documents between the Carter Administration and the Presidential Transition, all perfectly proper on the part of both parties. Likewise, a reference to a file labeled with a title such as "briefing books" is not inconsistent with transition activity which necessarily included briefings of the President-elect and the Vice President-elect.

We are not trying to inhibit any legitimate and relevant file review, but feel this request raises a serious problem. Premature disclosure of the possible existence of such files before appropriate evaluation can be done, as occurred this past weekend, underlines the concern.

In an attempt to resolve this issue, however, I would recommend the following procedure:

1. The Archivist will examine each file requested to determine whether it contains any pre-election materials that fall within the proper scope of inquiry as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding. If it does not, obviously there will be no purpose to any further review of that file.


2. If the Archivist finds material in a particular file that appears to be pre-election material that falls within the scope of inquiry, and there is no indication that it was supplied after the election, that file may be reviewed in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for an initial review by the GAO investigators which is limited to the areas of relevancy as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 of that Memorandum. The Subcommittee investigators would limit their review to the product of the GAO search. The rules for relevancy and for the copying and release of information would all remain consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding.

In regard to the remaining files which you have requested to review -- that is, the files of Messrs. Garrick, Hopkins/Bandow, Carmen and Ms. Maddox -- I assume these are campaign files, since there is no indicia to the contrary in your request. If that assumption is correct, the Trustees would agree to a review of these files in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, particularly paragraph 5.

In regard to boxes marked "Truth Squad", these are not files of individuals. As described, it would appear that the files and material contained in these boxes have already been covered by paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Beyond that, however, given the nature of any campaign's "Truth Squad", it is difficult to see how these files would have appropriate relevancy to the scope of your investigation. If, upon reflection, you still feel that this is an item of inquiry we should discuss further, please let me know.

I will await word from you regarding all the foregoing.

Sincerely,


Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

Mr. Micah S. Green
Staff Director
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service Subcommittee
on Human Resources
511 House Office Building Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: James Hamilton, Esquire

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

August 25, 1983

DOH ALBOSTA, MICH. CHAIRMAN
 THOMAS DART, ILL. S. DIR. DANIEL B. DEANE, ILL.
 LUDWIG PATRICK, PA. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, N.Y.
 WOODWARD W. WILCOX, CALIF.

The Honorable Fred Fielding
 Counsel to the President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

I appreciate your response to the August 10th letter of my Staff Director, Micah Green. I've also been advised of your conversation with Jim Hamilton. The following discussion sets forth my views concerning your letter and a further search of Hoover Institution records. I hope that an agreement as to further review can be reached on the terms presented below, which adopt several of the ideas you proposed.

Please be assured that it has not been the Subcommittee's intention to review files maintained at the Hoover Institution that relate solely to the transition period. However, as we discovered at Hoover, campaign and transition files in many cases have been combined in the personal files of specific campaign officials. This is the case for Edwin Meese, as well as for Robert Garrick and others. I agree that the Archivist may remove from the requested files any documents that are clearly identifiable as post election transition materials. However, this must be a simple mechanical function on the part of the Archivist, as it is my feeling that the Subcommittee should not depend on him to judge relevance of any documents to the task the Committee has undertaken. The Archivist's review should be undertaken with G.A.O. investigators present. They will view what the Archivist has pulled as transition material, in a very cursory manner, to ensure that the materials removed are clearly identifiable as transition information and therefore not relevant to this request for access.

We recognize that some documents dated prior to the election may have been sent by the Carter Administration to the transition team in an authorized manner. When there is a clear indication that such an authorized transfer occurred, the documents should be treated as transition materials in the manner described above. Where this is unclear, to any degree, the agreed-on rules for relevancy will still apply to any examination of materials by GAO investigators on behalf of the Subcommittee.

I am concerned with that portion of your proposal that would require the Archivist to extract from the campaign files, for GAO review, only those documents relevant to our inquiry. This would constitute a change from the Subcommittee's earlier agreement with the Trustees. As you know, Item 5 of that agreement provides for review by General Accounting Office (GAO) professionals of the campaign files of specified individuals. In fact, the GAO investigators have reviewed those files and have shown the Subcommittee investigators only those documents the GAO investigators deemed relevant to our inquiry. There were, however, no restrictions on what the GAO investigators could see within those files.

It appears from your proposal dated August 15th that you are asking the Subcommittee to treat Edwin Meese's files differently from those of other individuals. I thus recommend, that, after the Archivist has removed from Mr. Meese's files those materials that are clearly transition documents, the GAO investigators shall have full access to the remaining materials to which we have requested access. This would mean that Mr. Meese's campaign files would be treated in exactly the same manner as the campaign files of the other specified campaign officials. Of course, the GAO investigators would work under the relevancy rules of the original agreement and the Subcommittee investigators would only review the product of the GAO search.

The requested Robert Garrick files may contain transition materials. I thus propose that the procedures recommended as to Mr. Meese's files be applied to Mr. Garrick's files.

With regard to "truth squad" files, I note that, under item 6 of the agreement between the Trustees and the Subcommittee, the Subcommittee has reserved the right to request access to any other relevant materials, not just the files of specified individuals. I consequently believe that the Subcommittee may rightfully request access to any documents that appear relevant after reviewing the index of the Hoover files.

The Subcommittee believes that the truth squad files may be most relevant. For a "truth squad" to counter what the opposing candidate is saying, it must have quality information. Gathering such information could involve a research operation. Conceivably, the Reagan-Bush truth squad could have sought confidential Carter Administration materials. We already know that an Anne Wexler memorandum dealing with economic information intended only for Cabinet Members was transmitted to officials of the Reagan-Bush campaign. Such a memorandum is a good example of inside information that could be of use to a "truth squad".

For the above reasons, I believe that the Subcommittee should have access to truth squad files. I propose, however, that the review of these files be accomplished by GAO investigators, a procedure that would protect the files from partisan use. I sincerely hope the Trustees will reconsider their position as to these specific files.

In closing, I would again like to convey my desire to complete the Hoover review as quickly as possible. I am confident that you also desire that result.

Thank you for your continued cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Don Albosta", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mq/tal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 12 1983

September 9, 1983

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of August 25, 1983. Please excuse the delay in my response; as I have discussed with Jim Hamilton in the interim, staff travel and vacations, as well as intervening unrelated international events, have made it difficult to fully discuss this matter with the Trustees until now.

In regard to the requested review of the files of Edwin Meese located at the Hoover Institution, the Trustees are agreeable to the following procedure:

1. The Archivist will examine each file requested, to determine whether it contains any pre-election materials. If it clearly does not, there will be no further review of the file.
2. If the Archivist finds that a particular file contains both pre-election and transition materials, the Archivist shall remove all items that are clearly transition materials and any items that were clearly supplied after the election. If there is any question by the Archivist as to whether an item falls into these categories of "transition materials", the Archivist shall review the materials with the GAO investigators. If agreement cannot be reached between the Archivist and the GAO investigators on a particular item, the issue shall be referred to counsel for the Subcommittee and a representative of the Trustees for resolution.
3. Once any "transition materials" are removed from a requested file, that file, and any file containing only pre-election materials, may be reviewed in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for an initial review by the GAO investigators which is limited to the areas of relevancy as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 of that Memorandum. The Subcommittee investigators would limit their review to the product of the GAO search. The rules for relevancy and for the copying and release of information would all remain consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding.


Thus, after removal of materials that are clearly "transition materials", the Meese files will be treated as any other individual's files as provided in the Memorandum of Understanding particularly paragraph 5.

In regard to the files of Robert Garrick, if they contain both transition and campaign materials, it is agreeable to the Trustees that they be treated as outlined above in regard to Mr. Meese's files.

In regard to the request to review files contained in boxes marked "Truth Squad", it continues to appear that the files and materials contained in these boxes have already been covered by paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Likewise, the Trustees still remain unconvinced that these files have apparent relevancy, and the example of the Anne Wexler memorandum is unconvincing since it is hypothetical and it has been reported that that document was readily available during the campaign from many sources other than the Carter campaign or White House. However, the Trustees are willing to permit review of these files pursuant to procedures which would otherwise be followed in the review of individual files, as you proposed in your letter of August 25.

I trust all the foregoing will be acceptable to you; we appreciate and share your desire to complete the Hoover review as quickly as possible. Upon your advice, I will notify the Archivist of our agreement as to the handling of these materials.

Sincerely,


Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

The Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman
U. S. House of Representatives
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resources
511 House Office Building, Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: James Hamilton, Esquire

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
811 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

DON ALBOSTA, MICH. CHAIRMAN
 THOMAS DASHNILE S. DAK. DANIEL B. CRANE, ILL.
 GUS YATRON, PA. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, N.Y.
 DOUGLAS W. BESSO, CALIF.

September 15, 1983

The Honorable Fred Fielding
 Counsel to the President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

I appreciate your response to my August 25th letter. I believe the position you have taken in providing the Subcommittee access to specific files in the Reagan Campaign/Transition Collection located at the Hoover Institution is quite reasonable. I am agreeable to the provisions of this proposal with the following addition:


After #2 in your September 9th letter, add the following:

NOTE: With regard to the Archivist's search under #1 and #2 above, material that post dates the election that relates to events that may have involved the campaign or any pre-election transfer of information from the Carter Administration will be reviewed by the G.A.O. investigators for relevancy.

I understand from Jim Hamilton that this addition is acceptable to you and that, upon receipt of this letter, you will immediately inform the Archivist of this agreement that allows the G.A.O. investigators access to the files listed in Micah Green's August 10th letter to you.

Thank you again for your efforts in this matter.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
 Chairman

DA/mq

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 27, 1983

Mr. Martin Anderson
Senior Fellow
Hoover Institution
Palo Alto, California 94306

Dear Mr. Anderson:

As you know, the Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.


In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee has interviewed numerous witnesses and reviewed files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or materials. As you know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files of the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign. Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for the cooperation you have shown the Subcommittee to date.

As it was clear from the review at the Hoover Institution that your complete campaign files are not part of the Reagan Collection, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. Of course, excluded from this request would be any files that you have already shown Subcommittee investigators.

I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,


Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/tal

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D. C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

The Honorable James Baker III
Assistant to the President
and Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Baker:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee must review files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or material. As you may know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files at the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign.

Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1983

Dear Congressman Albosta:

Your letter dated August 11, 1983, was received in Mr. Baker's office today, at approximately 3:40 p.m.

Mr. Baker is presently out of town on vacation. We will bring this matter to his attention as soon as possible, but wanted you to be aware of the foregoing.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Katherine Camalier".

Katherine J. Camalier
Staff Assistant to
James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Donald Albosta
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

Mr. Daryl Borgquist
 Office of Public Affairs
 Agency for International Development
 Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Mr. Borgquist:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee must review files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or material. As you may know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files at the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign.

Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C. 20505

16 August 1983

The Honorable Donald J. Albosta
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Albosta:

Your letter of 11 August was received in the Director's office yesterday. Unfortunately, Mr. Casey is out of town and will be unable to reply personally within five days as you requested.

Mr. Casey has asked me to inform you, however, that he has made his personal campaign files available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and will be pleased to make them available to you when he returns.

Sincerely,



John N. McMahon
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 8, 1983

The Honorable Anthony Dolan
 Special Assistant to the President
 and Chief Speechwriter
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Dolan:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/nq

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 9, 1983

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I would be delighted to be of any assistance to your investigation. If someone on your committee staff will contact me, I will be glad to comply with whatever requests you have.

Best regards,



Anthony R. Dolan
Chief Speechwriter
Special Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Donald Joseph Albosta
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

Mr. Robert Gambino
Deputy Inspector General
Synthetic Fuels Corporation
Room 421
2121 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20586

Dear Mr. Gambino:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

ROBERT W. GAMBINO
2028 Carrhill Road
Vienna, Virginia 22180
(703) 938-1829

August 23, 1983

Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service Subcommittee on Human
Resources
511 House Office Building Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please be advised that I have no files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I had no responsibility for disposing of the files of the Operation Center in which I worked during the Reagan-Bush Campaign, or any other element of the campaign organization.

In response to a request from Mr. Micah Green, I have searched my personal papers and have found nothing associated with the campaign except some posters. I mentioned to Mr. Green that I may have a roster of campaign workers which I could forward to your Committee. However, I have not been able to locate it.

If you believe it would be useful, I would be happy to discuss my work during the campaign with you or your staff.

Sincerely,



Robert W. Gambino

RWG:br

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 8, 1983

Admiral Robert Garrick
 233 South Euclid Avenue
 Pasadena, California 91101

Dear Admiral Garrick:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.


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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/ng

GARRICK ASSOCIATES, INC.

SE

Public & Government Relations

233 South Euclid Avenue • Pasadena, California 91101 • (213) 577-2110

September 12, 1983


The Honorable Don Albosta, Chairman
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resources
511 House Office Building Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman:

In response to your correspondence of September 8, this is to advise you that I retained no files from the Reagan/Bush campaign. Any files that I generated were placed in a single box and were delivered to a specific room at campaign headquarters. It is my understanding that they then were given to a representative of the Hoover Institute for delivery to California.

Regarding any papers concerning the debate, I had no association with the debate team and consequently had no cause to receive, review or generate any paperwork on that subject.

Yours truly,



Robert M. Garrick
President

RMG:fm
Dictated but not read.

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

The Honorable David Gergen
Assistant to the President for Communications
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Gergen:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee must review files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or material. As you may know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files at the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign.

Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1983

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

Enclosed are copies of the documents from
David Gergen's files which were requested
by John Fitzgerald.

Sincerely,



Richard A. Hauser
Deputy Counsel to the President

James Hamilton, Esquire
Ginsburg, Feldman and Bress
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

cc: John Fitzgerald ✓

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

Mr. Robert Gray
Gray and Company
3255 Grace St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Mr. Gray:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg



GRAY AND COMPANY

ROBERT KEITH GRAY
President

August 16, 1983

AUG 19 1983

The Honorable
Don Albosta
Chairman
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resources
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Albosta:

I appreciate your letter of August 11 in which you ask I make available to the Subcommittee my files relative to the 1980 Presidential Campaign.

I wish to cooperate fully with you and your Committee in its important work as I have attempted to cooperate in every inquiry made of me in this matter.

However, I have not retained any materials in my own files from the 1980 campaign. If any such materials were in my possession at the conclusion of the campaign they apparently were discarded during my move from the campaign to the Inaugural Committee or from the Inaugural Committee to my former employment or from my former employment to my current company. In any event, a careful check of our files here reveals nothing relating to the 1980 Campaign.

If there is any other way in which I may be of help to your committee, I will be grateful for the opportunity to comply.

Sincerely,

NATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS / PUBLIC AFFAIRS
THE EGYPT HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007
202 333 1400

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 27, 1983

Mr. Stephan Halper
 Chairman
 Palmer National Bank
 1667 K Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Halper:

As you know, the Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.


In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee has interviewed numerous witnesses and reviewed files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or materials. As you know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files of the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign. Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for the cooperation you have shown the Subcommittee to date.

As it was clear from the review at the Hoover Institution that your complete campaign files are not part of the Reagan Collection, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. Of course, excluded from this request would be any files that you have already shown Subcommittee investigators.

I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/tal

OCT 5 1983

243

126 Commonage Drive
Great Falls, Virginia
22066

September 30, 1983

The Honorable Don Albosta
Longworth House Office Building 1319
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Congressman Albosta,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 27, 1983. I support your effort to strengthen the Ethics in Government Act and to determine if there was an unauthorized transfer of materials from officials in the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Committee.

With reference to your request to examine any files that might have from the Reagan-Bush campaign, those files were forwarded to the Hoover Institution at the conclusion of the campaign along with the files of other campaign staffers. I have no other Reagan-Bush campaign files. What I do have are copies of some of the daily News Summaries developed by my staff, some Reagan-Bush question and answer materials, a few campaign issue papers and other memorabilia.

Although I believe that none of this material is relevant to your inquiry, your investigators are welcome to look at it if they wish.

Sincerely yours,



Stefan A. Halper

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 811 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 27, 1983

Mr. Peter Hannaford
 Chairman of the Board
 The Hannaford Company, Inc.
 905 16th Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Hannaford:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee has interviewed numerous witnesses and reviewed files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or materials. As you know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files of the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign. Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover.


Because of your role in the 1980 Presidential election, I would like to request your response to the allegations made about the unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan Campaign. I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value. However, if they are true, there may be possible violations of criminal law because of any theft that may have occurred, or for the failure to report such a theft. There are also additional potential violations, such as theft and receipt of U.S. Government property. Every employee and official of the Federal Government is obliged to report possible violations as well.

I would therefore appreciate having a thorough explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the obtaining and/or using of information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 Reagan Presidential campaign. Also, since your complete files were not located at the Reagan Collection at the Hoover Institution, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained.

I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/tal

Peter D. Hannaford
905 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
202/638-4600

September 30, 1983

The Honorable
Don Albosta
Chairman
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of September 27, 1983, please be informed that during my work in connection with the President's 1980 election campaign I did not knowingly come in contact with any information which may have been transferred from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign without proper authority. Nor did I at any time participate in any efforts to obtain information in this manner from the Carter Administration. Nor do I have any knowledge bearing upon this subject matter other than what I have read in the press.

From media reports, I am aware that the inquiry of your Subcommittee is focusing on the alleged unauthorized transfer of information relating to the 1980 Debates. In this connection, it may be helpful for you to know that my work during the 1980 Campaign principally involved the time period concluded by the Republican National Convention. For all practical purposes I did not participate further in Mr. Reagan's campaign after Labor Day, 1980. At the time the Debates were scheduled, I was essentially no longer involved in the Campaign.

Insofar as you requested access to files in my possession, you should know that practically all of these are at the Hoover Institution and that the matters which I have retained as personal memorabilia relate to convention matters which would be of no relevance to the subject matter of your Committee's inquiry.

Sincerely,



PDH:jlw

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 25, 1983

Mr. Richard Hauser
 Deputy Counsel to the President
 115 Old Executive Office Building
 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Hauser:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee must review files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or material. As you may know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files at the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign.

Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that the campaign files of Tony Dolan are not located at Hoover. Instead, these files are retained at the National Archives.

I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to Mr. Dolan's files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. Additionally, I would like to request at this time access to any other files of the 1980 campaign that are kept at the National Archives. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

This initial review, as per an earlier conversation with Mr. Fielding, will be done by General Accounting Office professionals assigned to the Subcommittee.

Thank you for your immediate attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

Mr. Francis Hodson
 Chairman
 National Endowment for the Arts
 2401 E Street, N.W.
 Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Hodson:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee must review files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or material. As you may know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files at the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign.

Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

AUG 19 1983

251

4424 North 25th Street
Arlington, VA 22207

August 19, 1983

Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resources
511 House Office Building Annex
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Congressman Albosta:

In response to your letter dated August 11, 1983 (received August 15), I am happy to cooperate with your legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.

You have asked for access to my files from the 1980 Presidential Campaign. I will collect these this weekend and bring them next week to my office at the Arts Endowment. I would be happy to have you or your staff come to my office and review these papers to the extent relevant to your investigation.

Please let me know when you wish to do this.

Sincerely,



F.S.M. Hodsoll

cc: Attorney General

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

DON ALBORELL, MDOL, CHAIRMAN

THOMAS B. BACHLE, R. BAK.
MAY 1980, PA.
DOUGLAS H. BODER, CALIF.DAVID B. CHASE, ILL.
BERNARD A. GILLES, N.Y.

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

811 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1

Washington, D.C. 20515

TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 8, 1983

Mr. Max Hugel
PCC Inc.
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1125
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Hugel:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Dan Albosta
Chairman

DA/nq

Porto, Duerk, Carlson & Pinco, P. C.
Attorneys at Law

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GLENN R. CARLSON
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WILLIAM A. DUFFRE, III
JOHN A. DURBIN, Jr.
FREDERICK H. DRAPEK
NATHANIEL P. KOSMAK
PAUL L. SPARTO
ROBERT D. TINDO
ERIC P. LITVIN
JOHN F. WINTWILL

ELLIOTT B. ADLER
FRANK WINDFORD, JR.
VICTORIA S. NILES
ROBERT PLOTZIN
ROBERT S. PORUBA
C. FREDERICK WYLAND
JERRY S. WILLIAMS

OF COUNSEL
MICHAEL P. CHWEN

* ADMITTED IN NEW YORK ONLY
** ADMITTED IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
AND MASSACHUSETTS ONLY

SUITE 400
1110 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004
(202) 462-8000
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NEW YORK COUNSEL:
PETER H. MORRISON

HARRISON, PAUL AND BEILEY, P. C.
110 E 40th STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10018
(212) 693-0600

September 23, 1983

HAND DELIVERED

The Honorable Donald Joseph Albosta
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
of the Committee on Post Office &
Civil Service
511 House Office Building
Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

Re: Request for Documents to Mr. Max Hugel

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On September 16, 1983, we advised you that, as a result of Mr. Hugel and his counsel's previously arranged travel schedules, as well as Mr. Hugel's participation in the religious holidays, we had been unable to respond to the Subcommittee's request for the 1980 Presidential campaign documents within the rather brief time-frame suggested in your letter. At that time, we assured you that the materials would be forthcoming shortly after we had met with our client and had an opportunity to review the contents of his files in Washington.

We are pleased to advise you that we have completed our initial review of all records and documents found in Mr. Hugel's Washington office which we believe are pertinent and germane to your inquiry. Accordingly, we are authorized by our client, and in accordance with your request, to make these materials available to you and/or your staff for review and/or copying. In order to facilitate your staff's review of these materials, we are enclosing an index to the materials which are currently in our possession.

In addition, we are in the process of reviewing a few additional materials which have just arrived at our offices. As soon as our review of these materials has been completed and we have discussed our conclusions with our client, we will be in contact with you and/or your staff.

In order to facilitate this process, we will be happy to communicate with any person on your staff whom you designate. We will arrange for prompt review of the actual documents at our offices upon request.

In the event that I personally am not available at the time your staff member contacts our office, please feel free to contact my able litigation colleague, Robert Plotkin, who is equally conversant with these issues.

We trust that our letter and index is responsive to your request and we look forward to continuing cooperation with your Subcommittee in your investigation.

Respectfully yours,

PERITO, DUEBA, CARLSON & PINQO, P.C.

Paul L. Perito
Paul L. Perito

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Max Hugel
John M. Fitzgerald, Esquire
Steve Memphill, Esquire

PLP:mek

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U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 8, 1983

The Honorable Edwin Meese III
 Counselor to the President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Meese:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 27, 1983

Mr. Loren Smith
 2120 L Street, N.W.
 Suite 500
 Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Smith:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

In order to conduct our inquiry into the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign, the Subcommittee has interviewed numerous witnesses and reviewed files which it has reason to believe may contain such information or materials. As you know, on July 29, 1983, the Subcommittee was granted access to certain files of the Reagan collection located at the Hoover Institution. Included in the files searched are the files of certain individuals involved in the 1980 Reagan campaign. Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover.

Because of your role in the 1980 Presidential election, I would like to request your response to the allegations made about the unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan Campaign. I want to assure you that it is not my intention to accept these allegations at face value. However, if they are true, there may be possible violations of criminal law because of any theft that may have occurred, or for the failure to report such a theft. There are also additional potential violations, such as theft and receipt of U.S. Government property. Every employee and official of the Federal Government is obliged to report possible violations as well.

I would therefore appreciate having a thorough explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the obtaining and/or using of information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 Reagan Presidential campaign. Also, since your complete files were not located at the Reagan Collection at the Hoover Institution, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained.

I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/tal

Loren A. Smith
2120 L Street, N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20037

October 3, 1983

The Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman
Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resources
511 House Office Building Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Congressman Albosta:

In response to your letter dated September 27, 1983, this is to advise you that I served as General Counsel of the Reagan-Bush Committee during the 1980 campaign. The bulk of my personal files are in storage in Delaware. I am quite certain that I have no files, records or documents which would have any relevancy whatever to the current investigation being conducted by your Subcommittee. My total involvement with the debate was limited to suggesting, at my own initiative, one or two possible answers to questions which might have been raised concerning independent expenditures, as I was the campaign's FEC expert and this issue was a lively press issue at that time. To the best of my recollection no such questions arose during the debate.

I have no knowledge other than what I have read in the press with respect to the "allegations made about the unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan campaign."

If I may be of any further assistance please do not hesitate to give me a call.

Sincerely yours,



Loren A. Smith

U.S. House of Representatives
 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
 511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX1
 Washington, D.C. 20515
 TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

August 11, 1983

Mr. Mitchell Stanley
 Special Assistant to the Counselor
 to the President
 The White House
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Stanley:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. It is also our understanding that your complete campaign files are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to your files from the 1980 Presidential campaign. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/mg

265

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


18 August 1983

The Honorable Don Albosta
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Albosta,

In response to your letter of 11 August requesting any files which I may have retained from the Reagan Bush campaign please be advised that any campaign files extant were sent to Hoover in accord with routine post-election procedures. Unfortunately at the time making detailed records and chronologies of campaign documentation was not given the priority which a more scholarly approach would have ensured.

Sincerely,


Mitchell F. Stanley
Special Assistant to the
Counsellor to the President

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 8, 1983

The Honorable David Stockman
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Stockman:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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Upon our initial search at Hoover, it became evident that many officials of the Reagan campaign retained their own files, as opposed to sending them to the Archivist at Hoover. Also, most of the files of individuals who had a less formal relationship with the campaign (i.e. volunteer) were not located at the Hoover Institution. It is also our understanding that the files you may have collected from the 1980 campaign are not located at Hoover.

Because of your role in the Reagan campaign, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained. I want to assure you at this point that it is the Subcommittee's intention to examine only documents deemed relevant to our investigation. After a cursory glance, if a document is determined irrelevant, the investigators will promptly move on in their review. Likewise, you have my personal assurance that the Subcommittee investigators will only copy those documents deemed relevant to this oversight investigation.

I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/ng

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

September 27, 1983

Mr. William Timmons
President
Timmons and Company
1850 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Timmons:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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
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I would therefore appreciate having a thorough explanation of your knowledge and participation, if any, in the obtaining and/or using of information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 Reagan Presidential campaign. Also, since your complete files were not located at the Reagan Collection at the Hoover Institution, I would like to request that you provide the Subcommittee with access to any additional files from the 1980 Presidential campaign that you have retained.

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I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Don Albosta
Chairman

DA/tal

TIMMONS AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED
1850 K STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 331-1760

October 3, 1983

WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
President

TOM C. KOROLOGOS
*Executive Vice President and
Director of Legislative Affairs*

MICHAEL L. REED
*Vice President and
General Counsel*

HOWARD G. PASTER
Vice President and Treasurer

MARY A. SIDLEY
Vice President for Administration

MICHAEL J. BATES
Director of Research

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am in receipt of your September 27th letter on the subject of possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush campaign.

Regarding your first question, I have no knowledge of any unauthorized information from the Carter Administration and did not participate in obtaining materials improperly during the 1980 Reagan Presidential Campaign.

As for your second inquiry, there are several boxes of campaign files in my office, and I would be pleased to provide space for your staff to go through them. I also have a copying machine which is also available if individual papers need to be reproduced.

I assure you of my complete cooperation with your committee's oversight investigation.

Sincerely,


William E. Timmons

The Honorable Don Albosta
Chairman
Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office & Civil Service
U.S. House of Representatives
Room 511, House Office Building Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
511 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 1
Washington, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE (202) 225-2821

October 17, 1983

Mr. Edward L. Weidenfeld
 1575 I Street NW
 Suite 500
 Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Weidenfeld:

The Human Resources Subcommittee is presently conducting a legislative oversight investigation into the implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In particular, the Subcommittee is focusing on the events surrounding the possible unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan-Bush Campaign. As such a transfer could have involved Federal employees acting in their official capacities, it is of great concern to this Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over the ethics programs in government, that the ethics law be as strong as is necessary to discourage such unethical behavior, while not serving as a deterrent for the recruitment of dedicated public servants.

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I hope you can respond to this request within five days, as the Subcommittee wishes to complete its work as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,



Dan Rostenbros
Chairman

DA/ng

ACCESS TO FILE GRANTED

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

June 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

The Subcommittee will hold hearings on the bills H.R. 828 and H.R. 829 on Tuesday, July 12th and Thursday, July 14th. This legislation would prohibit the contracting out of Federal jobs currently reserved for preference eligibles (veterans). Among those invited to testify are representatives from OMB and GSA, to present the Administration's position, several veterans' organizations, federal employee groups, and representatives of the business and handicapped communities. In addition to reviewing the pending legislation, these hearings will give the Subcommittee an opportunity to gather more information on the general issue of contracting out of government services.

The Subcommittee has tentatively scheduled joint hearings with the Committee on Science and Technology on contracting out of services at the National Weather Service. The hearings will hopefully be held prior to the August recess. Among those who will be invited to testify are representatives of NOAA and several agricultural organizations. A major focus of the hearings will be the recently released Booz Allen report on the National Weather Service, a study which was commissioned by NOAA.

As part of its continuing work on amendments to the Ethics in Government Act, the Subcommittee began an investigation into allegations that the Reagan campaign team obtained materials prepared for President Carter for the 1980 presidential debates. The Subcommittee has written to several Administration officials who were previously members of the Reagan campaign staff to request their response to the allegations made. The Subcommittee held a press conference to announce the investigation.

Staff Director Micah Green traveled to Bellaire, Michigan to speak before the Michigan Postmasters.

The Subcommittee staff will miss Tom Trabucco, who has worked with the Subcommittee for five years. We wish him much success in his new job at the National Association for Retired Federal Employees.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

July 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

The Subcommittee held hearings on July 12th and 14th on H.R. 828 and H.R. 829, companion bills which would prohibit the contracting for Federal occupations currently reserved by law for veterans. On the first day of hearings, the Subcommittee heard testimony on the broader issue of contracting out, as prescribed under OMB Circular A-76. Presenting testimony were four federal employee organizations, the Business Alliance on Government Competition, and the Disabled American Veterans. On the second day of hearings, the Subcommittee heard testimony from The American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Building Service Contractors, and from a panel of three organizations representing the handicapped and severely disabled. Also, Mr. Ray Kline, Deputy Administrator of the General Services Administration presented the views of the Administration on the legislation. All Subcommittee Members present expressed an interest in protecting benefits for veterans. Another issue raised at the hearings was the impact of the legislation on the handicapped. The Subcommittee will carefully study this matter as it continues to review the bills.

Subcommittee staff met with officials of the Department of Energy to discuss the contracting out of the two main libraries at DOE. The Subcommittee expressed concern about efforts to place separated employees at the libraries should a reduction-in-force occur. Subcommittee staff also spoke with representatives of the employees who would be affected by the contract conversion. The Subcommittee will follow-up on this matter in a letter to the Secretary of Energy.

Subcommittee staff met with officials from the General Accounting Office to discuss a study requested by the Subcommittee on the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. GAO hopes to provide the Subcommittee with a full report on possible abuses in the IPA within thirty days.

Subcommittee staff met with officials from GAO about their study concerning the hiring, classification, and use of librarians in the civil service.

The Subcommittee continued its investigation into the possible unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter White House to the Reagan-Bush campaign. The Subcommittee held meetings on July 12th, July 14th and July 21st to discuss the investigation. The Subcommittee adopted guidelines for the investigation. Subcommittee staff continued to interview witnesses to gain information on the matter, with both majority and minority staff present at each interview. Staff also viewed videotapes of the Reagan-Bush campaign's mock debates. At its meeting on July 19th, the full Committee approved the retaining on a consultant basis of Mr. James Hamilton, Esq., as Special Counsel to the Subcommittee for the investigation. Mr. Hamilton aided the Subcommittee in negotiations with the White House for access to Reagan-Bush campaign files stored at the Hoover Institution in California and for access to Justice Department materials.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

August 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

The Subcommittee continued its investigation into the possible unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan/Bush campaign. After an agreement was reached with the Trustees of the Hoover Institution Reagan collection, Subcommittee investigators traveled to the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California to review documents from the Reagan campaign. Subcommittee investigators have continued to interview witnesses and review documents associated with this matter.

Subcommittee staff also communicated with the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) about the status of confidential and public financial disclosure reports which are required under the Ethics in Government Act, and the guidelines adopted for this reporting procedure.

The Subcommittee continued to study contracting out of Government services. Chairman Albosta, while on a personal trip to Alaska, met with officials of the National Weather Service's (NWS) Forecast Office in Anchorage to discuss contracting out of NWS functions. The Chairman also met with officials and employees at the Elmendorf Air Force Base to discuss contracting out and other issues which affect Federal personnel. In addition, the Chairman discussed contracting with National Park Service personnel in Anchorage.

The Chairman wrote to Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel regarding the contracting out of the two main libraries at the Department of Energy. In particular, he asked for information on placement efforts for employees who face separation as a result of the contract conversion. Also, the Chairman wrote to the Associate Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), James Winchester, concerning the possible contracting out of the National Climatic Center in Asheville, North Carolina. An A-76 cost comparison study is currently being undertaken for the National Climatic Center, which is the national center for all climate information.

Also, in response to the Administration's revisions to OMB Circular A-76, which sets forth Executive Branch policy on contracting, Chairman Albosta announced his intention to hold a series of field hearings to gather information on functions which are being considered for contract conversion or are already being performed under contract. The field hearings would proceed a more comprehensive hearing on OMB Circular A-76 and contracting out.

Chairman Albosta joined other Committee Members in writing to Office of Personnel Management Director Donald Devine regarding a GAO report on the classification and qualification standards for Federal librarians. The letter to Mr. Devine urged the OPM to withdraw its proposed standards until questions raised by the GAO report have been resolved.

Subcommittee staff represented the Subcommittee Chairman at the opening of the National Headquarters Building of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

September 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

H.R. 2717, the Amendments to the Ethics in Government Act, was passed by the full House on September 19th. Following further work on the legislation by House and Senate conferees, the House passed the final version of the bill on September 30th. Subcommittee Chairman Albosta told the full House that he believes H.R. 2717 represents a bipartisan consensus on important improvements in the Ethics law governing conduct for Federal employees and officials.

In an effort to determine whether further changes are needed in the laws governing ethics and standards of conduct for Federal personnel, the Subcommittee continued its investigative work on the unauthorized transfer of information during the 1980 Presidential campaign. Subcommittee investigators continued to interview witnesses and review documents. The Subcommittee reached an agreement with the Trustees of the Reagan collection at the Hoover Institution which allows for further review of documents by professional GAO investigators.

Chairman Albosta released a GAO study, requested by the Subcommittee, on assignments in selected agencies under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA). The Chairman pointed out that the report supports his concerns that Federal agencies may be paying a greater share of IPA assignment costs than agreements for such personnel transfers call for. The Chairman called on OPM to review its policies and standards for the IPA program.

Subcommittee staff met with management officials from the General Electric Company to discuss GE's procedures during reductions-in-force or company reorganizations. Chairman Albosta had written to officials of the Lighting Business Group of General Electric to request information on the recent consolidation and resulting reduction-in-force. General Electric personnel provided Subcommittee staff with information on the company's efforts to train or find alternate employment for employees who may lose their jobs, benefit plans and severance payments.

The Subcommittee began planning for a field hearing on the staffing levels in a number of agencies which provide economic and technical assistance to businesses and local and state governments. The focus of these hearings will be to determine whether the levels, use and organization of personnel are at a point best suited to provide assistance to areas of severe economic need.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

October 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

S. 461, the final version of the Amendments to the Ethics in Government Act, was passed by the Senate. The legislation, on which the Subcommittee worked extensively, has been sent to the President for signature. In addition to improving laws governing standards of conduct and ethics for Federal personnel, the legislation reauthorizes the Office of Government Ethics.

Subcommittee Chairman Don Albosta announced that due to the need for further investigative work on a number of leads, the Subcommittee would not begin public hearings on the possible unauthorized transfer of information and materials from the Carter Administration to the Reagan presidential campaign by the end of October, as previously hoped. The Chairman said that although hearings may begin before Congress adjourns, he cannot announce a starting date for the hearings until investigators are able to follow through on the leads.

The Subcommittee has announced a fielding hearing on the levels, organization and use of personnel at the Farmers Home Administration to be held in Mount Pleasant, Michigan on November 7th. This hearing is part of the Subcommittee's review of staffing levels at several Federal agencies which provide economic assistance, such as loans, loan guarantees and grants. Witnesses invited to testify include farmers, Realtors and bankers, as well as the FmHA State Office Director. The Subcommittee hopes to determine whether FmHA programs are staffed and organized in a manner which allows them to meet the needs of the communities they serve.

Continuing its study of contracting out of Government functions in preparation for a series of hearings on OMB Circular A-76, Chairman Albosta wrote to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition to request information on the contracting out of Training and Audiovisual Support functions at Fort Bliss, Texas. Although a contract has already been awarded for the function, employees have filed an appeal of the decision to convert to contract.

The Subcommittee continued its review of the A-76 cost comparison study being undertaken at the National Climatic Data Center in Asheville, North Carolina. Subcommittee staff, joined by staff of Congressman James McClure Clarke of North Carolina, reviewed the Management Efficiency Study at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration offices, which has been completed for the NCDC functions which are being considered for contracting out.

Subcommittee Staff Director Micah Green and Counsel John Fitzgerald participated in a conference sponsored by the Office of Government Ethics, which was held at the Department of Labor. Micah and John gave a presentation on the Amendments to the Ethics in Government Act (H.R. 2717) that Congress recently passed.

Also, the Staff Director and Counsel participated in a conference sponsored by the Assembly of Governmental Employees, at which numerous issues affecting Federal employees were addressed. Micah and John discussed the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), which provides grants to states and localities to establish merit based personnel systems. IPA also has a program whereby Federal employees can be assigned to a state or local government or a non-profit institution for a short period of time. Subcommittee Chairman Albosta recently released a General Accounting Office study on the IPA program which pointed to abuses in the program at selected agencies.

Continuing its preparation for a series of hearings on OMB Circular A-76 and on contracting out, Subcommittee staff met with several organizations which have an interest in this issue. The Subcommittee is attempting to identify particular functions, which are either being considered for contracting out or are currently being performed under contract, as possible sites for field hearings on contracting out. Chairman Albosta believes that the Subcommittee would benefit greatly from reviewing these functions and speaking with Federal employees and contractors first hand before hearings are held in Washington.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

November 1983

Subcommittee on Human Resources

Subcommittee Chairman Albosta has announced that public hearings on the unauthorized transfer of information from the Carter Administration to the Reagan Campaign will begin shortly after Congress reconvenes in late January. The first day of hearings has been tentatively scheduled for January 26, 1984. The Chairman believes that public hearings are necessary to resolve conflicts that still exist and to examine the extensive work done by the Subcommittee on this matter during the last several months. In the interim period before the start of hearings, the Subcommittee hopes to fully assess the information collected and complete its review of materials being provided by the Department of Justice, which has been conducting a separate criminal investigation on the same matter.

The President has signed into law the Amendments to the Ethics in Government Act, legislation on which the Subcommittee has worked extensively this year (P.L. 98-150). As part of the continuing review of this legislation, Chairman Albosta wrote to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), David Martin, to request information about the financial disclosure forms filed by J. Lynn Helms, Director of the Federal Aviation Administration. P.L. 98-150 now requires that Presidential nominees provide written notification of actions taken to comply with the law's requirements, such as placing investments in a blind trust to prevent conflicts of interest.

On November 7th, the Subcommittee held a field hearing in Mount Pleasant, Michigan on the hiring, training and organization of personnel at the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). The Subcommittee heard testimony from farmers, real estate brokers and FmHA officials on how FmHA may improve its services to our nation's rural communities. Issues raised at the hearing include improving the training of loan officers, decreasing the amount of time needed to process farm and housing loans, and ensuring the most cost-effective use of FmHA appropriated funds.

Chairman Albosta cosigned a Committee request to GAO for a review of staffing levels for Federal airport police at National and Dulles Airports. Concerns have been raised that security at the airports is in jeopardy due to a severe staff shortage.

The Subcommittee continued its review of the contracting out of Department of the Army Audio/visual Support Center functions at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Chairman wrote to the Army to request further information on the appeals procedure followed during the A-76 process for these functions. The Chairman also wrote to the Army to request information on the contracting out of Army Tank

Automotive Command functions in Warren, Michigan.

Chairman Albosta wrote to the General Services Administration (GSA) regarding the elimination of the Federal Protective Officer (FPO) position at the Federal building in Saginaw, Michigan. The Chairman requested information on GSA guidelines for determining where FPO's will be assigned and information on provisions for security at the Federal building since the one-man RIF.

Continuing its work on H.R. 828 and H.R. 829, bills which would prohibit the contracting out of Federal positions reserved for veterans preference eligibles, Subcommittee staff met with representatives of veterans organizations to further discuss the affect of the legislation on veterans, sheltered workshops for the handicapped, and the business community.

Staff Director Micah Green spoke before the Society of Federal Labor Relations Professionals on contracting out of government services and activities. Micah discussed the Subcommittee's plans to hold a series of hearings on the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, which sets forth Executive Branch policy on contracting out.

December 1983
Monthly Report

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

Chairman Don Albosta has requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) conduct an extensive review of placement programs in Federal agencies. GAO will review placement figures for civilian agencies for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, and then conduct an in-depth review of placement programs at selected agencies. The GAO report will include a review of the Priority Placement Program (PPP) at the Department of Defense. Also, GAO will review Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidelines and policies on placement programs for employees facing separation. Finally, an analysis will be made of the effect OPM's new regulations on reductions in force would have on agency placement programs. The Chairman believes that the information from this GAO report will be beneficial to the Subcommittee as it continues to study the effects of reductions in force on employees and the possible implementation of new placement programs. The study will also assist the Subcommittee in its current review of the implementation and impact of OMB Circular A-76.

Continuing its review of reductions in force in the private sector, the Subcommittee wrote to the Melville Corporation, owners of Thom McAn footwear. Melville recently announced that it is closing nearly all of its domestic shoe factories, a move which will affect 2000 employees. Melville already has closed 25 plants in 1983, affecting 4,600 employees. The Subcommittee requested information on how the company has approached this major reduction in force, including protections and benefits for displaced employees, and placement and retraining efforts. The Subcommittee also wrote to the U.S. Steel company, which has recently announced a major reorganization which will affect a total of 15,000 employees.

The Subcommittee continued its investigation into the possible unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration to the 1980 Reagan campaign. Investigators continued to interview witnesses and review related documents. The Subcommittee also reviewed the product of the FBI investigation into the same matter, pursuant to an agreement with the Justice Department. The Subcommittee began preparations for hearings on the investigation, which are tentatively scheduled to begin January 26, 1984.

The Subcommittee continued to review the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, setting forth Executive Branch policy on contracting out of Government activities. Chairman Albosta wrote to HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce, requesting information on the contracting out of library services at HUD. The Chairman also wrote to Secretary Pierce concerning the contracting out of EEO investigative work at HUD. In the response on the latter contract conversion, HUD officials informed the Subcommittee that EEO investigative work was considered for contract conversion in May of 1983. Accordingly, Chairman Albosta has written to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), asking for an explanation of OFPP's directive to agencies on the implementation of the old and new A-76 Circular. Also, the Chairman again wrote to Secretary Pierce, requesting further information on staffing for HUD and EEO investigative work.

The Chairman wrote to OMB Director David Stockman about OMB's decision to contract out, or close, numerous printing and duplicating facilities government-wide. In particular, the Chairman requested information on the cost effectiveness of this action and the effect these contract conversions would have on other agency functions.

The Subcommittee continued to look into the contracting out of Army Communications Command activities at Fort Bliss, Texas. Chairman Albosta wrote to OFPP, asking for a review of the implementation of A-76 appeal procedures by the Army.

The subcommittee staff joined staff members from the Civil Service Subcommittee and former Subcommittee Chairwoman Ferraro's office in a meeting with GAO staff to discuss the GAO study on Pay Equity and Comparable Worth in the Federal government. The staff discussed the direction of the next phase of this major study, which will include a comparison of evaluation systems for occupations used by the Federal government, a history of the Factor Evaluation System, and a review of selected job evaluation systems being implemented by state governments and private companies.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

Subcommittee on Human Resources

January 1984

Subcommittee Chairman Albosta announced that the Subcommittee would not hold public hearings at this time on the investigation into the unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 Presidential campaign. Instead, the Subcommittee will ask certain important witnesses to sign sworn statements under oath about their knowledge of, or participation in, this unauthorized transfer of material. Subcommittee investigators are continuing to interview witnesses and review documents related to this matter. The Subcommittee will make its findings public in a Committee report by mid-March.

Continuing its oversight of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Chairman Albosta wrote to the Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) at each Federal agency. The DAEO is responsible for overseeing the ethics program(s) at his/her agency, as well as ensuring that the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act are properly implemented and enforced. The Chairman asked for an explanation of educational programs for employees regarding Standards of Conduct, any guidelines or regulations issued by the agency on Standards of Conduct, and a report on violations of Standards of Conduct and how they are dealt with by the DAEO.

Chairman Albosta also wrote to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, David Martin, to express his concern about conflicts of interest and the failure to disclose such conflicts by high ranking government officials. The Chairman asked for information about conflicts of interest which have been reported since the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act in 1978 and how these conflicts have been resolved. Finally, the Chairman asked for Mr. Martin's view on the effectiveness of certain amendments to the Ethics Act which were passed by Congress last year.

The Subcommittee continued to monitor the possible contracting out of EEO investigations at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Chairman Albosta again wrote to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to ask what actions that office might take in light of possible non-compliance by HUD with the guidelines and intent of OMB Circular A-76. The Chairman also wrote to HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce to express his concern about staffing for EEO investigative work since the agency began to consider this function for contracting out.

Chairman Albosta wrote to the House Armed Services Committee

to ask for a review of the contract performance of Training and Audiovisual Support Center functions at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Subcommittee has been reviewing the contracting out of this activity and was informed of possible overcharging and security violations on the part of the contractor.

Subcommittee Staff Director Micah Green addressed a workshop, sponsored by the Department of the Air Force, on the implementation of OMB Circular A-76. Micah discussed the Subcommittee's concerns about contracting out for government services, which include cost-effectiveness, the identification of inherently governmental functions, and the government's responsibility towards its employees.

The Subcommittee continued its review of how private sector companies deal with major reductions-in-force due to company reorganizations or plant closings. The Subcommittee received information from U.S. Steel and Melville Footwear Manufacturing, both of which have announced major reductions-in-force, on placement programs, retraining efforts, and benefits provided for employees facing separation. The Subcommittee will continue to study reductions-in-force in other industries, in an effort to determine how the Federal government may improve its placement programs for civil service employees.

The Subcommittee continued to study the organization, levels and utilization of personnel at the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Chairman Albosta wrote to the State Director of FmHA in Michigan to recommend possible changes or improvements in the structure and organization of FmHA offices, based on testimony presented at a Subcommittee hearing held in November.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

Subcommittee on Human Resources

February 1984

The Subcommittee began its preparation of the report in which it will present its findings of the investigation into the unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 presidential campaign. The Subcommittee asked key persons to sign sworn statements about their knowledge of, or participation in, this matter. The Subcommittee also continued to interview witnesses and review documents related to the investigation. The report will be completed in mid-to-late March.

The Subcommittee received responses from many of the 125 Federal agencies to which it sent inquiries concerning their ethics programs. The Subcommittee will carefully review all of the materials provided by the agencies to determine whether ethics regulations and Standards of Conduct are being properly enforced. Information also was provided by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) on the status of ethics programs and steps that have been taken by OGE to enforce provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as well as recent amendments to the Act.

The Subcommittee joined the Civil Service Subcommittee in writing to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, to express concern about the increasing number of attacks on Federal correctional officers. Among the issues raised by the Subcommittees are questions about a proposal to contract out for the building and operation of a Federal prison in Texas, and staffing levels at Federal prisons.

The Subcommittee continued to review the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, in preparation for a series of hearings on contracting out of Government activities. Chairman Albosta wrote to the Department of the Army, requesting a full review of the decision to contract out Industrial Operations Directorate activities at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Committee's Ranking Majority Member, Representative Morris Udall, expressed concern about the preparation of the A-76 cost comparison study conducted for these functions. Additionally, the Subcommittee received information from the Committee on Armed Services concerning the contract performance of Training and Audiovisual Support Center activities at Fort Bliss, Texas, and will continue to monitor the progress of an Army investigation of the contract.

Chairman Albosta joined Representative Thomas Daschle in writing to the Director of the National Park Service (NPS), to request information on the implementation of the A-76 Circular at

NPS. In particular, the Congressmen questioned National Park Service plans to complete numerous A-76 studies for functions at national parks nationwide by the end of March. They also expressed concern about the protection of park resources if certain activities are converted to contract performance, and the effect of these contract conversions on Federal employees.

The Subcommittee met with General Accounting Office (GAO) personnel to discuss the progress of the GAO study on placement programs in the Federal government, which was requested by the Subcommittee. GAO is currently reviewing the Priority Placement Program at the Department of Defense, and will also conduct an in-depth study of placement programs at selected Federal agencies.

The Subcommittee staff began its review of H.R. 4620, a bill to prohibit the recording of conversations made on the Federal telecommunications system, which has been referred to the Subcommittee.

DRAFT

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES

Subcommittee on Human Resources

March 1984

The Subcommittee continued preparation of the report on its investigation of the unauthorized transfer of materials and information from the Carter Administration during the 1980 presidential election campaign. On March 27, the Chairman wrote individuals who had not complied with the Subcommittee's request for the submission of sworn statements about their knowledge of, or participation in, the matters under investigation, to remind them that their testimony under oath was necessary to complete the Subcommittee report.

On March 14, Chairman Ford and Subcommittee Chairman Albosta wrote to Speaker O'Neill expressing concern about the bill H.R. 2133. This legislation, which amends the Small Business Act, would have a significant impact on the implementation of OMR Circular A-76. That impact could be detrimental to both Federal employees and contractors. The Subcommittee felt that before House consideration of this legislation, there should be discussions with the Small Business Committee to address the particular concerns of Albosta and Ford. These discussions are currently taking place.

The Subcommittee met to consider requests from Senators Metzenbaum and Levin for access to and copies of materials relevant to Mr. Edwin Meese's knowledge of, participation in, and statements about the potentially unauthorized transfer of materials and information during the 1980 presidential election campaign. On March 14, the Subcommittee, by recorded vote, approved a motion to approve access to Subcommittee materials assembled pertaining to Mr. Meese. To comply with the requests of Senator Metzenbaum of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Senator Levin of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Subcommittee made available copies of the requested documents.

The Subcommittee continued its review of the Ethics programs in the executive branch, including the enforcement of financial disclosure and conflicts of interest provisions of the law.

The Subcommittee continued its review of the implementation of OMR Circular A-76 and contracting out of government activities. The Subcommittee will begin its series of hearings on this issue by focusing on contracting out of Federal libraries. In preparation for the Subcommittee's on-site review of a Federal library under consideration for contracting out, the Subcommittee has been working with library organizations and Federal librarians.

The Subcommittee also continued to research the implementation of the A-76 Circular at other Federal agencies, including HUD, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of the Interior, General Services Administration, and Department of Defense. Chairman Albosta wrote to the Bureau of Reclamation to express concern about the contracting out of activities performed by veterans preference eligibles at the Hoover Dam.

On March 24, the Subcommittee Staff Director spoke to a seminar of the Federal Managers Association on the subject of contracting out of government services. In his remarks, he outlined the Subcommittee's oversight and legislative agenda on this issue. Another matter discussed was the impact H.R. 2133, a bill dealing with small business government procurement, would have on managerial discretion in the Federal Government.

The Subcommittee is working with General Accounting Office staff on GAO's review of placement programs in the Federal government. GAO is studying the Priority Placement Program at the Department of Defense, and the effectiveness of placement programs in civilian agencies. The Subcommittee is studying the use of placement programs for employees faced with separation from the Civil Service as a result of contract conversions.

The Subcommittee continued its review of H.R. 4620, a bill to prohibit the recording of conversations made on the Federal telecommunications system. The Subcommittee began a broader review of actions and policies affecting employees' rights of privacy.

The Subcommittee continued its review of personnel requirements and employee utilization at selected agencies including the Office of Government Ethics and the Farmers' Home Administration.

APPENDIX II
DEBATE BRIEFING BOOKS

(291)

September 11, 1980

Camp David

Q: How can you expect progress in the Camp David negotiations, if you are holding out the prospect of a summit? Also, our European allies, as well as most Arab nations, believe the Camp David talks are going nowhere. What makes you believe that there is something left to achieve from them?

A: For more than 30 years, there were efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Except for some limited disengagement agreements, none of them worked. Then came Camp David, which led to the first actual peace in the area -- the treaty between Egypt and Israel, which is being implemented. The other half of Camp David -- on full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza -- is the first time that both Israel's security and the rights of the Palestinian people have been at the top of the agenda, together. This approach also fulfills another essential condition -- that the toughest, most unanswerable questions, like the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, are put off until after a transition period of five years. This can permit the parties to have a time of living and working together, in order to find room for accommodation.

It is clear to us that any other approach to peace would also have to deal with these central problems, and follow this general approach. And no other approach has been suggested that can do that.

I am convinced -- as are Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat -- that Camp David can succeed, in the interest of all our countries and, when we are finished, in the interest

of the Palestinian people, as well. The road is not easy; the issues are complex and difficult, and reflect more than a generation of conflict. As the talks resume, however, they will focus on the difficult issues that remain, building on all the ground work that has been done in the past 16 months. With good will on all sides -- which does exist -- the answers can be found.

During Sol Linowitz' visit to the Middle East, the parties agreed to restart the talks, and to consider the timing and venue for a summit. The two efforts complement one another: the talks will develop the issues toward resolution and a summit could be useful in pushing the whole process forward. Given the decades that have elapsed since the search for peace began, we should not be concerned about a few weeks between the reconvening of the talks and a summit meeting.

September 12, 1966

Pressure on Israel

Q: With all the potential leverage we have on Israel, why don't you use some of it to get Israel to make some compromises?

A: It is important to bear in mind two factors:

-- there can be no peace in the Middle East unless Israel is secure. We are committed to its security, and we provide it with great quantities of assistance and modern arms to that end. Seeking to weaken Israel through "pressure" therefore, could fly in the face of our concern for Israel's security, and would undermine Israeli political confidence in the peace process;

-- the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be a political process, reached through political decision. Thus any agreement in the autonomy talks, to have any value, must have the approval of the prime minister, cabinet, Knesset, and people of Israel. Therefore, there is only one way to reach success: to work through each issue patiently and persistently, until there can be agreement that makes sense to both Israel and to Egypt. I am confident that that is possible, and will do all that I can to help.

We must also understand that the decisions and choices Israel is facing in the autonomy talks are among the most difficult in its entire history. It can only make these choices against a background of confidence in its security and its future. We are committed to helping provide that essential confidence. Israel needs our understanding at this difficult time. It will have it.

AFGHANISTANReaganThe Reagan Response to Afghanistan

Opposing the President's actions, Reagan proposed his own plan to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soon after the invasion Reagan advocated sending advisers, and stationing war planes in Pakistan. He also suggested that the United States send weapons to Afghanistan.

"(W)e ought to be funneling weapons through there that can be delivered to those freedom fighters in Afghanistan to fight for their own freedom. That would include those shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles that could knock down helicopter gun ships that the Soviets are using against them."

Washington Post
January 10, 1980

But that was not enough. Reagan also proposed that the United States blockade Cuba in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Even though Reagan advocated military options to counter the Soviet invasion, he opposed draft registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Although Reagan decries vacillation in United States foreign policy, and calls for a greater show of military force, his statements during the Afghanistan crisis call into question whether Reagan has the understanding and steadfastness required to initiate an effective U.S. response. Of the three steps the President initiated to counter the Soviets, Reagan opposed both the grain embargo and draft registration, and he vacillated on the Olympic boycott.

Sept. 4

Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1980

Harris joined the Community Services Administration in 1977 as Special Assistant to the Director and assumed his current position in August 1977.

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Nomination of Dennis Dale Clark To Be a Member. September 4, 1980

The President today announced that he will nominate Dennis Dale Clark, of Greenbelt, Md., to be a member of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. He would replace Jerome R. Waldie, who has resigned, and he will be nominated for an additional term expiring in 1986. Clark has been General Counsel of this Commission since 1979.

He was born December 31, 1944, in Detroit, Mich. He received a B.A. from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1967 and a J.D. from University of Michigan Law School in 1970.

From 1970 to 1976, Clark was an associate attorney with the Washington firm of Bredhof, Cushman, Gottesman & Cohen. From 1976 to 1977, he was associate attorney with the Washington firm of Lichtman, Abeles, Anker & Nagle. From 1977 to 1979, he was Deputy Associate Solicitor with the Fair Labor Standards Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.

B'nai B'rith International

Remarks at the Closing Banquet of the Biennial Convention. September 4, 1980

President Spitzer, President Day, Ambassador Euron, Senator Carl Levin, Secre-

tary Klutznick, Secretary Goldschmidt, members and friends of B'nai B'rith International, ladies and gentlemen:

My wife made me promise that at the beginning of my speech I would recognize the presence of Mr. Shalom Doron, Doron who's the chairman of the board of the B'nai B'rith Women Children's Home in Israel, one of the finest places that I have ever known about, where Rosalynn was privileged to visit when we were in Jerusalem last year.

This is a home, as you women certainly know, for children who are severely emotionally disturbed. They have a remarkable 70-percent recovery rate among those children. They give no drugs, and as Mr. Doron says, the therapy is love. My wife is one of the experts on mental health, says it's one of the most successful programs and schools that she has ever seen in her life, and you're to be congratulated for it.

I come before you at a special time in our Nation's history, a dynamic period of controlled turmoil known as election time. [Laughter] It's a time when good friends can find themselves in total disagreement. It's a time when parents are very likely to find themselves at odds with their own sons and daughters. It's a time when liberals ask the candidates if they'll do enough and conservatives ask the candidates not to do too much. It's a time when mere discussions become sharp debates and when debates turn into heated arguments. I understand it's a lot like hiring a new rabbi for the synagogue. [Laughter]

Speaking of elections, I'm told that Jack Spitzer was a shoo-in for reelection as your president this year. I find that a good omen as I appear before you. [Laughter]

Well, I'm delighted to be back with you again. I remember distinctly the excitement of my attendance at your banquet in 1976. And I'm delighted to be here, because, well, I think you know

why. The B'nai B'rith and the Democratic Party have stood together for progressive causes for almost 50 years—from social security to strong trade unions, from civil rights at home to human rights abroad. We've made progress because we've worked together, and we've worked together because we've had shared goals, shared ideals, shared commitments.

People sometimes say that the old Democratic coalition no longer exists. But I say that all those who care about economic justice and personal dignity and civil liberties and pluralism have a living record of achievement that keeps that coalition alive. If anyone doubts that it's alive today, let them look tonight at the people and the ideals and the achievements of B'nai B'rith International. The whole world looks to you with admiration and with appreciation.

Like you, I believe both in progress and also in the preservation of tradition. Progress is the very essence of the American dream, the conviction that each generation through hard work can give its children a better life than we ourselves enjoy. But we do not want reckless change. We value political traditions, we value our cultural diversity, and we treasure them as guideposts for the future.

This will be a decade of change, perhaps even more rapid change, perhaps even more disturbing change than we experienced in the 1970's. But it's also a decade of challenge; it's a decade of hope. Our country is on the right road to the right future, and we will stay the course. The election is not about the past. I've called it a choice between two futures, and I believe that Americans want a future of justice for our society, strength and security for our Nation. And I believe that Americans want a future of peace for the entire world. We're on the right road in building a just society.

We're not a perfect nation but we're making good progress.

B'nai B'rith has always recognized the universality of that effort for justice and for basic civil or human rights. That's why you seek ratification of the equal rights amendment, and so do I. Our Nation is more than 200 years old, and it's time for the rights of all Americans, women and men, to be guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States.

You want to preserve the separation of church and state, a policy that's served us so well for 200 years, and so do I. And you want a competent and an independent judiciary, and so do I. I want America to stay on the road that we've set for ourself in the past and which we insist upon following in the future. We're on the right road to the right future in bringing peace to the Middle East, and we'll stay the course, no matter how difficult it might be, in our commitment to justice and peace and to the security and the well-being of Israel.

I hope that when the history books are written about my own administration, that one of the paragraphs there will be that President Jimmy Carter, representing the United States, helped the leaders and the people of Israel and Egypt to find a permanent peace. This is most important for us. Ever since President Truman recognized Israel's independence the very day it was proclaimed in Israel, our two nations have had a special relationship based on a common heritage and a common commitment to ethical and Democratic values. It's in the strategic and the moral interest of the United States of America to have peace in the Mideast and a secure and a peaceful Israel. It's in our interest as well as those of the people of Israel.

We've not been completely successful yet, but our course in the Middle East has

brought the first real peace that that region has known in the 32 years of Israel's existence. There is no turning back. The brave vision of Prime Minister Begin and President Anwar Sadat has been vindicated. The proof is in the almost unbelievable present circumstance, for Ambassadors are exchanged between nations, in meetings between the leaders of those nations in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and also in Alexandria, in airline flights between the two countries on a routine basis, and even the fact that now Israeli visitors or tourists can buy the Jerusalem Post at newsstands in Cairo.

Normalization has begun. It can and it must proceed further. When I went to Jerusalem and to Cairo and to Alexandria, the excitement of the hundreds of thousands of people on the streets were the most vivid testimony to me of the hunger in the hearts and minds of the people of those two great nations for a lasting peace and for justice.

The United States of America is a full partner with Israel and Egypt in the task of extending that peace—extending a genuine peace between Israel and all her neighbors. And I'm also convinced that the people of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and the other nations in the Middle East who are Arab want peace as deeply as do the people of Israel and of Egypt. Some leaders have not yet been convinced, but I'm convinced that the people there want peace.

Together we're engaged in the only negotiation that has ever addressed both Israel's security and the political status of the West Bank and Gaza at the same time on the same agenda. And I'd like to remind you that this was an agenda set by the leaders of the two nations—Israel and Egypt—even before we began the three-way talks that led to Camp David accords and the peace treaty itself. Prime

Minister Begin has assured me that he wants this from the bottom of his heart.

The road will not be easy. I cannot assure you that our country will always agree with every position taken by the Government of Israel. But whatever differences arise, they will never affect our commitment to a secure Israel. There will be no so-called reassessment of support for Israel in a Carter administration.

As Ambassador Evron pointed out to you, when he spoke recently, we have never threatened to slow down or cut off aid to Israel, and I can assure you that we never will. I know from experience and from long and extended negotiations and discussion with the leaders of those two countries that without security for Israel there can be no peace. President Sadat understands this just as clearly, as do I, or as Prime Minister Begin understands it. That's why we moved so quickly in the first few months of my own Presidency to enact a strong antiboycott law.

Such a law, as you know, has been blocked under the Republicans by the Secretaries of State and Treasury. They were afraid it would hurt our relationships, diplomatic and trade relationships with the Arab world. I thought about this. But I decided to go ahead despite these risks, because I knew it was the right thing to do. Now foreigners no longer tell American business leaders where they can do business and with whom. And Secretary Phil Klutznick, the Secretary of Commerce, is making sure that we're going to keep it that way.

The United States Government and myself personally are committed to United Nations Resolution 242, and we will oppose any attempt to change it. The United States Government and I personally oppose an independent Palestinian state, and unless and until they recognize Israel's right to exist and accept Resolution

242 as a basis for peace, we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO. As I have repeatedly stated, it is long past time for an end to terrorism.

Also I know, and have known since my early childhood, the importance of Jerusalem in Jewish history. From the time King David first united the nation of Israel and proclaimed the ancient city of Jerusalem its capital, the Jewish people have drawn inspiration from Jerusalem. I sensed that special feeling myself last year when I stood as President of the United States before the Knesset in Jerusalem. I was there searching for peace in the city of peace. My prayers were answered in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

We're still pursuing with Israel and Egypt the larger peace that all of us seek. In such a peace, Jerusalem should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy places, and we will make certain that the future of Jerusalem can only be determined through agreement with the full concurrence of Israel.

It's important for me to point out to you—because we share an intense interest in this subject—that President Sadat understands perfectly that my positions have been, are now, and will be those that I have just described to you.

I believe in keeping Israel strong, and I'm proud that in the 32 years of Israel's existence, one half the total economic and military aid has been delivered to that great democracy during the brief time that I have been President of the United States. I don't look on this as being kind to Israel, nor as a handout; I look upon it as President of our country as an investment in the security of America.

Ultimately, as all of you know, there is no other path to peace in the Middle East except through negotiation, and those negotiations are difficult, tedious, some-

times contentious. Sometimes there is a delay in progress that causes us all to be frustrated, sometimes almost discouraged. No one who cherishes the goal of peace can allow that course to founder. This is the policy that I will always follow. There will not be one policy for election year and another policy after the election. Exactly the same policy that led to the Camp David accords and to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and an uninterrupted supply of military and economic aid to Israel will continue as long as I am President of the United States.

I shared a common problem with Prime Minister Begin and with President Sadat. As was the case with them, my personal involvement in the Camp David process carried high political risks. No politician likes to have a highly publicized effort for a great achievement and fail. There was certainly no guarantee of success. The differences seemed almost insurmountable. Neither was there any guarantee of success in Jerusalem or Cairo when I went there to remove the obstacles to a peace treaty. I have been personally involved in the peace process because in conscience there is really no choice for me. We simply must continue to move away from war and stalemate to peace and to progress for the people of Israel and for the people of Egypt.

Our efforts were successful in 1978. Our efforts were successful in 1979. If we stay the course, they will be successful in the future. This is a time not for despair, but for a renewed commitment.

This week my personal representative to the peace negotiations, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, has been in the Middle East again, meeting with Prime Minister Begin and then with President Sadat. Once again we've found a way to move towards peace. The talks will resume. And again I will personally join in the search for peace,

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Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1980

if necessary in a summit meeting, which Prime Minister Begin and I discussed on the phone when he called me this morning. He called to express his personal gratitude at the success of the Linowitz mission to the Middle East, and also to express his gratitude at the renewed prospects for progress. As you know, President Sadat has already publicly agreed with this idea of a summit meeting if necessary to ensure success.

We are on the right road in working for peace and in helping to keep Israel secure, and we'll stay on that road in close partnership with our Israeli friends as long as I'm President.

The Mideast peace effort cannot be isolated as an international affair. Closely related to it—and I hope that you will mark my words—we are on the right road also in moving toward energy security in the future. We had to fight for 3 years, as Senator Carl Levin knows, who helped me with this effort, to enact a comprehensive energy program. It's only just begun to work, because the legislation has only just recently been passed. But the benefits are already clear. We're now importing 24 percent less foreign oil than we were when I became President. The first year, 1977, that I was in office, we averaged importing about 8½ million barrels of oil every day. This year we expect that average to have dropped to about 6½ million barrels per day, which means that's a 2 million barrel less purchase of foreign oil every day, because we've moved on energy. But this progress is not a sure thing for the future. The success of this effort depends on the outcome of the election this year.

The new Republican leaders sneer at energy conservation. They say we should do away with the 55-mile speed limit. They say we should do away with the synthetic fuel program. They say we should abolish the windfall profits tax, a

tax on the unearned profits of the big oil companies. And they would like to let the big oil companies keep the money, money that we will use to spur solar energy, coal use, gasohol and to help the poor and the aged pay for the higher cost of fuel to heat their homes.

As an alternative, all they offer is the wan hope that if we just give the oil companies enough money, they'll solve the energy problem for us and maybe help to shape our foreign policy at the same time. We must be very careful about this. The new Republican leaders do not seem to recognize the cost of foreign oil dependence—not just the financial cost, not just the cost in joblessness and inflation, but the foreign policy cost and the national security costs as well. To abandon conservation, to abandon our energy program could be to take the destiny of our Nation out of our own hands and put it in the hands of OPEC. We must not permit that. You should consider very carefully who might be Secretary of Energy or Secretary of State in a different administration next year.

We're on the right road also in rebuilding the cities of America. We've built a tough-minded working partnership between American mayors and the Federal Government and also private industry. You can see and feel the result in cities all over America—a renewed sense of pride and accomplishment and confidence.

When I campaigned for President in 1976 and went into almost any city in this country and talked to the local officials there in the counties and the city governments, there was a sense of discouragement, alienation, and despair. We've not yet been completely successful, but we have started rebuilding the spirit of accomplishment and confidence in our cities. We still have a long way to go and

this program—so successful so far—is not a sure thing for the future. It depends on the outcome of this election.

A gigantic, election-year tax cut promised—Reagan-Kemp-Roth—would deprive us of over a trillion dollars between now and 1987—the financial tools to finish this job, not only in the cities but to meet the social needs of America. The scheme would deal our cities a great blow and would set them back a generation. We simply cannot permit this to happen.

Now our country is ready to build on these kinds of foundations. The economic renewal plan that I announced last week will help us do just that. We will retool American industry and make it more competitive and more innovative and more productive. The results will be more jobs and more stable prices for all the people of our country.

The alternative presented by the new Republican leaders would reignite inflation just as we're beginning to get it under control. The Republican nominee for Vice President once estimated that the scheme that he now advocates, Reagan-Kemp-Roth, would mean an inflation rate of more than 30 percent. This is one free lunch that America simply cannot afford.

We're also on the right road to the right future in meeting challenges from abroad. Before I took office, our military strength slid steadily downward for 8 straight years. We have reversed that trend, to ensure that we'll continue to have the modern conventional forces and the modern strategic forces needed to deter war, to keep our Nation at peace through strength.

We are now moving decisively to increase our security—and also that of our friends—in NATO and in the critical Indian Ocean, and in the Persian Gulf area we are building American strength. The

brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shows how important these efforts are. We're determined to respect the independence of the nations of that area, and we are determined to meet any threats to our vital interests.

At the same time, we will stand by our commitments to control nuclear arms. As long as I'm President, the United States will not initiate a pointless and a dangerous nuclear arms race. We'll continue to work for the control of nuclear weapons. Mutual and balanced nuclear arms control is not some sentimental act of charity. It's not a favor we're doing for some other nation. It's essential to our own national security.

And we're on the right road to promoting human rights. I'll not be swayed from that course. We'll stand firm for human rights at the Review Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Madrid this fall to make sure that the Helsinki agreements are carried out. We'll be fighting for human rights as we did in Belgrade under Secretary Goldberg at the last session.

Because of our strong efforts and the focus of world attention, more than 50,000 Soviet Jews moved last year to freedom in Israel and to the United States. As you know this was the greatest number in history. They found freedom to worship, freedom to rejoice in the cultural and religious traditions of centuries. But in July, last month, less than 2,500 were permitted to emigrate—an annual rate of 30,000—and the rate of new approvals was even lower. This makes our cause more urgent, our resolve more certain, and we will continue to communicate that resolve very clearly to the Soviet leaders.

In closing, let me say that, as President of our country, I try to represent its people. The American people believe in

peace, for ourselves and for our allies whom we love. The American people believe that in order to have peace we must be strong, strong militarily, and we're second to no nation in the world in military strength; that we must be strong politically; that our influence must be extended to others in a benevolent and acceptable way; strong morally, that we do not ever yield from a commitment to the unchanging principles and goals and ideals on which our Nation was founded—a nation committed to freedom and to pride in the future and to the worth of an individual human being, a nation committed to the principle that every person can worship as he or she chooses, and that in diversity, in the plurality of our economy and our social structure, lies not weakness, but strength.

I represent a nation that believes in truth, and sometimes the truth hurts. Sometimes it's a temptation for a political leader in a democracy like ours or like Israel's to mislead the people, because most people want to hear good things. But Americans and Israelis are not afraid to face the facts, and that's part of the strength of our society.

And I represent a people who believe in democracy and openness in letting government differences be exposed, in letting the people of our nations be involved in the debates. We're not afraid of those differences and those debates. We're not afraid to strip away the bark and let people understand the reasons why decisions are made.

Part of our strength as a country is that a President or a Prime Minister—we're not alone. When we speak, we speak for the people, not in spite of the people. And I also represent a country that believes in the future. A country that's not afraid. A country that realizes that we have never made progress the easy way. A country

that knows that we can't find simple solutions to difficult questions and that we cannot waver in our commitment. And that the country must be united. It must be bound together with confidence in our own strength, recognizing the blessings that God's given us, thankful for them and willing to use them for the benefit not only of ourselves but of others.

We would never have been successful in Camp David had it not been for our attention to the future. The last few hours we were there were hours of despair, because we felt that we had failed. As we prepared to leave Camp David Prime Minister Begin sent over a stack of photographs of me and him and President Sadat and asked me if I would simply sign my name. He wanted to give them to his grandchildren. And I had my secretary go and find out from some of the other members of the Israeli delegation the personal names of every one of his grandchildren. And I took a little extra time, and I wrote each name on the photograph and signed it myself. And instead of sending it back to Prime Minister Begin by messenger, I carried it over myself.

We were both discouraged men, because we had reached what seemed to be an impasse. And we stood there on the porch of one of those little cabins at Camp David, and he began to go through the photographs—they were all just alike but had different names—and he told me about each one of his grandchildren and which one he loved the most and which one was closest to him and which one got in trouble, which one was the best student. And I told him about my grandchildren, too. And we began to think about the future and the fact that what we did at Camp David was not just to be looked upon as a political achievement that might bring accolades or congratulations to us. It was not just an investment in peace for

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our own generation; it was an investment in the future.

We share a lot, Prime Minister Begin and I. The people of the democratic world share a lot—a common faith in our own country and its principles and a faith in the worth of other human beings all over the world, even those quite different from us. We believe that there's the same yearning in the hearts of people in every land for freedom, for self-realization, a better life for their children, and a future of peace and security and hope. That's what I want for our country and for the countries that are so important to us, like Israel.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:53 p.m. in the Sheraton Ballroom at the Sheraton-Washington Hotel. In his opening remarks, he referred to Jack J. Spitzer, president of B'nai B'rith International, Grace Day, president of B'nai B'rith Women, and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron.

Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indians of Oregon

*Statement on Signing S. 2055 Into Law.
September 5, 1980*

I am pleased to sign into law S. 2055, an act to establish a reservation for the Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indians of Oregon.

Early in my administration I signed into law the Siletz Indian Restoration Act of 1977, restoring Federal acknowledgment of the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon and making them eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States for Indians. Section 7 of that act provided for the establishment of a reservation for the tribe and required the administration to submit to the Congress

within 2 years a plan for the establishment of the reservation.

S. 2055 reflects this administration's plan and strikes a balance among the interests of the tribe and those of the local community, the State of Oregon, and the Federal Government. Most of the lands to be conveyed to the tribe under the act are timberlands. They also include an important area which would permit the tribe to centralize its facilities and activities in a place to which the tribe has strong historical, cultural, and emotional ties.

All parties involved—officials of the administration, of the tribe, and of the State and local governments of Oregon are to be commended for their fine spirit of cooperation. I want to specially commend Congressman Les AuCoin and Senator Mark Hatfield for their leadership in this endeavor.

It is with pleasure that I sign S. 2055.

NOTE: As enacted, S. 2055 is Public Law 96-340, approved September 5.

United States Attorney Herman Sillas, Jr.

White House Statement. September 5, 1980

There have been a number of press reports about the Department of Justice's recommendations to the President concerning Mr. Herman Sillas, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California. The President's Counsel, Lloyd N. Cutler, has reviewed these recommendations and, together with the Department of Justice, has afforded Mr. Sillas and his counsel a full opportunity to examine the record and submit their comments.

Reagan Bush Committee

901 South Highland Street, Arlington, Virginia 22204 (703) 565-2400

NEWS RELEASE

EMBARGOED UNTIL:

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8:00 p.m. EDT

CONTACT:

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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN
B'NAI B'RITH FORUM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 3, 1980

I know it will come as no surprise to you that I have come to speak to you tonight about the State of Israel, its importance to our own nation and world peace.

But in a sense when I speak of Israel, I speak as well of other concerns of B'nai B'rith and of the entire Jewish community in the United States. Israel is not only a nation--it is a symbol. During my campaign I have spoken of the values of family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom. I made a commitment to it that those values would be at the heart of policy-making in a Reagan Administration. Israel symbolizes those values. What is Israel if not the creation of families, working together to build a place to live and work and prosper in peace and freedom?

In defending Israel's right to exist, we defend the very values upon which our nation is built.

The long agony of Jews in the Soviet Union is, of course, never far from our minds and hearts. All those suffering people ask is that their families get the chance to work where they

choose, in freedom and peace. They will not be forgotten by a Reagan Administration.

But, I must tell you this:

No policy, no matter how heartfelt, no matter how deeply rooted in the humanitarian vision we share, can succeed if the United States of America continues its descent into economic impotence and despair.

Neither the survival of Israel nor the ability of the United States to bring pressure to bear on the situation of dissidents against tyranny can become realistic policy choices if our American economy continues to deteriorate under the Carter policies of high unemployment, taxes and inflation.

The rhetoric of compassion and concern becomes just that, mere words, if not supported by the vision--and reality--of economic growth. The present Administration does not seem to realize this. It seems to believe that if the right kind of words are chosen and repeated often enough, all will be well. Can those who share our humanitarian concerns ignore the connection between economic policy, national strength and the ability to do the work of friendship and justice and peace in our own nation and world?

The theme of this convention, "A Covenant with Tomorrow," speaks directly to the question of American interests and the well-being of Israel. There is no covenant with the future which is not firmly rooted in our covenant with the past. Since the

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rebirth of the State of Israel, there has been an iron-clad bond between that democracy and this one.

That bond is a moral imperative. But the history of relations between states demonstrates that while morality is most frequently given as a motive for actions, the true and abiding motive is self-interest. Well, the touchstone of our relationship with Israel is that a secure, strong Israel is in America's self-interest. Israel is a major strategic asset to America.

Israel is not a client, but a very reliable friend, which is not something that can always be said of the United States today under the Carter Administration.

While we have since 1948 clung to the argument of a moral imperative to explain our commitment to Israel, no Administration has ever deluded itself that Israel was not of permanent strategic importance to America. Until, that is, the Carter Administration which has violated this covenant with the past. Can we now have confidence it will honor a covenant with tomorrow?

The interests of all the world are served by peace and stability in the Middle East. To weaken Israel is to destabilize the Middle East and risk the peace of the world, for the road to world peace runs through the Middle East.

How do we travel that road?

We cannot positively influence events at the perimeters of our power if power—including economic power—at the center is diminished.

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The conduct of this nation's foreign policy in the last four years has been marked by inconsistency and incompetence.

We must have a principled, consistent foreign policy which our people can support, our friends understand, and our adversaries respect. Our policies must be based upon close consultation with our allies.

We require the defensive capability necessary to ensure the credibility of our foreign policy, and the security of our allies and ourselves. There can be no security for one without the other.

Today, under Jimmy Carter, our defensive capability has been so seriously eroded as to constitute not a deterrent but a temptation.

This is not a campaign issue, it is a matter of grave national concern; indeed so grave that the President considers it a liability to his personal political fortunes. He has tried to give the appearance of responding to it. But the half-hearted measures he proposes are clearly inadequate to the task.

We must restore the vital margin of safety which this Administration has allowed to erode, maintaining a defense capability our adversaries will view as credible and that our allies can rely upon.

As an ally of the United States, Israel must have the means to remain strong and secure. Over the years, the United States has provided economic and defense assistance, and a Reagan Administration will maintain this traditional commitment.

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In 1976, Candidate Jimmy Carter came before this convention and said: "I have called for closer ties with our traditional allies, and stronger ties with the State of Israel. I have stressed," he said, "the necessity for a strong defense--tough and muscular, and adequate to maintain freedom under any conceivable circumstances."

One wonders, did the candidate listen to his own call? Today we have fewer real allies and, among those, we speak with diminished authority. Our relations with Israel are marked by doubt and distrust. Israel today is in grave danger, and so is freedom itself.

In 1976, Jimmy Carter declared that he would seek what he called a "comprehensive settlement" in the Middle East. What this might mean for Israel and how this might be achieved were questions neither asked nor answered.

The comprehensive agreement which Mr. Carter sought required, first, a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Israel was amenable to this step. Her adversaries agreed conditionally. But, the conditions were that the Palestine Liberation Organization be represented and that Israel effectively agree in advance of negotiation to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, which were in fact armistice lines resulting from the first effort to destroy the State of Israel. Israel rightly refused these conditions and was promptly accused of intransigence. Can we believe that Mr. Carter is not still in favor of dealing with the P.L.O. and desirous of forcing the terms of a settlement?

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Mr. Carter invited the Soviet Union to join him in his effort to force Israel to accept the mockery of negotiations in Geneva. Before that, it had required a major effort to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East peace process. In October, 1977, Mr. Carter invited them back in free of charge, and they graciously accepted. The Carter Administration presented as a major achievement the conclusion of a joint Soviet-American accord which would have given the Russians a stranglehold on negotiations, as well as a convenient calling card for inserting themselves more deeply into the Middle East.

This seriously disturbed President Sadat. The President of Egypt did not share Mr. Carter's appreciation of the Soviets, and he came to the conclusion which other world leaders, including Mr. Brezhnev, have now reached: Mr. Carter is incapable of distinguishing between his own short-term political interests, and the nation's long-term foreign policy interests. Mr. Carter professed not to understand what all the fuss was about.

The result was that the United States Government, for the first time in the history of the rebirth of Israel, found itself on the outside looking in. President Sadat made his courageous trip to Jerusalem at the invitation of Prime Minister Begin, and bilateral peace process began. Without, let me re-emphasize, the participation of Mr. Carter. The quick foreign policy success that Carter had hoped to achieve turned instead into another major foreign policy blunder.

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What we do or fail to do in the Middle East is of vital importance not only to the peoples of the region, but also to the security of our country, our Atlantic and Pacific allies, Africa, China, and the Asian subcontinent.

Because of the weak and confused leadership of Jimmy Carter, we are approaching a flashpoint in this tragic process, with Soviet power now deployed in a manner which directly threatens Iran, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; with Soviet forces and proxy forces building up again in the region; with Soviet fleets and air bases emplaced along the sea lanes on which we and our Allies and the entire free world depend.

In spite of this I am confident that if we act with vigor, vision and practical good sense, we can peacefully blunt this Soviet thrust. We can rely upon responsible Arab leaders in time to learn what Anwar Sadat learned, which is that no people can long endure the cost of Soviet patronage.

How we deal with Israel and her neighbors in this period will determine whether we rebuild the peace process or whether we continue to drift. But let it be clear that the cornerstone of our effort and of our interest is a secure Israel, and our mutual objective is peace.

While we can help the nations of that area move toward peace we should not try to force a settlement upon them.

Our diplomacy must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns all in the area. Before a negotiated peace can ever hope to

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command the loyalty of the whole region, it must be acceptable Israelis and Arabs alike.

Most important, we must rebuild our lost reputation for trustworthiness. We must again become a nation that can be relied upon to live up to its commitments.

In 1976, Candidate Jimmy Carter said: "I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France have poured arms into certain Arab countries--five or six times more than Israel receives."

But it was Mr. Carter who agreed to sell sixty F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. To get the Congress to go along, he assured these aircraft would not have certain offensive capabilities. Now, the Secretary of Defense tells us he cannot say whether the commitment to Congress will be honored.

It was Mr. Carter who agreed to sell one hundred main battle tanks to Jordan.

It was Mr. Carter who agreed to provide U.S. licensed turbine engines for Iraqi warships.

Meanwhile, Israel is being increasingly isolated by international terrorism and by U.N. resolutions designed to undermine Israel's position in the world while Carter stands by and watches.

I was appalled to see the Carter Administration abstain from voting on, rather than veto, the Resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council two weeks ago, totally disregarding the Democratic Platform promises of 1976 and 1980. As I stated then that Resolution not only undermines progress toward peace by

putting the United Nations on record against Israel and on one side of the sensitive issue of the status of Jerusalem; it also presumes to order other nations—including our Dutch ally—to move their embassies from Jerusalem.

I believe this sorry episode sheds some light on an earlier action by Jimmy Carter concerning another U.N. resolution, voted on in March this year. On March 1st, the Carter Administration failed to veto a mischievous U.N. resolution condemning Israel's presence in Jerusalem, calling it an "occupation." That was the position of the Carter Administration on Saturday. Two days later, on a Monday, reacting to the public outcry, Jimmy Carter put the blame for this outrage on his Secretary of State and reversed the position of the Administration.

The man who asks "trust me," zigzags and flip-flops in ever more rapid gyrations, trying to court favor with everyone: Israel, the P.L.O., the voting bloc in the United Nations and the voters at home. On March 1st, it took the Carter Administration three days to switch positions. On August 20th, it took only three minutes. Secretary of State Muskie condemned the U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem in a long speech that was for the voters in this country. Minutes later, he abstained instead of vetoing the U.N. Resolution. That was for the P.L.O. and their friends.

This is the Carter record on the Middle East. Arab leaders are persuaded that we don't say what we mean. Israel is persuaded that we don't mean what we say. How do we build productive relations with either side on such a basis?

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Before we can act with authority abroad, we have to demonstrate our ability to make domestic policy without asking permission of other governments.

Mr. Carter sent an emissary to Saudi Arabia to ask for permission to store petroleum here in our own country--a strategic reserve vital to our national security and long demanded by Congress. The Saudis, predictably, said no. Mr. Carter halted the stockpiling.

Can we have relations with our friends in the Arab world if those relations are built on contempt for us?

Clear away the debris of the past four years, and the following issues remain to test the good faith of the Arab nation and of Israel, and to challenge our national will and diplomatic skill in helping them to shape a peace.

There is the unresolved question of territorial rights resulting from the 1967 war.

There is the status of Jerusalem which is part of the first question.

There is the matter of refugees.

There is the matter of the P.L.O., which I consider distinct from the matter of the refugees.

The question of territory, putting aside Jerusalem for the moment, must still be decided in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We will tolerate no effort to supersede those Resolutions. We must weigh the future utility of the Camp David accords against that position.

There are basic ambiguities in the documents Camp David produced, both in the links between the Israeli-Egyptian peace, and in the provisions for an autonomous regime in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These ambiguities have now brought negotiations to a dangerous impasse.

Let us remember that an autonomous Palestinian Arab regime for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was an Israeli proposal--a major concession on Israel's part in the interest of progress toward peace.

Negotiations between Israel and Jordan could result in long and creative steps toward resolving these problems. Israel and Jordan are the two Palestinian states envisioned and authorized by the United Nations. Jordan is now recognized as sovereign in some 80 percent of the old territory of Palestine. Israel and Jordan are the parties primarily authorized to settle the future of the unallocated territories, in accordance with the principles of the Mandate and the provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Thus, the autonomy plan called for in the Camp David Agreements must be interpreted in accordance with the two Security Council Resolutions, which remain the decisive and authoritative rules governing the situation. The Camp David Agreements cannot and should not lead to fundamental changes in the security position, or to the withdrawals of Israeli troops, until Jordan and other neighbors make peace.

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Jerusalem has been a source of man's spiritual inspiration since King David founded it. Its centrality to Jewish life is known to all.

Now it exists as a shared trust. The holy places of all faiths are protected and open to all. More than this, each is under the care and control of representatives of the respective faiths. Unlike the days prior to 1967, Jerusalem is now and will continue to be one city, undivided, with continuing free access for all. That is why I disagree with the cynical actions of the Carter Administration in pledging to preserve the status of Jerusalem in its party platform and its undercutting Israel and Jerusalem by abstaining on a key U.N. vote. I believe the problem of Jerusalem can be solved by men of good will as part of a permanent settlement. The immediate problem is to make it easier for men of good will to come to the peace table.

President Carter refuses to brand the P.L.O. as a terrorist organization.

I have no hesitation in doing so.

We live in a world in which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas, or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

The P.L.O. is said to represent the Palestinian refugees. It represents no one but the leaders who established it as a means of organizing aggression against Israel. The P.L.O. is kept under tight control in every state in the area except Lebanon, which it has effectively destroyed. As for those it purports to represent when any Palestinian breathes a word about peace to Israel, he is an immediate target for assassination. The P.L.O. has murdered more Palestinians than it has Israelis.

This nation made an agreement with Israel in 1975 concerning its relations with the P.L.O.

This Administration has violated that agreement.

We are concerned not only with whether the P.L.O. renounces its charter calling for the destruction of Israel, we are equally concerned with whether it is truly representative of the Palestinian people. If we can be satisfied on both counts, then we will not be dealing with the P.L.O. as we know it, but a quite different organization, one truly representative of those Arab Palestinians dedicated to peace and not to the establishment of Soviet satellite in the heart of the Middle East.

Finally, the question of Arab Palestinian refugees.

My analysis of this tragic situation begins with the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948. Let me read the relevant paragraph:

"We appeal--in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months--to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and to participate with us in the

upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions."

Tragically, this appeal was rejected. People left their land and their homes confident Israel would be destroyed in a matter of days and they could return. Israel was not destroyed and the refugee problem is with us today.

One solution to this refugee problem could be assimilation in Jordan, designated by the U.N. as the Arab Palestinian state.

In the final analysis, this or some other solution must be found as part of a peace settlement. The Psalms speak to our concerns, for they encompass all that we strive for. They are a vision of our ideals, of the goal to which we strive with constancy, dedication and faith. They embrace our hopes for a just, lasting peace in the Middle East and our hopes that the works of justice and mercy be done at home:

...May our garners be full,

affording every kind of store;...

May there be no breach in the walls,

no exile, no outcry in our streets.

Happy the people for whom things are thus;

It is given to us to see that this vision is never lost, its message never forgotten, that the work of peace and justice and freedom goes on, inspired by our values, guided by our faith and made permanent by our commitment.

* * * * *

MIDDLE EAST -Reagan

"It is questionable whether under Reagan the Camp David accords would have happened, or whether they would have much of a future."

"...I would not like to see...the United States try to impose a settlement on the Middle East problems. I think we should stand ready to help wherever we can be of help, and whenever, in both the factions there, in arriving at a peaceful settlement -- but we should not, as the great power, go in and attempt to dictate or impose the settlements."

Clifford Evans Interview
RKO General Broadcasting
April 10, 1980

In a related incident, Reagan denied that he had promised Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal that, if elected, he would seek a "comprehensive peace settlement" as Ambassador Ghorbal claimed. (Washington Star, June 18, 1980)

Bush

"The Palestinian question is best resolved by progress in that area without the U.S. dictating or indicating what it needs to be. The U.S. should keep close relations with Jordan. It is in our interests to do so. We should improve relations with the moderate Arab countries, while keeping a commitment to Israel, because my perception is that the Arab countries in the Gulf area are much more concerned about our lack of commitment and our lack of credibility in foreign policy overall...They are much more concerned about that than the Begin-Sadat accords, which they don't support. To be honest with you, I was as skeptical as the devil as to whether Carter could get anything out of the Begin-Sadat thing in the first place. I saw that happen, so I'm not about to say this thing has totally broken down. The U.S. has a role as a catalyst..."

New York, NY. Village Voice
December 17, 1978

Bush

"I believe in keeping our commitments with Israel. I would argue with Carter about pulling back from those commitments.

"We can't be in the position of trading off the security of an ally in the hopes of economic advantage during our energy crisis.

"We don't need troops in the Middle East but we need to inject naval power and we need to restore the Naval budget which Carter cut."

Elgin, IL, Daily Courier News
December 2, 1979

Bush

"We must not appear to trade off a commitment to an ally for economic gain, or, in this instance the price of oil. The appearance of that transcends Middle East politics and gets into my whole argument with Carter foreign policy; that we don't keep commitments. We are pulling back. We are vacillating."

ABC Issues and Answers
October 21, 1979

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 14, 1979.

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in United States banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to insure that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in an orderly manner.

The order does not affect accounts of persons other than the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved cannot be ascertained at this time, but there is no reason for disturbance in the foreign exchange or other markets.

The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

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PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 53
OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

9:00 P.M. EST
NOVEMBER 28, 1979
WEDNESDAY

The East Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: For the last 24 days our nation's concern has been focused on our fellow Americans being held hostage in Iran. We have welcomed some of them home to their families and their friends. But we will not rest nor deviate from our efforts until all have been freed from their imprisonment and their abuse. We hold the Government of Iran fully responsible for the well-being and the safe return of every single person.

I want the American people to understand the situation as much as possible, but there may be some questions tonight which I cannot answer fully because of my concern for the well-being of the hostages.

First of all, I would like to say that I am proud of this great nation, and I want to thank all Americans for their prayers, their courage, their persistence, their strong support and patience. During these past days our national will, our courage, and our maturity have all been severely tested and history will show that the people of the United States have met every test.

In the days to come our determination may be even more sorely tried but we will continue to defend the security, the honor, and the freedom of Americans everywhere. This nation will never yield to blackmail.

For all Americans our constant concern is the well-being and the safety of our fellow citizens who are being held illegally and irresponsibly hostage in Iran. The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world.

For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism, for a government actually to support and in effect participate in the taking and the holding of hostages is unprecedented in human history. This violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law, but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity. There is no recognized religious faith on earth which condones kidnapping. There is no recognized religious faith on earth which condones blackmail. There is certainly no religious faith on earth which condones the sustained abuse of innocent people.

We are deeply concerned about the inhuman and degrading conditions imposed on the hostages. From every corner of the world

END

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nations and people have voiced their strong revulsion and condemnation of Iran, and have joined us in calling for the release of the hostages.

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Last night a statement of support was released and was issued by the President of the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, on behalf of all of its members. We expect a further Security Council meeting on Saturday night, at which more firm and official action may be taken to help in obtaining the release of the American hostages.

Any claims raised by government officials of Iran will ring hollow while they keep innocent people bound, and abused, and threatened. We hope that this exercise of diplomacy and international law will bring a peaceful solution, because a peaceful solution is preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

At the same time, we pursue such a solution with grim determination. The government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created, and the grave consequences which will result if harm comes to any of the hostages.

I want the American people to know, and I want the world to know, that we will persist in our efforts, through every means available, until every single American has been freed. We must also recognize now, as we never have before, that it is our entire nation which is vulnerable, because of our overwhelming and excessive dependence on oil from foreign countries. We have got to accept the fact that this dependence is a direct, physical threat to our national security. And we must join together to fight for our nation's energy freedom.

We know the ways to win this war: more American energy, and the more efficient use of what we have. The United States Congress is now struggling with this extremely important decision. The way to victory is long and difficult, but we have the will, and we have the human and the natural resources of our great nation. However hard it might be to see into the future, one thing tonight is clear: we stand together.

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We stand as a nation unified, a people determined to protect the life and the honor of every American. And we are determined to make America an energy secure nation once again. It is unthinkable that we will allow ourselves to be dominated by any form of over-dependence at home, or any brand of terrorism abroad. We are determined that the freest nation on earth shall protect and enhance its freedom.

I will be glad to answer questions.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. President, the Ayatollah Khomeini said the other day, and I am using his words, that he doesn't believe you have the guts to use military force. He puts no credibility in our military deterrent. I am wondering how do we get out of this mess in Iran and still retain credibility with our allies and with our adversaries overseas?

THE PRESIDENT: We have the full support of our allies, and in this particular instance we have no adversaries overseas. There is no civilized country on earth which has not condemned the seizure and holding of hostages by Iran. It would not be advisable for me to explore publicly all of the options open to our country. As I said earlier, I am determined to do the best I can through diplomatic means and through peaceful means to insure the safety of our hostages and their release. Other actions which I might decide to take would come in the future after those peaceful means have been exhausted.

But I believe that the growing condemnation of the world community on Iran will have a beneficial effect.

QUESTION: Mr. President, why did you reverse your policy and permit the Shah to come into this country when, one, medical treatment was available elsewhere, two, you had been warned by our Charge that the Americans might be endangered in Tehran and three, the Bazargan government was so shaky that it was questionable whether he could deliver on the promise to protect our embassy, and last of all, in view of the consequences do you regret the decision?

THE PRESIDENT: No, the decision that I made personally and without pressure from anyone to carry out the principles of our country, to provide for the means of giving the Shah necessary medical assistance to save his life, was proper. At the same time we notified the government of Iran. We were assured by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that our embassy would be protected, and it was protected for several days, in spite of threats from outside.

Then peremptorily, after Khomeini made an aggravating speech to the crowds in the street and withdrew protection from the embassy, it was attacked successfully. The embassy was protected by our people for the length of time possible without help from the host government. No embassy on earth is a fortress that can withstand constant attacks by a mob unless a host government comes to the rescue of the people within the embassy.

But I took the right decision. I have no regrets about

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it nor apologies to make because it did help to save a man's life and it was compatible with the principles of our country.

QUESTION: Mr. President, we appear to be in a rather dangerous period of international tension and volatility, especially in the Islamic world, and it comes at a time when we are about to embark on our quadrennial election campaign, with all that that will bring. Have you given any thought to whether following examples of other national emergencies it may be wise to try to mute the political fall-out of this by trying to bring opponents in and outside of your party into some kind of emergency coalition for this purpose?

THE PRESIDENT: We have attempted to keep the political leaders in our nation informed, both publicly and through other channels. We have given frequent briefings, for instance, on the Hill, both to the members of the Senate and to the House. We have encouraged all of those who have become announced candidates for president to restrain their comments which might be misconstrued overseas and to have a maximum degree of harmony among those who might be spokesmen for our country.

I myself, in order to stay close to the scene here where constantly changing events could be handled by me as President, have eliminated the major portion of political oriented activities.

I don't think the identity of the Islamic world is a factor. We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and for all those who share the Moslem faith. I might say that so far as I know, all of the Islamic nations have joined us in condemning the activities and the actions of the government of Iran. So I don't think religious divisions are a factor here at all.

But I will have to continue to restrict my own political activities and call on those who might be opposing me in the future for president to support my position as President and to provide unity for our country and for our nation in the eyes of those who might be looking for some sign of weakness or division in order to perpetuate their abuse of our hostages.

MORE

QUESTION: What can the U. S. do now, what can it do to prevent future incidents of the nature of Iran? How can you satisfy the public demand to end such embarrassment?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is an unprecedented and unique occurrence. Down through history, we have had times when some of our people were captured by terrorists or who were abused, and they have obviously been instances of international kidnapping which occurred for the discomfort of a people or a Government.

So far as I know, this is the first time that such an activity has been encouraged by and supported by the Government itself. And, I don't anticipate this kind of thing recurring.

We have taken steps already in view of the disturbances in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf regions to guard our people more closely, to provide them with a higher degree of security, and to make arrangements with the host Government to provide assistance if it is needed in the fastest possible way.

Many other nations have reduced severely the number of people overseas. I think that one of the points that should be made is that a year ago, we had 70,000 Americans in Iran. Seventy thousand. There were literally thousands of people who were killed in the Iranian Revolution, from all nations.

We were able to extract Americans from Iran safely. It was a superb demonstration of cooperation and good conduct on the part of the State Department and other American officials. So, there will be disturbances in the future, but I think we are well protected as we possibly can be without withdrawing into a shell from protecting American interests in nations overseas.

My own experience, so far, has been that the leaders of Nations have recommitted themselves to provide security for Embassies of all countries. I think we have learned a lesson from this instance. But, because it is so unique, in the high degree of irresponsibility, of the Iranian Government leaders, I don't believe that we will see another recurrence of it any time soon.

QUESTION: Mr. President, Former Secretary Kissinger has criticized your administration in handling the situation in Iran. He has suggested and that it came about because, partly because of the perceived weakness in American policy and that you have further damaged America's image as a result.

How do you respond?

THE PRESIDENT: I would rather not respond. There is no reason for me to get into a public debate at this time with former Secretary Kissinger about who is, or who is not responsible for the events that took place in Iran. Obviously, what has occurred cannot have been predicted.

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And, for 30 years, our country has had a relationship with a fairly stable Government there. The changes took place very rapidly. So far as I know, no one on this earth predicted them.

And, I think it is not becoming at this moment, and not conducive to better American understanding to get involved in answering allegations that I or someone else may have been culpable and may have caused a further aggravation of a very difficult situation.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what role did the former Secretary play in your decision to permit the shah to enter the country?

THE PRESIDENT: None. I did not hear at all from the former Secretary Kissinger, nor did he contact Secretary Vance at any time during the days when we were deciding that the shah should come in the United States for medical care to save his life. In previous weeks and months, since the shah was deposed, Secretary Kissinger and many others let it be known that they thought that we should provide a haven for the shah. But Secretary Kissinger played no role in my decision to permit the shah to come in for medical treatment.

MOPE

QUESTION: Speaking of the Shah, if he is well enough to travel, would you like him to leave the country?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a decision to be made by the Shah, and by his medical advisors. When he decided to come to our country, with my permission, I was informed then, and I have been informed since, that as soon as his medical treatment was successfully completed, that his intention was to leave. I have not encouraged him to leave; he was free to come here for medical treatment, and he will leave on his own volition.

QUESTION: Yes, I would like to follow up Mr. Schorr's question. The consequences of the crisis in Iran is drifting the United States into almost a cold war with the Islamic countries. Watching TV news for 25 days, Americans soon will believe the whole Moslem world is hating them. Moreover, they are not told that the Shiites are very minor minority among the population of the Islamic world, because the majority is Sunni. Don't you think you get any help from any Islamic countries, and what will your policy be toward Islamic countries under these circumstances?

THE PRESIDENT: The premise of your question is completely wrong. We are not approaching any sort of cold war with the Islamic countries. So far as I know, every Islamic country has condemned Iran for its capture of our hostages, and has been very supportive.

This includes Moslem nations which, in the past, have not been close friends of ours: Iraq, Libya, and others. So I don't see this as a confrontation at all between our nation and the Islamic world. It is certainly not part of the Islamic faith to condone, as I said earlier, blackmail or the persecution or harm of innocent people; or kidnapping or terrorism.

So I think that we have a very good relationship with the people and the governments of the Islamic world, and I don't think it has deteriorated in this instance. In some ways we have been drawn closer to these people, because they see what has occurred in Iran as something of a disgrace for their own religious faith, and they don't see this as typical of what Moslems believe.

I might add also, that this is not typical of the Shiite faith either. It is the misguided actions of a few people in Iran who are burning with hatred and a desire for revenge, completely contrary to the teachings of the Moslem faith.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, there is a feeling of hostility throughout the country towards Iran, because of the hostages. Senator Long said that the taking of our embassy in Iran, in his words, is an act of war. There are rumors, since denied, that our Navy has been called up for service. I ask you, as our Commander in Chief: is war possible, is war thinkable?

THE PRESIDENT: It would be a mistake for the people of our country to have aroused within them hatred toward anyone; not against the people of Iran, and certainly not against Iranians who may be in our country as our guests. We certainly do not want to be guilty of the same violation of human decency and basic human principles that have proven so embarrassing to many of the Iranian citizens themselves.

We obviously prefer to see our hostages protected and released completely through peaceful means. That is my deepest commitment, and that will be my goal. The United States has other options available to it which will be considered, depending upon the circumstances. But I think it would not be well-advised for me to speak of those specifically tonight.

QUESTION: Mr. President, we have had 55,000 Iranian students in this country. We have been very good to them, very hospitable. Even the new Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia was a student who once demonstrated in Washington against law and order. Shouldn't we be very careful in letting any of these students come in here? Shouldn't we screen them in the future, and make them agree that they will not demonstrate?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is very difficult for an Iranian citizen or a student to get a visa at the American embassy in Iran at this time. (Laughter.) And I think the influx of Iranians to our country now would be minimal.

I am determined to enforce the law in regard to Iranian students. Some of them have violated the law; they are now being screened, they are being assessed in their commitment and the legality of their presence here. We have already finished this procedure with more than 22,000. About 17,000 have proven to be here completely legally, and are indeed full-time students. Among the other 5,000, about several hundred have already departed. Others are now having to prove that, contrary to the earliest evidence, they do indeed have a right to be in our country. If they are here illegally, they will be expelled. There is one exception to that rule: if a citizen of Iran can prove that if he or she returned to Iran that they would be executed or abused because of their political beliefs, they can seek asylum here. And if that asylum in our judgment is justified, we will provide it for them. But this procedure is going forward in accordance with American law, in accordance with American fairness, in accordance with the full principles of the United States Constitution.

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QUESTION: Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Can this crisis go on indefinitely or ought the Ayatollah Khomeini to understand that at some point the American people may demand and other nations may expect that you move forward to resolve it by whatever means you find necessary?

THE PRESIDENT: It would not be possible or even advisable for me to set a deadline about when or if I would take certain action in the future. This is an ever-present consideration on my mind. I am carrying out all of the duties that normally fall on a President's shoulder, which are adequate, but I never forget one moment that I am awake about the hostages whose lives and whose safety depend on me, and I am pursuing every possible avenue to have the hostages released.

Any excessive threats or any excessive belief among the Iranians that they will be severely damaged by military action as long as these negotiations are proceeding and as long as legalities can be followed, might cause the death of the hostages which we are committed to avoid. So that is one of the questions that I cannot answer, to set down a certain deadline beyond which we would take extra action that might result in the harm or the death of the hostages.

We are proceeding, I guarantee you, in every possible way, every possible moment, to get the hostages freed and at the same time protect the honor and the integrity and the basic principles of our country. That is all I can do. But I am doing it to the best of my ability and I believe we will be successful.

QUESTION: Mr. President, many Americans view the Iranian situation as one in a succession of events that proves that this country's power is declining. How can you assure Americans tonight that our power is not declining abroad and how are you reassessing priorities for the eighties in terms of foreign policy?

THE PRESIDENT: The United States has neither the ability nor the will to dominate the world, to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, to impose our will on other people whom we desire to be free, to make their own decisions. This is not part of the commitment of the United States.

Our country is the strongest on earth. We are the strongest militarily, politically, economically, and I think we are the strongest morally and ethically. Our country has made great strides, even since I have been in office. I have tried to correct some of the defects that did exist. We have strengthened the military alliances of our country, for instance. NATO now has a new spirit, a new confidence, a new cohesion, improving its military capabilities, much more able to withstand any threat from the east, from the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, than it was before.

We have espoused again the principles that unite Americans and make us admired throughout the world, raising the banner of human rights. We are going to keep it high. We have opened up avenues of communication, understanding, trade with people that formerly were our enemies or excluded us -- several nations in Africa, the vast people and the vast country of the People's Republic of China.

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In doing so we have not alienated any of our previous friends. I think our country is strong within itself. There is not an embarrassment now about our government which did exist in a few instances in years gone by. So I don't see at all that our country has become weak. We are strong and we are getting stronger, not weaker.

But if anybody thinks that we can dominate other people with our strength, military or political strength or economic strength, they are wrong. That is not the purpose of our country.

Our inner strength, our confidence in ourselves, I think, is completely adequate. I believe that the unity that the American people have shown in this instance, their patience, is not at all a sign of weakness. It is a sign of sure strength.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, serious charges have been placed against the shah concerning the repression of his own people and the misappropriation of his nation's funds. Is there an appropriate vehicle to investigate those charges and do you foresee a time when you would direct your administration to assist in that investigation?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know of any international forum within which charges have ever been brought against a deposed leader who has left his country. There have been instances of changing governments down through the centuries in history and I don't know of any instance where such a leader who left his country after his government fell has been tried in an international court or in an international forum. This is a matter that can be pursued. It should be pursued under international law, and if there is a claim against the shah's financial holdings there is nothing to prevent other parties from going into the courts in accordance with a law of a nation or internationally and seeking a redress of grievances which they claim.

But as I said earlier, I don't think there is any forum that will listen to the Iranians make any sort of claim, justified or not, as long as they hold against their will and abuse the hostages in complete contravention to every international law and every precept or every commitment or principle of humankind.

MR. JACKSON (AP): Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

END

(AT 9:30 P.M. EST)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 5, 1979

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT

BY

THE VICE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

(12:01 P.M. EST)

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Over the past several weeks we have been hearing a drumfire of propaganda out of Tehran, some of it from people calling themselves students, some of it from the government-controlled radio and television in Iran, and some of it from various officials or people in authority. The message is very clear. It says over and over that the world and the American people should ignore the hostages, forget about the innocent people bound hand and foot, overlook the continued outrage to law and standards of human behavior. We are told to forget all that and focus on the hatred of one man.

We are not going to forget and the American people are not going to get their priorities confused. How are our hostages being treated? The facts are there for all to see, and the simple fact is that 50 human beings are being held in inhuman conditions, contrary to all civilized standards, in order to prove a political point. They are not permitted regular visitors. They are isolated and not allowed to speak except to their captors. As far as we know, the hostages have not been allowed to receive mail or messages. There has never been a systematic accounting of the numbers and welfare of the hostages.

The so-called "students" have not permitted any outside observers even to see these people for 10 days. They are refusing to let international organizations such as the Red Cross into the compound. They refuse visits by religious organizations. They refuse representatives of neutral states. Even prisoners of war are guaranteed certain standards of human treatment. But these standards are being dragged in the dirt every day by a group of kidnappers with the acquiescence of the government.

We are hearing daily propaganda about the alleged crimes of our people in Tehran, most of whom volunteered to serve their country at a difficult and dangerous time. We are not and will not respond to that propaganda. I would note that one of those being held as a so-called "spy" in Tehran is in fact a private American citizen who simply happened to be visiting the Embassy on business at the time of the attack on November 4. It was many days before we even learned, indirectly, that he was being held. That man, like the rest, has now been held for 31 days, tied up, denied contact with his family, denied exercise, denied access even to the comfort of religion.

We hear a great deal about the crimes of the shah, but that is not the issue. The issue which disturbs the American people is that 50 of our fellow citizens are being abused in violation of international

MORE

(OVER)

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law. These are our brothers and sisters.

Yesterday the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which called as the first most important priority, as it should, for the release of the American hostages. That is the issue. It is the only issue, and we are not going to forget they must be set free.

END

(AT 12:05 P.M. EST)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 7, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Ever since Iranian terrorists imprisoned American embassy personnel in Tehran early in November, these 50 men and women -- their safety, their health and their future -- have been our central concern. We have made every effort to obtain their release on honorable, peaceful and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians have refused to release them or to improve the conditions under which they are being held captive.

The events of the last few days have revealed a new and significant dimension of this matter. The militants controlling the embassy have stated they are willing to turn the hostages over to the Government of Iran, but the Government has refused to take custody of them. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the illegal and outrageous holding of the innocent. The Government itself can no longer escape responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the embassy.

It must be made clear that the failure to release the hostages will involve increasingly heavy costs to Iran and its interests. I have today ordered the following steps:

- (1) The United States is breaking diplomatic relations with Iran. The Secretary of State has informed the Government of Iran that its embassy and consulates in the United States are to be closed immediately. The Iranian diplomatic and consular personnel have been declared persona non grata and must leave the country by midnight tomorrow.
- (2) The Secretary of the Treasury will immediately put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports from the U.S. to Iran in accordance with the sanctions approved by ten members of the United Nations Security Council on January 13, in the resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Although shipment of food and medicine were not included in the U.N. Security Council vote, it is expected that exports of even these items to Iran will be minimal or non-existent.
- (3) The Secretary of the Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order, and of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting will aid in designing a claims program against Iran for the hostages, their families and other U.S. claimants. We are preparing legislation to facilitate processing and paying these claims.
- (4) The Secretary of State and the Attorney General will invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States effective today. We will not reissue visas or

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issue new visas except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest requires. This directive will be interpreted very strictly.

The United States has acted with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis. We have supported Secretary General Waldheim's activities under the U.N. Security Council mandate to work for a peaceful solution. We will continue to consult with our allies and other friendly governments on the steps we are taking and on additional measures which may be required.

I am committed to resolving this crisis. I am committed to the safe return of the hostages and the preservation of our national honor. The hostages and their families and all of us in America have lived with the reality and the anguish of their captivity for five months.

The steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other action may be necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 25, 1980

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON
HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT

The Oval Office

(7:00 A.M. EST)

THE PRESIDENT: Late yesterday, I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive there since November 4th.

Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

HOPE

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However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interest and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties, but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now. We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Thank you very much.

END

(7:07 A.M. EST)

IRANReagan

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Sept. 9, Reuter -

Republican Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan said today the way to deal with the hostage situation in Iran was to give the Iranian government an ultimatum.

Speaking at a street corner rally here, Mr. Reagan said the U.S. Government should send a private message saying: "We want our people back and we want them back today or the results will be very unpleasant."

Mr. Reagan, who is on a campaign swing through the country's industrial states, did not specify what reprisals he had in mind if the Iranian government did not comply.

He said the Carter Administration "Is responsible for the situation that brought about the taking of the hostages in the first place."

* * *

Mr. Reagan said the United States should have stood by the late Shah before he was forced from power by the revolution led by religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

After the Shah was overthrown, the Carter Administration should have evacuated the U.S. Embassy in Teheran or strengthened its guard, he added.

Instead, he charged, Mr. Carter ordered that weapons be taken away from the U.S. Marines guarding the Embassy.

President Carter told a press conference after the embassy was seized that it would have been futile for the Marine Guards to have tried to resist.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Street Corner Rally
September 9, 1980

Reagan

In reference to the fall of the Shah of Iran, Reagan vaguely asserted the revolution somehow could have been averted.

"I believe there was a time this revolt (against the Shah's government) could have been halted. I can't tell you exactly how. But I think it could have been done."

San Francisco Chronicle
November 15, 1979

Bush

"Do you know that only recently did Jimmy Carter talk about 53 hostages instead of 50? Three of them are held by the government. they could turn those people loose, take them out to the Tehran Airport and send them home today. And in addition to that, you have these terrorists that they call students, and so I just think that nothing's risk free. You're dealing with people that have total disrespect for international law. And I would say nothing is risk free. And that's a tough decision for the President. But he'll have my support if he goes -- tightens up."

NBC Meet the Press
April 20, 1980

Bush

"But I know enough about it (the Iranian situation) to know that somewhere between sending in the Marines and sitting there doing nothing, as United States of America, is a need. And that's what I'm talking about paramilitary."

NBC Meet the Press
April 20, 1980

Bush

"I've been a severe critic of Carter's weak foreign policy, but this is no time for bipartisan criticism. Potential candidates must act responsibly.

"If you study the hostage situation psychology, the longer they stay alive, the better their chances for freedom.

"When this is all over with and the hostages are free, I will have a clearer perspective and will make a statement at that time. Until then, I support the President."

"We ought to have standby plans, of course, but I assume the President has such plans."

Elgin, IL, Daily Courier
News, December 2, 1979

Bush

"Obviously the United States should act, and act in a definitive way to let tyrants around the world know they can't brutalize American citizens (as in Iran)."

Keene, NH, Sentinel
November 26, 1979

Bush

"You'll hear plenty about it when this crisis (in Iran) is over. You're not dealing with rationality here. I would put the lives of the hostages ahead of your understanding, at this moment, the intricacies of my foreign policy.

"Sometimes you have to resist the temptation to unload and act more responsibly... I'm not the President of the United States. I would forgo political advantage, even if it means you won't vote for me."

UPI release
November 26, 1979

Bush

"By God, if they (American hostages in Iran) get harmed I want to see some action. I don't want us to act like a third class power."

Boston, MA, Globe
November 27, 1979

Carter

"One very immediate and pressing objective that is uppermost on our minds and those of the American people is the release of our hostages in Iran.

"We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution or the people of Iran. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in the region. We are prepared to work with the government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship.

"But that will not be possible so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostage, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful diplomatic and economic steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. This reflects the deep respect of our Nation for the rule of law and for the safety of our people being held, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is not unlimited and our concern for the well-being of our fellow citizens grows each day."

State of Union Message
January, 1980

September 10, 1980

IRAN

Q: What are you doing about the hostages?

A: There have been a number of recent developments relating to the hostages:

-- Secretary Muskie sent a letter to the new Prime Minister; the Prime Minister commented on the letter in a long speech on September 9.

-- 185 U.S. Representatives sent a letter to the new Iranian Majlis, and they have prepared a response.

-- Most important, Iran seems to be in the final stages of installing an official government for the first time since the revolution.

-- All of these events have an effect on the internal situation in Iran and on the hostages. It is too early to say whether that effect will be positive.

The new leadership in Iran should be increasingly aware that their policy of holding hostages in defiance of international law and elementary human rights is hurting their country and bringing dishonor on their own revolution. We have no desire to hurt Iran or its people, but we will persevere with our economic sanctions and other efforts until they reach that very simple conclusion.

We are exploring every avenue which may lead to a resolution of this crisis. We will be watching the activities of the new Majlis very carefully as they address this issue. There need be no obstacles to the quick termination of this problem.

Q: Former Ambassador Sullivan has recently leveled a series of charges against your Administration for its handling of Iran policy at the time of the fall of the Shah. Sullivan suggests that Dr. Brzezinski was, in effect, running an independent embassy in Tehran and that conflicting policy views in Washington resulted in the United States having no policy at all at a crucial moment. He says his own views were disregarded and that Dr. Brzezinski favored a coup attempt even after the Iranian military had effectively collapsed. These are very serious charges about your management of U.S. foreign policy in a critical region. How do you respond?

A: There are two things which surprise me about Ambassador Sullivan's recent article:

-- First, I am surprised that a professional diplomat would publish an account of such an important series of events without a careful check of his facts. The article includes a number of serious misstatements and misrepresentation of fact. I do not agree with his account of events and I do not agree with the conclusions he draws from it.

-- Second, and perhaps more surprising, is his decision to publish these highly personal and inflammatory impressions at a time when we are engaged in very sensitive efforts to attempt to free his colleagues who are being held prisoner in Iran. More than anyone else, I would have expected him to understand the danger of unpredictable reactions in Tehran. I do not understand what motivated him to publish these personal reminiscences at this time; I do know that his decision to do so is not helpful in our efforts to free his former colleagues and associates in Tehran.

I believe any further comment would only compound the problem. There will be time for a full discussion of these issues after the hostages are free, but not now.

April 16, 1980

SALT II PROSPECTS

Q: Is the SALT II Treaty dead? If not, when do you plan to ask the Senate to resume consideration of it?

A: -- Early in January, at our request, the Senate leadership deferred further consideration of SALT II for the time being. But the Treaty remains on the Senate calendar; we remain firmly convinced that the Treaty is in the national interest of the United States; and we are committed to its ratification.

* * *

-- We did not negotiate this treaty to make friends with the Soviet Union. We negotiated because, as adversaries with awesome military power, it is in our security interest to have reliable, verifiable limits on the strategic arms race. In a period of heightened tensions, it is all the more important to have reliable constraints on the competition in strategic weapons.

-- The United States intends to abide by its obligations under international law to take no action inconsistent with SALT II, provided that the Soviet Union reciprocates. The evidence we have is that the Soviets have to date taken no actions inconsistent with the Treaty.

SALT II COMPLIANCE

Q: What did you mean when you said that the US would comply with the provisions of SALT II within the bounds of reciprocal action by the Soviets and consultations with the Congress? Does this obviate the need for actual ratification? And are the Soviets in fact complying?

A: -- Under international law the United States and the Soviet Union are obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty while its ratification is pending.

* * *

-- In addition, the United States has no plans to take actions which would be inconsistent with any of the terms of the SALT II Treaty, so long as the Soviets act with similar restraint.

-- We will continue to monitor Soviet activities closely. The evidence we have to date is that the Soviets have taken on actions inconsistent with the Treaty.

-- Our currently-planned strategic programs are consistent with the Treaty. They will enable us to maintain effective deterrence and essential equivalence. We will, of course, continue to assess our strategic posture in the light of our overall security interests, taking into account the military need for additional steps, Soviet actions, and the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

-- This policy we have adopted in no way eliminates the need for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. SALT II must be ratified if the significant constraints it imposes on Soviet nuclear weaponry are to have full, long-term effect.

Q: Since the Backfire bomber can reach targets in the continental US, why shouldn't it be included in SALT?

A: -- The Soviet Union is currently deploying Backfires in both their long-range air force and in naval aviation units. The Backfire bomber has been in production for several years, and current production averages two and a half aircraft a month. We continue to believe that the primary purpose of the Backfire is to perform peripheral attack and naval missions. Undoubtedly, this aircraft has some intercontinental capability in that it can surely reach the United States from home bases on a one-way, high-altitude, subsonic, unrefueled flight; with refueling and Arctic staging it can probably, with certain high-altitude cruise flight profiles, execute a two-way mission to much of the United States.

-- The ability to strike the territory of the other side is not the criterion for determining whether an aircraft is a "heavy bomber" and, thus, subject to the limitations in the SALT II agreement. For example, the US has 67 FB-111's which are part of our strategic bomber force and dedicated to attack on the Soviet Union. We also have over 500 aircraft deployed in the European and Pacific theaters which have the capability to strike Soviet territory. The Soviet Union at one time tried to get these latter aircraft included in SALT on the grounds that they could strike the Soviet Union. With the firm support of our Allies, we adamantly resisted that position on the grounds that these aircraft, whatever their theoretical capability, are deployed for theater missions and, thus, not subject to SALT limitations. The Soviets have used this same argument with respect to the Backfire.

-- Nevertheless, the Soviets have agreed to furnish specific assurances concerning the Backfire. The US regards the obligations undertaken by these assurances as integral to the Treaty. These assurances, which include a freeze on the current Backfire production rate, are consistent with the US objective of constraining the strategic potential of the Backfire force, while continuing to exclude our own European and Pacific-based theater aircraft from SALT. Those assurances also help to restrict the Backfire to a theater role. In particular, limiting the numbers available means that Soviet diversion of Backfire from its theater and naval missions to a strategic role would substantially reduce Soviet strength in these areas while adding only marginally to overall Soviet strategic capability.

Q: It is claimed that SALT II will be adequately verifiable; but how will the US make sure that the Soviets aren't cheating? Doesn't the loss of intelligence collection sites in Iran undermine our ability to verify the SALT II agreement?

A: -- The US relies for verification on "national technical means" which is a general term covering a variety of technical collection methods for monitoring Soviet military activities. As the President has publicly confirmed, these national technical means include photographic satellites. There are other collection methods as well. For example, we are able to monitor Soviet telemetry -- that is, the technical data transmitted by radio signals from the Soviet missiles during tests -- from outside Soviet territory. A further example of national technical means are the ships and aircraft which we also use to monitor Soviet missile tests. The sides have also acknowledged that large radars, such as the COBRA DANE radar at Shemya Island in the Aleutians, can be used as a form of national technical means (NTM).

-- This is not a complete list of the technical devices that constitute our NTM. Still less is it a complete list of US intelligence resources. Many of our intelligence resources are very sensitive. Public acknowledgement of their existence, much less of their technical capabilities and details of how they work or what information they produce, would make it far easier for the Soviets to negate them. Therefore, what we can say publicly about the details of our intelligence facilities is very limited. Members of the Senate who will have to vote on the Treaty will, of course, have full access to all the details.

-- However, there is no secret that our NTM enable us to learn a great deal about Soviet military systems, including the strategic nuclear forces that are limited in SALT. We are able to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic forces, despite the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet concern with secrecy. A good measure of the capabilities of our system of intelligence collection is the detailed information we publish on Soviet forces: For example, the Secretary of Defense's Report for FY 80 lists the numbers of Soviet bombers, missiles, and gives estimates of the numbers of weapons carried on Soviet forces. We know that the Soviets have a "fifth generation" of ICBMs under development, and we know a good deal about their characteristics -- this before a single missile has been flight-tested. That this is by no means the full extent of our knowledge of Soviet systems is clear from the mass of unofficial -- but often all-too-accurate -- leaks of detailed information on Soviet programs.

-- From these sources, then, we are able to assemble a detailed picture of Soviet forces, both overall and in terms of the characteristics of particular systems. No one source is essential; instead we rely on information from a variety of sources -- for example, what we learn from photography can be checked against information from radar or telemetry monitoring. This means both that loss of a particular source, though it can be important and require replacement, does not "blind" our ability to monitor what the Soviets are doing. Moreover, the use of multiple sources complicates any effort to disguise or conceal a violation. The Soviets know we have a big intelligence operation and know a certain amount about how it works, from our official statements, from leaks, from spies, and from their own NTM. But we know they do not know the full capabilities of our systems -- or, equally important, how we use the information we collect. The result is that efforts to conceal would have to be planned to cope with a number of US collection systems, some of them entirely unknown. (The need to maintain this uncertainty is a major justification for continued secrecy about our intelligence systems and methods.)

-- As for the loss of the intelligence collection sites in Iran, we are proceeding in an orderly fashion to reestablish that capability. As Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown pointed out in his April 5 speech in New York, the issue is not whether the capability will be reestablished but rather how, where, and how quickly. There are a number of alternatives available to us for recovering the capability. Some can be implemented more quickly than others. Some involve consultations with other countries, some do not.

-- Intelligence of the kind obtained from the Iranian sites provides information on Soviet strategic systems, including some of the aspects of the strategic systems which are limited by SALT. For this reason, we will be moving with all deliberate speed to reestablish the capability. However, as noted above, we have a large number of other technical intelligence collection sources which collect intelligence on Soviet strategic systems. As a consequence it is not imperative that the Iranian capability be immediately reestablished to ensure that the emerging SALT agreement is adequately verifiable, i.e., that any Soviet cheating that could pose a military risk be detected in time for the US to respond and offset the threat. As long as the capability is reestablished on a timely basis -- as we plan to do -- there will be no impact on SALT verification. We estimate that regaining enough capability to monitor adequately these tests for SALT purposes will take about a year.

-- The principal information at issue is the nature and characteristics of new or modified Soviet ICBMs. Each such Soviet program will require about 20 flight tests over a period of years. We would be able to monitor testing and detect violations well before the testing programs were complete. On this basis, we are confident that we will be able to verify adequately a SALT agreement from the moment it is signed.

The Defense Debate, Such As It Is

What pretends to be the defense debate of the campaign amounts to a claim by Ronald Reagan that he would restore nuclear "superiority" over the Soviet Union and Jimmy Carter's retort that he will preserve a strategic strength that is "second to none." The Republican candidate deprecates delay of the MX missile and other weapons; the President says he is acquiring the MX and more at the proper pace. Only John Anderson challenges the MX directly.

Mr. Reagan wants to create the impression of a dangerous new "missile gap" while Mr. Carter has bought the MX mostly to defend himself politically. These are the worst motives for so fateful a decision.

The failure to debate the merits and flaws of the MX is bad enough; even worse is the Carter Administration's effort to preempt discussion by boasting about some new nuclear targeting strategy. Duffin, Defense Secretary Brown says that American warheads are now being targeted to allow the nation to fight and win a "limited" nuclear war — which he personally doubts could be either limited or won. This is hardly instructive to the electorate.

The fascination with the MX and with new targeting strategies arises from a concern that the Soviet Union's big and accurate new missiles give it a theoretical capability to destroy most American land-based missiles in a surprise attack. Some Soviet military writings do suggest that there are Soviet generals who believe such a first strike could win a war. The theory is that a surprise strike would leave Moscow with such overwhelming nuclear strength as to make America sue for peace rather than risk further devastation of cities in both nations.

President Carter's first, proper response to this theoretical danger was a decision to make some American land-based missiles mobile. They would be immune to surprise attack and remain available for retaliatory strikes. But when it came time to choose a

mobile missile, Mr. Carter picked the MX, to gain the support of the Joint Chiefs for SALT II. The MX was the biggest and best of the foreseeable weapons. It would therefore make the Soviet land-based missiles appear as vulnerable as the American ones.

Such symmetry, however, would actually be less safe and only accelerate the arms race. For while a Soviet first-strike capacity theoretically threatens one-fourth of America's nuclear forces, an American first-strike weapon would threaten three-fourths of present Soviet forces. And with both sides possessing first-strike temptations, their behavior in a crisis could be less certainly restrained than now.

In fact, the Soviet first-strike challenge could be offset in much less dangerous ways. Instead of the MX, America could deploy a smaller missile, like Minuteman or Trident, in a mobile form. That would remove the danger of surprise attack without threatening one against the Soviet Union.

The argument for a very large and potent mobile weapon is simply not persuasive. The United States already has the ability to fight any kind of nuclear war, including any that could be realistically described as "limited." With 10,000 warheads, America could destroy two-thirds of Russia's land-based missiles and every other important military target and still have enough left to destroy every large Soviet city, most of Soviet industry and 75 million people.

With so many warheads, American missiles have to be periodically retargeted to emphasize one or another priority. The danger lies not in aiming at more military targets than cities but in looking to the MX to advance any serious "limited war" strategy. For the MX would not only survive surprise attack and add to America's capacity to initiate such an attack, it would threaten Soviet weapons in a way that will force the Russians to build their own powerful mobile system, thus diminishing the prospects of arms control.

The major party candidates notwithstanding, these are issues worth debating.

BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
NY TIMES EDITORIAL: THE DEFENSE DEBATE, SUCH AS IT IS

Does M-X constitute a first-strike weapon?

Deploying the M-X will not give us a disarming first-strike capability against the Soviet Union, because the Soviets would still have sizeable and powerful strategic forces remaining after an M-X strike. (Similarly, a Soviet capability to destroy our MINUTEMAN force won't give them a disarming first-strike capability against the U.S.)

It is true that silo-based ICBMs will be vulnerable to strategic response of the other side--U.S. silos in the early 80's and then the Soviets' later. To a considerable extent, Soviet ICBMs would be vulnerable to a first-strike in the 80's, even without M-X, because of recent improvements to MINUTEMAN III.

Compelling evidence that M-X is not in fact or by design a first-strike weapon exists in the open press:

- A very significant portion of the \$33.8 billion price tag is consumed by a basing design whose first task is to make M-X survivable, a notion incompatible with a true first-strike weapon.

- We are planning to deploy only 200 missiles--a number far too small to constitute a first-strike weapon. We could have chosen to deploy more; we did not because, in part, to avoid the erroneous perception we were bent on acquiring a first-strike weapon system.

Deployment of M-X will simply accelerate the arms race.

Fundamental to our development of strategic forces is the policy of strategic deterrence: to build our defenses to a level sufficient to deter any rational foreign government from attacking us.

The M-X concept provides the force survivability essential to deterrence without threatening the Soviet deterrent posture. This is accomplished by choosing a large number of shelters (4600) to provide survivability, while limiting the number of missiles (200) to a level insufficient to place the entire Soviet ICBM force at risk. Our M-X decision is consistent with both a serious commitment to arms control, and an equally serious commitment to maintain unambiguous deterrence.

How can we possibly need a large missile in light of the existence of 10,000 warheads?

The very first question we addressed in considering M-X was why is it necessary at all? Why do we need modernization or improvement of our strategic nuclear forces? Today we have 9,000 nuclear warheads in our strategic forces. The 9,000 warhead force is sufficient only if it is available when needed. The relevant issue is not how many warheads we have in our force, it's how many we can count on surviving a surprise attack--how many the Soviets have to take into account as surviving after a surprise attack. We want that number to be large, and we want there to be no uncertainty in the mind of the Soviets that these surviving forces will be large and powerful. So the issue is not the size of the force; the issue is the survivability of the force.

In the past the survivability of our ICBMs, our MINUTEMAN force, was achieved by putting the missiles in vertical silos and surrounding them with concrete and reinforcing steel. Given this hardening and the poor accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, MINUTEMAN could ride out an attack and still be available to provide a counter-strike, therefore deterring a Soviet attack from taking place. This was true until the Soviet Union began tests of a new guidance system on their largest missile, the SS-18.

In December 1977, the Soviets began testing the new guidance system for the SS-18. We followed those tests very carefully, analyzed the data that our intelligence sources collected, and by the summer of 1978 concluded that they had developed a guidance system that allowed the SS-18 to detonate close enough to MINUTEMAN silos to destroy them. From that point on, it was clear that the MINUTEMAN system could not provide the deterrence in the future which it had provided in the past. More generally, we concluded that silos were inadequate, and that any fixed basing was inadequate as a way of protecting our strategic forces.

Why not use a smaller missile, like MINUTEMAN or TRIDENT?

Extensive analyses showed that the total costs of acquiring and operating a survivable, mobile, land-based ICBM system were minimized by use of a large missile. We did look seriously at a possible compromise missile, common or essentially common to SLBM and ICBM. That study indicated we would have to give up too much ICBM capability to realize cost savings. In the final analysis, with SALT II looming very large, we decided to develop the largest missile allowed by that treaty, thus seizing that opportunity rather than foreclosing it by development of a smaller ICBM. Simultaneously, we knew that decision would minimize costs of the M-X system.

Won't deployment of M-X be destabilizing in a crisis?

We believe the contrary to be true, largely because we think the Soviets know that M-X does not constitute a disarming first-strike weapon. But there are other reasons for believing that M-X will have a stabilizing effect, reasons derived from anticipating what the likely Soviet responses might be to M-X deployment. By making Soviet silo-based missiles more vulnerable, M-X will deter any Soviet efforts to increase the threat to M-X by expanding their silo-based missile forces.

Finally, to the extent that the capabilities of the M-X worry the Soviets, they can use the time until it is deployed to put increased emphasis on systems that will be more survivable than fixed land-based ICBMs (such as the mobile system suggested in the editorial), or to cooperate with us in negotiating arms control agreements that make silo-based missiles survivable for both sides, or that make deep reductions in nuclear weapons. We would welcome any of these likely responses as stabilizing.

Administration Record in Foreign Policy

We have a strong and good record: peace in the Middle East -- the most crucial area -- which provides us with a basis for dealing with an outrageous situation in Afghanistan. Nothing puts us in a better position for dealing with this problem than the Camp David Accords. Beyond that, we are improving America's strength and resolve -- in the post-Vietnam era -- both at home and abroad; relations with our key Allies have rarely been better; we have made decisive progress in peacemaking; both in the Middle East and (with the British) in southern Africa; and we have demonstrated to the world -- following Vietnam -- that we are a country that stands for its values, and are the major country others look up to.

Afghanistan is the product of fundamental Soviet miscalculation about the reaction of the entire world. It has revealed the Soviets for what they are -- not the partisans of independence and non-alignment and the whole world has brought them to account.

-- Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is the result of a disastrous failure of Soviet policy. That is the way it is perceived by virtually every nation in the world, and I am sure that is how it will come to be seen in the Kremlin in time.

I have drawn the line in the region and the response of other countries has been very gratifying, including those who are prepared to provide necessary facilities.

-- In defense, I reversed a decade's decline in real defense spending, and we are now making steady increases in the face of 15 years of major Soviet defense increases. We created the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, a major achievement; and we now also agree to deploy long-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

-- External factors -- the growth of Soviet power and arrogance, spreading turmoil in parts of the developing world -- have complicated this task, but we have been putting together the essential building blocks for the future. Specifically: 5% real growth in defense spending; NATO Long-Term Defense Program; negotiating SALT II normalization with China; Camp David; southern Africa peacemaking; Panama Canal Treaties; Multilateral Trade Agreement; Seven-nation Summits; Common Fund.

-- There is much left to be done. Most important is realizing as a nation the critical importance to us of the Persian Gulf/southwest Asia area, and the need to convince the Soviet Union of its mistake in believing that we are too preoccupied with our domestic problems to resist the further expansion of its powers abroad.

I have heard and read recently a lot about a strong America. We are strong, and I intend to see that we stay that way. But words are cheap.

It does no good to talk about a strong America and oppose a strong defense.

You can't attack inflation with brave words while you vote for larger deficits.

Anyone can be in favor of a "firm response," so long as the response is not controversial, and we certainly will never end our addiction to OPEC oil by promising the American people cheap, plentiful energy in the years ahead.

SALTReagan's Early Position -- Objections

Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by both the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even before the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds that it would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.

"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile...The best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement is to negotiate from a firmly established position. We should not be so eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite for more."

New York Times
February 11, 1976

Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become superior to the United States.

"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress ...are negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and offense capability."

Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979

Reagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a standard campaign line.

"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory..."

New York Times
September 16, 1979

Reagan's Current Position -- Proposals

In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a new policy.

"...(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces nuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents a threat to the other."

San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979

By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of SALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority, and then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.

"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot negotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the Soviet military buildup, as long as we let the Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments. Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be equitable."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Bush

"And my conviction is this--amend the Treaty; send it back, and I think this administration is wrong when they're saying (sic) there's a new arms race. Why? Because the Soviet Union is already in an arms race. They're spending 40 percent more than we are."

CBS Face the Nation
page 6
October 7, 1979

Bush

"And it's the intent of the Soviets that concerns me; and I believe that those who, in the Senate, who want to see it amended are on the right track. And I want a SALT Treaty. I prepared the national intelligence estimates for this country; I don't like what I see in this arms race. Frankly, my presidency would be aimed as much as possible at the reduction--SALT III. Not easy to do, but strength of commitment, I think, could get us there."

CBS Face the Nation
Page 7
October 7, 1979

Bush

"Can we catch the Soviets if they try to cheat? The answer is ominous for the United States. The fact is that under this treaty we are virtually unable to monitor whether the Soviets comply with its terms....When it comes to verification of SALT II, Jimmy Carter will ask us to trust the Soviets as he once asked us to trust him. But I say ...that a treaty that cannot be verified tomorrow shouldn't be ratified today,"

Wall Street Journal
July 6, 1979

Bush

"What we need is an actual reduction, not limitation in nuclear weapons."

Birmingham, AL, News
October 3, 1979

Bush

"I oppose the SALT agreement as put forward. I would amend the treaty. After a period of time, I believe the Soviets would indeed negotiate."

Vancouver, WA, Columbian
July 18, 1979

Bush

"It is not a good treaty as drafted. Our ability to verify Soviet compliance is severely diminished by the loss of (observation) stations in Iran.

"There are things the Soviets can do to make the treaty verifiable. Why aren't they willing to do them? I want to see that tested."

Columbus, OH, Citizen
Journal
October 17, 1979

Bush

"Somehow every negotiation should push the Soviets for far more meaningful reductions....I'd be prepared as president to go a long way toward real reductions and real verifiable limits....A SALT III treaty is really a lot more important and meaningful than SALT II. So don't get caught in a bad deal now. Push harder for better SALT II terms."

Political Profiles, page 9
1979

Bush

"We should have SALT III, a meaningful, verifiable reduction in nuclear arms. You don't get there through a bad SALT II treaty, however."

Illinois interviews and
speeches
Champaign, Illinois
News-Gazette
February 3, 1980

Bush

"I don't like the SALT Treaty. I don't think it's a good agreement. I think the Senate should amend it or reject it. I think the Soviets would renegotiate... (the treaty) locks in inequality and can't be verified."

Carroll, IA, Daily Times-
Herald
July 2, 1979

Bush

"The Soviet economy is less than half as strong as ours, and yet they're spending 40 percent more on military matters. I don't think rejecting the treaties would mean an arms race. Their economy is already over-burdened."

Claremont, NH, Eagle-Times
August 10, 1979

Carter

"...we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"In recent days, three major questions have been raised about the SALT treaty. In each, I believe the evidence is clearly on the side of ratification.

. "The first question: Does SALT undermine our national security? Those who believe it does point to the weapons the Soviets are permitted under the treaty, like the so-called heavy SS-18 missile, or the Backfire bomber. Because we do not possess our own heavy missile, and because the Soviets can keep their Backfires, it is claimed that the treaty jeopardizes our national security.

"But that argument does not stand up to common sense. It is totally misleading to single out one or two aspects of Soviet strategic forces and claim that this treaty gives them superiority. What counts and what must be kept in mind is the total picture. And what is it?

"First, of all, we don't have any heavy missiles because we don't need them, and the Defense Department has always said they don't want them. We have what they call a triad of weapons, some on land, some in water, some in air. The Soviets put 70% of their forces on the increasingly vulnerable fixed land-based ICBM systems. We have put 3/4 of our strategic weapons, and I think wisely so, in our essentially invulnerable and greatly superior submarines and bombers.

"Nor are we standing still. On the land, the President has ordered full-scale development of the new MX that will make our ICBMs mobile. The MX, though smaller in size than the SS-18, is absolutely equal to the biggest Soviet missile in military capability, and will be much more survivable because it is mobile.

"Developing the MX, coupled with the increasing strength of the rest of our forces, meets the threat of a possible Soviet first-strike advantage in the 1980s. And the MX is explicitly available to us under the treaty. And that's not the end of it.

"In the water we have 4 times as many warheads as the Soviets do on our far less vulnerable and far superior submarines. This fall we will begin fitting our Poseidon submarines with the longer ranged Trident I missiles. By the middle of '81, the U.S.S. Ohio, the first Trident, will be deployed.

"These new systems assure that our submarine based missiles will continue to be invulnerable. And that's not all.

"In the air, we are fitting our B-52s with cruise missiles that are five to ten years ahead of the Soviet weapons. Our B-52 forces eclipse the Soviet air defenses. We are working with our NATO allies toward modernizing our theater nuclear weapons. We have a flying armada of strategic FB-111s, of F-111s in Europe, of aircraft on our carriers -- all of which can strike Soviet territory and none of which is counted under the treaty.

"...And we are explicitly reserved the right to build an aircraft comparable to the Backfire if we want it.

"When our total nuclear capacity is measured against the Soviets' strategic equivalence between us in indisputable. Nothing in the SALT treaty undermines that effort. Nothing in the treaty forecloses any option we want. But without SALT, everything will be far more costly.

"Without SALT, the characteristics and size of the forces we face will be far less certain.

"An that is why, and I want to underscore this, that is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- every one of them the head of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines -- unanimously support this treaty. That is why the current SAC commander, the Strategic Air Command commander, supports this treaty. That is why the Secretary of Defense, a California product, by the way, an expert in strategic arms and one of the most gifted Americans ever to hold that post, supports it.

"And that is why all of our Western allies, every one of them, support this treaty, and have given their strong and unqualified endorsement.

"The second major argument brought against the treaty is that it is based on hard-nosed reality and suspicion. The diplomatic language of those negotiations is not so polite to ignore that we must rely on our own means to verify what the other side is doing.

"And the treaty is built on seven years' experience with Soviet behavior in SALT I. In that agreement, a standing body was established to deal with issues that might arise relating to compliance under the earlier treaty. Not a single charge of violation was made by either side. And every issue regarding ambiguous activity that we or the Soviets brought to that body was satisfactorily resolved.

"Can SALT be adequately verified? I serve on all the highly classified, super-secret agencies that deal with this matter, And I say it can, and I have no doubt about it.

"That is the testimony of the leader of every aspect of the American intelligence community. There are people who are not tied into political party. They are long-time professionals who conduct the most sophisticated super-secret work that is carried on anywhere in our government.

"To the person, they have testified that this treaty is verifiable. That's the position of the Secretary of Defense, and it's the position of every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"What is critical in verification is that we be able to identify any violations before they can affect the strategic balance. What is important is not that we know everything about Soviet forces, but that we know about those things that matter to our security.

"We have monitored Soviet strategic forces for 30 years, and with unbelievable accuracy. And we will continue to do so with or without a SALT agreement.

"We have a multi-billion dollar intelligence network. We have photographic satellites, radar stations, and other highly sophisticated devices. And SALT, and this is very important, expressly forbids the use of any measure by the Soviet Union or by us to deliberately obstruct verification of the provisions of this agreement.

"This treaty is not built on trust, it is built on our own technology, and our proven ability to monitor backed up by the terms of the treaty.

"The third major argument about SALT has been made from both ends of the political spectrum. It is said that the treaty does not limit the arms race or does not limit it enough or even that it legalizes an arms build up.

"But the claim this treaty fails to cap the arms race collapses in the face of a few simple facts.

"Today the Soviets have 2500 strategic missile launchers and bombers. Under the terms of the treaty, they must dismantle 250 of them. But without the treaty, we estimate that they could have had up to 3,000 such launchers and bombers by 1985, 1/3 more than the total permitted under this agreement.

"Under the limit of the 2500 launchers and bombers, there are additional sub-limits that are very important to us. Without SALT II, by 1985 we expect that the Soviets could have as many as 1800 multiple warheaded, or MIRVed, missile launchers. With SALT, they are limited to 1200. Without SALT by 1985 we expect that the Soviets could have up to 1400 MIRV'ed ICBM launchers. With SALT, they're limited to 820. Under SALT, the number of warheads they're permitted under their largest missile, the 13, is ten warheads. They are capable of putting 20 or 30 warheads on that system. The difference is some 6,000 fewer warheads with the treaty than without it. Without SALT, the Soviets could continue developing newer and more deadly land-based missiles. In the past they have done so, having 3 or 4 new systems underway at the same time. But with SALT, they are restricted to only one new system.

World Affairs Council
Los Angeles, CA
July 1979

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Bush

"Suddenly, after long years of administration silence on the subject, the White House, with the help of the defense secretary, is busy orchestrating a massive public relations program to bolster President Carter's image as a Commander-in-Chief who recognizes the Soviet military threat.

"Suddenly, we hear of a presidential directive--PD 59--which we're told restructures American nuclear strategy in light of a fresh look at Soviet objectives."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980

Carter

"Recently, there's been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential directive that I have issued, known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this Nation, I decided that our Nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack --in responding to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers we have been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our Nation's defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

"No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to ensure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use."

American Legion Address
August 21, 1980

NATO ALLIES

Reagan

Reagan's primary concern is that if the United States does not appear a strong and dependable ally, the nations of Europe will seek an accomodation with the USSR.

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with-- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

To prevent such action, Reagan proposes to consult with the allies and reassure them of our interest in preserving the alliance.

"I think the Reagan Administration, first of all, would do it by action, by consulting with them, making it evident to them that we do value that alliance and want to preserve it."

Time
June 30, 1980

Reagan has stated he would not be adverse to intervening in the affairs of our NATO allies, however.

"To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted 'in any way to prevent or discourage' the Communists, adding 'It was clearly interest to do so.' But he refused to be more specific."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Reagan has also suggested that the United States push for an extension of NATO's defensive perimeter into the Middle East.

"There would be nothing wrong with us...appealing to our NATO allies and saying, 'Look, fellows, let's just make this an extension of the NATO Line and you contribute some forces in here too.'"

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Carter

"At the outset of this Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. We have made important progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security environment.

"We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of important ways:

"First, there is a recognition among our allies that mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3% per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this objective.

"Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic step in Alliance security policies with the decision to improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes the deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential. TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory will remain unscathed."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"Mr. Secretary General, Members of the Council:

In behalf of President Carter, I have come today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of the first priority. I have come to convey to you and the member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- The President's most sincere greetings;
- His commitment--and the full commitment of the United States--to the North Atlantic Alliance as a vital part of our deep and enduring relations with Canada and Western Europe; and
- His dedication to improving cooperation and consultations with our oldest friends, so as to safeguard our peoples and to promote our common efforts and concerns.

The President's conviction concerning NATO's central role is deep-rooted and firm. As he stated in his message to the NATO ministers last month: "Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partnership between North America and Western Europe. NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our collective security. The American commitment to maintaining the NATO Alliance shall be sustained and strengthened under my administration."

Address to North Atlantic
Council
Brussel, Belgium
January 24, 1977

DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL

Reagan

Regardless of political affiliation, almost all public leaders support efforts aimed at reducing conflicts through negotiation. But Ronald Reagan has had doubts about negotiating peace.

"The President wants to end the cold war era of conflict and to substitute an era of negotiations, peaceful settlements of disputes before they flare into war. I am sure every American shares that goal. But are we also aware that every nation in history which has sought peace and freedom solely through negotiation has been crushed by conquerors bent on conquest and aggression."

Speech to World Affairs
Council
October 11, 1972

Mondale

"National strength requires more than just military might: it requires the commitment of the President to arms control.

"If there is one thing that bothers me more than anything else and I think bothers you, it is the fear that someday, somehow, for reasons that don't matter, the world will resort to the final madness of a nuclear holocaust. Reason, common sense, and a decent respect for humanity demand that we stall this nuclear arms race before it bankrupts and destroys us all.

"Without arms control, everything is out of control. Without the SALT treaty we would be forced to waste billions on weapons that buy us nothing.

"And even though it took seven years to negotiate this treaty; and even though our President, and our Secretary of Defense and all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every NATO ally wants this treaty ratified, Mr. Reagan for the life of him cannot understand why.

"Well, let me say Mr. Reagan: We must have arms control for the life of all of us, and we need a President Jimmy Carter who believes in controlling the madness of nuclear arms."

DNC Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NON-PROLIFERATION

Reagan

A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:

"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business."

Washington Post
January 31, 1980

Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:

"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium..."

Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980

Mondale

"Our relationship with Western Europe and our NATO allies can be severely damaged by the defeat of this SALT II treaty. They strongly support it. They've been involved in it all the way. Their interests have been carefully taken into account. Around the world, as you know, there are several so-called threshold nations that are within a short distance of having their own nuclear weaponry. And we have been pleading with them, don't do it. Please don't resort to nuclear weaponry yourself. And the only basis for persuasion that we have is that, despite the fact that we are the holder of the most sophisticated pool of nuclear weaponry in the world we have handled that responsibly and with restraint, and therefore with moral authority we can ask them to refrain from resorting to their own nuclear weaponry.

"All of these things and more will be affected by the outcome of this agreement. I am convinced it is in our interest. I'm convinced it's in our national security interest. And I'm convinced that with the support of the American people, the ratification of this treaty will take the most important step that we can take together for our children. And that is to reduce the possibilities of the final madness, a nuclear war."

L.A. World Affairs Council
July 1979

Mondale

"Third, as we limit and reduce the weapons of existing nuclear states, we must work in concert to insure that no additional nuclear-weapon states emerge over the next decade and beyond.

"The spread of nuclear weapons to an ever-increasing number of countries and regions is a chilling prospect. It brings ever closer the probability of their use. Such proliferation would seriously heighten regional and global tensions. It would impede peaceful commerce in the field of nuclear energy. And it would make the achievement of nuclear disarmament vastly more difficult."

Address to the U.N.
Special Session of
Disarmament
May 1978

FOREIGN POLICYReagan

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

Reagan has chosen to ignore the progress that both Democratic and Republican administrations have made toward a secure peace.

His 1976 attacks on President Ford were at least as harsh as those he makes on President Carter in 1980. Throughout, he provides simple answers to the delicate complexities of foreign affairs -- answers which reflect his lack of understanding of the consequences of his remarks.

I. Military Involvement

Reagan frequently rejects a tempered response to international problems, preferring instead to flex America's military might at the slightest provocation. Over the last 12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home) and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.

Angola

In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:

"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting or you're going to have to deal with us."

New York Times
January 6, 1976

Cuba

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan said:

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Cyprus

Reagan has said that, in a manner similiar to Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Ecuador

In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:

"(T)he U.S. government next winter should send along a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say 13 miles off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to 'talk softly, but carry a big stick.'"

San Diego Union
Marcy 7, 1975

Lebanon

"In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Middle East

Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan said:

"I think this might be a very, very good time for the United States to show a presence in the Middle East. I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it looks like anyone bullying..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

North Korea

In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, Reagan said:

"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone in the United States government, particularly the President, has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor

in 24 hours or we are coming in after it."

Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968

To demonstrate United States resolve and willingness to stand by defense treaties, Reagan said we should let it be known that "B-52's should make a moonscape out of North Korea if South Korea is attacked."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Pakistan

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.

"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be."

St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980

Reagan also proposed sending "a squadron of planes" to Pakistan to counter the Soviets' move in Afghanistan.

Washington Star
January 31, 1980

Portugal

To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent or discourage" the Communists, adding "It was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Rhodesia

To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:

"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not I don't know."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

North Vietnam

The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Panama Canal

Reagan has long been a principal opponent of the Panama Canal Treaty, and has promised that:

"If there is any possibility of keeping the Panama Canal, believe me I would do it..."

Atlanta Constitution
January 18, 1980

United Nations

In the past, Reagan has found excuses to question United States' participation in the United Nations. The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China to the United Nations was being discussed.

"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organization...I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service organizations surrounding it are doing good work."

Press Conference
October 26, 1971

In 1975 when the United Nations condemned Zionism as racism, Reagan suggested, that if the U.N. continues its present conduct, the United States should serve notice "we're going to go home and sit a while."

Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975

Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO, Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave his reply.

"...UNESCO -- the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization...May actually be a base for communist espionage."

Jefferson City Missouri
Post
December 15, 1977

Foreign Aid

Reagan has attacked the foreign aid program.

"We've bought dress suits for Greek undertakers, extra wives for Kenya Government officials."

New York Times
January 23, 1965

Vietnam

Reagan has consistently defended the Vietnam war. In a recent speech before the Veteran's of Foreign Wars Convention, Reagan once again asserted the war was a "noble cause."

August 18, 1980

Reagan has also claimed that "The Vietnam war was not an action of moral poverty; it was a collective action of moral courage..."

Lafayette Journal
and Courier
April 23, 1980

Reagan feels that despite the best efforts of our soldiers to win the war, they were hamstrung by the politicians and some segments of the public.

"There is a lesson...in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail, or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace...we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to win."

Speech to Veterans
of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

In a 1967 Newsweek article, Reagan called upon President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam War using nuclear threats

"...no one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons...But...the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might."

Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967

Richard J. Whalen, one of Reagan's advisors, shares his outlook. He believes the United States should have bombed the dikes of North Vietnam, then "with 90% of the country under water" negotiated a peace.

Los Angeles Times
June 26, 1980

Bush

"Certainly there are going to be situations where an American President might have to contemplate the use of force. One of Carter's great problems is that nobody thinks under any circumstances that he would use force. It's the post-Vietnam syndrome. But, going back to Reagan, I do not favor blockading Cuba because I think that's irrelevant. You'd lose all support of moderates in this hemisphere on that."

National Journal
March 15, 1980

Bush

"I don't favor permanent bases (in the Middle East). That's where I differ with some of the other Republican candidates. And the reason I don't is not that I don't want to--don't recognize that you need at some point to project power or show force, but I see a permanent base in the Middle East as an invitation to the Soviets to do the one thing that the Sudanese and the Egyptians kept them from doing: getting a foothold in the Middle East again."

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"I am convinced that Carter has been an abnormally weak and vacillating president in foreign affairs."

"He sees the world as he wishes it were, not as it is."

"We don't seem to be realistic enough, tough enough, strong enough. We have projected a failure to keep commitments, a weakness and vacillation."

Madison WI, State
Journal
November 8, 1979

Bush

"I don't believe in bullying one's allies. Or pushing some guy around because he's smaller. I believe in leading him and I know that at times, you have to say, 'This is how it's going to be.'"

Concord, NH,
Monitor & Patriot
October 12, 1979

Bush

Asked recently where he would draw the line and commit American troops, Bush said,

"Look, I'm not going to answer a hypothetical question about where you draw the line and put troops. That's one way to get into foreign policy trouble, and it's a sure way to get into political trouble."

Wall Street Journal
February 26, 1980
file #1-19-1 (R)

Bush

"I don't think you need an overall change in diplomacy, but I do think we need to be able to protect conventional force power selectively. I don't favor stationing of U.S. forces in the Middle East which, in my view, would draw Soviets back into the Middle East. But I don't think it's a question of redesigning something in the sense of a new machinery to deal with foreign policy, I think it's a projection of commitment and will."

New York Times
January 5, 1980

Bush - - - -

"Mine is a moderate approach. We don't need radical solutions. We need to figure out what works and what doesn't work. We need to find a balance."

Philadelphia, PA
Inquirer
October 22, 1979
file # 2-3-7

Carter

"There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense

"That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the Producer Price Index (Applause). The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice and I am determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared. The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who compromise American society give us the assurance of success.

"We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense -- a 4 or 5 percent real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.

"Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people, cultures and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

"In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we have been committed now for the last three and a half years.

"We pursue five major objectives:

"First, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies.

"Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World.

"Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world.

"Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are now threatened in Southwest Asia.

"And fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

"Our first objective, solidarity with our Allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder.

"This is why we have led the North Atlantic Alliance in its program to upgrade its convention forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.

"Next month, the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important Allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation, but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity."

World Affairs Council
Philadelphia
May 1980

Naval Balance Vis-a-Vis Soviet Union

• The CNO stated earlier this year that the U.S. Navy is the best in the world and has improved in capability relative to a year ago. The Navy believes that, in conjunction with our allies, we currently possess a slim margin of superiority over the maritime forces of the Soviets.

• Current estimates indicate that the Soviets are continuing to emphasize qualitative improvements and that the trend toward construction of larger surface combatants and auxiliaries will result in a moderate decrease in overall Soviet Navy force levels over the next decade. For example, the total of Soviet principal surface combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates) and general purpose submarines is projected to decline by 5-10% over the next decade.

• Conversely, our naval forces are projected to grow from current levels (about 540 total ships) to about 590 ships by the mid-1980s and remain at this level through the late 1980s, based on Navy force projections that reflect a shipbuilding program generally consistent with the 5-year plan submitted to Congress last January (roughly 19-20 new construction ships per year). Projections beyond the late 1980s are more difficult to make due to the uncertainties associated with future shipbuilding plans, ship designs and costs, and the retirement schedules of existing ships. Furthermore, our threat projections become increasingly uncertain beyond the late 1980s thus making detailed capability assessments extremely speculative.

• In addition to the projected growth in the number of ships in our Navy -- in terms of both major combatants and support ships -- our naval force structure will undergo major qualitative improvements through the 1980s. Such qualitative improvements are not reflected in numbers comparisons but are taken into account in capability assessments. Some examples:

-- Our 12 deployable carrier battle groups will be maintained and strengthened by the addition of two CVNs, AAW improvements with new CG-47 Aegis cruisers and upgrades to other guided missile ships, and ASW improvements such as towed tactical array sonars and new LAMPS MK III ASW helicopters. 12 deployable aircraft carrier battle groups represent the minimum offensive capability required to meet peacetime needs and wartime demands in the face of Soviet opposition.

-- We will continue to modernize and increase the size of our nuclear attack submarine force with both continued SSN-688 procurement and introduction of a more affordable yet fully adequate follow-on submarine (FA-SSN).

-- Our overall ASW capabilities will be further strengthened by continued modernization of our highly effective land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft forces. Substantial improvements will also be made in our undersea surveillance capabilities with improved SOSUS and introduction of at least 12 SURTASS mobile surveillance systems (TAGOS ships).

Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan

The current five-year shipbuilding plan proposes to build 97 new ships and modernize 5 older ships. This shipbuilding plan incorporates both a shift toward the high end of the mix of combatant ships, and the construction of new maritime prepositioning ships (MPS/TAKX) to support the rapid deployment force.

The five-year shipbuilding program was derived on the basis of the Navy being prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of our national interests. Using information from the Navy's study program, we have reviewed carefully over the past year the roles that can be played by the Navy in a NATO war, non-NATO contingencies, intervention and crisis control, and in promoting strategic deterrence and world wide stability.

The first priority of our naval forces in a NATO war is to ensure the timely delivery of military shipping to Europe with acceptably low losses. Intervention and crisis control, where the chance of direct U.S./USSR conflict is small, generate a need for offensive operations by our carrier and amphibious forces. We are continuing to explore the implications of basing naval forces program planning on forward deployments and intervention outside NATO, rather than exclusively planning scenarios that emphasize the Navy as primarily a sea control force designed to secure the North Atlantic sea lines of communication against Soviet submarines and long range bombers in a NATO war.

It has been estimated that to maintain the fleet at its present level of about 533 ships (active force, naval reserve force, and naval fleet auxiliary force) will require an average of about \$7B (FY 81 \$) in the shipbuilding account annually. The program that is proposed provides for an 11% average real growth over the five-year period. In a war with the Soviets and with the help of our allies, this force would be capable of performing sea control operations in the Atlantic; sea control and projection operations in the Mediterranean; and austere sea control operations in the Pacific.

We need not only realistic estimates of force levels and capability, but also stability in the shipbuilding program to provide a firm industrial base.

The shipbuilding plan supports the Navy's requirements for strategic deterrence and forces to fight a NATO war by:

- Enhancing the capability of our strategic forces by adding 6 Trident submarines.

STATUS OF U.S. DIVISIONS

The New York Times article of September 9 on Army readiness was factual and accurate, but fell short of a reasonable explanation of the situation. Forward deployed divisions, the combat force of that 45% of the Army which is overseas, are maintained at highest status.

State-side divisions have the mission to deploy overseas where needed, to reinforce forward deployed units, or to go to areas where required. The status of state-side divisions is forecast to improve significantly over the next several months for several reasons:

- Recruiting for the past year has fully met objections and those soldiers are now beginning to arrive in units.
- NCO shortages will be improved, as the Chief of Staff of the Army announced the other day, as balancing of forces by reduction of overstrengths in forward deployed forces takes effect.

These actions take about six months to work, and we can expect to see reasonable improvements in the status of state-side units within the next six months.

The situation is not as dreary as it might appear on the surface.

The Army's Units Status Report classifies divisions as "fully ready" to "not ready" according to personnel, equipment, and training conditions. A division rated low is one of these resource areas is capable of operating with two of its three brigades if required to deploy immediately. In addition, assets could be quickly shifted from one division to improve the readiness of another division. Even though personnel challenges prevail, the Army could cross level resources in the United States to respond to a crisis. This would provide earlier deploying force full combat capability. In any event, the Unit Status Report is an indicator of a division's resource picture and the time required to bring it to full capability -- excellent for flagging divisions rather than a measure of combat readiness.

It is common practice among all armed forces to man units in peacetime at lower levels than would be required in wartime.

It is also important to recognize that the Soviets keep the majority of their divisions at less than full combat readiness.

Force Readinessa. Aircraft Readiness (including spares parts)

- Over the past several years the Defense budget has generally provided enough spare parts to support the peacetime flying hour program fully. However, we are continuing to build war reserve inventories of spare parts and it will be several years before those inventories will be adequate to support all of our combat air forces at wartime sortie rates in a major conflict for the full combat durations for which we plan.

- The claim that our hardware and spares posture is such that "only half the planes can fly" is inaccurate. This assertion seems to be based on a misinterpretation of the so-called aircraft "mission-capable (MC)" rate. MC rates are not a measure of wartime readiness. They are an index of the peacetime performance of our logistics support system--not a measure of our ability to fly sorties in wartime.

- We should not expect MC rates to even approach 100%, for two reasons--first, even under the best of conditions, significant maintenance downtime (much of it scheduled preventative maintenance and inspections) must be expected as an unavoidable cost of doing business; second, we cannot predict with certainty which aircraft components will fail when, where, or how often. It is not practical or wise to buy enough spare components to protect completely against the uncertainty involved, and we typically stock to about 85% spares availability.

- If we were to make a transition to war from our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would selectively defer nonurgent periodic inspections and preventive maintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited access to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary, cannibalize serviceable components from out-of-commission aircraft to maximize our wartime sortie capability.

b. Navy Ship Aviation/Readiness

- Today, the Navy's inventory of active deployable ships stands at 455. One hundred two of our ships are deployed. Two hundred eighty-nine (64%) are reporting combat ready. 85 ships are in programmed maintenance, a category which includes overhaul, selected restricted availability, and post shakedown availability. Seventeen ships are not combat ready* because of elective maintenance

* "Not Combat Ready" means that the unit has insufficient resources to meet warfighting demands in a projected combat environment. However, units being deployed in this category can execute planned operations in a peacetime environment.

(this is work that is done during scheduled upkeep periods), and fifteen others are in a corrective maintenance category, having sustained casualties to combat essential equipment. The remaining 49 are deficient principally in areas of personnel, training and supply.

- Of 157 deployable active Navy squadrons, 36 report their primary degraded area as personnel and 15 report not combat ready for the remaining resource areas.

- Recognizing the inevitability under existing requirements that units reporting not combat ready may be required to forward deploy, the Navy has recently initiated an assessment procedure which is required thirty days prior to deployment for all units reporting not combat ready in personnel. This assessment either offers a final opportunity for improvement measures or furnishes the basis for operational limitations in the interests of safety. In the past the Navy has augmented ships with personnel from other duty stations to meet critical skill shortages. The fleet commanders administer this level manning policy in order to spread manpower shortages throughout the fleet. Use of this practice has been infrequent. However, there will probably be some necessary increases in this practice for ships on station in the Indian Ocean.

c. Divisions

- Our forward deployed Army divisions are well-equipped, well-trained, and at a high state of readiness. Within the United States, the 82nd Airborne Division is maintained at a high state of readiness. Many of the remaining divisions in the United States have serious personnel problems, primarily due to shortages of combat arms NCOs.

- We are taking numerous steps to improve our division readiness by alleviating personnel shortages. In recruiting, we are expanding bonus programs that are keyed toward critical skills. We are also supporting legislation now in Congress to improve educational benefits, including provisions that would pass on unused educational benefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of middle-grade NCOs, we are working to expand bonus programs to include mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry, armor, field artillery, and other selected skills.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEADERSHIP

Bush

"The Carter Administration, despite its sudden recognition of the American people's concern over our nation's ability to defend itself, has shown no understanding of the lessons of modern history."

"Under a Reagan presidency, however, the reversal of those ominous trends will serve as a keystone of a foreign policy based on just such an understanding: a foreign policy that proceeds from strength--not simply military strength, but the strength of our alliances--and the reinforcement of those alliances by America's being true to its word in our dealings with other nations."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh, September 5,

Bush

"We don't have the luxury of dealing with one problem while the others languish...They are interrelated, and so must our handling of them be."

"The message will be loud and clear around the world: The United States means to maintain her security and to retain the ability to stand by her friends."

Boston Globe
September 8, 1979

Wondale

"We will also stake the contest on the paramount issue the Republicans tried to raise in Detroit--the question of national strength. We gladly accept that challenge."

"The President of the United States has an enormous job. He's charged with the most powerful responsibility to be found in the world--the burden of nuclear power. He is the leader of the civilized world. He must defend its freedom. He must grasp the complexities of our difficult world. He must protect our security by freeing our dependence on foreign oil."

"And to do all of that, we must have a strong President. Yet last month Ronald Reagan spent two days on national television drawing up a plan to divide the Presidency and weaken its powers. Anyone who seeks the Presidency--and in his first serious act convenes a Constitutional Convention in his hotel room to weaken the office he's seeking--does not understand the Constitution, the Presidency, or what national security is all about."

D.N.C. Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NAVAL BALANCE VIS-a-VIS USSR

Reagan

Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing Navy programs.

"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by 1980. By the end of this fiscal year only 5 or 6 weeks away, our conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships. Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.

"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with the equipment and spare parts they need."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships:

"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and Marines aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling rapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to meet the requirements of additional carriers.

1980 Republican Platform

Bush

"A stronger Navy for us, a three-ocean Navy, is essential."

Political Profiles
page 9
1979

Carter

Naval Forces

"Seapower is indispensable to our global position--in peace and also in war. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat.

"The program I have proposed will assure the ability of our Navy to operate in the high threat areas, to maintain control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication--both military and economic--and to provide the strong maritime component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for operations in remote areas of the world, where we can not predict far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition equipment on land."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"It has been said that our Navy is inferior to the Soviet Navy, because they have more ships. But the number of ships alone is a false measure. It assumes that one of their coastal patrol ships is the equal of one of our aircraft carriers, and that one of their diesels is as capable as one of our modern Trident nuclear submarines. The truth is that the technology of our carriers, of our submarines, and our new surface ships is far more advanced than theirs. Moreover, from frigates on up, we have a two-to-one advantage over the Soviets in surface combat tonnage. All of these factors must be weighed for any serious and realistic assessment of the strength of our Navy -- a strength that is unsurpassed on the high seas.

Commonwealth Club
September 5, 1980

AFGHANISTANBush

"The idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed, risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet. It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless foreign policy."

Milford, CT
Washington Star
March 22, 1980

Bush

"Ronald Reagan has proposed a blockade of Cuba to stop Russia aggression halfway around the world. I would not. I don't believe that is right. I don't know where all the ships would come from to do it. I don't quite see the relevance. I am not soft on Castro. I believe Castro is trying to export revolution...but there has to be some adherence to international law.

"I can see some vague relationship, inasmuch as Russia is training Cubans to be their surrogates in Africa, but I don't see why when the Soviets are aggressors in Afghanistan we declare war on China. That's not my conception of how one uses power or how one makes foreign policy decisions."

Manchester, NH
Washington Post
February 10, 1980

Bush

"I think you're going to see a peace offensive by the Soviet Union. I think they underestimated world opinion. I don't think they want war today. I think you're going to see a pullback, maybe this summer."

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
New York Times
March 24, 1980

Bush

"So, getting them (Soviets) out (of Afghanistan), I think, will be part of a Soviet peace effort, an idea to show that they really aren't the brutal aggressors that they are and I think that's what's going to do it. It's going to be more world opinion than it is bristling weapons lined up against the. But, the ideas that they've stabilized things is not quite accurate. They've stabilized it militarily, but they haven't stabilized the heartbeat of the Afghans, and don't forget it, and we haven't heard the last of it. You do not brutally aggress and crush a people and have a permanent stability.

That's not what's happened."

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"But the Soviets also will have an energy shortfall in the mid-1980's and so the Afghanistan invasion can also be seen as a drive toward warm-water ports and Middle East oil fields."

Interviews with J.F. terHorst
Detroit, MI, News

Carter

"The Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the ruthless extermination of its government have highlighted in the starkest terms the darker side of their policies - going well beyond competition and the legitimate pursuit of national interest, and violating all norms of international law and practice.

This attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets have sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a non-aligned and sovereign state.

On January 4 I therefore announced a number of measures, including the reduction of grain sales and the curtailment of trade and technology transfer, designed to demonstrate our firm opposition to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to underscore our belief that in the face of this blatant transgression of international law, it was impossible to conduct business-as usual. I have also been in consultation with our allies and with countries in the region regarding additional multilateral measures that might be taken to register our disapproval and bolster security in Southwest Asia. I have been heartened by the support expressed for our position, and by the fact that such support has been tangible, as well as moral.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Mondale

"America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain; tightened controls on high technology trade; limited Soviet fishing in our waters; raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces; strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean; intensified development of our Rapid Deployment Forces; and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

In the UN General Assembly, the United States joined more than a hundred other nations in an unprecedented majority -- calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow Games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

Address to U.S. Olympic Committee
April, 1980

DEFENSE FORCE READINESSS

Bush

"I am clearly in favor and continue to be of a three-ocean Navy, and that means we should commence work on a nuclear carrier. The first year of this, a lot of this spending, this extra spending would be to catch up in conventional types of categories where we've gotten behind, and inventory. We've gotten behind in maintenance. We've gotten behind in a lot of just plain replacing of obsolete items."

Wall Street Journal
February 19, 1980

Mondale

"It is not wrong to ask whether we are strong enough to provide for this nation's defenses: that is how we keep the peace. But it is utterly wrong to assume we are behind. The truth is that today there is no American General or Admiral who would propose to trade our defense forces with those of any other nation--now, or in the foreseeable future."

Commonwealth Club
Address, September 5, 1980

Carter

"Yes. The answer is yes. I don't want to go into detail now because the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense today are answering an article that was published in the New York Times this morning on the front page saying that some of our Army divisions were not prepared for combat, did not enjoy combat readiness."

"We've added, including a bill I signed yesterday to increase the pay and benefits of military personnel, we've added about \$4 billion since I've been in office to improve the quality of military persons, to improve the retention rate among vital trained petty officers primarily and also to help with recruitment."

"We've had remarkable success that we did not anticipate really with the registration for the draft with about 93 percent of the young people who were eligible registering for the draft. About 15 percent of those who registered expressed a desire to know more about career opportunities in the military forces. There was a place on the form that they could check there, which I think will help us with recruitment in the future."

"The spirit within the military is very good. They've had some onerous assignments that I've given them, for instance, the longterm stationing of aircraft carriers and the support ships in the north Indian Ocean. They've performed superbly in that respect. I visited a lot of the military bases. I happen to be a professional military man by training and I've found them to be well trained. so I would guess that our military forces are in good condition."

New Jersey Editors Week 1
September 9, 1980

Defense Manpower Policies

The 1970's: Requirements

As the 1970's ended, the U.S. fielded its leanest active and reserve armed force since the 1950's: slightly over two million active duty members; a little over one million reservists (attached table 1). This leanness resulted from a number of things, but it was in no small measure the product of some important doctrinal changes concerning force structure that were made in the first half of the seventies. Four of these are noteworthy.

- Worldwide manpower requirements were adjusted downward by President Nixon, from a program objective to be prepared for 2 1/2 wars simultaneously to a less demanding scenario that envisaged a major European war and a smaller contingency elsewhere.

- At the same time, a concept of global "total force planning" was embraced, which placed greater reliance than in the past on the armed forces of allies and regional powers to supply initial forces and the first line of defense for many warfare possibilities.

- Within U.S. manpower assets, in 1973 a concept of "total force planning" was also adopted, one which placed less heavy reliance on the active forces and much more on the activation and emergency mobilization of reserves, and which worked some shifts of wartime functions and assets from the active to the reserve structure; and

- The all-volunteer (or "zero" draft) force replaced the partial conscript manning scheme that had existed from 1948 to 1972.

Two other factors were at work in the early seventies as well: the Vietnam conflict ended, and with it came a drawdown of the strength increases that had begun in 1964; and the increasing sophistication of modern weaponry, plus the need for forward deployments and rapid responses (made vivid in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) were inexorably forcing shifts to smaller but more experienced forces that had been the case in the first two post-war decades.

For the remainder of the decade, defense manpower strategy consisted of:

* In part for budgetary reasons, in part to reflect the changing role of China in U.S. strategic concerns about Asia and the Pacific.

-- To be augmented in the first instance in an emergency by a call-up of reserves;

-- To be augmented additionally by call-ups of pretrained individuals subject to call-up and by a resumption of conscription in the context of a mobilization.

The Administration refined, but did not make fundamental changes, in these manpower policies.

The 1970's: Resources

The Defense manning performance in the remainder of the decade was mixed. Despite some periodic shortfalls in enlistments, the active forces were generally successful in meeting recruiting goals (Table 2); and since 1974, had never been more than one-and-one-half percent below authorized strength (Table 3). First term reenlistments remained strong. At the same time, reserve strengths lagged notably behind the active forces (Table 2), and the Services experienced a significant--almost chronic--slippage in retention of more experienced enlisted members. (The problem is particularly serious in the Navy, where second term reenlistment rates have fallen 15 points over the last five years.)

This mixed yield took place in a context that circumstantially favored military manning needs in a couple of ways, but which otherwise was not very sustaining. The Services benefitted for most of the decade from two things in combination.

- The demographics--the baby boom legacy-- worked to our advantage. By the time it peaked in 1978, the prime recruiting pool (males, 17-21) topped ten million.

- We met a smaller manpower requirement in the post-Vietnam seventies than we had at any time since 1950.

But other factors were not favorable, and more than offset these cushions:

- The relative value of military compensation eroded notably beginning in 1973;

- There was a similar erosion in the uniqueness of the advantages that military service had long offered youth. No longer was the military the major source of initial jobs and training, nor the principal stepping stone to higher education. A bounty of federal programs in place by mid-decade (basic educational opportunity grants, CETA, the Job Corps, Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Opportunity Acts, and various counter-cyclical programs) now compete for young people.

- The G.I. Bill was replaced in 1977 by an educational package for service personnel that is seen by many young people as much less attractive (and, as a matter of benefits, is in fact less attractive);

- The U.S. embraced all-volunteer manning with a compensation and incentive structure that is long on tradition but short on flexibility. The military retirement system (which the Administration studied and has proposed sweeping changes in) is a notable example--a structure built on perverse incentives, such that a person has little inducement to stay after 20 years, and no incentives to say for less. We have no rewards to offer the youth who would give 10 or 15, but not 20, years of service to country.

In embracing the AVF in 1973, the nation's policy changed faster than its structures; its philosophy outpaced its budgets and programs in some key respects.

Administration Policy

There are two cornerstones:

- In the absence of an exigent international circumstance, the nation's military manpower requirements are best met on an all-volunteer basis. Current military manning problems seem most capable of solution in an AVF context. A return to a peacetime draft is neither necessary nor desirable at this time. So long as our recruiting needs continue to be met, and so long as the demands on the armed forces can be met with present force levels, a return to the draft is neither prudent nor required.

- The nation's ability to augment its forces in an emergency had eroded in mid-decade, however, and requires a reinvigoration. The reinstitution this summer of peacetime registration has been taken as a precautionary step to save crucial time in the event the nation had to mobilize in an emergency. (It was always intended that the AVF be augmented by conscription in such emergency circumstances.)

With the baby boom legacy receding (the prime recruiting pool in 1992 will be 20 percent smaller than its 1978 level) and with tougher competition for recruits, DoD has embraced two general strategies.

- First, we can reduce demand by managing the force in ways that permit us to need fewer recruits from the marketplace. DoD is already firmly embarked on such a course in three respects: reversing the trend of the 1970's toward high attrition (i.e., wash-outs) of first term personnel, pruning manpower requirements in weapons systems acquisition and design, and improving our long term retention of those who do join up.

• Second, we can expand supply, by embracing policies that would make more people eligible for military service, and would make service more attractive to those who are eligible. DoD is doing the first of these by increasing the enlistment of women for non-combat positions. It is also studying whether some of its physical entrance standards--many of these adopted in the draft era when supply was virtually unlimited--bear a sound relationship to required performance. The yield from this measure will be finite, however, to do the second--increase the attractiveness of service--will require some hard decisions. There has been a serious downward slide in the comparative value of military pay and benefits for junior personnel. Other federal programs that require no service obligations offer highly valued lures to youth. In educational assistance, we now have the G.I. Bill without the G.I.

We have made considerable headway, but certainly not enough, in both strategies since 1977. And there is nothing to suggest that the strategies themselves are not inherently appropriate.

Are the Services enlisting the "right kinds of people?" "The right quality?" The short answer is that there is no sure test to tell. True military readiness is difficult to measure and appraise; on-job performance can be graded, but its relationship to the testable characteristics of candidates for service remains a vague and imperfectly documented one.

Historically, the caliber of incoming recruits has been described using two surrogate measures: graduation from high school and entrance test scores.

By the first of these, high school graduation--a good predictor of a candidate's staying power and adaptability to discipline but not of his on-job performance--the Services have experienced a decline since mid-decade. At the same time, however, the staying power of both graduates and non-graduates (measured by attrition rates) has been improved in recent years, largely through better management of recruits after they join.

As for the second, we have recently found that in entrance tests--used to predict "trainability"--we have inadvertently inflated the scores of lower-scoring personnel in recent years, such that the Services have been mislabeling large numbers of recruits as having higher "aptitude" levels. The significance of these mischaracterizations may not, however, be very profound. DoD has now undertaken a special analysis of the relationship between these scores and the job performance of those whose scores were inflated. The first (but still tentative) findings suggest that most of the low scoring people have successfully completed training and are performing adequately.

The relationship of these predictors to "quality"--and the relationship of what a recruit brings to the military and what military service itself produces in the way of eventual "quality"--are imprecise, at best approximate, ultimate unsure. Neither the AVF's critics nor its supporters have an indisputable formula for measuring such things.

Defense Manpower--Overview

President Carter has been explicit in his opposition to a peacetime draft; he has submitted legislation for a fair benefits package to improve military pay and benefits; he has cut military attrition, and (measured against the years of the prior administration) improved military reenlistment rates. In addition he has corrected major weaknesses that arose during the prior administration with respect to our pool of mobilization manpower.

Specifically:

- First term attrition (the drop-out rate of those who sign up for military service but do not complete their terms) has fallen from 37% in 1976 to 30% in 1978.

- Conversely, reenlistment rates for DoD as a whole are up from 50% in 1976 to 53% now. (The reenlistment rates of first termers are up, particularly in the Army. Career reenlistment rates are down. The net effect is a modest plus.)

- As a general matter DoD has been within 1.5% of its active force manpower pools in every Carter year--a better record than in the prior two administrations.

- Virtually all of the particular items recommended by critics of this Administration's military pay and benefits policy (right down to the nitty gritty item of increasing the allowance for mobile homes) were first publicly recommended by this Administration.

- Beyond that, the Administration has been vocal in support of many important benefits that go beyond those endorsed by its critics. Among these are improvements in the military medical insurance program (CHAMPUS) under which the President has proposed the creation of dental and other benefits. The Administration also supports a variable housing allowance. It introduced--and supports--legislation that would permit larger pay raises for the military than for civilian government employees.

This Administration has not proposed reducing any in-service benefits,* and, as noted, has proposed numerous additions. An Administration proposal with respect to

* Note, it may be argued that the President's paid parking operation is such a diminution, but it more or less incidentally affects only a small fraction of military personnel.

military retirement (first advanced by an independent commission on the subject: would add \$7 billion to military pay and benefits over the next 20 years, while saving tens of billions of dollars over the longer term.

- It should be noted that selected reserves (i.e., reserves in units) strength declined dramatically every year during the last administration, while it has increased during the last two Carter years; that individual reserve strength declined even more dramatically during the last administration, but has been reversed by Carter programs; and that in reinstituting peacetime registration this Administration has restored an important standby mobilization capacity that the previous administration had abandoned for budgetary reasons.

MILITARY MANPOWER/REGISTRATION/DRAFT

Reagan

Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate draft registration and any peacetime draft.

"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration."

Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980

He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the same buildup as an alternative to registration.)

"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained in them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force) to deteriorate very badly. It is must too small, it is not equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the training.

National Journal
March 8, 1980

To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.

Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve strictly on a volunteer basis?

Reagan: yes.

Q: How, with pay incentives?

Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Bush

"I also support draft registration for both men and women, and I would like to see an immediate investigation of the readiness of our military troops. If the facts demand it, we should not hesitate to increase financial incentives for those in uniform or even to return to the draft. I am confident that our young people will rally to the flag as the need is there."

The Candidates 1980
 American Enterprise Instit:
 Received May 20, 1980

Bush

"I think that we have to have draft registration....I don't know whether we need a draft now. But when we do need it, I'm going to say so. A fair draft with not a lot of exemptions that would prevent people from serving, letting rich kids to ahead and get a PhD, while some poor ghetto kid gives his life in the service of his country....It'll be men and women. That doesn't mean that women will fight, go on the line or in the trenches. But I believe in women's rights and opportunities and I believe that women should have to serve their country."

Birmingham, AL, Post-Her:
 October 5, 1979

Bush

"It would be an equitable draft if we need it. It would be a non-sexist draft if we need it....But that main thing is that it would be a fair draft."

Champaign, IL, Daily Ill
 January 31, 1980

Bush

"I favor registration....I'm not convinced we need the draft, but if we ever should, it ought to be men and women, exemption proof and with a limited period of exposure."

Political Profiles
 page 6
 1979

Bush

"I voted for the volunteer Army. (But) we might have to go to a draft, and if we do it's going to be a fair-play draft. Not any exemption for a rich kid to get his PhD, and the poor kid gets the rifle."

Christian Science Monitc
 January 24, 1980

Carter

"At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both friend and foe alike.

It should be clear to everyone who studies national security or defense that our work to keep American the strongest nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of today and the world of tomorrow. "

Address to American Legion
Convention
August, 1980

USE OF FORCE/U.S. RESOLVEReagan

Reagan's record is replete with examples of suggestions that force be used to temper international disturbances. While he was governor, Reagan called upon President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam war, using nuclear threats.

"...no one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons...But...the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might."

Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967

Over the last 12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home) and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.

When questioned on his frequently used pledge -- "no more Taiwans, no more Vietnams" -- Reagan elaborated, describing the circumstances in which he would use combat troops, naval forces or air strikes to defend an ally:

"Well, it's a little bit like a Governor with the National Guard...You use whatever force is necessary to achieve the purpose..."

New York Times
June 2, 1980

Bush

We live in a nuclear age when no rational world leader can fail to recognize that a war between major powers risks the future existence of man on this planet.

Yet that risk hasn't deterred the leaders of the Soviet Union from aggression against its neighbor, Afghanistan -- or the reckless use of troops from its satellite, Cuba, in military ventures in the Middle East and Africa -- or from boldly placing a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba itself.

Certainly, the leaders of the Soviet Union don't seek a military confrontation with the United States. Throughout Soviet history, their penchant for aggression has always been for the easy, helpless mark -- from Poland in 1939, to Afghanistan in 1980.

But like Hitler at Danzig forty-one years ago, the Soviets' perception of the leading nation in the west as vacillating and militarily weak could one day result in a major power confrontation with unthinkable consequences.

The seizure of Danzig proved to be unacceptable to Britain and France. But Hitler miscalculated -- a miscalculation that led to war -- because the national leadership of Britain and France had already accepted the "unacceptable" in the seizure of the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Forty-one years later, America's leadership has accepted what was once described as "unacceptable" -- the stationing of a Russian combat brigade in Cuba.

In and of itself, that brigade doesn't pose a critical threat to American security. But President Carter's erratic response to the Soviets' action in this instance -- a policy of bluff-and-backdown--could well lead the men in the Kremlin to some future miscalculation -- an act of aggression that would force an American president to take measures leading to the confrontation no one wants.

This is what Ronald Reagan means when he says "We must make unmistakably plain to all the world that we have no intention of compromising our principles, our beliefs or our freedom. Our reward will be world peace; there is no other way to have it."

World Affairs Council
September 3, 1980

Carter

The maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me.

As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: "This is still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be re-won every day."

We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries and to support our friends and allies.

We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world. That price has increased as the military power of our major adversary has grown and its readiness to use that power been made all too evident in Afghanistan.

* * *

I see five basic goals for America in the world over the 1980's:

-- First, we will continue, as we have over the past three years, to build America's military strength and that of our allies and friends. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will have reason to question our will to sustain the strongest and most flexible defense forces.

-- Second, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working -- together with our friends and allies -- to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to make any aggressor pay a heavy price.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Carter

As I said in my State of the Union Address -- an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The purpose of my statement was to eliminate the possibility of any gross miscalculations by the Soviets about where our vital interests lie, or about our willingness to defend them. I am sure this is well understood.

Over the past year, we have made major strides in improving our capabilities to resist successfully further Soviet aggression in the region. Our efforts are designed to show the Soviets that we are both willing and able to deny them control over this vital region.

Persian Gulf Commitment

Carter

"Our world is one of conflicting hopes, ideologies and powers. It is a revolutionary world which requires confident, stable and powerful American leadership -- and that's what it is getting and that's what it will continue to get -- to shift the trend of history away from the specter of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace.

"So we must strive in our foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests.

"Unchanging American ideals are relevant to this troubling area of foreign policy and to this troubled era in which we live. Our society has always stood for political freedom. We have always fought for social justice and we have always recognized the necessity for pluralism. Those values of ours have a real meaning, not just in the past, 200 years ago or 20 years ago, but now, in a world that is no longer dominated by colonial empires and it demands a more equitable distribution of political and economic power.

"But in this age of revolutionary change, the opportunities for violence and for conflict have also grown. American power must be strong enough to deal with that danger and to promote our ideals and to defend our national interests.

"That's why the foreign policy which we've shaped over the last three years must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles -- principles founded on the enhancement of human rights -- and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none. This fusion of principle and power is the only way to ensure global stability and peace while we accommodate to the inevitable and necessary reality of global change and progress."

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia
May 9, 1980

STEALTHReagan

Ronald Reagan charged yesterday that President Carter's administration compromised national security for "purely political purposes" and "a two-day headline" by leaking secret plans to build a new bomber that could evade radar.

Speaking to a businessmen's luncheon at an outdoor rally in Jacksonville, Florida on his first Southern trip of the fall campaign, the Republican presidential nominee accused the Pentagon of giving the editor of the Armed Forces Journal details of the top-secret "stealth" program, then calling a news conference to announce it "because of 'leaks' to the press."

The "leak" involved, he said, "some of the most tightly classified, most highly secret weapon information since the Manhattan Project" -- the development of the atomic bomb during World War II.

September 4, 1980
Statement at Jacksonville Rally

Bush

"Suddenly we hear of plans for a new weapon in our strategic arsenal -- the highly-classified "Stealth" bomber -- which we're told gives us an edge over the Soviets. And while the Defense Secretary professes outrage that information regarding this new weapon has been leaked, we can only wonder at the coincidence that the leak occurred at the very time that President Carter's re-election campaign was stressing his new-found interest in our national defense posture.

"All of this may sound and look reassuring in terms of our country's ability to conduct a foreign policy based on strength -- but to those who remember history, the desperation of these administration efforts is ominous."

World Affairs Council Speech
September 5, 1980

Carter

I had one question inside that I thought I'd better repeat to you all because you're going to get it in the transcript. I was asked about the Republican allegations concerning whether we have revealed the information about the Stealth airplane improperly. This is an absolutely irresponsible and false charge by Governor Reagan and by a carefully orchestrated group of Republicans.

As a matter of fact, no impropriety has been committed. The only thing that has been revealed about the Stealth development which is a major technological evolutionary development for our country, is the existence of the program itself. When I became President in 1977 the existence of the Stealth program then was not even classified. It was unclassified. Public testimony had been given on it and a contract to develop a Stealth device was done with an open and published contract. We classified the Stealth program in the springtime of 1977.

Since that time it has grown because of its importance and the major nature of it more than a hundredfold. Lately large numbers of people were involved in the knowledge of Stealth and also the development of it. Literally thousands of workers have been involved in this project and we have had to brief several dozen Members of the House and Senate and the crucial members of their staffs in preparation for large expenditures of funds for this major technological improvement in our nation's defense.

It's obvious that the Republicans have taken what is a major benefit to our country and tried to play cheap politics with it by alleging that we have violated our nation's security. The fact is that we have enhanced our nation's security and we took an unclassified program under the previous Republican administration, classified it, and have been successful for three years in keeping the entire system secret.

Statement to Newspapers
September 9, 1980

STEALTH

1. This is a major technological advantage to us. It is an important achievement that will affect the military balance in the coming years. It is one of a number of major technological advantages that the U.S. possesses. These technological advantages weigh heavily in the military balance and keep us second to none. In addition to stealth, these include anti-submarine warfare, precise guided munitions (smart bombs) and the cruise missile. We have publicly discussed our advantages in these other technologies in the past and will continue to do so in the future, because it is important that our potential enemies, our allies and the American people understand our military strengths. This is an essential factor in deterring war.

2. As with the other programs, we have kept secret the technical and operational details of stealth that give us an advantage.

3. Secrecy on the details of stealth combined with our technological achievements will enable us to keep ahead of the Soviets in this program for decades to come.

4. Programs to make aircraft less visible to radar have existed for 20 years. When this Administration came into office, stealth was a low-level technology program and its existence was not classified as secret. The program had been dealt with in open testimony and in open contracts. In the spring of 1977, stealth was turned into a major development and production program [do not say what vehicles we will produce] and the existence of the new program was classified at the highest level. The funding level is now more than 100 times larger than it was in early 1977 and there have been major achievements in the program.

5. Hundreds of contractor personnel are now working on stealth and over 40 members of Congress and Congressional staff members were briefed on the existence of the program and provided varying details about it before the August 11-14 leaks. The increasing size of the program and the increasing numbers of persons aware of it made certain that its existence would have come out in the near future.

HEARINGS
ON
MILITARY POSTURE
AND
H.R. 3689
[H.R. 6674]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1976 AND 1977
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

Part 4 of 4 Parts

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUB-
COMMITTEE TITLE II, H.R. 6674

HEARINGS HELD MARCH 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 24, 25; AND APRIL 9, 11, AND 14, 1975



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1975

81-042 O

navigation systems. That is, in which we call HOWLS,

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and identification area is the work on what we call "sanc-

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Written Statement of Dr. George H. Heilmeyer, Director,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

INTRODUCTION

This is my first appearance before this Committee, having assumed my present position of Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in late-January. I would like to describe my background and what I bring to ARPA. I would also like to explain the role of ARPA, and my own view of the unique approach and contribution of ARPA to the solution of Defense problems. Finally, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will leave for the record a description and explanation of the ARPA programs that are included in the President's budget and respond to any questions the Committee may have concerning the program, my background and views.

I bring to this job a sense of commitment, a low tolerance for bureaucratic shuffling, a record as a market-oriented technologist and a determination to give the country a fair return on its R&D investment. I also bring a unique perspective to the job in that, in addition to my industrial R&D experience, I have also viewed ARPA from the vantage point of a position in the Office of the Director of

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certain degradations, they cannot in principle compensate for film or
sensor errors since they act on the light before it reaches these elements.
Thus, ARPA is also investigating postdetection compensation techniques
which enhance an image after it has been formed and recorded. While
these techniques are generally less efficient at correcting atmospherically
induced errors, they are effective in removing blur due to instrument errors
and in enhancing contrast in particular areas of the image. Here, ARPA's
main thrust has been the development of computerized methods of blur
removal when the precise mathematical representation of the cause of the
blur is initially unknown.

The effectiveness and ability of offensive weapons systems to
reach their targets are directly related to the vulnerability of the systems
to early warning, detection and track. The ability to control the radar
cross section (RCS) of air vehicles can decrease their detectability and
this improves the overall effectiveness of offensive systems. Both passive
and active techniques as well as vehicle design parameters are being
employed to control RCS. Vehicle design practices have been established
but are generally compromised by mission constraints in an actual design.
Passive technology is fairly well established. The active techniques under

investigation, while as yet unproven, do offer the potential for high RCS reduction and minimum air vehicle redesign. To be effective, active RCS control technology must demonstrate adaptive wide band control through large variations in target aspect angles for targets which are roughly the same size as the incident energy wavelength. Several new techniques as well as new design practices are being evaluated to determine their capability to control RCS.

ARPA is currently developing advanced imaging radars operating at both microwave and laser frequencies. There are, however, limitations in resolution, image detail, and range. The first approach to overcome these limitations is ARPA's modification of the one hundred twenty foot diameter Haystack radar in Massachusetts by the addition of a new RF box and signal processing system. This system uses a more advanced form of the data processing technique previously developed. Operational testing at the system level is scheduled to begin in FY77. The second approach is the development of a wideband laser radar operating at 10.6 μm wavelength. Operational testing of the laser radar is scheduled to occur in FY78. Compared to the costs of the various concepts of the past decade, the ARPA investment in imaging radars has been extremely modest (\$28.4M FY72-75), while the information that has and will be provided is significant.

An RPV radar demonstration is being started to provide destroyer escort and smaller ships with ocean surveillance. This RPV radar could

August 9, 1976, Aerospace Daily

XST: Name being heard for the new stealth aircraft being built at Lockheed under sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAILY, July 23) is the XST, which may stand for "experimental, stealth (or silent), tactical." Aircraft also may have a new missile. Ben Rich, Kelly Johnson's successor as head of Lockheed's "Skunk Works," is playing the key role in the program. Johnson, although formally retired, has continued working two or three days a week at Lockheed and is given major credit for convincing the military that the plan can be built.

August 2, 1976, Aviation Week

Development of a small fighter intended to demonstrate stealth, or low signature, technologies under contract from Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, funded by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

May 5, 1975, Commerce Business Daily: Air Force gives them copies of all contract summaries (p. 21 col 2)

A--HIGH STEALTH AIRCRAFT DESIGN STUDY.
Contr F-33615-75-C-2056 (F-33615-75-R2056)
funded by ASD/YRPHM, 513/255-4036 (A119),
Wright-Patterson, AFB, OH 45433

July 28, 1976, Aerospace Daily from an Air Force contract (p. 19 col 3)

A--LOW RCS VEHICLE DESIGN HANDBOOK (Additional Work, Time, and Money) Contr F-33615-75C-3094 (F-33615-75R3094) funded by AFFDL/FES, 513 255-5066, Wright-Patterson AFB, Oh 45433

HEARINGS
ON
MILITARY POSTURE
AND
H.R. 5068
[H.R. 5970]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978

BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

Part 3 of 6 Parts
Book 2 of 2 Books

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TITLE II

HEARINGS HELD FEBRUARY 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25,
MARCH 7, 16, AND 28, 1977



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1977

53-574 O

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE H. HEILMEIER

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

TECHNOLOGICAL INITIATIVE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES OF THE 1980'S

I. INTRODUCTION

When I appeared before this committee last year, I outlined an investment strategy which focused on some key questions whose answers are deeply rooted in advanced technology. There is little doubt in my mind that these questions could become the national security issues of the 1980's. Let me review them briefly:


- Are there technologies on the horizon that could make possible a space-related use of high energy lasers and could such a laser system in the hands of the Soviets threaten our vital satellite network and strategic deterrent capability? Conversely, could such a laser serve the United States in some defensive way?
- Are there technologies on the horizon that can provide surveillance capable of detecting aircraft and warning us of missile launches?
- Is a new class of underwater surveillance systems possible that could detect and localize submerged submarines at great range with sufficient accuracy to target them? What are the limits of ocean hearing? Can the oceans really be made "transparent?"
- What is the nature of armor on the battlefield of the future? Are there technologies that could permit unique tradeoffs to the age-old parameters of mobility, agility, armor, and firepower? Could such technologies result in a new and better class of lower-cost armored vehicles?

- What can technology do about the seemingly endless spiral of increasing costs? For example, can we dramatically reduce the cost of jet engines by making them out of new types of ceramics instead of costly and strategically critical metallic superalloys? Can the sophistication and low cost represented by the pocket calculator and digital watch be used to simplify the maintenance problems of our equipment and make it more reliable?
- What are the technological initiatives in the command and control area that could enable us to use our current forces more effectively? For example, can pocket switching, intelligent terminals, or computer-based decision aids significantly improve command and control?
- Can we develop a new class of airborne systems with the capability of "assured penetration" of enemy air defense systems?
- Are there technological breakthroughs possible which could lower the cost or greatly increase the speed, range, and endurance of small unmanned vehicles?

Even two years ago some of these questions would have seemed like something out of a modern day Jules Verne novel. However, as a result of DAXPA initiatives, while difficult technical problems remain, the technologies to answer each of these questions in the affirmative are on the horizon today and require little in the way of major, unknown, conceptual breakthroughs to make visionary answers to these questions a reality. But what are the implications to our security assuming that we or the Soviets are successful?

For a moment, I'd like you to consider:

- Space Defense - Both the United States and Russia depend heavily on space assets. Ponder the consequences of a space associated system that could protect our own satellite resources while possessing the capability to destroy enemy satellites in a surgical and timely manner.



THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT
TEST AND
EVALUATION
FY 1978**

STATEMENT
BY
THE HONORABLE
MALCOLM R. CURR
DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

TO THE 95th CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION 1977

- o Cruise missiles -- already changing military thinking -- are in their infancy and offer revolutionary potential. Future characteristics such as "zero CEP" accuracy at large stand-off ranges and supersonic dash, at relatively low cost, will fundamentally change land, sea, and air warfare.
- o High energy lasers.
- o New forms of undersea submarine detection.
- o New capabilities in space, including satellites used for targeting, missile guidance and surveillance.
- o Applications of the Space Shuttle.
- o ~~Aircrafts with low observables to make them virtually undetectable and with VSTOL capabilities.~~
- o New forms of defense against ballistic missiles.

All of these and others will dominate future thinking and our future programs. A vigorous technology base must be created now.

NATO STANDARDIZATION

There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving efficiencies and improved effectiveness through standard and interoperable systems in NATO.

I feel the US should take the lead in bringing this about through a policy of international cooperation with our Allies which will encompass joint industrial programs, licensing both ways, and co-production.

We have been pursuing this goal vigorously. We have made a great deal of progress despite the complexities of national interests, international economic factors, and industrial pressure groups here and abroad. But we still have a long way to go. The Culver-Nunn legislation has been very supportive of this effort.

Mr. President, as the controversy over the stealth program continues, let me address a few of what I consider to be the essential points.

First, despite the recent flurry of charges from past, current, and would-be public officials, there is simply no evidence of planned, high-level Administration leaks about stealth. In fact, not only has the current Administration increased spending on stealth one-hundred fold, but three years ago it, for the first time ever, classified the very existence of the program, and since has kept knowledge of it restricted to a named list of individuals.

Second, going back at least as far as 1976, there have been published reports of attempts to reduce radar detectability, to make aircraft "invisible," as it were. It is inconceivable to me that Soviet analysts missed these various references, so we can assume they have been aware for some time that the U.S. was engaged in such efforts.

Third, as the stealth program continued to become larger and more expensive, its existence would have had to be made public in the near future anyway. The existence of a program of this size, with hundreds of contractor personnel and government officials

involved, could not be kept secret much longer--under any circumstances.

Fourth, a rash of press reports of stealth occurred last month, leaving the Pentagon no practical recourse but to acknowledge the existence of the program--admittedly slightly earlier than they wanted to or would have had to, in the absence of such press reports I do not see how, in August 1980, the Soviets, who already knew from open literature about such work, could have been tricked into believing that there really was no such program. They are not naive men in the Kremlin, although some in this country apparently would have us believe they are.

Lastly, the Pentagon has now drawn a clear line between what little has been declassified regarding stealth and everything else about the program. It behooves all of us to honor that line and to do all we can to see that others do as well.

Let me also make two observations in passing. One is that I cannot help but be struck by what one distinguished journalist has called the "selective indignation" on the part of some of those who are most loudly and fervently decrying alleged leaks about steal. One wonders why all of these same voices were not raised in indignat when earlier leaks occurred about U.S. negotiating positions during SALT or about various Soviet strategic programs. One merely wonders one doesn't know why.

The second observation involves current allegations that the incumbent Secretary of Defense has broken tradition and engaged in what are described as unusual, if not unprecedented activities, such as replying to charges made by political candidates about defense policy. I have not researched this matter closely and my memory is far from perfect, but I do seem to recall other Secretaries of Defense--in both Republican and Democratic Administrations--addressing party platform committees, correcting inaccurate allegations about defense matters, at times even using very strong language while replying.

It is not unusual for national security matters to become issues in a campaign. It is not unusual for challengers to make criticisms, and it is not unusual for incumbents to make replies.

Best we get diverted into partisan exchanges that obscure the real issues, let me offer my opinion that the most important question to be answered after the stealth dust settles is: in a democratic society, yet one which has real adversaries around the world, how do we protect our most vital secrets while not losing the freedoms which define our system and our way of life? The answers are not obvious or easy. They involve questions of policy, of law, of ethics, of freedom of the press, of justice. These are the matters to which this body must return.

Mr. Speaker, the overriding concern in the matter of the stealth program is whether the Soviets have benefitted from recent publicity of the program. A secondary, but nonetheless very important concern is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated leaks of classified information about the program for political gain--and thereby giving the Soviets a head start in countering stealth technology.

I don't know about the infrared signature of stealth aircraft, but I do know that, so far, this controversy has generated far more heat than light.

Let me try to shed some light on this matter, in part by putting it in a broader context and by laying out a fuller chronology of events. From much of the current controversy, even the moderately attentive observer would get the impression that the whole affair began with a meeting on August 18, 1980, between Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benjamin Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal. In fact, there is much more history to be reckoned with.

Virtually since the invention of radar, scientists have been working to develop ways to offset it--to blind radars, to fool radars, to make objects less detectable by radar. As in many areas of high technology, the United States has been in the vanguard of this work. The professional journals and the trade press have published articles about such research over the years.

Contrary to the impression recently left by former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. effort in this area was not highly classified until 1977. In the ^{fall} ~~spring~~ of that year, after recognizing the true potential of stealth, the Carter Administration turned it into a major development and production program; compartmentalized it, and classified even the existence of this new, intensified program. This is the first important landmark in the chronology of stealth.

The second is in June 1978, when Ben Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal came to Dr. Perry with an article about stealth--an article 98 percent of which, Mr. Schemmer testified, came from unclassified sources, yet which contained so much sensitive information that Dr. Perry, invoking our national security interest, asked Mr. Schemmer not to print it. To his credit, Mr. Schemmer agreed--but let me emphasize that Mr. Schemmer did not initiate the notion of restraint; Dr. Perry did.

And the secret held for over two years, despite a dramatic expansion of the scope and size of the program, and therefore the number of people who had to--and did--know about it.

The third landmark is a series of stories this summer, beginning with a June 28 Washington Post article describing a new bomber that "could be made invisible to enemy radar through highly secret gadgetry."

Then in the second week of August, three stories in rapid succession:

- August 11 -- Aviation Week and Space Technology refers to "the advanced technology 'stealth' bomber." Two sentences in the article are worth highlighting in our search for who leaked what to whom and when:
 "Several in the Senate contend Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William J. Perry oversold the 'stealth' aircraft in order to stop a Senate amendment for a new but more conventional bomber. Perry's stealth bomber, one senator complained, is too small, will cost \$14-15 billion for 50 aircraft and cannot be ready by 1987, the date requested by Congress."
- August 14 -- the Washington Post publishes the article that Gen Ellis of SAC has said "brought the

The key point is that, while there had been occasional public references to such work over the years, the summer of 1980 brought a rapid-fire series of such stories--this at a time when more and more people--members of the House and Senate, their staffs, Defense Department and other executive branch officials, and contractors--were being brought in on the Stealth program as it continued to grow in size and intensity and cost.

As members of this House know well, there is a world of difference between rare and scattered references to an issue and a flurry of stories about one.

After this flurry of articles, a period of intense activity began at the Pentagon--and, again, the chronology is important.

-- August 14 -- the date of the last two stories - Dr. Perry sends Secretary Brown new security guidelines for stealth, declassifying the existence of the program, but drawing a tight circle around sensitive technical and operational details.

-- August 16 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Air Force Secretary Mark meet and give final approval to the new guidelines,

order additional Congressional briefings, and decide on an August 22 press conference to announce the existence of the stealth program.

- -- August 18 -- With Brown's approval, Perry meets with Schemmer, tells him of the August 22 press conference and indicates what has been declassified. Perry offers to let Schemmer print the story of what has been declassified, one day in advance of the press conference--because Schemmer has honored Perry's 1978 request to hold AFJ's earlier stealth story.
- August 19 -- Schemmer shows Perry his new article, and--at Perry's request--agrees to delete about a dozen items, several of which Perry felt were particularly important from a security point of view.
- August 20 -- Perry gives SECRET stealth briefings to four Congressional committees, specifying what has been declassified and what remains classified at SECRET level, and

states that all other stealth information remains compartmented at the highest security level.

- August 21 -- Schemmer article appears.
- August 22 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Gen Kelly Burke hold a press conference. They confirm: 1.) that a stealth program exists, 2.) that tests have been conducted, 3.) that stealth does not involve a single technical approach, and 4.) that stealth technology could be applied to many military vehicles. Following the new guidelines, they emphasize that operational and technical details will be protected at the highest security level.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we come back to the key question--did the Soviets benefit from DoD's public acknowledgement of stealth's existence?

The answer, I believe, clearly is no. You don't have to be a Washington veteran or an intelligence expert to know that the Soviets read Aviation Week, Aerospace Daily, the Washington Post, and other important journals and newspapers. They watch American

television news as well. So, they had seen, over the years, a number of reports in respected and authoritative publications about a U.S. program that had real consequences for Soviet defense. Well before Brown's August 22 press conference, Soviet scientists and engineers--and, no doubt, Soviet intelligence agents--were hard at work on stealth and possible countermeasures.

They weren't tipped off by Harold Brown on August 22, or by the Schemmer article on August 21. And nothing Harold Brown could have said on August 22 could have turned them off. Given the public reports over the years, and given the importance of U.S. stealth capabilities to the Soviets, does anyone seriously believe that, had Harold Brown said "no comment," "neither confirm nor deny," or "stories about Stealth are a bunch of baloney," the Kremlin would have breathed a sigh of relief and told the scientists, engineers, and KGB agents working on stealth to go back to other projects?

The second question, Mr. Speaker, is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated stealth leaks for political gain? Unlike Mr. Schemmer in his sworn testimony before a Committee of this House, I will not engage in speculation about other people's motives.

As to leaks this summer, Aviation Week cites "several in the Senate," not administration sources. The Washington Post says its June 28 article was based on interviews "with defense specialists

in Congress and the Carter Administration." It does not say only with DoD officials.

As for the Armed Forces Journal, in 1978 it was Schemmer who came to Perry with the story--not the other way around. It was Perry who asked Schemmer not to go public--not the other way around. In August of this year, Perry--who as a contractor and as a defense official has been working with classified material for years--says he gave Schemmer no classified information in 1978 or in 1980. Schemmer, whose publication regularly--one is tempted to say routinely--prints classified information, says his sources for the 1978 article included people in Congress, in the White House, and at the Pentagon. Contrary to what some may believe, the Armed Forces Journal was not a virgin as far as classified information is concerne

In conclusion, let me summarize: Secretary Brown's August 22 press conference did not tip off the Soviets. Earlier press accounts had. In August 1980, no other response could have turned the Soviets off.

Until three years ago, the existence of Stealth was not classified. For the past three years it has been, even to the point that you yourself, Mr. Speaker, have indicated you were not aware of it.

An investigation is underway to find the source of the earlier leaks. A tight security circle has been drawn around operational and technical details of the program.

The August 21 Schemmer article was not the excuse or the occasion or the trigger for the August 22 press conference. Earlier press reports led to that course.

Who leaked what to whom, when, how, and why is a matter for the investigators. As testimony before a Committee of this House has revealed, there are real and serious problems in maintaining security and investigating breaches of it. By and large, these problems are not a function of executive policy, but rather a function of the law. Legislation is written in this building, not in the Pentagon. And it is to legislation regarding secrecy and security that those of us in this building should turn our attention. There is much important and difficult work to be done, and I say full speed ahead.

Grain Embargo

September 10, 1980

- Q: Why do you continue the grain embargo? The Soviets have apparently covered their grain needs from other sources. Has the embargo had any noticeable effect on the Soviet economy?
- A: -- I ordered the partial suspension of grain sales to the USSR to force the Soviet Union to pay a concrete price for its aggression in Afghanistan. They have paid -- and are continuing to pay -- that price. Evidence continues to mount that the grain suspension is having a substantial, adverse impact on the Soviet economy, in particular, on the livestock industry.
- By suspending grain sales above the 8 million metric tons (MMT) required by our bilateral agreement, we denied the Soviets 17 MMT. We estimate that the USSR will be able to make up only 8-9 MMT of the 17 MMT during the 1979/80 agreement year (October 1979-September 1980).
- The impact has been especially severe in the first half of 1980. The Soviets had hoped to import about 20.5 MMT between January and June. They obtained only 14.0 MMT. The resulting shortfall of 6.5 MMT is equal to 10% of Soviet total feedgrain requirements for that period.
- Meat production has suffered. In the first seven months of 1980, total meat output was 5% below 1979 levels. And the trend is downward. Meat production dropped

-- The grain embargo has stymied Soviet plans to provide the Soviet consumer more meat and dairy products. Per capita meat consumption remains at the 1975 level, far short of the 1980 target. Meat consumption in the USSR lags behind all Eastern European countries.

September 10, 1980

Continuation of the Embargo

Q: When do you plan to end the grain embargo?

A: I have no intention of lifting the partial embargo on grain sales to the USSR for the foreseeable future. We will honor the US-Soviet long term grain agreement which allows the USSR to buy up to 8 million metric tons of US grain annually. But we will not sell more than that amount unless the Soviets stop their aggression in Afghanistan.

USSR GRAIN EMBARGOReagan

Reagan has long been an opponent of selling wheat to the Russians. He has, on two occasions, advocated halting grain sales to the Soviet Union.

"But isn't there also a moral issue? Are we not helping the Godless tyranny maintain its hold on millions of helpless people? Wouldn't those helpless victims have a better chance of becoming free if their slave masters collapsed economically?...Maybe there is an answer -- we simply do what's morally right. Stop doing business with them. Let their system collapse, but meantime buy our farmers' wheat ourselves and have it on hand to feed the Russian people when they finally become free."

Radio Transcript
October 29, 1975

After disclosure of a Russian brigade in Cuba, Reagan said:

"If the Russians want to buy wheat from us...I wouldn't sell it to them."

Los Angeles Times
September 30, 1979

In fact, in 1975 Reagan suggested using a grain embargo to force the Soviets out of Angola and in June, 1979 Reagan advocated a "no crude, no food" policy toward Nigeria.

However, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan Reagan commented:

"I just don't believe the farmer should be made to pay a special price for our diplomacy, and I'm opposed to what's being done (proposed Soviet grain embargo)."

Washington Post
January 8, 1980

Bush

"You're not going to get the Russians out of Afghanistan by embargoing eight million tons of grain. What's missing is a redefinition of our foreign policy."

Worcester, MA, Gazette
January 16, 1980

Carter

"In response to the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve, I took several actions to demonstrate our Nation's resolve to resist such hostile acts of aggression against a sovereign, independent nation. One of the most important of these actions was the suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million tons provided under our 1975 grains agreement. The Soviet Union had intended to purchase an estimated 25 million tons of U.S. wheat and feed grains. Thus, the suspension of sales above the 8 million ton agreement level is expected to result in the freeing of about 17 million tons.

My decision to suspend these sales was a difficult one, but a necessary one. We could not continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union while it is invading an independent, sovereign nation in an area of the world of strategic importance to the United States. I am fully committed to a policy of promoting international trade, and particularly the expanded export of U.S. agricultural products. I am proud of my Administration's record in this regard. Because of the aggressive efforts of American farmers and businessmen, working in cooperation with Federal representatives, and the provision of new authorities by Congress, we have set new export records in each of the past 3 years. Even with the Soviet suspension, we intend to set still another record in the coming year. In making my decisions on the suspension, I believe it would be unfair to ask the American farmer to bear a greater share of the burden and sacrifice than their fellow Americans were asked to bear. Farmers should not be penalized simply because they are part of an agricultural machine that is of growing strategic importance in the world.

To protect American farmers from the price depressing effects of the grain suspension, I directed the Secretary of Agriculture to take several actions:

- The Commodity Credit Corporation will assume the contractual obligations for grain previously committed for shipment to the Soviet Union.
- The Department of Agriculture, acting through the Commodity Credit Corporation, will purchase wheat contracted for export to the Soviet Union for the purpose of forming an emergency international wheat reserve. In this connection, I will propose legislation authorizing release of this wheat for international aid purposes.

- To encourage farmers to place additional grain in reserve, the Secretary of Agriculture has made several modifications in that important program.
- The Commodity Credit Corporation will purchase corn at the local level to alleviate the congestion within the transportation system caused by the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Association to load grain up to the 8 million metric ton level.

In combination, these actions are expected to isolate from the market an amount of grain equivalent to that not shipped to the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding a decline in grain prices. I am pleased to report that these actions are having the desired results and that American farmers are being protected from the effects of the suspension.

If further actions are necessary to insure that American agriculture does not bear a disproportionately large share of the burden associated with this action, I will not hesitate to take them.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Mondale

"In the President's address to the nation Friday night, he announced that we were suspending shipments of grain to the Soviet Union in excess of the 8 million tons per year that we are committed to sell under the five-year grain agreement that expires next year. As a result, approximately 16 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union will not be delivered.

In addition, he directed that no sales of high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice while we review our licensing policy.

These are strong actions. The President took them because it is absolutely crucial to force the Soviet Union to pay a heavy price for the aggression it has chosen to commit in Afghanistan.

Like any strong action, the grain suspension is not without cost to ourselves. But as the President said Friday night, he is determined that this cost will be shared fairly by all of us. American farmers are just as willing as other Americans to carry their share of the burden -- but they must not be forced to carry an extra share just because they are farmers.

That is why the Administration took a number of immediate actions to protect farmers from adverse price effects associated with the suspension.

The President has today directed Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland to take one additional step to make absolutely sure that our farmers are not unfairly penalized for an action that is in the best interest of the entire nation. To minimize disruptions in the nation's grain markets and economic damage to farmers resulting from the export suspension, he is directing the Secretary of Agriculture to offer to purchase contractual obligations for wheat, corn, and soybeans previously committed for shipment to the Soviet Union. The Commodity Credit Corporation will assume these contracts at the contract price minus any costs that have not already been paid. Our purpose is to protect against losses, not to guarantee profits. This grain will not be sold back into the markets until it can be done without unduly affecting market prices.

This action, in combination with those already announced by the Secretary of Agriculture on Saturday, will ensure that the quantities of grain that would have been shipped to the Soviet Union will be isolated from the market and that America's farmers will face essentially the same set of supply-deemed conditions as if the sales to the Soviet Union had gone forward.

I know that the President is personally gratified at the many expressions of support he has received from the farm community. Although we are determined to see that the farmers are not unfairly penalized by this suspension, some sacrifices will be required of everyone. Again, we will do the very best we can to make certain that these sacrifices are shared fairly."

Press Statement
January 7, 1980

August 28, 1980

PERSIAN GULF COMMITMENT

Q: What is the nature of our commitment to defend the Persian Gulf region?

A: As I said in my State of the Union address -- an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The purpose of my statement was to eliminate the possibility of any gross miscalculations by the Soviets about where our vital interests lie, or about our willingness to defend them. I am sure this is well understood.

Over the past year, we have made major strides in improving our capabilities to resist successfully further Soviet aggression in the region. Our efforts are designed to show the Soviets that we are both willing and able to deny them control over this vital region.

August 25, 1980

Impact of the Grain Suspension on the Soviet Economy

1. Soviet Grain Requirements. The 1979 Soviet grain crop of 179 million metric tons (MMT) was the smallest since 1975 -- 48 MMT below plan and 58 MMT below the record 1978 harvest. We originally estimated that the Soviets would import 36 MMT during the period October 1979-September 1980, the fourth year of the US/Soviet long term agreement. Of that 36 MMT, the Soviets planned to buy 25 MMT from the US. The President's decision to limit exports to the 8 MMT ceiling established in the agreement denied the USSR 17 MMT of grain. We estimate that by September 30 the Soviets will be able to import only 8-9 MMT of the 17 MMT, leaving them with a shortfall of 8-9 MMT during the 1979/80 agreement year.

But viewed on a marketing year basis (July 1979-June 1980), which relates more directly to the availability of domestic crops in the USSR, the impact of the grain suspension is more dramatic. Without our grain embargo, the Soviets would have imported about 37.5 MMT during the 1979/80 marketing year. They acquired 17 MMT before the embargo went into effect and planned to purchase 20.5 MMT more during the first six months of 1980. We believe they have obtained only 14 MMT -- 6.5 MMT less planned. This is equal to 10% of the USSR's feedgrain requirements during the six month period.

2. Impact on Soviet Meat Production. The shortfall in feedgrains is having a substantial impact on the Soviet livestock industry. So economic journals report that state meat production is down 5% in the first seven months of 1980 compared with 1979. And the trend is downward. In May, total meat output was down 5.6% from May 1979. Production in June and July was off 10.7% and 15%, respectively, from corresponding months in 1979. We can attribute much of this steady decline in production to shortages in imported feedgrains during the first half of 1980.

3. Impact on Soviet Meat Consumption. The availability of meat is a sensitive internal issue in the USSR and is considered by Soviet consumers an important measure of their standard of living. The 1979 crop failure and the partial grain embargo have caused a serious setback in Soviet plans to improve the availability of meat and other animal products to the Soviet consumer. Per capita meat consumption will remain at the 1975 level of 125 lbs compared with the 1980 goal of 139 lbs. Soviet per capita meat consumption lags behind all Eastern European countries (e.g. 156-159 lbs in Poland and Hungary) and far behind the US (244 lbs). With meat production falling over the short term, the Soviets will not be able to meet consumption goals for the foreseeable future. There are recurring reports of severe meat and dairy product shortages throughout the USSR.

4. Soviet Grain Prospects. Secretary Bergland recently testified that Soviet grain production in 1980 should be in the 200-225 MMT range with the most likely estimate placed at 210 MMT. The latter figure may now be optimistic. Our Embassy in Moscow reports that hopes for a large harvest have diminished because of bad weather. Prospects are for a crop of about 200 MMT with the possibility that they may even dip below this level. The implications are clear: (1) the USSR will not be able to rebuild depleted grain stocks without a further cut in meat production in 1981; and (2) Soviet grain import demand in 1980/81 will remain strong. With a crop of between 200-225 MMT the Soviets would probably prefer to buy substantially more than 30 MMT to meet current consumption needs and rebuild stocks. But the embargo has effectively reduced Soviet port capacity. In shifting from US to non-US suppliers, the average load per ship has decreased while the port turnaround time has lengthened substantially. Such logistic constraints limit the Soviet Union's ability to handle more than 30 MMT of grain imports annually.

September 3, 1980

CHARGE: Defense spending declined during the Nixon-Ford years because of the Southeast Asia wind-down.

REBUTTAL: That is true, but even absent Southeast Asia-associated costs, Defense-related spending declined in five of those eight years by about 7%, or almost by the amount we have in four years increased it.

CHARGE: The decline in Republican Defense budgets was not so great as we have said it was.

REBUTTAL:

-- Measured across the years 1970 to 1977, and in constant dollars, defense spending fell more than 35%. This figure is produced by totalling the decline in defense outlays over those eight years, which are the years over which the Republican Administration exercised control.

-- The President's record on defense spending is that of steady and sustained growth, and is in sharp contrast to the record of significant declines during the prior eight years. When the Carter Administration's commitment to national security is evaluated under the

appropriate measure of defense expenditures -- outlays: the money actually spent in any given year to produce tangible improvement in our armed forces -- the record reveals that outlays rose by 10.1% in constant dollars over the 4 year period. As projected in the current Five Year Defense Program, at the end of President Carter's second term, Defense spending will have increased over the eight year period, by 27%.

CHARGE: That spending declines from 1970 to 1977 were caused by Congressional reductions to the budget request, and the Congress was controlled by Democrats.

REBUTTAL: True, Democrat-controlled Congresses did reduce annual Defense appropriations requests (on an average only by between 5-10%), but the requests themselves declined by \$30 to \$40 billion in the eight

years before FY 78. Not until President Carter's defense budget proposals, beginning in FY 1978 and running for four consecutive years, did continuing increases occur. This record underlines the President's consistent commitment to sustaining modernizing defense capabilities.

CHARGE: The Carter Administration has irresponsibly reduced the Navy Shipbuilding Program initiated by the Republican Administration.

REBUTTAL: Under the last Republican Administration (from 1970 to 1977) the U.S. Naval Fleet declined in size from 847 ships to 543. The current fleet size is 539 vessels (all numbers include the Active Fleet, the Naval Reserve Force, the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force and Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines). Under the current five year shipbuilding plan, our fleet will increase to 590 by 1990. These facts provide a weak basis for the Republican opposition to criticize our naval posture.

-- Like President Ford's budget for fiscal year 1978, submitted after his defeat at the polls, left Republican officials free to propose a budget that would neither have to be defended before Congress nor executed, the Ford 1977, 156-ship five year plan was a lame duck document that did not have to meet the tests of affordability and consistency. The program proposed

twice as many ships per year as the average number authorized by Congress during the previous seven years.

-- In contrast, the current Carter program is based on a policy to structure a realistic, executable 5-year ship building program within available resources, rather than to continue to delude ourselves with unrealistic shipbuilding plans.

-- The Carter Administration five year shipbuilding plan provides for the construction of 97 new ships, and for major modernization of five other ships, including three aircraft carriers. Two-thirds of these new ships are combatants, the rest are support vessels. The shipbuilding plan reflects two deliberate decisions to increase our strength and military flexibility: the construction of highly capable combatant ships (as exemplified by the construction of sixteen CG-47 class, AEGIS-equipped guided missile cruisers), and supporting our rapid deployment forces through the procurement of 14 newly designed maritime prepositioning ships.

CHARGE: President Carter irresponsibly cancelled the B-1.

REBUTTAL: It is true, as Mr. Reagan claims, that President Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber program; but what Mr. Reagan does not explain is that the decision to

do so was based on the President's judgment that the B-1 would have been obsolete ^{shortly after} ~~even before it was ready for~~ deployment -- an assessment that, incidentally, has been confirmed by our most recent intelligence on Soviet advances in air defense. In addition, Mr. Reagan neglects to mention that instead of developing the B-1, President Carter chose to modernize our bomber forces by equipping our B-52s with small, long-range, and deadly-accurate cruise missiles, which had not previously been developed, and which are far more able to penetrate Soviet air defenses than the B-1.

CHARGE: President Carter irresponsibly stopped Minuteman Production.

REBUTTAL: It is true, as Mr. Reagan claims, that President Carter stopped production of the Minuteman III; but what Mr. Reagan does not explain is the context within which the decision was made. The decision had been firmly taken to limit Minuteman deployment to 450 Minuteman II and 550 Minuteman III ICBMs. This fact, along with our commitment to a follow-on strategic missile system eliminated the need for any Minutemen beyond a reasonable number of spares. We already had 100 "extra" Minuteman III missiles in inventory. Thus, continued production at a cost of as much as \$300 million a year made no sense.

CHARGE: President Carter irresponsibly delayed M-X development.

REBUTTAL: It is true, as Mr. Reagan claims, that President Carter initially delayed development of the M-X program; but what Mr. Reagan does not explain is that when the Carter Administration entered office, we inherited an M-X basing concept which subsequent analysis indicated was vulnerable to a first strike. It was only after considerably more analysis and work that the mobile basing scheme was decided upon to preserve the retaliatory capability of our ICBMs, and to permit us to proceed with the M-X program, which is now fully underway.

CHARGE: President Carter has irresponsibly slowed the Trident program.

REBUTTAL: Mr. Reagan's assertion that President Carter has cut the TRIDENT I Missile program and decided against the TRIDENT II Missile is simply incorrect; the TRIDENT I program has been fully implemented by this Administration, and President Carter has taken the first positive step by any administration to implement the TRIDENT II program by formally indicating his intention to fund it in the FY 1982 budget.

CHARGE: We must seek strategic superiority.

REBUTTAL: This Administration is committed to the maintenance of a military force that is equal to none.

Unlike Mr. Reagan, however, this Administration does not advocate a policy of American military superiority over the Soviet Union. As superficially desirable as the goal of across-the-board supremacy may be in the abstract, a common-sense assessment shows that pursuit of such an objective would:

- Mean the end of arms control;
- Produce an uncontrolled and very expensive arms race;
- Lead to an inevitable concentration of our finite resources on strategic weapons at the expense of vitally necessary conventional forces; and
- Result in a condition of dangerous instability and the constant threat of possible nuclear conflict.

Rather than pursuing the military and economic impossibility of absolute supremacy, this Administration is committed to maintaining our essential equivalence with the Soviet Union. Contrary to what Mr. Reagan would have us -- and others -- believe, the truth is that our military power is second to none. Our conventional military power, coupled with that of our allies, is not exceeded by any combination of nations or

earth. Likewise, our strategic nuclear military power does not lag behind that of the Soviets. Indeed, in some areas of strategic capability, we are ahead of the Soviet Union. In short, our strategic forces are fully adequate both to protect ourselves and our allies and to deter our adversaries.

The Carter Administration's Defense Budget Record

The President's record on defense has been consistent, and in sharp contrast to the record of prior years. During the first half of the 1970s, although most Americans failed to recognize it, the Soviets were steadily increasing their military capabilities while U.S. defense efforts were declining in real terms--by more than 37% during the eight years preceding this Administration.

- Outlays for defense declined for seven of the eight years.

- The budget for strategic forces declined in seven of the eight years--a 20% drop overall.

This Administration has reversed the decline in defense strength. During the first four years of this Administration, we have increased real defense spending more than 10%. This record, and the Administration's FY 81-85 Five Year Defense Program, which projects a sustained 4-5% real increase through the next five years, underlines the President's consistent commitment to sustaining and modernizing defense capabilities.

In late fall 1979, Secretary Brown presented to the Congress a preview of the Administration's FY 81 defense budget. This preview accurately forecast the January budget request. In March--once the impact of inflation, oil price increases, and the cost of expanded Indian Ocean operations became clear--the Administration submitted necessary FY 80 supplemental and FY 81 amendment requests, to accommodate the budget to these changed circumstances. Both these requests were necessary to adapt the budgets of the two years to unforeseen and unforeseeable changes--such as those arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--and reflect the Administration's determination to preserve the program in the face of these events.

With respect to military compensation, the President's fair pay package announced aboard USS NIMITZ contains three elements: support of a number of Warner-Nunn proposals, specific improvements in the existing CHAMPUS program, and eight other "legislative contingency" items (e.g., a pilot continuation bonus). The FY 81 cost of this entire package is just over \$1 billion.

Recent congressional additions to the President's defense budget proposal threaten to distort both the balance in the budget between defense and non-defense programs, and the balance within the defense budget itself. The net effect

would be a fiscally irresponsible program: one that would encourage further inflation, and one that does not come close to providing improvements to our military capabilities in proportion to the sums expended.

Beyond these considerations we must also take into account the effect of the Defense program--and those proposed additions to it--in the context of the economy as a whole. Defense remains our most important but not our sole national objective. Nor is its achievement independent of the state of the national economy. In arriving at his FY 81 submission, the President weighed the demands not only of national defense, but of the other claims on our national resources in both the public and the private sectors.

Of special concern is the danger of a profound mis-allocation between the Department's operating and investment accounts. Congressional actions require greater procurement of some major systems (such as aircraft and ships) than in the Administration's proposed program and in some cases accelerated production rates of these systems. Procurement increases historically have come at the expense of the maintenance and operation of existing systems, the future logistic support of the systems newly procured, and the personnel to operate the weapons procured. While increased procurement may offer greater near-term production efficiency, this would be in exchange for the combat readiness of our forces today and tomorrow.

There has been no inconsistency in the Administration's approach to these issues. In his testimony and public statements, the Secretary of Defense has repeatedly urged the Congress to support steady, sustained real increases in defense spending, and argued against one year "crash" programs to attempt to correct twenty years of neglect of our defense posture.

The Administration continues to believe that a stronger defense and a balanced budget are compatible. But these goals cannot be achieved if defense spending is permitted to increase uncontrollably, driven by narrow or partisan self-interest or unwarranted--and damaging--doubts about our military capability.

Department of Defense*

Total
\$ Millions

Fiscal Year	TOA			OUTLAYS		
	Current Dollars	Constant FY 81 \$	Percent Real Growth	Current Dollars	Constant FY 81 \$	Percent Real Growth
1970	75,517	178,621	-9.6	77,070	179,556	-8.
1971	72,815	160,903	-9.9	74,472	162,695	-9.
1972	76,502	156,156	-3.0	75,076	152,311	-6.
1973	78,924	149,768	-4.1	73,223	139,050	-8.
1974	81,682	142,834	-4.6	77,550	135,867	-2.
1975	86,163	137,509	-3.7	84,900	134,681	-0.
1976	95,796	143,462	4.3	87,891	130,355	-3.
1977	107,872	150,491	4.9	95,557	133,003	2.
1978	116,528	150,927	0.3	103,042	134,045	0.
1979	124,759	149,489	-1.0	115,013	139,278	3.
1980	141,693	153,830	2.8	130,885	142,620	2.
1981	161,763	161,763	5.2	146,971	146,971	3.
1982	184,141	169,528	4.8	167,286	153,291	4.
1983	206,774	176,987	4.4	188,570	160,036	4.
1984	230,488	184,420	4.2	210,968	166,918	4.
1985	256,119	192,166	4.2	234,162	173,762	4.

Cumulative Changes

Fiscal Year	TOA	OUTLAYS
1970-77	-25.7%	-37.2%
1978-81	7.3%	10.1%
1982-85	17.6%	17.1%

* Based on the FY 81 Budget Revision (March 1980).

Department of Defense*
Excluding Southeast Asia Costs
\$ Millions

Fiscal Year	TOA			OUTLAYS		
	Current Dollars	Constant FY 81 \$	Percent Real Growth	Current Dollars	Constant FY 81 \$	Percent Real Growth
1970	61,116	144,188	- 2.7	59,696	139,219	- 2.1
1971	63,245	139,264	- 3.4	63,020	137,468	- 1.1
1972	69,520	141,393	1.5	67,848	137,239	- 0.1
1973	73,752	138,942	-1.7	67,957	128,036	- 6.1
1974	80,392	140,295	1.0	74,824	130,745	2.1
1975	85,895	137,094	-2.3	84,181	133,534	2.1
1976	95,796	143,462	4.6	87,866	130,316	-2.1
1977	107,872	150,491	4.9	95,557	133,003	2.1
1978	116,528	150,927	0.3	103,042	134,045	0.7
1979	124,759	149,489	-1.0	115,013	139,278	3.9
1980	141,693	153,830	2.8	130,885	142,620	2.4
1981	161,763	161,763	5.2	146,971	146,971	3.1
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1983	206,774	176,987	4.4	188,570	160,036	4.4
1984	230,488	184,420	4.2	210,968	166,918	4.3
1985	256,119	192,166	4.2	234,162	173,762	4.1

Cumulative Changes

	TOA	OUTLAYS
Fiscal Year		
70-77	1.9%	- 7.1%
78-81	7.3%	10.1%
82-85	17.6%	17.1%

*Based on the FY 81 Budget Revision (March 1980).

Q. How do you respond to the charges by Ronald Reagan that our U.S. defense posture and policies are inadequate and that the Administration has not acted responsibly in molding our defense posture?

A. . Context

- Our program provides for national security of the United States now and in the future.
- In spending terms (outlays), real growth each year.
 - total of 10% over 4 years
 - 27% over 8 years
- Republicans, by contrast, had 35% reduction over 8 years.
 - even with Vietnam factored out, about 7% real reduction.

Specific Program

- Strategic
 - M-X
 - Trident-sub-which was stalled
 - Cancel B-1, accelerate cruise missile
 - Stealth technology
- NATO
 - Leadership with 30
 - Long term defense program
 - Long range theatre nuclear forces

- Rapid deployment force

· Conclusion

- Our program is prudent and responsible
- Reversed a declining trend to one of growth
- Realistic approach which acknowledges other national priorities
 - Ours - a carefully costed and balanced program
 - Theirs - do everything, but Reagan won't know how much it costs until he is elected.

- Strategic Forces. We have strengthened all three legs of our strategic triad.
- The MX program has moved from an ill-defined concept under the Republicans to full scale engineering development under the Carter Administration. It has gone from an untenable basing scheme to a survivable and effective concept far ahead of anything the Soviets have.
- We have moved forward with the Trident submarine and missile programs stalled by contract disputes and other delays.
- Instead of investing billions in a bomber -- the B-1 -- which would have been dangerously vulnerable soon after deployment, we accelerated the cruise missile program which exploits some of the best and most advanced military technology in the world today.
- As Secretary Brown and Under Secretary Perry's statements last week on the Stealth program technology indicate, we have, in the most prudent fashion continued to dedicate our resources to technology which will provide for really meaningful steps in enhancing our strategic capability.

- NATO. We have developed and implemented a concerted and effective policy together with our NATO allies. Our leadership with the long term defense program and the modernization of our long range tactical nuclear forces have moved the alliance to a position of strength far exceeding any previous time. Our actions in this area demonstrate not only our leadership but also the consistency of our dedication to a prudent defense policy. Through our leadership in 1977 -- within the first four months of this Administration -- the alliance adopted a commitment to 3% real growth annually in defense spending. We are meeting that commitment and so is the alliance as a whole.
- Rapid Deployment Force. As conditions in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere have demonstrated the need for our flexibility in responding to crises we have taken the steps to enhance our capability to respond to threats in various regions. We have moved and are continuing to move from the position of inadequacy which this

Administration inherited to a Rapid Deployment Force concept which is both real and which is supported by forces in being.

These are but the major elements of a concerted, prudent, and responsible program undertaken by this Administration to guarantee the security of the United States. We have taken a program which under the Republicans had marched backwards and moved it forward. The real growth in defense spending which by the end of a second Carter term will reach 27% is a carefully measured response to external challenges. Unlike the approach of our opponents, we have faced this problem with a realistic response. We have improved our situation progressively and within the bounds established by our other national requirements.

We recognize our responsibility. We know how much our program costs. We are able to measure our needs and respond to them prudently. Our opposition merely shrugs his shoulders and says "do it all," but also says that he won't know how much it all costs until after he is elected.

DEFENSE BUDGETReagan

Ronald Reagan has never wavered from his staunch support of increased defense spending. He has consistently favored increases in defense spending at the expense of other areas of the budget. In a 1971 speech at a Republican fundraiser in San Diego, Reagan set out his philosophy of defense spending.

"This nation once had a slogan, 'millions for defense, not one cent for tribute,' today it is billions for welfare and take them from defense."

Press Release
July 24, 1971

Both Reagan and the Republican party call for a massive military buildup to attain military superiority. By engaging in an arms race with the Soviets, Reagan believes that we can use our economic might to defeat the Russians.

"They (the Soviets) know they can't match our industrial capacity."

New York Post
May 29, 1979

However, neither Reagan nor the Republican party has made it clear how they would fund this massive build-up.

"...I've always believed that defense is something in which you do not make the determination (of a budget) -- it's made for you by your possible opponent."

Washington Post
April 20, 1980

When pressed for figures on how much would be necessary to achieve military superiority, Reagan avoids specifics.

"Well, I've never gone by the figures. In fact, I think it's wrong to say we're safe because we're spending 5 percent more or 3 percent more or anything. No, go by the weapons. Now, I have outlined a number of weapon shortages that we have, but I don't have access to the high command. Just ask these men who would have to fight the war what

are the essential weapons, the top priority that we must have now to restore our ability to deter the Soviet Union. I tell you, I think we're talking about the next few years that we must change the situation, not eventually down the road."

National Journal Interview
March 8, 1980

While Reagan refuses to give a specific figure for defense spending, his advisors have been mentioning some figures. The Washington Post reported that some of "Reagan's military advisors believe that nothing less than increasing defense spending by 10 percent a year will do." The Post adds that "such an increase in the prospective \$150 billion defense budget for fiscal 1981 alone would come to 15 billion -- equal to the Education Department's total budget for fiscal 1981." (Washington Post, June 16, 1980)

In another Washington Post story, one of Reagan's top defense advisors, William Van Cleave, mentioned that, in his opinion, 6 percent of the total U.S. Gross National Product or "maybe even a little more," may be required to pay for Reagan's defense programs. (Washington Post, August 27, 1980)

When asked how he would fund the arms build-up, Reagan's standard reply is: "out of the economy."

New Yorker
March 24, 1980

In fact Reagan would rely on Reagan-Kemp-Roth to provide the needed revenues for the military build-up:

"We would use the increased revenues the federal government would get from this tax decrease to rebuild our defense capabilities."

Flint Journal
May 18, 1980

Bush

"If it came down to that (more for defense, a tax cut and a balanced budget), I would still have to go with defense increases because we really do have a so-called window of danger. The evidence coming out of the SALT talks is overwhelming...But it is not unrealistic to think that you can increase defense spending, have a supply-side tax cut and get a (budget) balance. Everybody says that's impossible. The economists advising me don't think it's impossible."

March, Florida airplane interview
Washington Post
April 20, 1980

Bush

"Our strategic forces are really quite vulnerable, shockingly so, compared to the Soviets. I don't have a specific figure on increased defense spending yet but I'm impressed that General Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is saying we need five percent."

Political Profiles
page 9
1979

Bush

"There are some things you have to spend for, even acknowledging that it might be inflationary, but if it's in defense of our country, you've got to build it into the budget."

Eugene, Oregon, Register-Guard
December 19, 1979

"This is what Reagan means when he says, 'The cause peace is best served by strength, not bluster.'"

"It's what Governor Reagan means when he says that as president he will work for 'an honest verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons' but that he will not acquiesce to a SALT II Treaty 'which, allows for a clear strategic imbalance favoring the Soviets.'"

"It's what Ronald Reagan means when he says that our best hope of persuading the Soviets "to live in peace is to convince them they cannot win at war."

"It's why Ronald Reagan is the true peace candidate in 1980 campaign for the presidency -- and why the present administration in Washington, ignoring the lessons of modern history, has allowed our nation's defense to stagnate and weaken in the face of a massive Soviet arms program.

"That the Carter administration recognizes its failure in this vital area is borne out by the switched signals that have come from the White House and the Secretary of Defense in recent months.

"After 3-1/2 years of administration policies and rhetoric that have had the effect of reducing our strategic capabilities, relative to Soviet arms development, the president and his Defense Secretary are desperately trying to assure the American people that despite all evidence to the contrary, our country's military strength has kept pace with Soviet arms expansion."

World Affairs Council
September 5, 1980

Mondale

"The first responsibility of a strong President is to defend our nation.

"For the eight years of Republican rule -- while the Soviets were building up their power -- real American defense spending dropped thirty-five percent. That's the Republican record. We not only have increased real defense support by ten percent -- we have also invested in the most sophisticated weapons in the world. Today, no American general or admiral would dream of exchanging our forces for any other on earth.

"But Mr. Reagan scolds us for having cancelled an outmoded bomber that would be obsolete and vulnerable the day it was launched. President Carter chose instead the modern cruise missile -- which renders the whole expensive Soviet air defense system obsolete.

"Up and down the defense agenda, the Republicans repeat the same mistakes. They want to resurrect decommissioned ships. They want to revive the ABM System -- which even Nixon junked. With obsolete missiles, mothballed ships, vulnerable bombers, and petrified ideas, they would waste billions on defense relics that would drain and weaken us.

"President Carter does not want to mimic the Soviet's bulk. He has chosen to offset it with the greatest resource we have -- the genius of American technology. And as a result, this nation today is building security not for yesterday, but for the rest of the century."

DNC Acceptance Speech
August, 1980

Foreign Affairs/Defense Issues:

The former permanent representative to the United Nations, envoy to Peking and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency stressed during his recent campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination that because of his background in foreign affairs he is more competent to deal with problems facing the United States around the world than is President Carter.

Despite a reputation as a moderate in foreign affairs, Bush is a "hardliner." His view of the world is focused on the "menace" of Communism -- Russian Communism. It is his often stated opinion that the Soviet Union is "seeking superiority" in the world and the United States must take steps to counteract this aggression. Nearly all of Mr. Bush's foreign policy and military issue positions reflect his overriding preoccupation with the Soviet Union.

As a Presidential candidate Bush castigated the Carter Administration for what he termed the following foreign policy failures:

- Projecting a perception of vacillation and weakness in U.S. foreign policy among our allies and adversaries alike.
- Gutting American defense by slowing the MX and cruise missile programs, and cutting funds for the B-1, a new carrier and naval modernization.
- Initiating a misguided human rights campaign, which overloads our strategic interests and harms our allies.
- Failing to act to release our hostages in Iran.
- Presenting an unverifiable and weak SALT II agreement to the American people.

Defense Spending:

If George Bush's view of the world is clouded by Soviet aggression, his prescription for a stronger, more confident, United States is crystal clear -- increase defense spending and improve our alliances with friendly foreign powers.

Bush is clearly a "hawk" on defense spending, and views the need for additional military hardware as essential. He criticizes the Carter Administration for falling behind the Russians in terms of military strength and calls for the near term funding of the following defense needs:

- . a new manned bomber -- the B-1;
- . an accelerated MX deployment schedule;
- . a long range cruise missile;
- . a strengthened three ocean navy;
- . improved air defense capabilities;
- . expanded and improved strategic airlift capabilities;
- . expanded and improved conventional weaponry;
- . support for the volunteer army with registration for both men and women;
- . an expanded military training program;
- . a strong intelligence service, capable of providing accurate information on events abroad;
- . increased military R&D funding.

To meet these defense needs Bush has argued for an increase in defense spending of \$5-8 billion per year over the President's latest defense budget figures.

Despite the fact that President Carter has increased spending on defense every year since the last Ford budget -- an overall increase of \$73 billion -- Bush criticizes Carter for "gutting" American defense by cuts in defense spending, which have resulted in "underpaid military personnel, inadequate personnel to operate equipment and equipment malfunction such as the helicopter malfunction that led to the abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt." Houston City Hall Speech, Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80.

Bush believes the U.S. can build the military hardware -- the MX, the B-1, a three ocean Navy and implement conventional forces improvements all for \$6-8 billion over several years and still balance the budget by 1982. He would accomplish this feat by "eliminating waste and move away from spending programs such as CETA." Business Week, 2/4/80.

"If it came down to that (more for defense, a tax cut and a balanced budget), I would still have to go with defense increases because we really do have a so-called window of danger. But it is not unrealistic to think you can increase defense spending, have a simply side tax cut and get a (budget) balance. Everybody says that's impossible. The economists advising me don't think it's impossible." Washington Post, 4/20/80.

Intelligence:

The former CIA Director believes the American Intelligence System should be strengthened, but with protections for the rights of U.S. citizens. He is critical of the President's decision to halt SR-71 flights (spy planes) over Cuba, and points this out as an example. His only example of a weakening U.S. intelligence capacity.

Bush also feels the U.S. must "retain the capacity for covert operations in other countries" and refuses to rule out "American participation in the overthrow of foreign governments."

Under his direction at the CIA, new guidelines were adopted. While many critics thought they were not tough enough, there have been no charges of illegal intelligence activity during the past six years.

"I would simply follow the law (concerning covert operations and the CIA)...It excludes assassination, for example. The findings have to be -- and I think this is proper -- in writing by the President, that a sensitive operation is in the national interest and be reported to the Congress. But I think covert operations should be sparingly used ... quiet support for a friend is covert action." Miami Herald, 2/3/80

SALT II:

Bush does not support the SALT II treaty, he believes several amendments should be made to the treaty before it is passed. Specifically:

- . the Soviet backfire bomber must be counted as a strategic weapon;
- . the size and strength of nuclear warheads and missiles must be addressed to make the treaty more equal;
- . obstacles to deploying the MX missile must be removed;
- . the treaty must be made verifiable.

Bush does support an arms reduction agreement that is more verifiable and believes the Soviets would be willing to make the changes he has recommended because he believes pressure is mounting in the Soviet Union against increased defense spending.

In 1964, during his unsuccessful race for the U.S. Senate in Texas, Bush vigorously opposed the nuclear test ban treaty.

Nuclear Policy Abroad:

Bush is one of only a few national politicians who has ever stated the view that there is such a thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange. In an interview with Robert Scheer, a writer with the Los Angeles Times, Bush outlined his views on nuclear exchange.

Robert Scheer: "Don't we reach a point with these strategic weapons where we can wipe each other out so many times and no one wants to use them or is willing to use them, that it really doesn't matter whether we're 10% or 2% lower or higher (than the Soviets)?"

Bush: "Yes, if you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes a little sense. I don't believe that."

Scheer: "How do you win in a nuclear exchange?"

Bush: "You have a survivability of command in control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and you have a capability that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can inflict upon you. That's the way you can have a winner, and the Soviets' planning is based on the ugly concept of a winner in a nuclear exchange."

Scheer: "Do you mean like 5 percent would survive? Two percent?"

Bush: "More than that -- if everybody fired everything he had, you'd have more than that survive."

Scheer: "So have we made a mistake, then, in not thinking of nuclear war as a possible option that we could survive?"

Bush: "Our strategic forces should be considered as a deterrent, and that is the way I'd do it..."

Los Angeles Times, 1/24/80

Military Draft:

As a member of Congress, Bush supported President Nixon's plan to eliminate the military draft, and remains opposed to a peacetime draft today.

However, he supports registration, for both sexes. He is a strong supporter of the All-Volunteer Army, but believes it must be supplemented, to some degree, if we are to keep our forces at proper levels. He does not explain how he would supplement the all volunteer armed forces without implementing a peacetime draft.

Soviet Union:

Bush feels the root cause of all our foreign policy problems is the Soviet Union. Bush believes the Soviets are not satisfied with nuclear parity with the U.S., instead he feels they are seeking nuclear and conventional force superiority. "The Soviets want a first strike capability, and don't think they are above using it." Salinas, California, Californian, 1/23/80.

Afghanistan:

Bush believes the President's failure to spell out our commitments to our allies and other non-alleged nations led to the invasion of Afghanistan and continues to cause foreign policy credibility problems for the U.S. Bush feels that a redefinition of our foreign policy should be made, and include the following:

- keep commitments
- strengthen intelligence operations
- place human rights concerns in proper balance with strategic interests.

In addition, he favors shipping arms to Afghanistan rebels through Pakistan and is critical of the President for not helping "people that are resisting brutal aggression."

Soviet Grain Embargo:

He opposes the U.S. embargo of grain to the Soviets because he feels it hurts us more than it hurts them. However, he would support a total across the board trade embargo against the Soviets. Bush has termed the President's embargo actions as ineffective, and inconsistent. His one example is "we halt grain shipments to the Soviets which lower our farm prices and yet we sell phosphates to the Soviets to improve their crops." Face the Nation, 1/20/80

Olympic Boycott:

Supported the decision to boycott the Moscow games, even proposed withholding athlete's passports to force them to stay home and not participate in the games.

Cuba:

He believes Cuba presents this country with one of its major foreign policy challenges. Specifically, he cites the basing of Soviet troops in Cuba as an outrageous affront to our security and insists they must be removed.

Agrees that the Administration has appeared "important" by not dealing directly with the issue of Cuban troops in Africa. Bush has stated, "the Cubans are surrogates for the Soviets...they are being used as pawns by the Soviets to gain political advantages and seek hegemony everywhere." Political Profiles, Inc., 12/79

Bush ridiculed Ronald Reagan's suggestion that we should blockade Cuba in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by saying "the idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed, risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet. It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless foreign policy." Washington Star, 3/22/80

Europe:

Bush strongly favors European unity . . . supports the admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EEC.

During the recent campaign he was highly critical of the President's handling of the issue of deploying the neutron bomb in Western Europe. Bush said, "Carter backed off after convincing West Germany to deploy the neutron bomb, in the face of a massive propaganda campaign launched by the Soviets, and left Chancellor Schmidt out on a political limb." Face the Nation, 1/20/80

Human Rights:

Bush believes the U.S. human rights policy, under the Carter Administration is misguided and harmful to our allies.

He argues that we should decide foreign policy on the basis of strategic interests and not solely on a particular country's human rights record. He uses Iran as an example by saying: "our failure to defend our ally, the Shah, created a situation where one form of tyranny is replaced with an even worse form and one that is not in our strategic interest." Dallas Morning News, 5/1/80

Bush supports efforts to improve human rights, but only in concert with U.S. strategic interests.

Iran:

Bush leveled his harshest criticism of the President during his recent campaign over the issue of Iran and the hostages being held there. In an interview with Robert Shogan of the NY Times in March, Bush said, "Carter has manipulated the news media, for the benefit of his own reelection, it is time the American people recognize our Iranian policy for what it is...one of failure, inaction and even calculated deception."

He also charged the President with full responsibility for the hostage crisis by saying, "the weakness and inexperience of the President have both led to this crisis and managed to isolate us in our tragedy." Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80

Without offering his own suggestions to resolve this hostage crisis, Bush demanded we close the Iranian embassy in Washington and expell all Iranian diplomats.

He completely rejects the notion that the U.S. should apologize for any past actions in Iran. For all the criticism of the Shah's regime American support for Iran was the aim of our policy for nearly three decades, and the wisdom of that policy has been reinforced by recent events." LA Times, 5/15/80. Bush considered the Shah "a friend who was less than perfect in human rights." The Flint Journal, 5/11/80

Bush differed with Ronald Reagan's "live in the dust" position on Iran, which would set a firm date for the release of the hostages or risk American action to release the, by saying "Reagan owes the American people a better explanation of his proposal. In the decade of the 80's a foreign policy based on bluffs is as ineffectual as it is dangerous." LA Times, 5/15/80

Panama:

Bush opposed the canal treaties primarily because of "the appearance that we are retreating and pulling back on commitments." LA Times, 1/24/80

Middle East:

He strongly supports the State of Israel, believes we need to strengthen our ties with moderate Arab states and feels the Palestinian people should have a role to play in negotiations that will determine their future.

Bush is generally supportive of the Camp David accords but argues that Jordan and other Arab countries must be brought in to the peace making process. He is opposed to allowing the PLO to participate in any negotiations until they renounce their pledge to destroy the state of Israel and cease terrorist attacks. He has likened the PLO to an international KKK.

On the issue of settlements he is opposed to the construction of additional settlements on the West Bank, but supports "the legitimate construction for national security purposes" of those settlements that currently exist.

He believes Ronald Reagan's suggestion that Sinai troops should be based in the Sinai would be a mistake and would draw the Soviets back into the middle east.

China:

Bush views himself as an expert on China which stems from his term of duty as U.S. envoy to China in 1974. He sees China as a backward country with a large standing conventional army. He also believes the Chinese are not expansionistic, but rather they seek to be self reliant by the year 2000.

He is opposed to selling arms to the Chinese until he is certain they have "no foreign ambitions."

Bush is highly critical of the way the Carter Administration ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan. "For the first time in our history, a peacetime American government has renounced a treaty with an ally (Taiwan) with cause or benefit." Washington Post, 12/73.

Bush's assignment in the U.N. was highlighted by the failure of the United States to retain a seat in the General Assembly for Taiwan. The U.S. position had been to support a "two China policy" with both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China being represented.

As Ronald Reagan's emissary, George Bush recently visited China and Japan to outline what many foreign policy advisors believe in Reagan's version of a "two-China policy" for U.S. foreign relations in the 1980s. The Chinese are clearly not enthusiastic over Mr. Bush's return to China, where he is viewed as a supporter of Taiwan and an adversary of arms sales to the People's Republic.

East Asia:

Bush would push for stronger ties and security arrangements with East Asian countries and isolate (economically) disruptive nations ... North Korea, Vietnam.

He would also encourage Japan to assume greater responsibility in regional defense and security matters. In addition, he supports an increase in air and naval forces in the Pacific as well as the establishment of an Indian Ocean fleet.

MondaleChina: A test of Presidential Judgment

"In this election the Republicans seem to be running on two major planks. The first is their pro-worker policy, which comes down to blockbuster giveaways to the rich. And the second is the issue of national strength.

I want to talk about national strength for a moment. It means many things -- strong military defenses; arms control; energy security; a foreign policy based on American values -- and I'll be speaking about them all as this campaign moves along. But the element of national strength I want to emphasize this morning is presidential judgment.

Last week, Lane Kirkland -- the President of the AFL-CIO -- pointed out that few presidential elections in modern history offer such a stark contrast between the candidates as this one. In my speech to the New York State Federation, I'll be highlighting that contrast in two areas -- policies affecting working Americans, and foreign affairs.

The last ten days have given the American people an opportunity to assess the judgment of the Republican nominee for President. In his handling of an area of extreme sensitivity -- our relations with China -- he has stumbled into a public argument with the Chinese. He has proposed a change in our relations with Taiwan which is unnecessary, undesirable, and which carries with it potentially disastrous consequences to our national security. He has demonstrated his lack of understanding of the basic facts of the issue. And he has had a public disagreement with his running mate, who has returned in failure from his trip to Peking.

What Mr. Reagan has done, quite simply, is to propose a policy towards this delicate question which would turn the clock back, and recreate the conditions which made the Taiwan question a perennial source of tension both in Asia and in our political debate at home.

The central fact is this: President Carter's historic decision to complete the normalization process with the government of China in December 1978 has been a dramatic success. It has strengthened our strategic position throughout Asia and the Pacific, and with the government in Peking -- which represents one-fourth of the world's population.

Our gains with the mainland have been accomplished without damage to the basic prosperity, stability, and security of the people of Taiwan.

All this is jeopardized by Mr. Reagan's confused and misinformed positions. He says he does not want to turn the clock back -- but advocates creating an "official liaison" office on Taiwan. His proposal is a violation of the central fact around which the United States and China were able to construct both the Shanghai Communique issued by President Nixon and Chou EnLai in 1972, and the announcement of normalization made by President Carter and Premier Hua Guo Feng in December of 1978.

Mr. Reagan has taken a position which could seriously damage our national strength and give cheer to only one major nation -- the Soviet Union. He has demonstrated that he does not understand this sensitive issue.

Mr. Reagan offered us a "two China" policy. With Mr. Bush's trip, he now offers us two China policies. Neither situation will do.

In the coming days, they will no doubt issue clarifications and explanations. But no clarification will obscure the fact that in his first foray into the international arena since becoming his party's candidate, Mr. Reagan has repudiated the policies of the last three American Presidents -- two from his own party. It is an inauspicious way to open a campaign. It is a potentially disastrous way to run our nation's foreign policy, and I believe the American people will reject it in November."

New York AFL-CIO Convention
Monticello, New York
August 25, 1980

SOUTHERN AFRICAReagan

No where is Reagan's disregard for human rights more apparent than in southern Africa where Reagan perceives the confrontation as between Marxism and the principles of the West, rather than as an attempt by a disenfranchised majority to gain some measure of control over its destiny.

Reagan stated his appraisal of the election won by the reverend Abel Muzorewa which excluded Joshua Nkomo's ZANU and Robert Mugabe's ZAPU.

"The guerillas were determined to rule the country, and neither one of them could win an election."

Jefferson City Missouri Post
May 6, 1979

As for South Africa, Reagan favors a policy which ignores apartheid.

"Isn't it time we laid off South Africa for awhile?
...As for letting South Africans work at solving their problems while we solve our own, all in favor say 'Aye.'"

Radio Transcript
October 22, 1976

One of Reagan's advisors, Peter Duignan, claims Carter is too harsh with South Africa, giving blacks "unrealistic" expectations. (Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1978)

Another advisor, Kenneth Adelman, states flatly that one man, one vote probably is not applicable to South Africa. (Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 1977)

Another advisor, Joseph Churba, would go so far as to advocate establishing a military relationship with South Africa, including use of the naval base at Simonstown by the United States Navy and strengthening the South Africa armed forces. (New York Times, June 13, 1980)

Mondale

"Our job in Nigeria's new democracy underscores the fundamental change in America's relations with Africa. When President Carter and I were inaugurated in early 1977, we were determined to build a new foreign policy on the foundation of America's democratic values.

We value justice. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from racism and oppression.

We value personal dignity. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from want and suffering.

We value peace. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from war and from foreign domination.

These three goals -- human rights, economic progress, and peace -- were underlined by President Carter here in Lagos two years ago, in the first state visit by any American President to Africa. And when he arrived here, he was greeted by words both friendly and direct. "The Nigerian public," he was told, "has learned to measure policy pronouncements by results -- and not expectations."

It was an appropriate point. And tonight is an appropriate moment to assess those results -- and to survey the work ahead.

First, human rights. For the United States, the question is not whether we should work to advance justice in Africa, but rather how to do so.

Tonight, as your Vice President pointed out, we celebrate a historic step forward -- majority rule and independence for the people of Zimbabwe. It was an achievement of which Nigeria can be proud, most African governments, the British government, and all Zimbabweans should be proud. And I am proud that my own country stood firm with yours and others. For today, the people of Zimbabwe control their own future, free from outside interference, whether from their neighbors or from other continents.

Throughout the years of effort to find a solution, the United States held to a policy of support for free and fair elections, open to all parties; for a democratic and fair constitution; and for a negotiated settlement based on these principles.

The President insisted on maintaining American sanctions against Rhodesia until an impartial election process had begun. There was intense pressure to abandon this course -- to drop our principles and take a short-sighted view of our interests. But our President, he and our Congress, helped by the three great leaders, refused.

We know that it is in our national interest to support further programs for Zimbabwe. The United States has pledged substantial assistance to Zimbabwe -- because we believe that its future will help decide the future of southern Africa.

One of our partners in the search for peace in Zimbabwe was Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana. He was a gifted, gentle leader of modern Africa -- the father of a state both non-racial and democratic, in a turbulent region that has known too little of either quality and we all mourn his passing.

But we also celebrate a cause he nurtured -- democratic government in Africa. We welcome the return of civilian rule in Nigeria, Ghana and Upper Volta, and the movement toward democracy in other nations in this region. We applaud the heightened emphasis on human rights in many African nations and in OAU councils. We offer our support for the future of Zimbabwe. But we must also address those areas where human rights are trampled.

Injustice based on racial discrimination is abhorrent to men and women everywhere. That is why the problems of southern Africa have been of special concern.

We believe that an agreement on a plan for peace and justice in Namibia, based on fair and open elections, is within reach. The plan proposed by the UN Secretary-General has received strong African support and the agreement of the Southwest African People's Organization. South Africa has accepted the plan -- but does not yet agree on how to carry it out.

Now is the time for South Africa to put its faith in the plan it has accepted. If it does not, if instead it insists on its own formulas and carries the conflict further afield into neighboring states -- the opportunity for peace could be lost, and the conflict will continue. We urge South Africa to build on the experience of Zimbabwe and to move forward -- not backward -- on the issue of Namibia, while there is still time.

Events within South Africa concern us as well. In May of 1977, I met in Vienna with the then Prime Minister Vorster. I impressed upon him, in the clearest terms, that relations between our two countries would depend upon progress toward full human rights and full political participation for all the people of his country. I expressed our strong hope that the South Africa government would meet soon with representative leaders from across South African society to determine that country's future.

I repeat that appeal again today -- for the clock is ticking in South Africa.

We advocate no simple formula. We know there is no simple answer. We see the need to solve a problem. And we believe that only blacks and whites, talking and reasoning together, can find its solution.

Address in Nigeria
July, 1980

HUMAN RIGHTSReagan

Reagan's attitude toward human rights stems from the belief that the United States confuses its friends and allies with the selective application of a human rights policy, making it that much easier for the Soviets to drive for world domination.

"While the Soviets arrogantly warn us to stay out of their way, we occupy ourselves by looking for human rights violations in those countries which have historically been our friends and allies."

Address to Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Latin America

Reagan's disregard for the basic precepts of human rights is obvious in the admiring way he speaks of Argentina after three years of rule by a military dictatorship. Reagan quoted an economic advisor to the junta.

"...in the process of bringing stability to a terrorized nation of 25 million, a small number (of people) were caught in the cross fire, among them a few innocents."

Radio Transcript
August, 1979

Bush

"You're not always choosing in the world between perfection and imperfection. In Pakistan, it is in the interest of the United States to have a Pakistan that will not be dominated by the Soviet Union. That is our interest. Now, if that means at least having some negotiation with General Zia, who is less than perfect in human rights -- fine. But what kind of government, if you don't do it, and if Pakistan falls, do you get? You get one less interested in human rights. And I point to Iran as a good example of what I'm saying. I point to Iran."

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"We are up against a strong force -- the Soviets backing the Cubans. I'm concerned about our foreign policy that, along with human rights, has also to consider the strategic interests of the country. I fault Carter, because in his concern for human rights, he has sacrificed that."

Peoria, IL, Journal Star
November 6, 1979

Bush

"My argument with Jimmy Carter is that he lets human rights drive our strategic interests. Iran is a good example. Cuba is a good example" of a foreign policy "where we wake up and we find not only is there less human rights, but our strategic interests have been diminished."

"Yes, there were some human rights violations (in Iran). But look at today and the adherence to human rights, plus our strategic interests are totally bludgeoned and totally diminished."

Des Moines, IA, Register
November 14, 1979

Bush

"So, the reality is: (you) need to redefine your policies so you can have a concern about human rights but so you're going to keep in mind at the same time your strategic interests."

Los Angeles, CA, Times
December 31, 1979

Bush

"We face a threat, which is manageable, nevertheless a threat from the Soviet Union, which compels us to strengthen our alliances, strengthen our intelligence and to strengthen our strategic posture around the world by altering our human rights policy, not to pull away from human rights, but not to be naive in our application."

Le Mars, IA, Daily Sentinel
December 17, 1979

Bush

"We should not impose our standard of human rights on every country around the world. China is a good example. We must improve relations, but if we start dictating to them or cutting them off because of human rights, we will diminish our strategic interest."

Washington Post
January 27, 1980

Bush

"If you just try to change governments because you don't like their human rights, sometimes you wake up and you find no human rights at all. We have to recognize there are varying degrees of imperfections in the world."

Rockford, IL
Freeport, IL, Journal-Standard
January 30, 1980

Bush

"Certainly the difference between me and some others is that I see areas of gray, I don't think everything is pure and impure, and I think we have been hypocritically selective in our indignation of human rights, and have diminished our strategic interests in the process. That's what I believe."

Los Angeles, CA Times interview
with Robert Scheer
January 24, 1980

Bush

"I like the concept that recognizes our commitment to humanrights but also recognizes that we're not gonna remake the world in our image...And we're also got to recognize that strategic interests are very important."

Illinois interviews and speeches
Champaign, IL, News-Gazette
February 3, 1980

Bush

"Im for human rights. We're all for human rights. But when we turn our backs on our allies, the ones we promised to support...someday we'll wake up and find no human rights at all -- and no strategic interests."

Greater Miami Kiwanis Club
Miami, FL, Herald
February 1, 1980

Bush

"If we press our friends for change and change and change so much faster than their systems can take... sometimes we wake up with that friend gone from the scene replaced by something less good, something worse in terms in human rights, and something where our strategic interests have been totally diminished."

Florida meeting
Washington Post
February 23, 1980

Carter

"The ultimate aim of our foreign policy must be to preserve freedom for ourselves and to expand freedom for others. This is a matter both of national principle and of national interest. For we believe that free and open societies are not only better able to meet the rising expectations of their people; they are also better able to accommodate often conflicting internal pressures before popular frustrations explode in violent and radical directions.

We do not seek to impose our system or institutions on others. Rather, we seek to support, in practical and concrete ways, the efforts of other nations to build their own institutions in ways that will meet the irrepressible human drive for freedom and justice.

Human rights policy commands the strong support of our citizens, and of the Congress. The world climate increasingly favors human rights progress.

Despite new turbulence and conflict, the past year featured some encouraging positive developments. We cannot and should not claim credit for them. But it is clear that we are part of a growing movement. During 1979, we saw:

- The further strengthening of democratic practices in Spain and Portugal, with free elections in both countries;
- The disappearance of several of the world's most repressive regimes;
- The freeing of political prisoners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
- A return to democratic rule in several Latin American countries and widespread progress in reducing human rights violations in the region;
- The growing strength of international human rights institutions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held its first meeting. Preparations began for another conference to review compliance with the Helsinki accords, to be held in Madrid this November. The OAU took long strides toward establishing a human rights commission for Africa. UN bodies became increasingly active in their human rights efforts.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Mondale

"Above all -- above all, America's strength depends on American values. Every time we have a foreign policy that reflects Americans' beliefs, we strengthen this nation.

Last month I was in Nigeria -- the world's most powerful black nation, and the second largest source of American oil. A few years ago the Secretary of State under the Republicans was told he was not welcome in Nigeria because they did not stand up for the principle of human rights and majority rule.

But when I went to Nigeria I was welcomed -- because the United States has a President -- President Carter -- who in his first act in office said from here on out the United States is going to stand for human rights and majority rule all over this earth.

And now in Rhodesia we see the same developments -- a new democracy based on democratic institutions, and the Soviets suffering another reversal. Today our human rights policy is drawing the nations of Africa and the world together like a magnet and toward us.

The Republicans say that a strong nation is one that never apologizes to anyone. I say it's a nation whose leaders are not doing things for which we must apologize. That's the difference.

A foreign policy that reflects American values advances American interests.

When President Carter saw to it that we ratified the Panama Canal treaties, not only did we rid ourselves of the last vestiges of colonialism: we also strengthened our influence in Latin America. When the President normalized relations with China, he not only told one-fourth of the human race that they exist: he also established a powerful counterforce to Soviet aggression. And when the President denounced the persecution of Andrei Sakharov, he not only affirmed individual liberty: he also unmasked the Kremlin to other nations."

Democratic National Convention
Acceptance Speech
August, 1980

LATIN AMERICACuba

Reagan has long held that Cuba is a mere proxy of the Soviet Union, and is behind most revolutionary movements in Africa, and Latin America.

"Despite the power the Soviet Union is able to exert over Castro, the Cuban dictator still fancies himself as a revolutionary leader who aids and inspires revolts in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The Russians aren't bothered by Castro's delusions of grandeur because much of his international interference fits nicely into their own foreign policy designs."

Jefferson City Missouri Post
October 26, 1979

Relaxing Relations With Cuba

In 1977, when the Administration was considering relaxing relations with Cuba, Reagan wrote:

"... (t)he U.S. decision on Cuban trade must rest on broader considerations. Our trade embargo of Cuba is a little like a long-running advertising campaign. Just as its full effects are being felt, the sponsor may get tired of it."

Jefferson City Missouri Post
October 26, 1979

Cuban Refugees

Reagan supported a "Berlin airlift -- massive and swift" to rescue those Cuban residents seeking political asylum from Castro. (Dallas Times Herald, April 10, 1980)

Panama

Reagan has been at the forefront of those opposed to the Panama Canal Treaties. As negotiations were underway, Reagan stated his strong objection to the proposed Treaty.

"As I talk to you tonight, negotiations with another dictator go forward, negotiations aimed at giving up our ownership of the Panama Canal Zone... The Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is not a long-term lease. It is sovereign U.S. territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all the states that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase. We should end those negotiations and tell the (Panamanian head of state): 'We bought it, we paid for it, we built it and we intend to keep it.'"

Los Angeles Times
August 12, 1977

During the 1980 campaign Reagan has raised the issue of abrogating the Treaties on several occasions.

"If there is any possibility of keeping the Panama Canal, believe me I would do it because I believe it was one of the great mistakes we have made so far."

Bangor News
January 18, 1980

Mexico

In his announcement address, Reagan proposed a "North American Accord" between the United States, Mexico and Canada.

"I would be willing to invite each of our neighbors to send a special representative to our government to sit in on high level planning sessions with us, as partners, mutually concerned about the future of our Continent."

Announcement of Candidacy
November 13, 1979

Bush

"The idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed, risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet. It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless foreign policy."

Milford, CT
Washington Star
March 22, 1980

Bush

"Unlike Berlin we do not have any air rights to fly through a corridor safely into Cuba. In addition, these Cuban people have been granted visas by the Peruvian government....

"What we are talking about here is not a state of war, pending war, or even hostility. We are talking about an evacuation problem, a problem the United States should help to solve by financial assistance and transportation assistance, especially through the use of ships or aircraft from a neighboring country (sic), such as Haiti."

Philadelphia press conference
Philadelphia, PA, Inquirer
April 12, 1980

Bush

"The correct approach (to the Cuban 'crisis') was to exert quiet but intense pressure; to inform the Soviet leadership that there could be no progress on the wide array of issues important to both sides until we were satisfied that the combat troops had been removed."

Washington Post
October 18, 1979

OLYMPIC BOYCOTTBush

"You don't reward brutal aggression by giving them (the Soviets) the opportunity to put a beautiful face on something ugly."

Keene State College, Keene, NH,
Sentinel - January 23, 1980

Bush

"First he (Reagan) said he supported the boycott, then he said 'Let the athletes decide.' Then he finally came back around and now agrees the U.S. shouldn't send a team to Moscow. Yesterday, back again, he said maybe individuals should have a choice."

Center City, PA
Philadelphia, PA, News
April 9, 1980

Bush

"Those who don't (voluntarily comply with Carter's wishes) must not be allowed to participate and the president should take the step of withholding their passports."

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia
Washington Star, April 9, 1980

Bush

"The President laid down the gauntlet early this year, telling the Soviets that if their troops were not out of Afghanistan by Feb. 20 that the United States would not participate in the Olympics.

"The president's decision in this matter is irrevocable. And it's time political candidates of both parties, the United States Olympic Committee and our athletes give their total support to President Carter on this matter. Frankly, I'm appalled that some athletes and a sizable number of delegates to the United States Olympic Committee are even considering...participation in the games."

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia
Washington Star - April 9, 1980

Bush

"I would cancel our participation in the Olympics in Moscow, put them someplace else. I don't want to see the Soviets able to use the Olympic Games as some kind of a turnaround now in the summer, in a peace overture, and showing a good side of a naked aggression."

CBS Face the Nation
January 20, 1980

Reagan

Reagan proposed boycotting the Moscow Olympics even before the Afghanistan invasion.

"What would happen if the leaders of the Western world told the International Olympic Committee and the Soviet Union that torch must be lit in some other country...If they don't and we participate in the games anyway, what do we say to our young athletes about honor?"

Radio Transcript
October 3, 1978

However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Reagan vacillated. First he opposed the boycott.

"...threats to refuse to attend the Olympics are not responsive to the Soviet call of our hand."

Washington Post
January 25, 1980

Then Reagan changed his mind and supported the boycott.

"...I support the idea of taking the Olympics someplace else."

Detroit News
February 14, 1980

Then Reagan opposed the boycott.

"It's a tough one...You'll just have to let me stew about that one for a while."

Los Angeles Times
March 28, 1980

Then Reagan threw the issue to the athletes.

"I would leave the decision to the athletes themselves."

Washington Post
April 1, 1980

Finally Reagan felt pressured to issue a clarifying statement.

"I support the boycott today. I supported it yesterday. And I supported it when the President first called for it."

Philadelphia Inquirer
April 11, 1980

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Mondale

"As we meet today, the lesson of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still waits to be drawn. History holds its breath -- for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world.

If one nation can be subjugated by Soviet aggression, is any sovereign nation truly safe from that fate? If a hundred thousand Russian troops, and the barbaric use of lethal gas, and the spectre of nightly assassinations -- if these fail to alarm us, what will? If the Soviet lunge toward the most strategic oil-rich spot on earth fails to unite us, what will?

And if we and our allies fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

While history holds its breath, America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain; tightened controls on high technology trade; limited Soviet fishing in our waters; raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces; strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean; intensified development of our Rapid Deployment Forces; and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

In the UN General Assembly, the United States joined more than a hundred other nations in an unprecedented majority -- calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow Games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

I am convinced that the American people do not want their athletes cast as pawns in that tawdry propaganda charade. And I urge you to respect that undeniable consensus.

Your decision today is not a question of denying our Olympic team the honor they deserve -- for the American people deeply respect the sacrifice we are asking our athletes to make.

It is no longer a question of whether participation in the Moscow Olympics confers legitimacy on Soviet aggression. When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign policy, surely that issue is behind us.

Nor is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the Games from Soviet domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of teams committed to participating -- surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is also behind us.

Above all, the decision you will make today is not a choice between a sports issue and a national security issue. For the President and Congress have made it clear that the Olympic boycott is a genuine element of America's response to the invasion of Afghanistan. It is an unambiguous statement of our national resolve. It is a keystone in our call to our allies for solidarity.

We must not -- and cannot -- break that link between America's power to check aggression, and America's call for an Olympic boycott. Your vote is a test of our will, our confidence, our values, and our power to keep the peace through peaceful means."

Address to U.S. Olympic Committee
Colorado Springs, April 1980

SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBABush

"Before Carter got there we negated a commitment in Angola; we waked (sic) up; we find instead of 18,000 Cubans in Africa, 44,000; and instead of some little training units down there in Cuba, we find a combat brigade, operating and maneuvering in combat formation with no training function at all."

ABC Issues and Answers
October 21, 1979

Bush

"I believe that our foreign policy has been very, very naive and I am absolutely convinced, going back to my CIA days, that this (Soviet troops in Cuba) is something new, that this wasn't there all along. In fact, Castro says it, or Brezhnev says it, doesn't impress me one bit.

" There were things we had to watch, ingredients that should be watched; but I am saying what is there (in Cuba) now is different than what was there before. That is all I am saying."

ABC Issues and Answers
October 21, 1979

Bush

"I think we ought to have a dialogue with them (Soviets); I think we ought to discuss with them, but I know the only way you deal with them is to deal from strength. They understand that."

Dover, NH. Foster's Democrat
June 14, 1979

Bush

"I would bring it directly to them (The Soviets). I would say, 'We know you have a brigade there (Cuba); we want them out.' You want a hell of a lot from us, so you had better do this in return."

Jacksonville, FL, Journal
October 4, 1979

Bush

"They want technology and grain from us. I would have explained that the American people will be awfully upset when they find out about the troops and that it would be in the Soviets' best interest to move them out of Cuba."

Fort Worth, TX, Star-Telegram
October 21, 1979

Bush

He would "firmly and quietly tell the Russians that there would be no SALT II treaty, no grain or high technology until after those troops are removed from Cuba."

Rock Island, IL, Argus
September 21, 1979

Bush

He resents Carter's attempt "to shift the responsibility to past administrations rather than to move ahead to solve the problem."

"The foreign policy point is to get them the hell out of there."

Houston, TX, Post
September 12, 1979

Bush

"If the Soviets did not feel that this brigade-level force was a provocation, it would not have been surreptitiously placed in Cuba. The stationing is a clear provocation -- it's a test of the United States will. The president must meet this test with resolve."

Houston, TX, Post
September 12, 1979

Bush

"After proclaiming that we would do our part, the Carter administration is, in effect, fighting those who seek freedom. That is a foreign policy outrage."

Tarrant County Law Day luncheon
Fort Worth, TX, Star-Telegram
May 1, 1980

Bush

"The President of the United States should insist those troops be removed. And I believe they would be. the United States is not so impotent...and the Soviet Union wants so much from us."

Philadelphia, PA, Bulletin
September 7, 1979

Bush

"You've got to remember there are certain things Castro wants from the United States. And I think there ought to be a code of behavior that he's held to before he gets anything."

Political Profiles
page 9
1979

Carter

"The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. However, the Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to our concern: that the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training and can do nothing more; that they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities.

They have said that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation; that they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed upon confirmation in 1970 and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding.

These assurances have been given to me from the highest level of the Soviet Government.

Although we have persuasive evidence that the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future noncombat status of the unit are significant. However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone.

First, we will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba.

Second, we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere. Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It's a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in an offensive action against any neighboring countries."

Third, I'm establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign to this headquarters, forces from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and for conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability to monitor and to respond rapidly to any attempted military encroachment in this region.

Fourth, we will expand military maneuvers in the region. We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on. In accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

Fifth, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to ensure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination.

The United States has a worldwide interest in peace and stability. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea, and air units to distant areas, rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damages to our crucial intelligence sources and methods.

Address to Nation
October, 1980

Carter

"In addition, responding to the Soviet military presence in Cuba and the proxy role of Cuba on behalf of the USSR, we have taken or are taking the following actions in support of the rapid deployment force:

- (1) We are substantially increasing our ability to monitor Cuban and Soviet/Cuban activities;
- (2) We have established a Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters which improves our ability to respond to events in the region;
- (3) We are increasing regional military exercises; and,
- (4) We are intensifying assistance to countries in the region that are threatened by Soviet or Cuban intervention.

State of the Union
1980

HELSINKI/CSCE/MADRID REVIEWReagan

Reagan considers the Helsinki accords another means of legitimizing the Soviet Union's imperial ambitions by de jure recognition of the satellite empire.

"In signing the Helsinki pact we gave the Russians something they've wanted for 35 years. In effect, we recognized the Soviet Union's right to hold captive the Eastern and Central European nations they have ruled since World War II. We signed the pact apparently because of one clause which had to do with human rights. Those making the decision to sign claimed the Soviet Union by its signature had agreed to let people have some (if not all) of the rights the rest of us take for granted. They are (for example) supposed to be able to leave the Soviet Union and the captive nations if they choose. But the Russians make promises; they don't keep them.

Radio Transcript
January, 1978

As mentioned above, Reagan believes detente was one way in which the Soviets exploited the West's weaknesses to their own benefit.

"Detente, which started out worthily and with a good purpose, has become a one-way street. I think the Soviet Union has become more truculent, more aggressive in the world. And we have been responding with preemptive concessions without getting anything in return. I think it is time for us to rebuild our strength and at the same time ake detente if it is to exist a two-way street by telling the Russians that is the only way we will observe it."

Christian Science Monitor
June 3, 1976

Reagan compared himself to President Carter.

"I would be very worried about me if the Soviet Union wanted me to be president."

Washington Post
July 14, 1980

Carter

"There is opposition abroad, as you well know, to the pursuit of the principles espoused by the 35 nations at Helsinki, and there is some skepticism here at home from others who don't understand the fundamental truth that peace on the one hand and the pursuit of human rights on the other are irrevocably interrelated. Peace and the pursuit of human rights cannot be strengthened one without the other; they cannot be successfully advanced independently of one another. That belief, which we all share, is above party, as the history of the Helsinki process proves. A Republican administration signed the accords, and now a Democratic administration is deeply committed to carrying out those agreements.

The accords embody goals and values in which Americans believe, as human beings who are struggling to build a more decent and a more humane world. The pledges given by the 35 signatories at Helsinki 5 years ago were not lightly undertaken, and they cannot be lightly abandoned or ignored. The document that was signed there, even though it was called the Final Act, was not the end of our work. It was just a fresh start on work that commenced in this Nation more than 200 years ago.

The Madrid meeting this year is designed to assess what progress has been made and, if possible, to speed its pace and to widen the scope of that progress. Like the Belgrade meeting in 1977, attended by some of you, Madrid is an opportunity to look carefully backward and also to permit us to push forward vigorously.

Some have said that we should stay away from Madrid, that we ought to drop out of the Helsinki process. Such ideas spring from ignorance of the meaning of Madrid. Some have even compared the meeting in Madrid to the Moscow Olympics, suggesting that since American athletes chose not to go to Moscow, that American diplomats and citizens should not go to Madrid. This reasoning, of course, is very confused.

As host to the Olympics, the Soviet Union sought to enjoy both the fruits of aggression in Afghanistan and the prestige and the propaganda value of being the host of the Olympics at the same time. American athletes and those 50 other nations rejected that equation as indecent and unacceptable. I commend them. They stayed at home, at great sacrifice to themselves, and without them, the Moscow spectacular has become a pathetic spectacle.

But Madrid will not be an aggressor's propaganda festival. The Spanish are the hosts, not the Soviets. The Soviet Union will be there, as the other 34 states will be there -- to give an account of the manner in which the commitments at Helsinki have been fulfilled or not fulfilled is the undertaking of the meeting at Madrid. It would certainly please those who are most guilty of violation of the principles of Helsinki, including human rights, to be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion, which will be focused upon the meeting in Madrid.

There will be no medals awarded in Madrid. It's not a wrestling match or a gymnastic tournament among diplomats. What it will test is the progress made on the international agenda of security and cooperation and the firmness of the principles by which the 35 participants agreed to be bound.

In pursuing the cause of human rights, through the Helsinki accords, there are no shortcuts. The road that we're on is the right one. As the Belgrade meeting was ending, Dante Fascell, who was our congressional chairman at the time, said, and I quote from him: "Advocacy of human rights is not a quick fix. It holds no promise of easy victories." We know that all too well. But this advocacy of human rights, no matter how difficult it might be at times and how much it is scorned at times, must be pursued. And at Madrid it will be pursued, aggressively, persistently, and with the full focus on it of world opinion."

Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating
the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing
of the Final Act in Helsinki
July 29, 1980

CHINAReagan

Since 1971 when he visited Taiwan as an emissary for President Nixon, Reagan has ardently supported United States relations with Taiwan. He defended President Nixon's proposed trip to China.

"I'd be scared to death that a Democratic President would give something away..."

Baltimore Sun
February 26, 1972

After Nixon's trip Reagan cautiously supported the President's efforts:

"The trip is over. And, despite the efforts of many in the press to distort the outcome of that trip, I know because I asked him what would happen if the Red Chinese should attempt to take Taiwan by force. And the President said to me, 'This country will protect and defend Taiwan..'

I know that many of us are uncomfortable. But if we demand 100 percent adherence to what we think we would do if we were president, we ignore the fact that unless we are president and have access to all the facts that he has, we don't know whether our decision would be any different than his.

So let's stop giving him and let's stop giving each other political saliva tests to determine whose Republicanism is better than whose."

Quoted by Senator Goldwater
Congressional Record
April 20, 1972

Reagan was not prepared to improve relations with China at the expense of Taiwan.

"Frankly, I have to wonder if it isn't time for China to come visit us...(W)hile I want better relations with Red China, as I am sure everyone else does, that this country not, if it means sacrificing our relationship with Taiwan."

Issues and Answers
November 30, 1975

Reagan

When he heard rumors that President Ford intended to renounce the United States Defense Treaty with Taiwan, Reagan said:

"I don't believe, however, that in pursuing that relationship we should be persuaded to drop any of our longtime friends or allies like Taiwan. I think we should say to the mainland Chinese that they accept us and our friendship with the knowledge and understanding that we will not, in return for that, throw any allies aside or break any of our commitments to our allies."

Christian Science Monitor
June 3, 1976

When the Carter administration began normalizing relations with Peking, Reagan stated:

"...(I)t's beginning to look as if our government is willing to pay the price Peking has put on 'normalization,' though it is hard to see what is in it for us."

Radio Transcript
July, 1978

Just after normalization of relations with China Reagan began proposing a two China policy -- where both China and Taiwan would have an official liaison office.

"If the Chinese Communists could handle embassy functions in Washington by calling it a 'liaison office' before January 1, why can't the Republic of China's embassy -- handling much more work -- be called a 'liaison office' after January 1."

Radio Transcript
January, 1979

During the first month of normalization with China, Reagan stated that he thought communism was "kind of foreign to the Chinese temperament." He added:

"I will do everything to try and perhaps lead the communist nation away from communism."

United Press International
January 29, 1980

Reagan

A favorite theme which Reagan has since dropped was:

"No more Taiwans, no more Vietnams, no more betrayal of our friends."

Time Magazine
February 4, 1980

Reagan stuck to his two-China stand throughout the campaign.

"I want to have the best relations and have the Republic of China, the free Republic of China, know that we consider them an ally and that we have official relations with them...That liaison office is unofficial, it is not government. It is a private kind of foundation thing...I would make it an official liaison office so they knew they had a governmental relations."

Los Angeles Times
August 17, 1980

Realizing that his candidate's position would cause trouble, Reagan's chief foreign affairs advisor, Richard Allen, held a press conference to deny Reagan would change the American relationship with China and Taiwan. Allen said Reagan had been misquoted as advocating a two-China policy. (New York Times, July 11, 1980)

To clear up any misconceptions by the Chinese regarding Reagan's statements, Bush visited China as an emissary for Reagan. At a joint news conference, before the trip, Reagan restated his position.

"Yes I will advocate restoring official government status to the Taipei office."

Los Angeles Times
May 19, 1980

Either Reagan did not understand the consequences of his own proposal, or he was not familiar with the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1978. Even as Bush was in China, Reagan stuck by his proposal, when pressed on whether he favored establishing official relations with Taiwan, Reagan replied, "I guess...yes." (Washington Post, August 23, 1980)

After Bush's unsuccessful trip Reagan reaffirmed his support of a two-China policy.

"I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official."

Associated Press
August 25, 1980

Advisors and the China Issue

The public relations firm of two of Reagan's closest advisors, Michael Deaver and Peter Hannaford, has been on the Taiwan government's payroll since 1971. In fact, since 1977 both Deaver and Hannaford have registered with the Justice Department under the Foreign Registration Act as representatives of the government of Taiwan, a job for which their firm receives \$5,000 per month. (Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1980)

Bush

China has "enormous reserves" of oil and "can be a tremendous source of oil for the United States and the free world if we handle our diplomatic relations properly."

Dover, NH, Foster's Democrat
June 14, 1979

Bush

"When I last saw Mao Tse-Tung, the emphasis was 'You've got time to solve this problem.' Carter didn't understand it.

"We should continue to improve our relations with Peking, but not at the expense of our allies on Taiwan. The only way for us to have peace is for the United States to stay strong. I desperately want to see an (SALT II) agreement, but I wouldn't vote for this agreement without substantial changes."

Peoria, IL, Journal Star
August 5, 1979

SUBJECT: Reagan Press Conference

The garbled syntax and inaccuracies aside, there are serious flaws in Reagan's position on which he is vulnerable:

He very carefully avoids making any commitment to honor the normalization understandings with China. Although he concedes that the normalization negotiations are "behind us", implying that he does not intend to undo them, he goes on to say that his only concern is to "safeguard the interests of the United States and to enforce the law of the land". The implication here is that Reagan would merely be implementing "the law of the land", which he has a duty to do, even though the Chinese are not pleased with it. This is an evasion.

The Congress, in enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, wisely gave the President both the authority and the necessary flexibility, consistent with his Constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations, to manage the relationship with Taiwan in a way consistent with normalization. In signing the Bill into law, the President, as you will recall, removed any doubt as to the intent of the US Government by saying that

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he would implement the law in ways consistent with our normalization understandings with China. For Reagan to say simply that he will implement the law, while at the same time remaining silent on the question of whether he will honor the normalization understandings, sidesteps the real issue and raises more questions about his intentions.

Mr.
Mondale

"President Royo, Mrs. Royo, distinguished heads of delegations, members of Congress, honored guests and friends. This is indeed a proud day for the people of Panama. And it is a proud day for the people of the United States. Together on this moving occasion, our two nations rejoice as we write a new chapter in the history of our hemisphere. We meet at the magnificent Canal of Panama. For 65 years it has stood as a triumphant symbol of civilization, of the engineering, medical, and entrepreneurial genius of the 20th century. But from this moment forward the Panama Canal takes on a second symbolic meaning. It becomes two success stories; both of technology and of political ideals; both of engineering wizardry and of diplomatic vision; both of the conquest of nature and the cooperation of cultures. We now seal a relationship between two independent nations to guarantee the operation and defense of one of the world's key waterways, working together in mutual interest and for mutual benefit. The United States and Panama can be confident in our ability to achieve our shared objectives. I am here today to say that we will honor in full the terms of the Treaty. We will keep the Canal operating smoothly just as it has been since its opening in 1914. It will remain a safe and sure route of transit for the commerce of the entire world. Today the United States and Panama settle more than the future of the Canal. For as President Carter has said these treaties mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness and not force should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world. Our partnership is the outcome not of the politics of confrontation but of a common search for justice. A politics not of domination or dependence but of mutual interest and aspiration. And other countries of the world near and far can draw a meaning of what Panama and the United States have accomplished. For both our countries have acted with restraint and responsibility. Both achieved long-standing goals, and both have strengthened their capacity for independent action and influence on the global scene. Panama has long been a crossroads of world commerce. Today Panama also stands at the midpoint of a new heartland of emerging democracy. In Quito, in La Paz, we have just witnessed free elections and a successful transition to civilian rule. In Lima a new constitution has been adopted. In Santo Domingo elections brought an orderly transfer of power for the first time in our century. In Managua winds of democratic progress are stirring where they have long been stifled. In Honduras, the return to constitutional rule and elections is underway. From the Dominican Republic to the North, from the Andean states to the South we celebrate today a remarkable advance toward effective democratic institutions. This move toward more open and democratic societies is an indigenous process, not a formula imposed from elsewhere without regard to the diversities of the people concerned.

It is a dynamic and evolving order reflecting national diversities alive to aspirations for human rights, and responsive to the drive to participate in the political process. The process of the past two years refutes the claim that only authoritarian methods can provide the social discipline for wellbeing and growth. Instead, as the Quito declaration states, the best way to guarantee the prosperity of people is to provide a climate of freedom and enforcement of human rights under new forms of social democracy. These are the ideals we enshrine in our Panama Canal treaties.

As 15 years of negotiations reach their moment of fulfillment today, let us pay tribute to the countless thousands who have made and still make the Canal great. To the French pioneers who launched its history, to the Americans, and Barbadians, and Jamaicans, and people literally from every nation in the world who built the Canal against such overwhelming odds. To the Panamanians and Americans whose hard work day after day has maintained its efficient operation and to those who will continue that crucial work by staying on with the Panama Canal Commission. The creation of the Canal, as its superb historian has written, "was one of the supreme human achievements of all time, the culmination of a heroic dream of four hundred years, and of more than 20 years of phenomenal effort and sacrifice. The fifty miles between the oceans were among the hardest ever won by human effort and ingenuity. And no statistics on tonnage or tolls can begin to convey the grandeur of what was accomplished. The Canal is an expression of that old and noble desire, to bridge the divide, to bring people together." So today let us celebrate a new bridging of the divide, a new drawing together. For 65 years the Panama Canal has joined the oceans. Now and forevermore it will join our ideals.

Thank you."

Press Release
Albrook Field, Panama
October 1, 1979

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
AFTER THE BRIEFING

MAY 14, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON
CUBAN REFUGEES

After consultations with senior advisers and with Congress, and in the spirit of the San Jose Conference, the President has decided to take the following steps to welcome the Cuban refugees in a legal and orderly process:

1. We are prepared to start an airlift or a sealift immediately as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. Our Government is chartering two large, sea-worthy ships, which will go to Key West to standby, ready to go to Cuba. To ensure a legal and orderly process, all people will have to be screened before departure from Cuba. Priority will be given to political prisoners, to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, and to persons who sought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy and in our Interest Section last month. In the course of our discussions with the Congress and with the Cuban-American community, the international community and the Cuban Government, we will determine the number of people to be taken over the next twelve months. We will fulfill our humanitarian responsibilities, and we hope other governments will adjust their previous pledges to resettle Cuban refugees to take into account the larger problem that has developed. This will provide a safe and orderly way to accommodate Cubans wishing to enter the U.S.
2. Tomorrow, we will open a Family Registration Office in Miami to receive the names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. permanent residents who will be eligible for immigration.
3. The Coast Guard is now communicating with these vessels illegally enroute to or from Cuba and those already in Mariel Harbor to tell them to return to the United States without taking Cubans on board. If they follow this directive, they have nothing to fear from the law. We will do everything possible to stop these illegal trips to Cuba. We will take the following steps to ensure that the law is obeyed:
 - (a) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will continue to issue notices of intent to fine those unlawfully bringing Cubans to this country. As fines become due, they will be collected.
 - (b) All vessels currently and unlawfully carrying Cubans to this country will henceforth be seized by the Customs Service.
 - (c) Anyone who tampers with or seizes, or tows a ship to Cuba which has been ordered will be subject to separate criminal prosecution.

- (d) The Coast Guard will continue to review each vessel that returns to the United States for violations of boat safety law. Those found to be in gross violation of the law will be subject to criminal prosecution and additional fines. Furthermore, boats which are found to be safety hazards will be detained.
 - (e) Any individual who has been notified by INS for unlawfully bringing Cubans into the country and who makes another trip will be subject to criminal prosecution and the boat used for such a repeat trip will be seized for forfeiture proceedings.
 - (f) Law enforcement agencies will take additional steps, as necessary, to implement this policy and to discourage the unlawful boat traffic to Cuba.
4. Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and mental patients out of hospitals and has forced boat owners to take them to the U.S. Thus far, over 400 such prisoners have been detained. We will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society, and we will begin exclusion proceedings against these people at once.
 5. These steps will make clear to the Government of Cuba our determination to negotiate an orderly process. This is the mission of the three-government delegation established by the San Jose Conference last week. Our actions are intended to promote an international solution to this problem. We intend to continue our consultations with the participants of the San Jose Conference and consider additional steps the international community should take to resolve this problem.

In summary, the U.S. will welcome Cubans, seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws, and we will pursue every avenue to establish an orderly and regular flow.

The President continues to be greatly concerned about the Haitians who have been coming to this country on small boats. He has instructed appropriate federal agencies to receive the Haitians in the same manner as others seeking asylum. However, our laws never contemplated and do not provide adequately for people coming to our shores in the manner the Cubans and Haitians have. We will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of these "boat people" after the current emergency situation is controlled.

The Cuban American community has contributed much to Miami, the State of Florida, and to our country. The President understands the deep desire to reunite families which has led to this situation. He calls upon the Cuban-American community to end the boat flotilla and help bring about a safe and orderly resolution to this crisis.

DEFENSE POLICY/WEAPONS SYSTEMSReaganI. Weapon Systems

Reagan and the Republican Platform call for massive rearmament in both conventional and nuclear forces. While both Reagan and the Republican platform list specific weapon systems which they would fund, it appears that Reagan favors an arms race as an end in itself -- as a means for challenging Soviet industrial capacity:

"If we start an arms buildup, they (the Soviets) will understand that the alternative to legitimate limitation is our industrial might and power turned to a military buildup."

Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980

Reagan has been a constant supporter of all weapon programs. In fact, he has never publicly opposed any major weapon system in the last 15 years.

Neutron Bomb

Reagan strongly opposed any funding cuts in the development of the neutron bomb. He views the neutron bomb as "an offensive weapon that could bridge the gap for conventional weapons." (New York Times, May 6, 1980)

Reagan has called the neutron bomb the closest thing to the ideal weapon.

"Very simply it is the dreamed of death ray weapon of science fiction. It kills enemy soldiers but doesn't blow up the surrounding countryside or destroy villages, towns and cities. It won't destroy an enemy tank -- just kill the tank crew.

"Now some express horror at this and charging immortality, portray those who would use such a weapon as placing a higher value on property than human life. This is sheer unadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding, but all war weapons back to club, the sling and the arrow, are designed to kill

the soldiers of the enemy. With gunpowder and artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could not be confined to the battlefield. And so came total war with non-combatants outnumbering soldiers in casualties."

Reagan Radio Transcript
March 1978 - April 1978

Reagan supports deployment of the neutron bomb in almost every available delivery system.

"I favor development and deployment of the neutron warhead for U.S. theatre nuclear forces, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery and bombs."

Washington Post
April 24, 1980

MX Missile

Reagan supports development of the MX Missile system. However, because it will be years before the system is deployable, he has called for a faster remedy.

"To prevent the ultimate catastrophe of a massive nuclear attack, we urgently need a program to preserve and restore our strategic deterrent. The Administration proposes a costly and complex new missile system. But we can't complete that until the end of this decade. Given the rapidly growing vulnerability of our land based missile force, a faster remedy is needed."

Address to Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Cruise Missile

Reagan is a strong advocate of the cruise missile.

"You've got a weapon system they can't counter ...The cruise missile could be just that."

Los Angeles Times

Reagan has attacked the Carter Administration for delaying production of the cruise missile.

"We have an administration that in three years has done away with...the cruise missile...and you could go on with weapon after weapon..."

San Jose News
March 10, 1980

Republican Platform

The Republican platform calls for development of virtually every weapon system under consideration:

- o the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile in a prudent survivable configuration;
- o accelerated development and deployment of a new manned strategic penetrating bomber that will exploit the \$5.5 billion already invested in the B-1, while employing the most advanced technology available;
- o deployment of an air defense system comprised of dedicated modern interceptor aircraft and early warning support systems;
- o acceleration of development and deployment of strategic cruise missiles deployed on aircraft, on land, and on ships and submarines;
- o modernization of the military command and control system to assure the responsiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to presidential command in peace or war; and
- o vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies."

1980 Republican Platform

B-1 Bomber

In 1976, when the Senate voted to delay a decision on building the B-1 bomber, Reagan criticized its action.

"The action in the Senate must have been good news in Moscow. They must have been toasting in the Kremlin."

Washington Post
May 22, 1976

Similarly, when President Carter cancelled production of the B-1, Reagan questioned the decision.

"I don't think that the current administration is doing what should be done -- not when it cancels the B-1 bomber, which is probably the foremost advance in aircraft that has ever been -- or has been presented since we went to the jet engines..."

Face the Nation
May 14, 1978

Y-C 14

Reagan criticized the Carter Administration for cutting funding for the Boeing YC-14:

"All of this sounds reassuring, doesn't it? But there is a kicker in the story -- Last December the Administration cancelled the YC-14 program in one of its 'national security' or perhaps I should say 'insecurity' decisions.

"Meanwhile, by some strange coincidence the Soviet Union just happens to be going full-speed ahead on an airplane building program. And the plane they are building looks for all the world like a mirror image of the YC-14. Well, why not? The YC-14 is the most advanced idea in cargo transport of combat forces and equipment in the world today."

Reagan Radio Broadcast
June, 1978

MILITARY POLICYBush

"My view is, get a good SALT Treaty and sign it. My view is, strengthen defense. So I think the linkage that I got from your question is though I know others feel that way, I think it is; and my view has always been judge the Treaty on its merits, and if it's good, go ahead. Strengthen defense; yes, we're going to have to do that. You see, when President Carter came in he took out of the Ford budget the B-1, the neutron, improvement of the Navy. And there was one other major area -- MX -- the mobile missile. And he took all this out, shifted that money over into the social side of the equation, in terms of spending, and I think those priorities were wrong. I think we're getting too weak."

CBS Face the Nation
page 8
October 7, 1979

Bush

"For even if the Carter administration were able to convince the American people that it hasn't failed in its responsibility to maintain our nation's strategic capabilities -- and I, for one, believe the people are wise enough to see through this orchestrated campaign -- the Soviet Union is all-too-aware of our country's diminished military, naval and strategic power."

"The men in the Kremlin know, as Governor Reagan has pointed out, that in the past fifteen years the United States has lost its deterrent advantage over the Soviet Union in all but a handful of military categories -- and if current trends continue, they'll surpass us even in those."

"It's a frightening thought. But in this crucial year of decision, the operative phrase in that thought is, obviously, 'if current trends continue.'"

World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980

Carter Record on Defense Programs:
Claims and Reality

The Administration's defense budgets and programs demonstrate its clear commitment to preserving our national security in the face of sustained Soviet challenge. This record stands in clear contrast to the performance--if not the rhetoric--of preceding Republican administrations.

Some have claimed that "Ford would have done more than President Carter has done." It is always easier to claim what might have been done than to actually deliver. Again, the President's record is noteworthy--four years of sustained real growth, in contrast to eight years of real decline.

- The last "real" Ford budget was the one for Fiscal Year 1977, submitted in 1976; before GOP primaries stimulated a series of interim changes, and before the President's defeat in November 1976 left his officials just before leaving office free to propose a budget that did not have to meet the standards of realism and consistency required of a budget that must be defended and executed by its authors.

- Claims that strategic programs planned by the Ford Administration were vitiated by President Carter are based on a combination of misleading assertions and oversimplification. These charges simply don't stand up under scrutiny.

- We already had 100 "extra" Minuteman missiles (missiles without launchers) in the inventory. Keeping the production line in a stand-by status (as suggested by Ford) at a cost of as much as \$300 million a year, made no sense at all, and this Administration wisely declined to do it.

- Ford's covered trench-mobile MX missile might have been operational in FY 84, as he projected, but the system as designed would have been much less capable than the carefully studied design now undergoing full scale development by the Carter Administration.

- Meeting a FY 79 IOC for the TRIDENT SSBN, as projected by the Republicans, was clearly impossible as early as 1975. Shipyard management and industrial delay problems which plagued the TRIDENT program under previous administrations have now been cleared up. The first TRIDENT submarine is at sea now and will be on patrol next year.

-- The B-1 would not be as effective a way to maintain the third leg of our deterrent--in the face of vigorous Soviet air defense programs--as would the Administration's dynamic program of ALCM development, production and deployment. The ALCM contractor has been recently selected, and the program is on schedule. Work on design, construction and eventual procurement of a new ALCM carrier aircraft is also underway and on schedule. We now project an 1982 IOC for the first full squadron of B-52s, each aircraft equipped with 16 missiles. (Funding has also been requested for new penetrating bomber technology for a 1990s replacement to the B-52.)

-- Finally, the Carter Administration has assigned high priority to realistic ground- and sea-launched cruise missile programs, with the result that we will have a GLCM available for deployment in Europe as soon as the infrastructure is available to receive it. In December our NATO allies endorsed this deployment as one element of the Alliance's TNF modernization program. A SLCM program is proceeding in parallel with the counterpart ground-launched project. By contrast, no decisions on full-scale development of any cruise missile were made by the Republicans until the last few days of the Ford Administration.

• This Administration has responded wisely to the adverse trends in the military balance (trends which arise from a doubling of Soviet military spending in the last twenty years while ours remained level) and to increased dangers to U.S. interests through steady increases in defense budgets, culminating in substantial growth in the FY 81 defense budget. Our current Five Year Defense Program projects continued real growth in defense spending through FY 1985.

In the first year of this Administration, we placed the major weight of our efforts behind improving NATO's early conventional combat capability, primarily through the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program and the three percent real growth commitment. We next turned to the problem of modernizing our strategic Triad. Most recently, we have taken steps to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. Thus, programs in each of these areas are underway and have momentum. We are now concentrating special attention and resources on improving our capabilities to deal with the threats and crises around the world and, in particular, we are acting to expand the improvement (began two years ago) in our ability to get men and equipment quickly to potential areas of conflict and to retain our preeminence at sea in an era of new technologies.

Not only has the President's commitment to growth in Defense capability been steady over three years, but key planning to meet contingencies such as the present crisis in the Persian Gulf has been underway for some two years. Critics have tried to claim that our healthy increase in 1981 Defense spending was a last minute concoction in response to Afghanistan, and that our Rapid Deployment Forces were likewise an eleventh hour invention.

The contrary is true, and we have the public record to prove it. Our 1981 program was built last summer, with important emphasis--pre-hostage and pre-Afghanistan--on expanded capabilities to deploy forces worldwide, outside the NATO theater. That program and the emphasis was formulated during the early fall of 1971 and briefed to the Congress by Secretary Brown in early December, before the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. While some members in the Congress (which has cut every Carter defense budget by \$1B or more) have only recently "recognized" the need for sustained real growth, President Carter has been requesting and urging support for such defense budgets since his inauguration.

The Carter modernization thrust spans the entire defense program, with impressive capabilities now and in the future:

- For the Army, more than doubling the prepositioned combat equipment in NATO to allow rapid reinforcement of our Allies, the new XM-1 tank, IFV armored vehicle, and the Roland air defense missile.
- For the Navy and Marines, the Trident missile and continued Trident submarine production, the AEGIS fleet air defense cruiser, new TARK Marine Maritime Prepositioning ships, the F-18/A-18 fighter and attack aircraft, and more FFG-7 frigates for protection of supply convoys.
- For the Air Force, the MX missile and the air-launched cruise missile (a far more capable alternative to the B-1) to modernize and strengthen our strategic capability; twenty-six fully equipped tactical fighter wings, many with new F-15, F-16 and A-10 aircraft; the KC-10 advanced cargo/tanker aircraft to speed rapid deployment; and the CX transport aircraft to expand our ability to airlift men and equipment anywhere on the globe.

In addition, we are strengthening our nation's ability to respond forcefully in a crisis by reinstituting registration for potential military service. This registration of

young men shortens the time it will take us to mobilize in the face of any military contingency, and it will tend to increase enlistments, especially in our reserve forces.

In sum, the record of President Carter is a measured, responsible performance that reflects his consistent, long-term commitment to our nation's security.

AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

This paper presents a brief overview of the major defense programs in the Carter Administration's Five Year Defense Program.

SUMMARY OF PROGRAMSA. Strategic Forces

1. MX - In order to meet the challenge posed by the vigorous Soviet ICBM program, we will deploy 200 new MX inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a mobile and survivable basing mode. Each MX will be equipped with 10 warheads, compared to three on each of our current MINUTEMAN III missiles.
2. TRIDENT - We are modernizing the sea-based leg of the strategic TRIAD with two major programs. The new highly-accurate TRIDENT II missile will be placed on POSEIDON submarines. This missile's longer range will enable submarines equipped with it to patrol an ocean area 10 times larger, thus making them more difficult for the Soviets to detect and destroy. The new TRIDENT submarine, the first of which is scheduled to go on patrol next year, has more (24) and larger missile tubes than the POSEIDON boats, is quieter, and can remain on patrol much longer.
3. Air-Launched Cruise Missile - The long-range, deadly-accurate air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) is the key to the modernization of the third leg of the TRIAD, our bomber force. Our plans are to deploy over 3,000 ALCMs on 151 of our B-52 bombers. The ALCM can be launched from a bomber that is far outside the range of Soviet air defenses. This program will provide an effective retaliatory force well into the 1980s and beyond.
4. New Strategic Aircraft - To hedge against unexpected vulnerabilities in the B-52/ALCM system, we are continuing to investigate designs for a new cruise missile carrier and a new manned penetrating bomber.

B. Forces for NATO

1. NATO Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) - This Administration has reaffirmed our historic commitment to the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. In 1970, NATO adopted the LTDP (proposed by the United States in 1977), which provides for long-term planning and co-operative efforts among the United States and our NATO allies. We and our NATO allies are committed to increasing real defense spending (after inflation) by three percent per year through the mid-1980s, in order to bolster our conventional capabilities to deter -- and, if necessary, to defeat -- Warsaw Pact aggression.

2. Theater Nuclear Forces - Theater nuclear forces (TNF) provide an important link between conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities, demonstrating our willingness to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in support of our NATO allies. The Soviet build-up in their own long-range theater nuclear forces (especially the BACKFIRE bomber and the SS-20 missile) cannot go unanswered by NATO. Thus, modernization of our long-range TNF is a top priority. In December 1979, the Alliance decided to deploy in Europe 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beginning in 1982 and replace 108 of our older PERSHING IA missiles with longer-range PERSHING II missiles.

3. Pre-positioned Equipment - Our NATO reinforcement objectives can be met only if we severely reduce the demand on our limited airlift assets during the early stages of a conflict. To accomplish this, we are going to preposition more equipment in Europe. We have programmed enough additional equipment for three divisions in Europe by 1982 and are considering further increases.

4. Readiness and Sustainability - In order to increase both the readiness of our forces in Europe as well as their ability to fight for longer periods of time, we are programming increases in spare parts, munitions, support structure and training, war reserves, and other key support items. In the FY 1981 budget request, 63 percent of the \$59 billion defense logistics dollars are dedicated to support peacetime material readiness programs.

C. Mobility Forces

Our long-term mobility objective is to be able to support the concurrent demands of a world-wide NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and those of a non-NATO contingency. We will meet those demands with a carefully balanced program of forward deployed forces, airlift, sealift and prepositioned equipment.

1. Airlift - We are moving ahead with plans for the CX transport, which will carry outsized cargo (such as heavy tanks) over intercontinental ranges and have the capability to operate into small, austere airfields. We are considering two alternatives for the CX: a totally new aircraft and an existing aircraft (or modified version), like the C-5 or 747. To support deployment of our general purpose forces, we have programmed a new tanker-cargo aircraft, the KC-10. The KC-10 will have a unique long-range, large off-load capacity and the ability to carry cargo in addition to fuel. We are also enhancing our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, under which commercial aircraft are converted to carry military passengers or cargo during a crisis.

2. Sealift - Even with enhanced airlift to augment our sealift capability, much of the equipment our troops will need in combat must be carried by ship. We are purchasing eight commercial SL-7 cargo ships and converting them to RC/RO (Roll-on/Roll-off) ships. These fast ships can carry large amounts of equipment to European seaports in four days, and the Persian Gulf in two weeks, from U.S. ports on the East coast.

3. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) - In order to be able to respond rapidly to the requirements of a non-NATO contingency, we have designated certain of our land, sea, and air forces for the RDJTF. The forces available to the RDF include both heavy and light Army and Marine units, naval carrier battle groups, and tactical fighter and airlift wings. In a non-NATO contingency, we would initially deploy our light ground forces and tactical aircraft, with emphasis on speed and mobility, followed by heavy armored RDF forces, as dictated by the requirements of the particular contingency.

4. Maritime Prepositioning - Since rapidly deployable light forces are not adequate for sustained combat, we also need a capability to deploy heavy armored forces rapidly. A major initiative to that end is our program to buy new Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS). By prepositioning equipment, supplies and ammunition, these new ships will enable us to rapidly deploy an armor-heavy Marine division anywhere in the world. In the interim, we are currently prepositioning equipment for certain Marine units on seven specially configured commercial ships, which are now en route to the Indian Ocean to provide a flexible and rapid response capability for non-NATO contingencies.

D. Other Modernization Programs

1. Tactical Air - We are completing a major modernization of our tactical air (TACAIR) forces. Air Force units are now being equipped with the F-15, the world's best fighter; the highly reliable F-16 multi-purpose fighter; and the A-10, close air support and interdiction aircraft. Navy TACAIR units are now flying the F-14, which, with its sophisticated PHOENIX missile system, provides a significant air defense capability. We are also programming a new F/A-18 multi-purpose fighter/attack aircraft. To complement our TACAIR systems, we are also continuing to buy one more example of U.S. state-of-the-art military technology, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which provides early detection, warning, and command and control for our TACAIR forces.

2. XM-1 - The XM-1 main battle tank will provide a significant improvement in our ability to counter the Warsaw Pact armored threat. The XM-1 now carries a 105mm gun which can be fired accurately, day or night, even while the tank is moving at speeds up to 40 mph. In 1984, we will arm the MX-1 with a new, German-designed 120mm gun, which will insure its ability to counter the enemy threat into the 1990s.

3. Naval Forces - We are modernizing our naval forces both by building new ships and by updating existing ones. Our current plans call for expanding our fleet to a full 550 ships. We will maintain our force of 12 operating aircraft carriers through the year 2000 by continuing the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). We are maintaining the best anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in the world by procuring new attack submarines and frigates, and improving surveillance, detection and other ASW related equipment. We are continuing to build the AEGIS air defense ships which allow our naval forces to operate in "high-threat" areas. With its phased-array radar and automated control systems, AEGIS will substantially increase our capability to protect carrier battle groups against heavy air-to-surface missile attacks. Our ability to conduct amphibious operations will be enhanced by our program to buy new LSD-41 amphibious ships and TAKX maritime prepositioning ships. Our FY 1981 program calls for procurement of a total of 97 new ships, including guided missile frigates, oilers, mine countermeasure ships and cargo ships. These programs fully exploit the technological lead the U.S. holds in naval force development. The vast capabilities of U.S. naval power cannot be measured in terms of numbers alone. Our technological superiority has kept our Navy "second to none."

E. People Programs

Ensuring that we have capable and motivated people for our military forces is one of our top priority defense objectives. While we have placed greater emphasis on improving our recruiting programs, we have found that increased retention of senior enlisted men and women as well as officers in certain critical skills is essential.

To help meet the needs of our servicemen and women, President Carter has supported an 11.7 percent pay increase and proposed a comprehensive Fair Benefits Package, which includes:

- increased flight pay and sea pay;
- expanded recruitment bonuses;

- a variable housing allowance for high-cost areas within the U.S.;
- higher reimbursement rates for travel required to assume a new assignment;
- family separation allowances for lower enlisted ranks;
- continuation bonus for pilots;
- a dental plan for dependents; and
- baby care for dependents under two years of age.

We are confident that enactment of this proposal will greatly reduce the exodus of many of our most experienced and valuable military men and women and help provide the quality of life our people in uniform deserve.

on the occasion of his departure for Japan and China, a trip he undertook at my request. As we stressed at the time, the purpose of the trip was to provide for a candid exchange of views with leaders in both countries on a wide range of international topics of mutual interest. Amb. Bush returned last night and has reported his findings in detail. We're both very pleased with the results of his extensive discussions. In a series of meetings with a distinguished leaders in Japan, including pm Suzuki, former pm's Fukuda, Kishi, and Miki, Foreign Minister Ito, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka, he had the opportunity to hear their views and recommendations concerning the future of US - Japan relations. Our Republican Party platform stresses that Japan will remain a pillar of our ~~foreign~~ policy in Asia, and a Reagan-Bush administration will work hard to assure that US-Japanese relations are maintained in excellent condition based on close consultation and mutual understanding. Japan's role in the process of ensuring peace in Asia is a crucial one, and we must reinforce our ties with this close ally. Japan is our 2nd most important trading partner and we are her first. We have close ties in other fields too. The most important example is the US-Japan Mutual Security, which recently marked its 20th anniversary. Understanding the Japanese perspective is important for the success of American policy. As Amb. Bush will tell you in detail, he found Japanese leaders unanimous in their view that the US must be a strong, reliable, leading partner.

I am appreciate receiving their views, and I am grateful to them for the courtesies extended to Amb. Bush. I would also like to express my appreciation to and regard for US Amb. Mike Mansfield, who also extended many courtesies.

Of equal importance was Amb. Bush's trip to China, where he held a series of high-level meetings. As I said on Aug. 16, we have an obvious interest in developing our relationship with China, an interest that goes beyond trade and cultural ties. It is an interest that is fundamental to a Reagan-Bush Administration. The meetings in Beijing provided for extensive exchanges of views. George has reported to me in great detail the points of similarity and agreement as well as those of dissimilarity and disagreement.

Since the objective of the trip was to have just such an exchange without necessarily reaching any agreement, I believe the objective was reached. We now have received an updated, first-hand account of China's views, and the Chinese leaders have heard our point of view.

While in Beijing, Amb. Bush and Richard Allen met at length with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, as well as with other top foreign policy experts and military leaders. I appreciate the courtesies which the Chinese leaders extended to our party, and I also wish to thank US Amb. Leonard Woodcock for his kind assistance.

We now maintain full and friendly diplomatic relations with China. This relationship began only a few years ago, and it is one which we should develop and strengthen in the years ahead. It's a delicate relationship, and the Reagan-Bush Administration will handle it with care and respect, with due regard for our own vital interests in the world generally and in the Pacific region specifically.

China and the US have a common interest in maintaining peace, so our nations can grow and prosper. Two-way trade has now reached approximately 3 1/2 billion dollars annually, and China's ~~policy~~ program of modernization depends in a major way on Western and US technology.

Along with many other nations, we and China share a deep concern the pace and scale of the Soviet military buildup. Chinese leaders agree with Japanese leaders that the US must be a strong and vigorous defender of the peace. And they specifically favor us bolstering our defense and our alliances. It is quite clear

that we do not, however, see eye to eye on Taiwan. And thus, this is an appropriate time for me to state our position on this issue. I'm sure that the Chinese leaders would place no value on our relations with them if they thought that we would break commitment to them if a stronger power were to demand it. Based on my long-standing conviction that American can provide leadership and respect only if it keeps the commitments to its friends, large as well as small, a Reagan-Bush Administration would observe these 5 principles in dealing with the China situation.

-- First, US-Chinese relations are important to America as well as to Chinese interests. Our partnership should be global and strategic. In seeking improved relations with the People's Republic of China, I would extend the hand of friendship to all Chinese. In continuing our relations, which date from the historic opening created by President Nixon, I would continue the process of expanding trade, scientific, and cultural ties.

-- Second, I pledge to work for peace, stability, and economic growth of the Western Pacific area, in cooperation with Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.

-- Third, I will cooperate and consult with all countries in the area in a mutual effort to stand firm against aggression or seizure for hegemony which threatens the peace and stability of the area.

-- Fourth, I intend that US relations with Taiwan will develop with the law of our land, the Taiwan Relations Act. This legislation is the product of democratic process and is designed to remedy defects of the totally inadequate legislation proposed by Jimmy Carter. By accepting China's three conditions for normalization

Jimmy Carter made concessions that Presidents Nixon and Ford had steadfastly refused to make. I was and am critical of his decision, because I believe that he made concessions that were not necessary and not in our national interest. I felt that a condition of normalization, by itself a sound policy choice, should have been the retention of a liaison office on Taiwan of equivalent status to the one which we had earlier established in Beijing. With a persistent and principal negotiating position, I believe that normalization could ultimately have been achieved on this basis. But that is behind us now. My present concern is to safeguard the interest of the US and to enforce the law of the land.

It was the timely action, reflecting the strong support of the American people for Taiwan, that forced the changes in the inadequate bill which Mr. Carter proposed. Clearly the Congress was unwilling to buy the Carter plan, which it believed would have jeopardized Taiwan's security. This Act, designed by the Congress to provide adequate safeguards for Taiwan's security and well-being also provides the official basis for our relations with our long term friend and ally. It declares our official policy to one of maintaining peace and promoting extensive, close, and friendly relations between the US and the 17 million people on Taiwan, as well as the 1 billion people of the China mainland.

It specifies that our official policy considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to peace and of grave concern to the US. And most importantly it spells out our policy of providing defensive weapons to Taiwan and mandates the US to maintain the means to resist any resort to

force or other forms of coercion which threaten the security of the social or economic system of Taiwan.

This Act further spells out in great detail how the President of the US, our highest elected official, shall conduct relations with Taiwan, leaving to his discretion the specific methods of achieving policy objectives. The Act further details how our official personnel, including diplomats, are to administer US relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan. It specifies that for that purpose they are to resign for the term of their duty in Taiwan and then be reinstated to their former agencies of the US Government with no loss of status, seniority or pension right. The intent of the Congress is crystal clear. Our official relations with Taiwan will be funded by Congress with public monies, the expenditure of which will be audited by the Comptroller General of the US and Congressional oversight will be performed by two standing committees of the Congress.

Now you might ask what I would do differently. I would not pretend as Carter does that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, established by our Congress, is not official. I am satisfied that this Act provides an official and adequate basis for safeguarding our relationship with Taiwan, and I pledge to enforce it. But I will eliminate petty practices of the Carter Administration which are inappropriate and demeaning to our Chinese friends on Taiwan. For example it is absurd and not required by the Act that our representatives are not permitted to meet with Taiwanese officials in their offices and ours. I will treat all Chinese officials with fairness and dignity. I would not impose restrictions which are not required by the Taiwan Relations Act and which contravene its spirit and

purpose.

Here are other examples of how Carter has gone out of his way to humiliate our friends on Taiwan. Taiwanese officials are ignored at senior levels of the US government. The Taiwan Relations Act specifically requires that the Taiwanese be permitted to keep the same number of offices in this country that they had before.

Previously, Taiwan had 14 such offices. Today there are but 9.

Taiwanese military officers are no longer permitted to train in

the US or to attend service academies. Recently the Carter Administration attempted to ban all imports from Taiwan labelled

"Made in the Republic of China," but was forced to rescind the order after opposition began to mount in the Congress. The

Carter Administration unilaterally imposed a 1 year moratorium on arms supplies, even though the Act specifies that Taiwan shall be provided with arms of a defensive character. The Carter Admini-

stration abrogated the Civil Aviation Agreement with Taiwan, which had been effect since 1947. In response to demands from the People's Republic of China, he did this.

I recognize that the People's Republic of China is not pleased with the Taiwan Relations, which the US Congress insisted on as the official basis for our relations with Taiwan. This was made abundantly clear to Mr. Bush and, I am told, is clear to the Carter Administration. But it is the law of our land.

-- Fifth, as President, I will not accept the interference of any foreign power in the process of protecting American interest and carrying out the laws of our land. To do otherwise would be a dereliction of my duty as President. It is my conclusion that the strict observance of these 5 principals will be in the best interest of the US, the People's Republic of China, and the

Keep marginal notes

people on Taiwan." The specific implementation of these duties will have to await the results of the election in November. But in deciding what to do, I will take into account the views of the People's Republic of China as well as Taiwan. It will be my first intention to preserve the interests of the US, and as President will choose the methods by which this shall best be accomplished. That's the end of the statement. And now I'm sure you'll have a great many questions for Amb. Bush, who has been there on the scene.

Question: I've got a question for you first. It seems I heard earlier from the Chinese have been saying publicly is that what they've objected to is not the Taiwan Relations Act, but your characterization of your desire for our relationship with them to be "official." They seem to be most upset with that choice of words. So, I want to ask you why you have insisted that that is what you want--an "official" relationship?

Reagan: Well, as I have told you, the law is very clear and I would enforce it. It does give certain discretion to the President, and my quarrel is with the manner in which Jimmy Carter has abused that discretion. And I think it is a transparent and hypocritical to pretend that an act passed by the US Congress resulting in an agency for a foundation created by a Government agency, manned by Government employees who, even though they are on leave of absence, have all the prerequisites that existed when they were on active duty with the Government, and funded by our Government, is not indeed an official relationship. As a matter of fact, the very clause in the act that says we can provide defensive weapons--you cannot provide weapons to another country without officially going through the US Government to do so.

Question: Governor, in that press conference ten days ago you specifically cited this Act as providing authority for governmental relations with Taiwan. Amb. Bush has flatly contradicted that, saying the Act calls for non-governmental relations.

Bush: I don't remember you saying government.

Question: Can you tell what you now believe and whether you still think there should be an official, overt US Liaison Office on Taiwan?

Reagan: No, I'm just saying, I think I just answered that--that the act has made it very clear--as I say, the use of the word "official" is what George said when he was there, once publicly, that the problem really seemed to be one of semantics. And, no, the institute that is there and the law provides for the things that I, whatever changes I would make are within the context of that law, as I pointed out here in the statement.

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Question: Do you expect, if you were elected President, you would re-establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

Reagan: No, this would then be--this is the very thing where the misunderstanding lies, and I would have to say that this came from a distortion of my position that has been picked up by the Chinese press. I have never advocated diplomatic relations--which, in the language of diplomacy, a very technical meaning, which requires an embassy and so forth--and you would be violating the very thing that both governments in China--you'd be violating what they believe. Because both of those governments insist that each one of them are--is the government of all of China. And there's no way that we can do that.

Question: I don't understand your reference to "both governments in China." |

Reagan: I mean, the government of Taiwan and the government of the People's Republic of China. Now, each one claims to be the government of all of China. Now, that is an issue that they're going to have to settle between themselves as to how that works out. Our Government, due to what the President did a short time ago, has now officially recognized the government of the People's Republic of China and established diplomatic relations. Previously we have recognized the government on Taiwan, and had an Embassy there.

Q: ...Le Monde. The European press is concerned by your fierce anti-communism and they are as interested in your statements about the current upheavals in Poland as they are about China and Taiwan.

~~Reagan:~~ If you were President, would you be willing to establish diplomatic relations with the Polish strikers?

Reagan: (Laughs). No; but I do believe that what we're seeing there in Poland--I think that the US, there's no reason to interfere, but I think the US should also make it clear that we don't believe that the Soviet Union has a right to interfere in that domestic problem there.

Q: Amb. Bush, based on your visit, what do you think the Chinese reaction would be to the steps outlined in Gov. Reagan's statement, particularly the training of Taiwanese military officers in the US?

Bush: I know what the reaction would be, but these are examples that are set up of what Jimmy Carter has done. I don't think the Governor's taken a position here on which of these he's going to do or not do. But, there's no question that Peking would be unhappy. And during my trip, my mission wasn't to try to negotiate agreement, we're not in power. Our question wasn't even to try to minimize differences. Indeed, I very clearly pointed up Gov. Reagan's support—proper, in my view—for the Taiwan Relations Act, and we're bound to disagree. And in any relationship as new and as complicated as this one, there's going to be differences. So, I don't think you have to know anything about the China equation to suggest that some of these things would cause heartburn in Peking. But ~~the~~ relationship, in my view, the way the Governor has described it, the way he's put his position here, in my view, we can have improved relations with the People's Republic of China and still do what he has suggested vis-a-vis (Taiwan). He's saying that these things, you know, that the cat says you can do them; and when he is, and I presume, in office, why he makes a decision.

Question: Vice Pres. Mondale today said your statements regarding Taiwan would cheer only the Soviets. What do you think of the implications ~~for the~~ for the Soviet Union of the statements that you are making that are obviously making the Chinese unhappy?

Reagan: I don't know that I can comment on his interpretation of how the Soviets might feel. I don't feel that there's anything that we could do that would be provocative to them. They have their game plan which they follow. And I also don't take seriously too much of what almost amounts to hysteria recently in the shrillness of the criticisms of me and of our party by Vice Pres. Mondale.

on Taiwan to one day recover the Mainland? You have in the past
 (supported such hopes).

Reagan: Well, I have told you that this is a problem now: 2 governments both
claiming to be the legitimate government of China. This is something for them to
work out. And as the Taiwan Relations Act specifies, we want to see that done
peacefully and without force or coercion by either side.

Question: Do you still support the aspirations of the Nationalists on Taiwan to
one day control the mainland?

Reagan: Wait a minute. You asking for a question, that whatever I answer--let
 me give you what I think is a very broad answer. I would think that all of us
would be happier if the government, whether the government on Taiwan or the
government especially on the mainland of China, would give up the ideology of
communism. That would ease a lot of problems and make for a much better
relationship. They are a Communist government and we have established a
 relationship.

Q: What would you do to make US relations with Taiwan more "official"
 they are now?

Reagan: Well, I think, for one thing, that it is demeaning and insulting for us
 to say that with the establishment of their office in Washington and our American
 Institute on Taiwan that those people cannot meet on official business with
 representatives of either our Government or theirs in Governmental offices--that
 they gotta go to a restaurant some place or a club or a hotel. And this is not
 contained in the act; this is at the discretion of the President and this is his
 decision. That is an order I would rescind.

Bush: Might I add to that, the French and the Japanese, who have a similar rela-
 ship, both can do what the Governor suggested.

Reagan: No, there would be no need for that; it's to recognize what it is and make it more open. And what George has pointed out is a most significant thing: that France and Japan have done exactly the same thing, with regard to the same kind of offices, supposedly non-governmental, and allowed their people to meet on official business in government offices.

Q: Would it be an official Liaison Office of the US Government?

Reagan: No, it would be what the Taiwan Relations Act says it is--that's the law of the land.

Q: ^{Do you say} You said this American Institute was unacceptable, it should be an official ^{office} ~~(institution)~~. Have you changed that ~~position~~?

Reagan: Well, if I did in discussions of that, then I misstated. I have always talked about, and I have repeatedly referred to, the Taiwan Relations Act and said what I was advocating was contained in that act. Shall I have a show of hands on why many of you have read the Taiwan Relations Act? You might be surprised.

Question: Has not the Taiwan Relations Act been the basis of current US relations with Taiwan? And was not everything going smoothly until you raised the question of "official" relationship?

Reagan: I did not raise the issue. At a meeting in Cleveland, made up of Heritage groups, so called, various ethnic groups, I was asked by a Chinese regarding my position on this, and I used the word "official"--that I would favor an official relationship with them. Now, the Taiwan Relations Act, as I say, does not use the word "official," neither does it use the word "unofficial," anywhere in it. And I think that it is patently an act by our Government, a creation of our Government. I'm satisfied with that. But in reading the act you'll find that repeatedly, as is necessary in an act of that kind, there are statements that the President shall, and at his discretion, make regulations, and so forth and so on. It is there that I believe the President has, in effect, legislative intent.

Question: But at a press conference last week you were asked the question whether you believe that government-to-government relations should be implemented, and your response was, "yes." *The Act specifically precludes gov't to gov't relations*.

Reagan: I don't know that I said that or not.

Bush: If you're referring to the press conference where I attended? The Governor did not say government-to-government. Somebody has the text, look it up.

Question: I've got a text right here. The Governor said that under the Taiwan Relations Act, there are provisions for "governmental relations that just haven't been implemented."

Reagan: Well, that's what I've just put in this statement. Those are "government relations." For example, for quite a period of time this Administration had refused to implement that part about providing defensive military equipment. Now, this was the President of the US violating the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act, and obviously it is the government of Taiwan that is going to buy those defensive weapons.

Question: What is the difference between governmental relations and government-to-government relations?

Reagan: Well, I think that it could be interpreted as intending a change in the Taiwan Relations Act. I recognize that if you've got a basket of words, the more you have, the more they can be interpreted in different ways by different people. And I think that would just unnecessarily be provocative to--as I say, I stand by the act as it is; I do not stand by what I think are the violations of the spirit of the act by this Administration. And I think the issue is not how I feel about Taiwan. The issue today is that Carter foreign policy and what it is doing to our allies and to the US position in the world--and this is just another example of it.

Q: Forgetting the word "official" for just a moment, you have in the Act the power to use your discretion. You plan to use it, correct?

R: Yes, of course.

Q: Would that tend to make relations more official than they are now?

R: Well to the extent of officials being allowed to visit in offices,

Q: What do you mean by official then?

R: Well, just what I said. I think that if you look at this entire package, an act passed by Congress that creates an agency or institution with government personnel, funds it with government money, it is hypocritical to pretend that that is not something of an official relationship.

Q: Amb. Bush your mission has been described by the Chinese as a failure. Is that how you see it?

B: In the first place, I don't think it's a failure. The government officials have not said that. When you go to China, you are put up in a state guest house, you meet the Foreign Minister for 4 1/2 hours, while holding a position in our Government. You meet the Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping, for an hour and 40 minutes. You are accorded great civility and hospitality. You have a frank exchange of views. You did not go to an agreement, to pound out agreement. You went to clarify and give the Governor's views, which I think I did succinctly. I knew I'd run into some differences with them on the Taiwan Relations Act and on a lot of things. But I don't view this visit as a failure at all. And let me just ask a rhetorical question. Suppose we hadn't seen Deng Xiaoping and Huang Hua, as was suggested by some of the China watchers when we were there because they were supposed to be so outraged that they wouldn't see us. We saw the top officials, and here I am not holding any official position in the US Government. I don't see how that can be categorized

as a failure or a success. We just went and did what we set out to do. But really what's relevant is: do they have, as a result of this trip, a clearer understanding of the Governor's views, in terms of foreign policy as it relates to this one issue -- that has dominated this press conference -- and as it relates to many other areas where we have common ground? Southeast Asia is a very good example, to say nothing of the Soviet Union. And the answer to that question is: Yes, they clearly did. And you know and I know the kind of rhetorical that come out of Peking at various times, and I understand that. But we used these fruitful meetings -- in my view, we categorized them as they have as frank and earnest. And that means in diplomatic terms that we didn't seek or certainly hammer out agreement on every point. But for someone to suggest that the visit is a failure when I've cited what we did do, I just simply cannot accept that. And I am convinced that if Gov. Reagan wins this election, he will be a President of this country that the Chinese understand, respect, and indeed I think we'll see relations improve, as he and I both want.

Moderator: Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

R: Wait a minute. This isn't just shutting you off. George has a plane to catch, and he has to run for it right now. Let me just say before he goes, I am deeply grateful for the long and arduous trip that he made both of those countries and for what I consider to be the success of it. Basically the success is simply that his presence there belies the words of some of their more hysterical press statements about our interest in relations and ... maintaining and promoting relations with the People's Republic of China. His very presence there was evidence of that desire and the sincerity of our intent.

Central America and the Caribbean

- Q: How serious is the political instability in Central America and the Caribbean? What is the U.S. doing to stop Cuba in its efforts to transform the Caribbean into a red sea?
- A. Central America and the Caribbean are passing through a period of unusual social and political turbulence, and the U.S. is playing an active and positive role. Cuba is not the cause of the problems in the area, but its subversive efforts are making peaceful and democratic solutions more difficult to attain. We have devoted our efforts to assist moderate and democratic leaders in the area deal more effectively with their nations' economic and social problems, and at the same time, we are working to counter Cuba's aggression by enhanced military and security exercises and by close consultations with like-minded nations.

Since 1977, the U.S. has more than doubled its aid to the Caribbean, and when Congress completes action on the present aid bill, we will have nearly quadrupled our economic aid to Central America. We have done this, despite extraordinary budget restraints, because we recognize that only by investing in the economic future of the area can we give people hope and deprive the Communists of targets of exploitation.

Moreover, we have encouraged increasing aid and activities by international institutions and by other countries as a way to multiply our own impact. We have worked with 30 other nations and 15 international institutions to provide additional economic aid through the Caribbean Group. As a result of these efforts, multilateral assistance has increased fourfold between 1976 and 1980, from \$110 million to more than \$400 million. We have also undertaken regular consultations with regional leaders on political and security matters.

In summary, the U.S. had done more than any previous administration to try to ensure that this turbulent period will lead to democratic and social justice in Central America and the Caribbean. While there have been some setbacks, there have also been many more signs of success, including free elections in St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica and Costa Rica. An important land reform has been enacted in El Salvador. Cuba has been racked by a number of serious political and economic setbacks, and there is no better proof of the failure of the Cuban model than the mass exodus from the island.

Progress Toward Administration Goals in
Latin America and the Caribbean

Q: What progress has been made toward the goals President Carter set for his policy in Latin America?

A: On Pan American day in 1977, President Carter enunciated a new approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean. It is an approach which recognizes and is attuned to the important changes which have transformed the nations of the hemisphere during the last two decades; it is an approach which is guided by the universal ideals of human rights, democracy and security and by a vision of what we want this hemisphere to become.

Rather than bind ourselves to a single, uniform slogan or policy we have adopted a flexible approach enabling us to respond to the diversity of the region, the growing prosperity and self-confidence of some nations, the worsening economic plight of others and rapid political and social change in some. This flexibility comes from the President's principle of recognizing the individuality and sovereignty of each nation.

The nations in the hemisphere are now confident that we will treat them on the basis of mutual respect, and that we will cooperate in meeting external threats. This is in response to the President's steadfast commitment to the principle of non-intervention and to our obligations in the Rio Treaty.

For too long, the US was associated with dictatorships which trampled on human rights and with the status quo even when that meant poverty, political repression, and social justice. President Carter has changed the way the people of Latin America and the Caribbean view the US; the US is now associated with human rights, democracy, and moderate peaceful social change. Because the US is now identified with the cause of human rights, our ability to influence developments in the region in a direction compatible with universal ideals has been enhanced.

The third principle of the Pan American speech is to cooperate on global economic issues affecting the well-being of all American states. The major countries in the hemisphere have experienced rapid economic growth in which the private sector is playing a vital role. Our Economic Assistance to the poorer countries in the Caribbean and Central America has more than doubled since 1977. The Administration has taken the lead in negotiating large new replenishments of funds for the Inter American Development Bank and the World Bank, the two largest sources of aid to the area. Trade agreements have been concluded with 12 countries; we have successfully negotiated new international commodity arrangements for sugar, tin, coffee and rubber, and a new International Common Fund. The Administration has taken the initiative in developing new collaborative arrangements with the nations of the hemisphere in the important area of science and technology.

The President also attained specific goals.

1. A new treaty arrangement with Panama has been achieved. The Canal is operating smoothly and efficiently. A potential conflict with the people of Panama has been removed and the security of the canal enhanced. A divisive issue of long-standing in our hemispheric relations has been resolved to the satisfaction of all.

2. Encourage respect for human rights. The American Convention on Human Rights, signed by the President in 1977 and pending in the Senate, has now been ratified by 13 states and is in force. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the OAS has become a respected and vigorous voice in support of human rights, completing five major reports in the last two years. Violations of the integrity of persons have substantially declined in a number of countries. Disappearances are down in Argentina from more than 500 in 1978 to less than 50 in 1979; and in Chile and Uruguay there have been none confirmed since 1978. Political prisoners have been released in substantial numbers, about 3,900 in Cuba and all those previously held in Paraguay. The use of torture has declined sharply. Human rights has become a subject of major international importance, and progress is evident in virtually every country in this hemisphere.

3. To stand with those countries committed to democratic government. The trend toward democracy is gaining strength. Ecuador and now Peru have returned to freely elected democratic governments. Brazil has maintained a steady course toward democracy. Uruguay will have national elections next year. Chile is presently considering a democratic constitution. The new nations in the Caribbean, with the exception of Grenada, remain vibrant models of democracy despite severe economic hardship. The only setback has come in Bolivia, but even in Bolivia, where military coups are a tradition, one is encouraged by the strong new force of democratic groups and by the international support these groups have received.

4. To promote trade and investment. Long-standing hostility to US investment has diminished. Total trade reached \$59 billion in 1979, an increase of more than 20 percent in one year alone. The US has signed 12 trade agreements, increased aid, negotiated a Common Fund, and established new arrangements in science and technology.

5. To consult regularly on multilateral issues. This Administration has demonstrated its respect for the nations of the region by consulting regularly at all levels on issues of major concern, and by seeking whenever feasible, multilateral approaches to problems.

6. The Administration has successfully advanced US interests in human rights and other matters in Cuba. All Americans held in Cuban jails for political reasons have returned home, and many other political prisoners, including Huber Matos, have been released and have left the island. In 1979, over 100,000 Cuban residents in the United States visited their relatives in Cuba conveying in a personal way the advantages of a free economic and political system. Castro's bid for leadership in the Third World has been severely compromised. Among other setbacks, Cuba failed to win a seat on the Security Council. The exodus of Cubans in 1980 exposed the world to the failures of the Soviet system. But Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union remains and tension with us continues. We have improved our monitoring of Cuban/Soviet activities and increased our military readiness in the Caribbean as a precautionary measure. We now have American diplomats in Cuba giving us direct access to the Cuban government and firsthand knowledge of conditions there.

7. To forge new relationships in the Caribbean Basin. The President has placed special emphasis on developing a more balanced and respectful relationship with Mexico by inviting President Lopez Portillo as the first state visitor and subsequently meeting with him regularly, by setting up a special Coordinator for US-Mexican Affairs with the purpose of ensuring that all government agencies grant US-Mexican Affairs the priority it deserves. Using this mechanism, the US and Mexico have concluded agreements on energy, border problems, science and technology, and many other issues. The Administration's attention to the Caribbean and Central America have resulted in dramatically increasing our aid to the region, on improving the numbers and quality of our personnel, on enhancing the security of the area, and on improving people-to-people ties. Our goals in this turbulent region are to work with those who want moderate, peaceful reform and democracy.

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From 1968 to 1971, he was senior partner in a New York law firm.

Since 1971 Goldberg has practiced law in Washington. He has served on the President's Committee on Youth Employment, the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, and the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. He is former Chairman of the President's Committee on Migratory Labor.

Goldberg is the author of "AFL-CIO: Labor United" (1956), "Defenses of Freedom" (1966), "Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court" (1972), and numerous articles.

Mississippi River Commission

Nomination of William E. Read To Be a Member. September 7, 1977

The President today announced that he will nominate Brig. Gen. William E. Read, Corps of Engineers, to be a member of the Mississippi River Commission. He would succeed Maj. Gen. Charles I. McGinnis, who is being reassigned.

Read was born May 17, 1927, in Charlotte, N.C. He has served in the U.S. Army since 1950. He holds a B.S. in military engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. in civil engineering from the University of Illinois.

Read served in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. In 1971 and 1972, he was district engineer for the Tulsa District of the Army Engineer Division. From 1972 to 1974, he was Director of Procurement and Production for Army Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis, Mo., and from 1974 to 1976 he was Deputy Commanding General of that command.

Since 1976 Read has been division engineer for the Army Engineer Division,

Missouri River. He holds the Legion Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Bronze Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters.

Meeting With President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela

Remarks to Reporters Following the Meeting. September 7, 1977

President Pérez has developed into one of my best personal friends and is a great counselor and adviser for me on matters that concern the nations of the Caribbean and Central and South America.

Also, he was of great assistance in the negotiations between ourselves and Panama in developing the terms of the treaty.

The people of our country look upon President Pérez as a great leader in the hemisphere and also, of course, the leader of one of the great democracies of the world.

Note: The President spoke at 5:10 p.m. on the South Grounds of the White House. His concluding remarks in Spanish were not included in the transcript.

The transcript of the remarks was made available by the White House Press Office. It was not issued in the form of a White House press release.

Panama Canal Treaties

Remarks at the Signing Ceremony at the Pan American Union Building. September 7, 1977

Mr. Secretary General and distinguished leaders from throughout our own country and from throughout this hemisphere:

First of all, I want to express my deepest thanks to the leaders who have come here from 27 nations in our own hemisphere—20 heads of state, for this historic occasion.

I'm proud to be here as part of the largest group of heads of state ever assembled in the Hall of the Americas, Mr. Secretary General.

We are here to participate in the signing of treaties which will assure a peaceful and prosperous and secure future for an international waterway of great importance to us all.

But the treaties do more than that. They mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness, and not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world.

If any agreement between two nations is to last, it must serve the best interests of both nations. The new treaties do that. And by guaranteeing the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the treaties also serve the best interests of every nation that uses the canal.

This agreement thus forms a new partnership to insure that this vital waterway, so important to all of us, will continue to be well operated, safe, and open to shipping by all nations, now and in the future.

Under these accords, Panama will play an increasingly important role in the operation and defense of the canal during the next 23 years. And after that, the United States will still be able to counter any threat to the canal's neutrality and openness for use.

The members of the Organization of American States and all the members of the United Nations will have a chance to subscribe to the permanent neutrality of the canal.

The accords also give Panama an important economic stake in the continued, safe, and efficient operation of the canal and make Panama a strong and interested party in the future success of the waterway.

In the spirit of reciprocity suggested by the leaders at the Bogotá summit, the United States and Panama have agreed that any future sea-level canal will be built in Panama and with the cooperation of the United States. In this manner, the best interests of both our nations are linked and preserved into the future.

Many of you seated at this table have made known for years through the Organization of American States and through your own personal expressions of concern to my predecessors in the White House, your own strong feelings about the Panama Canal Treaty of 1903. That treaty, drafted in a world so different from ours today, has become an obstacle to better relations with Latin America.

I thank each of you for the support and help that you and your countries have given during the long process of negotiation, which is now drawing to a close.

This agreement has been negotiated over a period of 14 years under four Presidents of the United States.

I'm proud to see President Ford here with us tonight. And I'm also glad to see Mrs. Lyndon Johnson here with us tonight.

Many Secretaries of State have been involved in the negotiations. Dean Rusk can't be here. He has endorsed the treaty. But Secretary of State William Rogers is here. We are glad to have you, sir. And Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is here too.

This has been a bipartisan effort, and it is extremely important for our country to stay unified in our commitment to the fairness, the symbol of equality, the mutual respect, the preservation of the security and defense of our own Nation, and an exhibition of cooperation which sets a symbol that is important to us all before this assembly tonight and before the American people in the future.

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This opens a new chapter in our relations with all nations of this hemisphere, and it testifies to the maturity and the good judgment and the decency of our people. This agreement is a symbol for the world of the mutual respect and co-operation among all our nations.

Thank you very much for your help.

NOTE: The President spoke at 7:35 p.m. in the Hall of the Americas at the headquarters of the Organization of American States. In his opening remarks, he referred to Alejandro Orfila, OAS Secretary General.

Following the President's remarks, General Torrijos of Panama spoke, and then the two leaders signed the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

Panama Canal Treaties

Remarks at a White House Dinner for Western Hemisphere Leaders Attending the Signing Ceremony, September 7, 1977

We are not going to have toasts tonight, but I would like to say a few words of welcome to all of you.

I would like to start with one of the best friends I have, and a great leader of our country, President Ford, and welcome him here this evening.

And someone else who has inspired our country, and who has set an example of leadership and beauty and gracious example for us, and who also recognized the Marine Strings from olden times—Lady Bird Johnson.

I know that most of you were at the ceremonies where the treaties were signed, so I won't try to introduce all our guests, but I would like to present to you again our special guest for this evening, General Torrijos from Panama and his wife, Mrs. Torrijos.

Some guests that General Torrijos cares much more about now than he does about

me are the Members of the United States Senate. *[Laughter]* We are glad to have all of you here. It's a very fine thing for you to come.

I think that this was a very fine night, too, in the life of the Organization of American States. Secretary General Orfila, we are very proud to have you here.

Mr. Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, would you stand just a moment? General Torrijos said he's going to be very lonesome in Panama in the future without Ambassador Bunker being there. *[Laughter]* He's been negotiating in Panama now for 14 years. And this is a great accomplishment for our country and also for Panama.

We invited a special guest from Brazil here tonight, Pele, but at the last minute he had to leave to go to Spain.

I was talking to General Torrijos. As you may know, the lightweight boxing champion of the world is Señor Durran from Panama, and he's very hard to match, but we tried to match him by the heavyweight champion of the world, Muhammad Ali, and we are very glad to have you here.

There's another man that I would like to introduce—he and his wife. I've been a very close reader of the sports page for the last several weeks, because we have a very distinguished Georgian who has, I think, come forward with a great deal of enthusiasm and skill, a great deal of understanding of the elements, the oceans in particular. He's exemplified, I think, the name of his boat. He's a very courageous man—Ted Turner. We are very proud to have you here tonight. And as you all know, he will represent us in the America's Cup races very shortly, having overwhelmed his opponents much better

than has been the case with his baseball team, the Atlanta Braves. *[Laughter]*

This is an evening of historic importance, and I invited another special guest from Georgia, a woman whose husband inspired the world, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

I was talking to General Torrijos a few moments ago about how important the treaty was to Panama. It was shown throughout Latin America for a full hour live this evening—the ceremonies. And he said that because of the demands of his own people, that he used helicopters to carry to all the remote villages in Panama television sets; and since they didn't have electricity, that he also carried small electric generators so that he wouldn't have to carry all the people from the remote areas into Panama City this evening. And I think this demonstrates the importance of the treaty to Panama.

He said, "Mr. President, I can tell you without fear of being wrong that more than a million Panamanians wept this evening during the ceremonies."

And I could tell from his own private conversations with me the tremendous importance of this long search for an equitable treaty that has been consummated this evening.

There is another special difference between this treaty and the one that was signed in 1903. The Panamanians had a chance to read it before it was signed—*[laughter]*—which was not the case with the first treaty. And I believe that the American people are big enough and strong enough, courageous enough and understanding enough to be proud of what has been accomplished, initiated by President Johnson in 1963, following a temporary outbreak of violence in the Panama Canal Zone. And the demonstration that President Johnson gave of our good intentions caused an equal demon-

stration of patience and perseverance and good faith and good manners on the part of the Panamanians.

And the negotiations continued under President Nixon and under President Ford. And I am very glad that my predecessors, their Secretaries of State, their Vice Presidents and negotiators have led up to this successful conclusion of the effort this day.

We have an opportunity now in our own country to demonstrate again the respect and the appreciation which we feel toward our neighbors in the southern part of this hemisphere. This has not always been apparent to our neighbors, but I think the American people feel this deep within them, that the most precious friendships, the staunchest historical supporters, and those with whom we share a common history and a common future are those who live in Canada and in the nations to the south. And I believe that this treaty can open up a new era of understanding and comprehension, friendship and mutual respect, throughout not only this hemisphere but throughout the world.

It's not an easy thing to accept a change which has been so profoundly balanced in our favor and which can now be of equal benefit to both countries. But ours is a great country, and it's great enough to be fair.

I think it's accurate to say that never in the last 14 years has there been any semblance of a threat or an expression of displeasure on the part of the Panamanians toward our negotiators. Ambassador Bunker has told me this more than once.

And President Torrijos, I thank you for the good will that has been brought by you for the last 9 years as President and leader of your country to the negotiating table. And many other leaders who are represented here—27 countries in our

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hemisphere—have contributed a great deal of support and advice in times when the negotiations seemed to be on the verge of being broken off, when they gave quiet demonstrations of their interest in the treaty and what it might mean to all of us.

So, I am grateful to all of you leaders for coming here to give our people an expression of your interest and your support. And I think I can assure you that our Nation will rally itself to ratify the treaty, and also, General Torrijos feels sure that when the facts are presented to the Panamanians that in the plebiscite that will be held late in October, that his people will also give their approval to this great step forward toward peace and mutual respect.

We will have a chance during this 3 or 4 days—I will, and my Cabinet members—to meet with all of you leaders who have come from your own great countries. And I think that you are taking advantage of this opportunity to meet with one another to resolve longstanding disputes, to work out means of alleviating the threat of possible arms races that might lead to war or to conflict of some kind, and to restore friendships that perhaps in the past have been damaged and to join with one another in planning for the future, economically and politically, that will give us all a better life.

So, I believe that we'll always look back upon this event that has been made possible by General Torrijos and many of you as the first step toward even greater progress and greater friendship in what I think is the greatest hemisphere on Earth, the Western Hemisphere of our world.

Thank you very much.

I should have paused for the translations, but I didn't, and we will ask the translator to take his place now. And fol-

lowing that we will go and have a brief cup of coffee, and then I think you will hear some of the most delightful entertainment that you've ever heard.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House.

United States-Canada Agreement on a Natural Gas Pipeline

*Joint Statement by the President and
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
September 8, 1977*

Today, we have agreed in principle on the elements of a joint proposal to construct the Alcan-Foothills pipeline along the Alaska Highway to transport Alaskan natural gas through Canada to the lower 48 States and at a later time Canadian gas to Canadian markets.

This joint undertaking will be the largest single private energy project in history. The detailed agreement we hope to sign next week is an example of how both countries can work together to meet their energy needs.

After the agreement is signed, each of us intends to submit our decisions to our respective legislative bodies for the appropriate authorizations and assurances. We are both hopeful the project will be approved.

Major benefits from this project will accrue to both countries. When the pipeline is built, Canada will have a much greater ability to develop its own gas reserves, particularly in the frontier region of the Mackenzie Delta.

The U.S., in turn, will have the enormous benefit of new natural gas supply

September 4, 1980

NAVAL POSTURE IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOVIET CARRIER MINSK

Q: What is our naval posture in the Indian Ocean region?

A: We have maintained a strengthened presence in the Indian Ocean since late last year and we have made arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of Northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

— The size of our permanent presence in the region, the Middle East Force, was increased to five ships last fall. We currently have 36 ships in the Indian Ocean including two carrier task groups, headed by the carriers DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER and MIDWAY. The 36 ships include 21 combatants and 15 support ships (including the 7 maritime near term prepositioning ships).

—The Soviets currently have 27 ships in the Indian Ocean including 11 combatants and 16 support ships.

—The 40,000 ton Soviet carrier MINSK departed the Vladivostok area last week and is currently operating in the South China Sea (4 Sept). So far, its movements have not indicated a move toward the Indian Ocean.

FTI ONLY: MINSK arrived at Vladivostok on July 3, 1979, after earlier sailing from the Mediterranean, around Africa and across the Indian Ocean. Until MINSK's move last week, the ship had remained at or near Vladivostok.

Source: President's State of the Union address
DoD Press Guidance
CINCPAC

PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFINGForeign Policy and National Security IssuesPurpose

This briefing book is designed to assist the President in debates with Governor Reagan on foreign policy and national security issues. It may also be useful for more general campaign purposes. Although the book contains a large number of issues, it is not intended to be an exhaustive compilation of questions which might be asked. Rather, it seeks to identify the most likely questions about the President's leadership qualities and his record, based on a review of key speeches and statements by Governor Reagan, his supporters, the Republican Party platform, and critical press articles. Of the 69 questions contained in this book, twenty-three key questions have been marked with an asterisk in the table of contents.

Contents and Format

The suggested responses are drawn from speeches, press conferences and other policy statements by the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and other senior Administration officials dealing with foreign policy and national security issues. The responses are organized around basic themes of the Carter Administration and are intended to provide the basis for answering related questions. Some of the responses -- such as those relating to the conflict between Iran and Iraq -- may need to be updated depending on events.

A major focus of criticism will be that the President is incapable of leadership, indecisive, erratic, preoccupied with vague moralistic causes and unable to understand and respond to challenges to American interests. His record will be attacked as a series of unrelated, incoherent, reflexive actions to specific crises, without any guiding vision or strategy which ties individual policies or events together. Two broad responses, the first two in the book under the section entitled "Overview," have been prepared to provide a comprehensive rebuttal to such criticism.

Overall, the suggested responses seek to:

--demonstrate that the President has a concrete vision of a world order and a constancy of purpose in striving toward it;

-- emphasize the President's realism and toughness in dealing with our adversaries and in managing the complex problems of the modern world;

--highlight the specific accomplishments of the Carter Administration, and show how these relate to and support the President's goal of a stable, just world order;

--contrast the President's vision and record, and, in particular, the President's leadership qualities, with the picture formed by Governor Reagan's comments about what he would do on foreign policy and national security issues.

To support these contrasts between the President and Governor Reagan, pertinent statements by Governor Reagan are woven into the responses. In addition, where possible, relevant quotes by Governor Reagan on the different issues appear at the end of the responses.

Finally, and in addition to the questions and responses, this book contains several short papers which are meant to highlight the contrasts among the candidates and their platforms and the themes which Governor Reagan and Representative Anderson have stressed throughout their campaigns. Also, contained in this section, which is the last in the book, is a selection of the most notable quotes by Gov. Reagan on foreign policy and national security issues.

September 29, 1980

PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE BRIEFING BOOK
Foreign Policy and National Security

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Leadership

Q: A widespread and persistent complaint in this country and abroad about US foreign policy under the Carter Administration is that it lacks coherence and consistency. The various strands of policy are unrelated to one another, it is said, and the US lurches from one approach to another. The Administration has flip-flopped on the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, the neutron bomb, the Soviet brigade in Cuba and Iranian policy.

The Republican Platform has charged: "For three and one half years the Carter Administration has given us a foreign policy not of consistency and credibility, but of chaos, confusion, and failure. It has produced an image of our country as a vacillating and reactive nation, unable to define its place in the world, the goals it seeks, or the means to pursue them." "No failure of the Administration has been so catastrophic as its failure of leadership," concludes the GOP Platform.

Mr. President, how do you respond to these charges?

Response:

When I took office almost four years ago, our Nation was facing a series of problems around the world -- in southern Africa, the Middle East, in our relations with our NATO allies, and on such tough questions as nuclear proliferation, SALT II negotiations, the Panama Canal treaty, human rights, and world poverty. My Administration has directly, openly and publicly addressed these and other difficult and controversial issues, some of which had been skirted or avoided in the past. A period of debate, discussion, and probing was inevitable. My goal has not been to reach quick or easy agreements, but to find solutions that are meaningful, balanced, and lasting.

I have a vision of a more just, more secure and more stable world from which I have not wavered, and to which my Administration has directed all its efforts.

I believe an enduring world order means a world capable of peaceful change -- not a "status quo" world -- because change is and will continue to be for the foreseeable future a constant in international affairs. I have been striving for a strong, confident and progressive America leading the non-communist world in devising peaceful solutions to our many challenges. I want an international order which recognizes the basic human rights of each individual, and which understands and responds to the deep strivings of all peoples for a decent life, for food and education for their families, for democratic government and for hope for a better future.

Unlike my opponent, Governor Reagan, I do not believe a lasting world order is achievable by substituting the threat of intervention for diplomacy, by suggesting that we quarantine those nations which challenge our interests, or by seeking to regain an unachievable military "superiority" at unimaginable cost. I understand the need for a strong and powerful military in the present unstable international situation. And, let there be no mistake; if our vital national interests are threatened, I will use force to protect them. But, I will not order American troops into combat whenever there is an international disturbance that is not to our liking.

Unlike Governor Reagan, I would not abandon the arms control process, which has taken so many years to construct. That would be the consequence of his adamant opposition to the SALT II Treaty. I believe arms control, like our military forces, can contribute to our security and I will continue to pursue balanced, verifiable arms limitations agreements.

I believe progress is being made towards the world order I have described. Let me describe how I think my Administration's policies have fit into this broader vision:

America is at peace. For the first time in many years, my Administration has seen no engagement of American forces in combat. I am deeply proud of this fact. We all know the provocations have been many and the temptation to use force strong: we could have engaged in hostilities against Iran. But, I have chosen the course of patience and calmness. We attempted the rescue mission, and I believe this attempt was necessary. But, it was an attempt to free our fellow citizens; it was not a military action.

America is strong and growing stronger. My Administration has increased US real defense spending and successfully encouraged our NATO allies to do the same; we have launched the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, and we have agreed with our allies to deploy new missiles in Europe; we have developed the Rapid Deployment Force to

protect our vital interests wherever they may be threatened. Contrary to the irresponsible charges of the Republican Party, the United States has not become militarily inferior, "second to one" as Governor Reagan likes to quip. We are maintaining military equivalence with the Soviet Union. The long-term trends do show steady growth in Soviet military power, and we must continue our efforts over the long haul to preserve a stable balance. We will do so.

As a complement to our defense program, I have signed the SALT II Treaty to limit Soviet strategic forces while allowing the US to continue all its essential strategic modernization programs. The SALT Treaty, because it adds to American security, while contributing to nuclear stability, is one of the most important agreements of the decade. I am determined to seek its ratification.

America is providing leadership in a time of challenge.

I have met in five summits, and innumerable bilateral meetings with Western leaders to develop and coordinate policies to deal with the enormous economic and energy problems that confront the industrialized economies. The United States has played a leading role in stimulating and developing the North-South dialogue and in reaching agreement in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We have led the Western response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I have stated that the United States will use all means necessary, including the use of military force, to protect

our vital interests on the Persian Gulf. The West looks to the United States to provide leadership, and we are doing so.

America is broadening and deepening its relationships with the Third World. One of my proudest achievements is the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, while preserving a firm relationship with the people of Taiwan. Since normalization, the benefits of formal diplomatic relations with China have become clear. Trade, travel and, most of all, the security and stability of the Pacific region is greater now than at any time in this century. And, for the first time, the United States has good relations with both China and Japan.

We also contributed to and supported the settlement of the war in Rhodesia which led to the birth of the new nation of Zimbabwe. As a result of our strong support for majority rule in Africa, we are once again on good terms with that continent.

America is once again in the forefront in the pursuit of human rights. When I became President, I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. We have sought to stand

behind basic principles of respect for the individual, for fair trials, for political liberty, and for economic and social justice. Our human rights policies have given new credibility and new force to U.S. policies in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

America is contributing to peace. America has given leadership in the peaceful resolution of regional tensions. I have mentioned our role in promoting the settlement in Zimbabwe. In addition, my Administration has contributed to peace in other ways.

- In March 1979, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat signed the Israel-Egypt peace treaty at the White House. Israel has finally gained peace with its largest Arab neighbor. A framework for a comprehensive peace has been established. Within the framework agreed to by Israel and Egypt, the United States is committed and determined, more than ever, to help them in their negotiations. I am determined to persevere in this long and arduous road, because I believe a just and stable peace for all the people of the Middle East lies at the end of it.
- In Latin America, in the Panama Canal Treaties, we have recognized the deep feeling of the

Panamanian people, while retaining essential security rights to the United States. I believe those treaties have done more to strengthen U.S. influence in Latin America than any other step we could have taken. With the Panama Canal Treaties, together with our firm advocacy of human rights, we have forged a new, more enduring basis for our relations with our fellow Americans in the Southern Hemisphere.

My opponent seems to believe that the challenges facing us today are simple -- and so are the answers. I think Governor Reagan is looking backward to a simpler world where America was the only super-power, and global interdependence was a thing of the future.

The world is not like that now, if it ever was. The challenges are incredibly complex: think of developing and coordinating a global energy policy; think of forging workable relationships with the emerging nations of Africa and Asia; think of leading an Alliance of 15 proud, sovereign nations with diverse interests and foreign policies.

True leadership is not bulling one's way through these problems, compelling others to accept solutions made-in-America. That way leads to failure and animosity. I

believe leadership requires a willingness to tackle our problems head-on, but with an understanding of the need to compromise, to adjust to the possible, the attainable. And, yes, leadership requires the courage to recognize mistakes, and to change policies where necessary. That is the kind of leadership I have tried to give.

I believe deeply, honestly, that my vision of a better world is attainable. I have directed all my energies towards attaining that goal, and I will continue to do so.

September 29, 1980

Future Goals

Q. What are your top foreign policy and national security priorities for a second term?

How would these be different from Governor Reagan's?

Response

As with my first term, I will continue to address the difficult and controversial issues which confront our nation. In doing so I have no intention of looking for easy solutions or quick fixes. Rather, I will continue to seek solutions that are meaningful and lasting and in the long-term interests of the United States.

To this end, I see six basic priorities for the future:

- First, we will continue, as we have over the past four years, to build America's military strength and strong defense and economic relations with our allies and friends.
- Second, we will continue to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that a price will be paid for its refusal to abide by the accepted norms of international conduct. At the same time, we will make it clear to the Soviet Union that we seek no return to the Cold War, no indiscriminate confrontation. The choice is the Soviet Union's, we will respond to either.
- Third, we will remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control and the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. I intend

to push for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty at the earliest opportunity. This agreement is in our national interests. We are more secure with it than without it.

- Fourth, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working -- together with our friends and allies -- to resolve regional conflicts and to promote peace -- in the Middle East, and Persian Gulf, southern Africa, Central America, the Eastern Mediterranean.
- Fifth, we will strive to resolve pressing international economic problems -- particularly energy and inflation -- and continue to pursue our still larger objective of global economic growth through expanded trade and development assistance.
- Finally, and underlying all that we do, we will continue vigorously to support the process of building democratic institutions and improving human rights protection around the world

The objectives I have outlined are in sharp contrast to those that could be pursued by Governor Reagan:

- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe a lasting world order is achievable by substituting the threat of intervention for diplomacy, by suggesting that we quarantine those nations which challenge our interests, or by seeking to regain an unachievable military superiority at an unimaginable cost.
- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe we are a weak and floundering nation, dismissed with contempt by our enemies,

abandoned by our allies and sinking into decline as a major power. Rather, I know our resolve is steady, our military is powerful, our alliances are strong and we are gaining new friends among the young nations of the world.

- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe we can return to an early day when American interests went unchallenged in the world arena. The world that exists today is a world of diversity, of unequal wealth, and uneven resources. It is a world of upheaval and unrest and will be for decades to come. But, as a powerful and self-confident nation, we can live with a good deal of turmoil in the world while we protect our interests and be a friend to those who seek a new life free from tyranny.

- Unlike my opponent, I would not return us to the days of the Cold War. I do not believe, as he does, that the Soviet Union is responsible for all the unrest in the world today. The world is much too diverse for such a simple explanation. But I will continue to insist, through our actions and our words, that the Soviet Union respect the legitimate interests of other nations.

- Unlike my opponent, I would not accuse our allies of neutralism or accommodation with the Soviet Union. Leading an alliance of proud sovereign nations requires tact, patience and understanding. We and our allies share profound political, security and economic interests, but we must never forget that ours is an association of free peoples, and the United States must lead, not dictate.

- Unlike my opponent, I would not abandon the arms control process, which has contributed to our nation's security and has taken so many years to construct. That would be the consequence of his rigid opposition to the SALT II Treaty.

- Unlike my opponent, I would not jeopardize our new relationship with the People's Republic of China by tampering with the form of our good relations with the people of Taiwan. Our new relationship with China is clearly in our national interest and contributes to the peace and security of the Pacific region.

- And, finally, unlike my opponent, I would not jettison human rights as a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy. I believe the true interests of our nation are best served by honoring the ideals of our heritage.

I do not believe the American people share Governor Reagan's view of the future, a world filled with fears of change and unrest and damaging self-doubts about our military capability and strength. My vision is different. It is based on reality, and filled with faith and an unbending determination to achieve a life of meaning and purpose for every American in a nation that is strong and secure. Above all, I want us to be what the founders of our nation meant us to become -- a symbol of freedom, peace and hope throughout the world.

September 18, 1980

Military Superiority vs. Essential Equivalence

After accusing your Administration of permitting the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority, the Republican Platform states "We will build toward a sustained defense expenditure sufficient to close the gap with the Soviets, and ultimately reach the position of military superiority that the American people demand."

Would you comment on this Republican defense objective and contrast it with your own national security objectives?

Response

My Administration is dedicated to the maintenance of a military force that is second to none. Unlike Mr. Reagan, however, I do not advocate a policy of American military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The truth is that military superiority for either side is a military and economic impossibility -- if the other is determined to prevent it. There can be no return to the days of the American nuclear monopoly. There can be no winner in an all-out arms race. It is wishful thinking of the highest order to assume that the Soviets would drop out of a nuclear arms race early, or that they would shrink from imposing additional, even unimaginable hardships on their civilian society, in order to stay in the race.

As superficially attractive as the goal of across-the-board supremacy may be, common sense tells us that:

- It would mean the end of arms control. By definition, strategic superiority and arms control are incompatible -- a race to superiority is an attempt to achieve a real military advantage, one which the losing party would never accept in a formal arms control agreement. We will not negotiate from a position of inferiority, and neither will the Soviets.
- It would mean an uncontrolled, open-ended, and enormously expensive arms race. The sums involved would be huge even in absolute terms, let alone in the face of the Republican's proposed 30 percent tax cut.
- It would mean that we would have to skimp on conventional forces, where we need to improve, and to concentrate on a race in strategic weapons.
- It would channel the competition into the most dangerous arena -- the one most likely to lead to nuclear war, namely strategic arms.

Gov. Reagan's impulse for military superiority must be seen for what it is: unrealistic, simplistic, dangerous. In the real world, meeting our defense needs is not a matter of taking everything we have and increasing it by 10 percent or 20 percent or 40 percent. There is no magic formula. There is no quick fix.

My Administration will preserve our national security. We will improve our capabilities as necessary to maintain the military balance that exists today between the United States and the Soviet Union. We will continue to make steady and sustained increases in defense spending to build the capabilities we need. We will buy only the weapon systems that best serve our needs, not every glamorous weapon system that comes along. We will continue to seek equitable and verifiable arms control agreements -- like the SALT II Treaty -- to limit the growth in Soviet military power, and to avoid spending resources unnecessarily in an uncontrolled strategic arms race.

Prudence -- not impulse -- is the hallmark of a strong and a sane national security policy. Military power alone, no matter how great, cannot solve all of our international problems. Nor can it make the world over according to our design. I understand this reality; Gov. Reagan does not.

Gov. Reagan on Military Superiority

In January, Reagan called for an immediate "military buildup aimed at restoring our military superiority." (Rutland-Herald, January 14, 1980) This same proposal was later incorporated in the Republican platform.

While he called for an immediate buildup aimed at military superiority, just four days earlier, Reagan outlined the dangers of his impending stand.

"What I have said is that our defenses must be whatever is necessary to ensure that the potential enemy will never dare attack you. Now, if that is equivalence or if that is superiority, you must have the degree to know that you are safe. I could see if you really strive for an obvious superiority then you may tempt the other side into being afraid and you continue escalating on both sides..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

Reagan's most recent speeches follow both lines of reasoning calling for a military buildup to achieve nuclear superiority, and, once achieved, negotiate an arms limitation treaty.

"...I've called for whatever it takes to be strong enough that no other nation will dare violate the peace. Shouldn't it be obvious to even the staunchest believer in unilateral disarmament as the sure road to peace that peace was never more certain than in the years following World War II when we had a margin of safety in our military power which was so unmistakable that others would not dare to challenge us?"

Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

Two days later he stated:

Since when has it been wrong for America to aim to be first in military strength? How is American military superiority "dangerous?"

American Legion
August 20, 1980

September 26, 1980

Military Balance

- Q. Your Administration has been accused of allowing the military balance with the Soviet Union to deteriorate to a position of US inferiority and ushering in a period of grave danger to US interests around the world. The Secretary of Defense has said that even with the post-Afghanistan defense spending increases, it would require 40 years to catch up to Soviet expenditures.

How do you view the trends -- and the implications of these trends -- in the military balance? Are we, in fact, number two today in military strength as Governor Reagan has charged?

And, do you believe that our security over the next several years would have been helped or hurt if your Administration had moved more aggressively on production of such weapons as the neutron bomb, B-1, MX and Trident II?

Response

The charge that the United States has fallen into a position of military inferiority is false. Those who claim that the United States is weak, that the United States cannot carry out its objectives, that the United States cannot deter conflict, and it cannot win a conflict -- I think they do a disservice. We have very substantial capabilities. The Soviets are aware of it.

Over the past 20 years, the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially, both in absolute numbers and relative to our own. Discounting inflation, since 1960, Soviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily in real terms by three or four percent a year.

These Soviet efforts would put the USSR in a most advantageous military position if we do not counter their programs with force improvements of our own. We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us.

In the strategic area, the Soviets have reached parity with us. By some measures, we are ahead; by others, the Soviets are ahead. We have, for example, thousands more warheads than the Soviets do. They have more intercontinental ballistic missile payload. We have more submarine-launched ballistic missile payload. We have a better balanced strategic capability because we have bombers on alert. We have roughly half of our submarine-launch ballistic missiles deployed at all times. They have an edge in land-based ICBMs. So, the balance in these terms is reasonably even.

What is also clear, however, is that in strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today. Their forces have improved in quality as well as numbers. The Soviets have a potential for strategic advantage, if we fail to respond with adequate programs of our own.

We are responding. Today the United States is engaged in the most comprehensive military modernization program since the early 1960s.

In the strategic area, we are moving ahead on strengthening all three legs of our Triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and bombers. Four years ago there was no program for a survivable mobile ICBM. Four years ago the Trident missile submarine program was bogged down in contractor disputes and way behind schedule. Four years ago there was no long-range,

air-launched cruise missile program. Four years ago, the only major proposal to modernize our bomber force was the B-1. We cancelled this program because it was clear then -- and it is even clearer today -- that it would have been dangerously vulnerable to improving Soviet air defenses. Quite simply, the B-1 was obsolete and a waste of money.

My Administration has also taken steps to reverse a decade of decline in the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

-- When I first began to meet with Atlantic Alliance leaders almost four years ago, I found them very troubled by the state of our military strength in the Atlantic Alliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense spending in real terms by some three percent per year and our NATO Allies responded by making the same pledge.

-- With American leadership, NATO also took the crucial step of adopting a bold Long-Term Defense Program which will extend over 15 years. That program is helping us to increase our capacity to deter or defeat any surprise attack that may be launched against our European Allies and therefore against ourselves.

-- Last year, the Alliance agreed to respond to Soviet nuclear missile and bomber deployments by modernizing and upgrading our long-range theater nuclear forces with 572 PERSHING II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. Today, this program is underway and on schedule.

NATO is responding in a determined and coordinated fashion to the military competition posed by the Warsaw Pact. Never in the history of the Alliance has its military solidarity been greater than it is today.

The recent chaos in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have emphasized that the challenges to our vital interests and our security are not confined to one geographic area. It has also demonstrated that we need to correct deficiencies in our conventional power projection capabilities. The United States must be able to respond quickly and effectively to military challenges anywhere in the world.

Power projection is not new for the United States, but the demands change over time. That is why we are engaged in a systematic and significant enhancement of our capabilities to move forces rapidly to distant trouble spots.

Four years ago, we did not have adequate capability to respond to threats in far way places such as the Persian Gulf region as quickly and effectively as our interests required. Our intensified effort involves a number of different programs, including creation of RDF, prepositioning the weapons and supplies for Marine troops and Air Force tactical fighters in the region, increasing our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, gaining access to key port and airfield facilities in the area.

We all hope and work and pray that we will see a world in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary, but now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world as it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today, the keystone of our national security is still military strength -- strength that is clearly recognized by Americans, by our Allies, and by any potential adversary. As long as I am President, I am determined to maintain that strength.

Gov. Reagan on the Military Balance

"...in military strength we are already second to one: namely, the Soviet Union."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

"At the time (1965) we led the Soviet Union in about 40 strategic military categories. Today, they lead us in all but 6 or 8 and may well surpass us in those if present trends continue."

Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

September 26, 1980

Defense Spending

Q: The Republican platform accuses your Administration of "massive cuts in US defense spending." They charge that you have reduced defense spending by over \$38 billion from President Ford's last Five Year Defense Plan and have underfunded a great number of unglamorous Defense activities such as research and development, manpower, the reserves, just to name a few areas.

How do you respond to these charges?

Also, how will it be possible to maintain 3-5% real growth through 1985 in the defense budget, as you have promised, in light of growing public support for stemming public spending and the great difficulties in cutting back domestic programs?

Response: I am eager to compare my defense record of steady, sustained increase over the last four years with the record of underinvestment and decline during the previous eight years of two Republican Administrations.

Governor Reagan is fond of comparing the real accomplishments of my Administration with President Ford's FY 1978 budget, submitted after his defeat at the polls left Republican officials free to propose a budget that would neither have to be defended before Congress nor executed; that would not have to meet the tests of affordability and consistency. For example, that bogus lame-duck document proposed twice as many ships per year as the average number authorized during the previous seven years.

In contrast the real Republican record, from fiscal years 1970 through 1977, shows that outlays for

defense in constant dollars -- the measure of how much we are actually spending for defense -- declined every year. During the eight years prior to my Administration defense spending declined in real terms -- after inflation -- about 35%. Again, in real terms, Republican requests to Congress declined over \$30 billion in the eight years before FY 1978.

Eight consecutive years of decline cannot be reversed overnight. We are now taking corrective action to reverse the shrinking size of our Navy, the increasing vulnerability of our intercontinental ballistic missile force, the growing obsolescence of our tanks and armored personnel carriers.

When my commitment to national security is evaluated under the appropriate measure of defense expenditures -- outlays -- the record reveals that outlays rose steadily from just over \$134 billion in FY 1978 to almost \$147 billion in FY 1981 -- over 10% real growth in constant 1981 dollars over the four-year period. As projected in my current Five-Year Defense Program, defense spending will have increased, over the eight years of my Administration, by 27%. By 1985, the defense programs and plans I will have sent to Congress will involve a cumulative real increase of almost \$150 billion above the last budget year of the Ford Administration.

Moreover, my Administration is the first Administration to commit itself to protecting the level of real growth in defense spending from the effects of inflation. This commitment underscores my determination to preserve the Defense program in the face of unforeseen events such as oil price rises and the cost of expanded military operations in the Indian Ocean.

I intend to carry out my current five-year plan. The most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we could do would be to start this necessary program, then alter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an action might become politically attractive. It would also be harmful for the Commander-in-Chief to attempt to justify to the American people billions of dollars in unnecessary and unneeded programs. Although Governor Reagan has been very imprecise about how much his defense program would cost, the plans outlined in the Republican Platform would cost this nation over \$50 billion annually by 1985 above the substantial increases I have planned.

The defense program I have proposed for the next five years will require some sacrifice -- but sacrifice that we must afford. I am confident that the American people understand the threats our country faces, and will support this program.

Gov. Reagan on Defense Spending

Reagan has never wavered from his strong support of increased defense spending. Reagan and the Republican party call for a military buildup to attain military superiority. By engaging in an arms race with the Soviets, Reagan believes that we can use our economic might to defeat the Russians.

"They (the Soviets) know they can't match our industrial capacity."

New York Post
May 29, 1979

However, neither Reagan nor the Republican party has made it clear how they would fund this build-up.

"...I've always believed that defense is something in which you do not make the determination (of a budget)--it's made for you by your possible opponent."

Washington Post
April 20, 1980

It would appear that Reagan would rely on Reagan-Kemp-Roth to provide the needed revenues for the military build-up:

"We would use the increased revenues the federal government would get from this tax decrease to rebuild our defense capabilities."

Flint Journal
May 18, 1980

When pressed for figures on how much would be necessary to achieve military superiority, Reagan avoids specifics.

"Well, I've never gone by the figures. In fact, I think it's wrong to say we're safe because we're spending 5 percent more or 3 percent more or anything. No, go by the weapons. Now, I have outlined a number of weapon shortages that we have, but I don't have access to the high command. Just ask these men who would have to fight the war what are the essential weapons, the top priority that we must have now to restore our ability to deter the Soviet Union. I tell you, I think we're talking about the next few years that we must change the situation, not eventually down the road."

National Journal Interview
March 9, 1980

Gov. Reagan on Defense Spending

Recently, Reagan spelled out his case against the Carter Administration record on defense spending:

"(Secretary Brown) argues that defense spending dropped more than 35% between 1969 and 1976 under Republic administrations, and it has risen 10% under (the Carter) administration. The truth is that defense spending did go down between 1969 and 1975--and may I point out for the record that it went down by six percent not 35 percent as Mr. Carter erroneously charges. But the fundamental problem I have with Mr. Carter's rewriting of history is its sheer, blatant hypocrisy. Who was it who was principally responsible for the decline in defense spending in those years? You and I know the answer very well: The Democrats who controlled the Congress--men like Walter Mondale and Teddy Kennedy. Those Democrats in Congress cut more than \$40 billion from the Republican defense budget, and they block or delay almost every new weapons systems but even more incredibly, let me ask: Who was it in 1976 who campaigned up and down the land against Gerald Ford's attempts to restore those defense cuts? Who said the military budget had to be slashed even more? You know and I know that it was Jimmy Carter.

President Ford had begun the restoration of our margin of safety in 1975 with a five-year program for increasing our defensive capability. In these last three years, President Carter has cut that program by \$38 billion. His defense budget authorization requests reverted to the annual decline that had been halted by the Ford Administration.

He has since lobbied steadily against congressional efforts to increase defense spending.

Now, by such untruthful devices as manipulating inflation factors, shifting the base from authority to outlays, changing base years, and even ordering planned defense spending this year reduced so it would look as if he had met his promised percentage increase for next year, the Carter Administration tries to manufacture increases that in fact are largely phony."

American Legion
August 20, 1980

September 26, 1980

Strategic Program Cancellations

Q: Your critics have claimed that your Administration has scaled down, cancelled or delayed every strategic weapon program proposed by your Republican predecessor, including production of Minuteman missiles, the B-1, ground-, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the M-X, the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile. During this time, the Soviets have not shown similar restraint, continuing to deploy several new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple warheads, and developing a new generation of even more threatening missiles.

How do you respond to the charge that your Administration has failed to recognize the importance of maintaining the strategic balance and that only in the past year have you moved to fully fund necessary strategic programs?

Response: That list of charges made by Governor Reagan is a combination of half truths, falsehoods and misleading statements. Let me summarize the strategic programs as I found them when I entered the White House four years ago and where we are today.

In 1977 there was no program for a mobile ICBM. No final decisions had been made on the M-X missile, nor on how to deploy it. There was no program for long-range, air-launched cruise missiles; no program for ground-launched cruise missiles; no program for sea-launched cruise missiles. There were no plans to deploy additional Minuteman III ICBMs, so a continuing production line would have been a useless, senseless waste of \$300 million per year.

The Trident ballistic missile submarine program was bogged down in contractor disputes and way behind schedule. There was no Trident II ballistic missile. In the past

three years I have resolved these disputes and gotten the Trident program back on schedule. The first Trident submarine went to sea last summer. The 4,000-mile range Trident I missile is now being deployed on 12 Poseidon submarines and will be deployed on all Trident submarines. Looking further into the future, my Administration is committed to developing the Trident II missile, with even longer range and greater accuracy.

When I entered office, the only long-range bomber program was the B-1. It had been on the drawing board so long -- in part because Presidents Nixon and Ford were doubtful it would work -- that it was growing obsolete before it could be put in the hands of the Strategic Air Command. I cancelled the B-1 in 1977 because it had very doubtful prospects of being able to penetrate anticipated Soviet defenses. In the three years since then, it has become even clearer that this was the correct decision because the Soviets have gone ahead and improved their air defenses and have programs in the works that will improve them further.

Instead, because the existing cruise missile program at that time was inadequate, I initiated the long-range, air-launched cruise missile program. These missiles are designed to be launched from outside the Soviet Union, thus the B-52 or other aircraft may be used. These cruise

missiles are smaller and harder to detect and defend against than the B-1. They will be able to penetrate Soviet air defense system at the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s when the B-1, as I said, would have had very doubtful capability to penetrate. At the same time, we are studying a number of different advance manned bombers -- including Stealth -- for possible deployment in the 1990s.

With respect to the growing vulnerability of our Minuteman ICBM force, in 1976 there was indeed an M-X program, but there was no program to solve our strategic problem -- ICBM survivability -- the ability to survive a massive Soviet attack of high accuracy intercontinental ballistic missile warheads in large numbers. The preferred M-X basing plan on the part of the officials at that time -- 1976 -- was to put them in Minuteman silos. The other scheme in 1976 was one of underground tunnels, which at least recognized the need for a different deployment system in order for the M-X missiles to survive. Neither of these proposals was workable. Neither would have solved the problem of survivability. We then spent about two years trying to find a survivable system and we did. It's not inexpensive. But it will cost no more than the Minuteman system or the B-52s. And it will be able to survive. So, yes, we cancelled a basing system for the M-X that wouldn't work and we substituted a system that would.

Governor Reaganon Strategic Programs

Reagan has been a constant supporter of all weapon programs. In fact, he has never publicly opposed any major weapon system in the last 15 years.

The Republican platform calls for development of virtually every weapon system under consideration:

- "o the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile in a prudent survivable configuration;
- o accelerated development and deployment of a new manned strategic penetrating bomber that will exploit the \$5.5 billion already invested in the B-1, while employing the most advanced technology available;
- o deployment of an air defense system comprised of dedicated modern interceptor aircraft and early warning support systems;
- o acceleration of development and deployment of strategic cruise missiles deployed on aircraft, on land, and on ships and submarines;
- o modernization of the military command and control system to assure the responsiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to presidential command in peace or war; and
- o vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies."

1980 Republican Platform

September 23, 1980

M-X (including ABM)

Q: There have been a number of reports that the M-X is losing support as a result of its high cost, concern about its impact on the states where it would be deployed, and its viability in the absence of SALT.

In light of these problems, do you think M-X is still a viable weapon? If, as seems likely, M-X is delayed, what harm do you see to the national security? Should the Administration be pursuing alternatives, in the event of an extended delay in M-X? And, what is your position on an ABM system to protect MX?

Response: The M-X system is viable, and it is necessary for the security of our nation. Our land-based Minuteman ICBM force is becoming vulnerable and we must act promptly to restore its invulnerability.

When I entered office in 1977 there was no program for a survivable M-X. One alternative under consideration would have put the M-X missile into Minuteman silos -- and the M-X would have been just as vulnerable to a Soviet attack as the Minutemen are now. Another alternative at least recognized the need for improved survivability, but detailed analysis of this alternative -- the trench or tunnel system -- showed that it would not work either.

During the next two years I directed the Defense Department to pursue a determined search for a M-X basing system which would be able to survive and retaliate after receiving the most devastating Soviet attack possible, and allow the Soviets to verify how many missiles were deployed.

After studying dozens of options, we found a deployment system for the M-X which meets these criteria. Governor Reagan has criticized my decision. I would challenge him to be more specific about the alternative he favors. Does he want to build a missile and have no place to put it? Does he want to put it in the Minuteman silos where they will be vulnerable to a nuclear Pearl Harbor? Perhaps he wants to build thousands and thousands of M-Xs and proliferate them all over the country, as some of his advisors have stated, at a cost of untold billions and a highly dangerous arms race.

The missile deployment I have approved will protect us from a Soviet surprise attack and yet be consistent with trying to curb arms and not engage in an arms race. I am confident we have made the right decision.

Strategic nuclear forces necessary for our nation's security are costly, but it is a burden we must bear to protect our freedoms. The Defense Department cost estimate for the M-X of about \$33 billion in FY '80 dollars was worked out with care, and not artificially squeezed to make the M-X more saleable -- a tactic that has been used to sell military programs in the past. Even at this cost, M-X will be no more expensive than the Minuteman or the Polaris missile systems, or the B-52 bombers.

While we have focused on the strategic and security necessity for M-X, I have carefully reviewed the Air Force's plans to ensure that the M-X will not place an unfair burden on any of our citizens. I have met with the Governors of Utah and Nevada to assure them that, in deploying the M-X, we will respect all state water laws and will do everything possible to deal with the other economic impacts on the states. I am determined to see that these issues are resolved to the satisfaction of the residents around the deployment areas. I believe this can be done while planning to have the first missiles in service by 1986.

Finally, many Republican critics of my Administration favor abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying ABMs to protect M-X. I believe that would be a gross mistake at this time. The ABM Treaty is a very important achievement, the most important achievement of SALT I, and one which holds down the arms competition. A decision to deploy ABMs should not be made lightly. But if in the absence of the constraints of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets deployed tremendous numbers of warheads capable of attacking M-X shelters, perhaps as high as 20,000 or 30,000 warheads, then we might consider other responses, such as an anti-ballistic missile system. We have a vigorous long-standing technology program to develop ABMs and we would consider deploying such a system if that becomes necessary in the future.

Governor Reagan on MX

"To prevent the ultimate catastrophe of a massive nuclear attack, we urgently need a program to preserve and restore our strategic deterrent. The Administration proposes a costly and complex new missile system. But we can't complete that until the end of this decade. Given the rapidly growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force, a faster remedy is needed."

Address to Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

The race-track deployment proposed by the Carter Administration is enormously expensive and complicated, and will require years to build. This proposed mode of deploying the MX should be scrapped, because it is unworkable.

Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980

Representative Anderson on the MX

I have opposed development and deployment of the MX missile system as currently planned. Not only will this system be outrageously expensive and environmentally unsound, it will fail to address the fundamental need to enhance American security. We should not add thousands of new targets for Soviet military planners to contemplate, but should instead take advantage of technological advances in guidance, propulsion systems, command and control systems, and platforms to develop a secure and invulnerable system before the end of the decade. While the need for prompt counter-silo capability has not been completely resolved in my own mind, any such capability should not be deployed in a manner that invites attack on the United States.

Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980

September 18, 1980

New Strategic Bomber
(Including Stealth Controversy)

Q: Three years ago you cancelled the B-1 bomber in favor of less expensive cruise missiles. Now your Administration is apparently on the verge of agreeing with the Air Force that a new bomber may be needed for conventional missions as well as for a strategic role.

Given the increasing anxiety over the effectiveness of the aging B-52, do you still believe your 1977 decision to cancel the B-1 was justified?

Also, your Administration has recently come under attack for allegedly leaking the so-called "Stealth" technology for election year political purposes. Even if the original leaks did not come from the Administration, Defense Department officials seemed most eager to brief reporters and draw attention to the once-secret technology which, in Secretary Brown's words, "alters the military balance significantly."

How do you answer the charge that your Administration's handling of Stealth was politically motivated and has damaged our national security?

Response: Four years ago, the only major proposal to modernize our bomber force was the B-1. In 1977, I cancelled this program because it was clear then -- and it is even clearer today -- that by the time the B-1 could have been off the assembly lines and deployed at our SAC bases, improved Soviet air defenses would have made this aircraft dangerously vulnerable. Quite simply, the B-1 was obsolete and a waste of money. Yet Governor Reagan has continued to cite the B-1 as a bomber that should have been built. The Republican program is a program of obsolescence. They want to resurrect decommissioned ships. They want to revive the ABM system, which President

Nixon discarded. With vulnerable bombers, mothballed ships and obsolete missiles, they would waste billions of defense dollars.

Instead of the B-1, I chose to modernize the bomber force by exploiting some of the most advanced and effective military technology in the world -- the air-launched cruise missile. When I entered office four years ago, no long-range, air-launched cruise missiles were included in the defense program. Today, we are well on our way to equipping our B-52s with over 3,000 of these very highly accurate, long-range cruise missiles. They will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses not only in 1982, when the first full squadron will be ready, but through the 1980s and beyond.

At the same time we are studying a new bomber to meet any requirements for the 1990s -- the Stealth aircraft is part of this study. This is a major technological achievement that will affect the military balance in the coming years. Programs to make aircraft less visible to radar -- to give them a so-called Stealth capability -- have existed for 20 years. When this Administration came into office, Stealth was a low-level technology program and its existence was not classified as secret. The program had been dealt with in open testimony and in open contracts. In the spring of 1977, I turned Stealth into a major development and production program. The existence of this

new program was classified at the highest level. The funding level is now more than 100 times larger than it was in early 1977. There have been major achievements in the program.

Hundreds of contractor personnel are now working on Stealth. Dozens of Members of Congress have been briefed on the existence of the program. The increasing size of the program and the increasing numbers of persons aware of it made certain that its existence would have come out in the near future.

Governor Reagan's charge that the information provided by Secretary Brown's press conference would be helpful to the Soviets is simply nonsense. The information doesn't tell them how to change their air defense. They are already developing and building the best air defenses they can. Even if they could push their research harder to develop yet better air defenses, they have no idea of what characteristics to design against, or how much better their defenses must be. Secrecy of the details of the program, combined with our technological achievements, will enable us to keep ahead of the Soviets in this program for decades to come.

Stealth is one of a number of major technological advantages that the U.S. possesses. These technological advantages weigh heavily in the military balance and keep

us second to none. We have publicly discussed our advantages in other technologies in the past, and will continue to do so in the future because it is important that our potential enemies, our allies and the American people understand our military strength. This is an essential factor in deterring war.

Governor Reagan on the B-1 and Cruise Missiles

"I don't think that the current administration (Carter) is doing what should be done - not when it cancels the B-1 bomber, which is probably the foremost advance in aircraft that has ever been -- or has been presented since we went to the jet engines..."

Face The Nation
May 14, 1978

* * *

"We have an administration (Carter) that in three years has done away with...the cruise missile...and you could go on with weapon after weapon..."

San Jose News
March 10, 1980

September 27, 1980

Neutron Bomb

Q: Critics of your Administration have cited your surprise decision in April 1978 not to deploy the so-called neutron bomb as a prime example of inconsistency that has seriously harmed our position of leadership in the NATO alliance. At that time you said the ultimate decision on the neutron bomb would be made in light of Soviet restraint.

What considerations led you to decide so precipitously against deploying the neutron bomb in 1978? What is the status of your decision to defer production? What signs of Soviet restraint have, so far, prevented you from deciding to proceed with the neutron bomb?

Response: My decision of April 7, 1978 to defer a deployment decision still stands. I have directed that the Defense Department proceed with programs to modernize battlefield nuclear forces with improved weapons -- the LANCE missile and 8-inch nuclear artillery shell. I have further directed that the new warheads for these weapons be so designed that they can accept enhanced radiation elements and thus be converted to enhanced radiation warheads in the future, should we and our Allies decide on the need for such systems.

The military need for enhanced radiation weapons is not clear. NATO is deploying highly sophisticated, conventional "precision guided munitions" in anti-armor roles that are so accurate that there is a high probability that each shot would destroy an enemy tank. We and our NATO Allies are deploying these precision guided munitions by the tens of thousands.

The question of enhanced radiation weapons remains a sensitive one for our European Allies, on whose soil such weapons would be stationed. Governor Reagan's bland assertion that he would deploy enhanced radiation weapons in Europe

could cause serious strains in the Alliance. Governor Reagan ignores one essential fact: NATO is an Alliance of sovereign states. We do not tell our Allies that we are going to deploy a weapon on their territory. We consult with them, we examine the military requirements, we consider the political implications, then we as an Alliance decide.

On December 12, 1979, NATO adopted a plan for modernizing the theater nuclear forces (TNF) through the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. This plan is focused on long-range TNF because of their special contribution to deterrence. This decision was the product of model political and military consultations with our Allies.

Governor Reagan on the Neutron Bomb

Reagan strongly opposed any funding cuts in the development of the neutron bomb. He views the neutron bomb as "an offensive weapon that could bridge the gap for conventional weapons."

New York Times
May 6, 1980

Reagan has called the neutron bomb the closest thing to the ideal weapon.

"Very simply it is the dream of death ray weapon of science fiction. It kills enemy soldiers but doesn't blow up the surrounding countryside or destroy villages, towns and cities. It won't destroy an enemy tank -- just kill the tank crew.

"Now some express horror at this and charging immortality, portray those who would use such a weapon as placing a higher value on property than human life. This is sheer unadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding, but all war weapons back to the club, the sling and the arrow, are designed to kill the soldiers of the enemy. With gunpowder and artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could not be confined to the battlefield. And so came total war and non-combatants outnumbering soldiers in casualties."

Reagan Radio Transcript
March 1978 - April 1978

Reagan supports deployment of the neutron bomb in almost every available delivery system.

"I favor development and deployment of the neutron warhead for U.S. theatre nuclear forces, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery and bombs."

Washington Post
April 24, 1980

September 26, 1960

Nuclear Strategy

- Q. The Republican Platform charges that your Administration relies on a nuclear strategy known as mutual assured destruction (or MAD) which would limit the President in a crisis to choose between mass mutual suicide or surrender. Yet you have recently signed Presidential Directive 59, widely reported in the press to call for giving the President greater flexibility to retaliate with nuclear weapons against limited groups of targets.

How do you answer the charge that your directive was timed to refute the Republican Platform statement? Why was a Presidential Directive on this extremely important and sensitive subject undertaken during a political campaign?

Also, other critics claim that increasing the President's flexibility to order nuclear attacks will only make nuclear war more thinkable, hence more likely. How do you answer this concern?

Response

I deeply regret the ill-informed attacks on our Nation's nuclear deterrent strategy. There has been a great deal of exaggeration put out about Presidential Directive 59 in this campaign, and I welcome the opportunity to state once again the true facts about America's deterrent doctrine.

The United States has never had a doctrine based solely and simply on spasmodic, massive attacks on Soviet cities and populations, as Governor Reagan knows -- or at least he should know. The President is not faced with a Hobson's choice between suicide and surrender if the Soviets launch a nuclear attack on military targets, while sparing our cities. Previous Administrations going back at least two decades recognized the danger of a strategic doctrine that relied too heavily on the threat of attacking

Soviet cities to deter Soviet aggression. Therefore, since the early 1960s, the United States has had the capability to launch limited nuclear attacks on Soviet targets other than cities. This capability has grown as our nuclear forces have become more accurate and sophisticated.

Our strategy and our capability to inflict massive destruction in retaliation provide the means of convincing the Soviet leaders that there is no rational objective they might gain by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the United States or our allies. The strategy set forth in Presidential Directive 59 directs our Nation's military leaders to further develop our plans to carry out selective, limited attacks on those targets we know the Soviet leaders value most. It restates and redefines our plans to respond to any level of Soviet nuclear attack by striking back in ways that damage the political and military structure without hitting Soviet cities and population.

Therefore, it should be clear to all that the strategy contained in PD-59 is not a radical departure from previous policy of both Democratic and Republican Administrations. It is the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a number of years in response to growing Soviet strategic capabilities and to better understanding of Soviet military doctrine and operational planning. U.S. strategic forces are now, and will continue to be, capable of implementing this strategy.

I want to stress that the United States remains fully capable of devastating the Soviet Union under any circumstances. Assured destruction of the Soviet Union as a modern industrial society remains the cornerstone of the strategy expressed in PD-59. It does not signify a shift to a US plan to strike first at the Soviet Union with nuclear forces, nor does it mean the United States intends to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to gain foreign policy objectives. The only sane purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by the other side.

I do not believe either side could "win" a limited nuclear war. In PD-59, I want to ensure as best I can that the Soviets do not believe so either.

Representative Anderson on Nuclear Strategy

In a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September 24, Anderson charged that both President Carter and Ronald Reagan "have formed an alliance of folly" in their positions on nuclear war strategy.

"Both seem to harbor the fatal illusion that nuclear wars can be limited and perhaps even won. That conclusion is reflected in Mr. Reagan's platform and in Mr. Carter's twin commitments to the MX counterforce missile and to the new targeting doctrine formulated in Presidential Directive 59."

"Obviously, neither Mr. Carter nor Mr. Reagan is advocating nuclear war. But I consider both of them to be seriously misguided in their endorsement of the so-called nuclear war fighting thesis."

"[Both] would build super-accurate counterforce weapons to threaten Soviet missiles. Both would target weapons not only on missile silos but on command centers as well. And both insist that such weapons would be used only in a second strike to disarm any Soviet missiles remaining after an initial attack on the United States."

Anderson then spelled out his views.

"Any missiles capable of destroying enemy silos in a second strike could obviously do so in a first strike. The creation of these weapons and plans would move both sides toward a hair-trigger posture in which each would feel more inclined to launch its land-based missiles on warning of attack, lest they be destroyed on the ground."

"The futile pursuit of a capacity to wage limited nuclear war may only make more likely the very event we dread."

September 23, 1980

Defense Manpower

Q: According to the GOP, Carter Administration "mismanagement" of the all-volunteer force concept has turned it into a "shambles", a "national scandal" and "disgrace." The Party Platform blames your Administration as well for a "dramatic exodus" of skilled military personnel from the services, a loss which is "the direct result of neglect by the Commander-in-Chief." Additionally, this year it became known that tens of thousands of military families are eligible for food stamps.

How do you answer the charge that your Administration permitted this situation to deteriorate? What is your assessment of the strength and morale in our armed services? What measures have you proposed to solve the problems that do exist?

Response: The continuing ability of our Armed Forces to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of qualified young men and women is a matter of the highest national priority.

I am keenly aware, from my own personal experience in the Navy and from close attention to the subject as President, of the real sacrifices as well as satisfactions involved in military service. I greatly admire those who are working so hard to protect our country.

I realize that many experienced men and women are leaving the Services because of a feeling that they are not adequately compensated. I have taken several steps to improve this situation and I will continue to look for ways to help our service people as long as I am President. In early September, I signed into law legislation specifically targeted to the areas of most immediate need. These included an increased subsistence

allowance, a 25% increase in aviation career incentive pay, increased pay for enlisted personnel serving at sea, and reenlistment bonuses for persons with 10-14 years of prior service.

I also signed into law a 11.7% pay increase for military personnel effective October 1. Pay and benefits for the Armed Forces will rise more than \$4 billion in 1981, the greatest increase in the history of our nation, in either war or peace.

These measures, by themselves, are only a first step toward solving our manpower problems. In the past my efforts have been complicated by a number of limiting factors -- inadequate attention to the problem before I came to office, Congressional cuts in my defense budget, the need for fiscal restraint in the fight on inflation.

This year we have been very successful in building support in the Congress for higher pay and benefits. Our continued success through the 1980s will depend on recognition of the hard fact that sustained commitment of the American people will be required to pay the costs of retaining and supporting a voluntary military force.

September 26, 1980

Defense Readiness

- Q. In recent years, increasing publicity has been given to the low readiness of our military forces: shortages of spare parts, fuel and ammunition, growing backlogs of deferred maintenance through inadequate facilities to meet peacetime needs (let alone wartime requirements) and shrinking industrial capacity to supply defense goods.

More recently, Army Chief of Staff General Meyer has stated that we have "a hollow Army". Four years ago, all 10 Army divisions based in the US were rated fully combat ready. Now 6 of these divisions are rated not combat ready and the other 4 are rated marginally combat ready.

How serious do you believe this problem is? Where do the most critical problems exist and what steps has your Administration taken to correct them?

Response

Today our land, naval and air forces are fully capable of substantial and successful combat. My Administration has made extraordinary efforts to maintain readiness in the face of rapidly escalating costs -- such as the dramatic fuel price increase over the last year -- and the shortfalls and inadequate programs when I entered office.

In FY 81 we will spend over \$52 billion to support the maintenance and operations of our forces, an increase of almost \$5 billion, or about 10%, in real terms over President Ford's last budget year. During the past four years, one-third of total military spending has supported readiness-related operations and maintenance. Expenditures on procurement of munitions and spares -- another indicator of immediate combat readiness -- total another \$16 billion during this same 78-81 period.

Four years ago, munitions and spare parts inventories and production suffered from low baseline requirements established by previous Administrations. Immediately after taking office I commissioned, and followed through on a sustainability study of unprecedented detail and comprehensiveness. In part as a result of this study, the record of the past four years is of real improvement in munitions and war reserves. However, much work needs to be done and it will be several years before those inventories will be fully adequate to support all of our combat forces at wartime sortie rates.

Let me address some of the specific problems we have and the steps I have ordered to correct them.

Today the Army has 16 divisions, of which 10 are combat ready. The forward deployed divisions in Europe and the Pacific represent 45 percent of the Army and are maintained at highest readiness status. The Army classifies divisions as fully-combat ready to not-combat ready according to personnel, equipment and training conditions. A division rated low in one of these resource areas is capable of operating with two of its three brigades if required to deploy immediately. But all Army units could not be transported at the same time. While early deploying units are moving, the later units are brought up to full capacity.

Our current efforts to improve Army readiness are showing results:

- First, recruiting for the past year has fully met objectives and those soldiers are now beginning to arrive in units.
- Second, non-commissioned officer shortages will be improved through reducing unneeded personnel in forward deployed forces.
- Third, in recruiting, I am expanding bonus programs that are keyed toward critical skills. I have also supported legislation to improve educational benefits, including provisions that pass on unused educational benefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of middle-grade NCOs, I am expanding bonus programs to include mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry, armor, field artillery, and other selected skills. (By comparison only a third of Soviet divisions are combat ready. The remaining two-thirds are at reduced or cadre strength, having varying percentages of active duty personnel and equipment assigned to them, and would have to be filled out in an emergency with reservists.)

There has also been much attention focused on the readiness of our tactical air forces. It is untrue that a significant percentage of our aircraft can't fly. The index used by the Air Force is a measure of the peacetime logistic support system, not of how the air forces would perform in war. If we were to make a transition to war from our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would selectively defer non-urgent inspections and preventive maintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited

access to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary, use serviceable components from out-of-commission and damaged aircraft to maximize our wartime capability.

Today, our armed forces stand ready to fight, if that should become necessary. In response to events in Southwest Asia, I ordered the rapid deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean. Since the beginning of this year, we have deployed two aircraft carriers; over 25 other ships and more than 150 combat aircraft in one of the areas of the world most remote from the United States. To be sure, there have been sacrifices and hardships on the crews and their families. But we accomplished this deployment rapidly and smoothly, and can sustain it in the Indian Ocean as long as it is needed. No other Navy in the world could have performed as well.

September 16, 1960

Military Draft

Q. Critics on your left have attacked your reinstitution of draft registration as the first step to resuming the peacetime draft. Critics on your right have claimed that the draft registration program is an empty, symbolic gesture and would do nothing to speed mobilization in a crisis.

What were your objectives in ordering draft registration? How can you claim draft registration will expedite mobilization in a crisis when a Selective Service report early this year concluded that it would have no effect?

Response

I have repeatedly stated my opposition to the peacetime draft. With the personnel initiatives I have taken to raise military pay and benefits closer to compensate civilian occupations, I believe that a peacetime draft will not be necessary.

But it is important for us all to realize that the U.S. is committed to a sustained response to a long-term strategic challenge. We should be prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and that these sacrifices be borne by all. We should be prepared to reinstitute the draft on very short notice, if that becomes necessary.

What is the argument against registration? That we should not be prepared? I for one do not believe this is the case. I feel it is a fundamental matter of patriotism that Americans support. Symbolically, we would also be saying to the Soviet Union that the simple act of registration was too high a price to pay to enhance our security -- certainly a reckless notion to impart.

Moreover, our allies continue to look to us for leadership of the Atlantic Alliance. They rightly require of us wisdom and strength -- political, economic and military -- to properly manage the changing international security environment.

Draft registration is a tangible demonstration to our allies and potential adversaries of our national strength and will. It also assists our planning for national emergencies in which an actual draft could be necessary.

Governor Reagan on the Military Draft

Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate draft registration and any peacetime draft.

"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration."

Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980

He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the same buildup as an alternative to registration.)

"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained in them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force) to deteriorate very badly. It is much too small, it is not equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the training."

National Journal
March 8, 1980

To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.

Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve strictly on a volunteer basis?

Reagan: Yes.

Q: How, with pay incentives?

Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.

National Journal
March 8, 1980

September 26, 1990

Rapid Deployment Force

Q: The Administration's critics have charged that the RDF is just a paper organization, a political gimmick designed to draw attention away from four years of neglect. They also charge that since all of the military forces assigned to the RDF are already in existence, the main value of the Administration's initiative is more political than military. Would you comment on these charges.

Also, since our existing forces are stretched so thin, how can they be drawn down to take on new commitments elsewhere? What will the RDF be able to accomplish that could not be done before? If the challenges to our security worldwide are really on the rise, don't we need to increase the size of our armed forces and step up purchases of new equipment? Finally, does the formation of the RDF signify an increased willingness of the US to intervene militarily in regional disputes?

Response: Those who charge that the RDF is a political gimmick are demonstrating their lack of understanding of military forces. The present international challenges we face and the interests we must be prepared to defend require us enhance our capabilities, not add to our current force structure.

Force structure aside, we are dramatically improving our capability to engage and support more of our forces at greater distances from the United States. This is the essence of the Rapid Deployment Force. Having Rapid Deployment Forces does not increase the probability that we will use them. On the contrary, we intend for their existence to deter the very developments that would otherwise invoke their use.

The Rapid Deployment Force draws its forces from Army; Navy; Air Force; and Marine units which are oriented toward non-NATO contingencies and that can respond quickly to crises, primarily in areas in which we have no permanent military presence. The specific composition of the Rapid Deployment Force is not fixed -- the forces employed by the Rapid Deployment Force would be dependent upon the situation we faced. A company of 200 men might be sufficient to respond to requests by friendly countries to provide a natural disaster assistance team or communications-and-command support teams; a Marine Amphibious Force of 50,000 men or a mechanized Army Corps of over 100,000 men might be required to provide sufficient warfighting capability to regain territory overrun by the enemy or to hold critical objectives until reinforcements could reach the area.

Although the forces for the Rapid Deployment Force currently exist, we are buying selected items to improve significantly its mobility and responsiveness. We are developing special ships for prepositioning several brigades of Marine Corps heavy equipment -- tanks and artillery. We are buying additional KC-10 cargo/tanker aircraft to support our long-range airlift, and we are developing a new transport aircraft, the C-X, for hauling outsized cargo, like tanks. Our 1981 shipbuilding program has been increased to 95 units over the next five years.

We have already deployed a seven-ship, prepositioned support force afloat at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. The seven-ship group is composed of chartered Roll-on/roll-off ships, cargo ships and tankers. This group of ships stores Marine Corps armored equipment, artillery and other large items of rolling stock that place the largest demand on airlift.

Today, the RDF is ready to respond to a broad range of military contingencies in defense of our vital national interests. Through carefully selected procurement programs we are improving significantly that capability. It is important that our potential adversaries understand that we have the ability and the will to defend our interests and that any miscalculation on their part would be extremely costly to them.

September 12, 1980

Naval Strength

Q: In comparing your defense record with that of President Ford, the most dramatic area of cuts is naval shipbuilding. During the last four years, the naval share of the DOD budget has shrunk from 40 percent to 33 percent. President Ford's last five-year ship construction plan was cut from 157 ships to 83. Your shipbuilding proposals since then have gone up and down, showing no consistent pattern. In 1979, you vetoed the Defense bill because it contained a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. And you have requested only about one-third the Marine amphibious ships needed to maintain the current force level.

Have you downgraded the Navy's role in our national defense? How do you answer the charge that you have been dismantling the nation's naval and marine forces?

Response

I am glad to compare the record of my Administration with those of the previous Republican Administrations often quoted by Governor Reagan. During the decade before I entered office, the size of our Navy was cut in half as older ships were retired and the Republicans debated the future role of the Navy. Shipbuilding during those years was actually significantly less than the program we are now following.

Like President Ford's defense budget for fiscal year 1978, submitted after his defeat at the polls left Republican officials free to propose a budget that would neither have to be defended before Congress nor executed, the Ford 1977, 156-ship five-year plan was a lame-duck document that did not have to meet the tests of affordability and consistency. The program proposed twice as many ships per year as the average number authorized during the previous seven years of Republican Administration.

In contrast, the program I have followed is based on a policy to structure a realistic, executable five-year shipbuilding program within available resources, rather than to continue to delude ourselves with unrealistic shipbuilding plans or to resurrect old mothballed ships.

My Administration's five-year shipbuilding plan provides for the construction of 97 new ships, and for major modernization of five other ships, including three aircraft carriers. Two-thirds of these new ships are combatants, the rest are support vessels. My shipbuilding plan reflects two deliberate decisions to increase our strength and military flexibility: the construction of highly capable combatant ships (as exemplified by the construction of sixteen CG-47 class, AEGIS-equipped guided missile cruisers), and support for our Rapid Deployment Forces. through the procurement of 14 newly designed maritime prepositioning ships.

I am determined to keep our naval forces more powerful than those of any other nation on earth. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s; and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy -- in peace and also in war.

Governor Reagan on Naval Strength

Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing Navy programs.

"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by 1980. By the end of this fiscal year, only 5 or 6 weeks away, our conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships. Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement.

Reagan Speech to American Legion
August 20, 1980

Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.

"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with the equipment and spare parts they need."

Reagan Speech to American Legion
August 20, 1980

The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft carriers, submarines and amphibious ships:

"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and Marine aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling rapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to meet the requirements of additional aircraft carriers.

1980 Republican Platform

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September 10, 1980

Arms Control: Role in US Security

Q: What is your concept of the role of arms control in protecting US security? Do we pursue arms control in and of itself, or as a means of advancing specific foreign policy or national security objectives? Do you have a strategy which guides your Administration and ties our defense planning and arms control negotiations together? Why do you think there is so much suspicion of arms control in the last few years? Does arms control have any place in the present international atmosphere?

Response

I remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we have negotiated the strategic arms limitation talks, treaties -- SALT I AND SALT II. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries. My decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects my firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide.

Governor Reagan denounces the SALT II treaty. He would turn away from that treaty to a fruitless pursuit of an unachievable military superiority. Then, he says, he would

negotiate with the Soviets. There are two problems with Governor Reagan's strategy: One, the Soviets will no more let us build to nuclear superiority over them than we will them over us; two, the Soviets are not going to negotiate under the conditions Governor Reagan describes. So, the American people would be left with an all-out -- and unwinnable -- arms race and no chance for negotiating limits on Soviet forces, as we have done in the SALT II Treaty.

Careful, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements can complement our defense programs in maintaining the military balance of power and preserving international peace and stability. Let there be no mistake: I believe the SALT Treaty is in the security interests of the United States. When conditions permit, I will seek its ratification, and press on to SALT III.

My Administration will continue to pursue arms control agreements where these clearly can contribute to the security of the United States and its allies and friends. Unlike Governor Reagan, I do not regard balanced, verifiable arms limitations, such as the SALT II treaty, as "appeasement."

September 27, 1980

Arms Control: Administration Record

Q: Your Administration began with a great emphasis on arms control. You sought agreements on 'strategic weapons, on anti-satellite weapons, on military forces in the Indian Ocean, on restraining conventional arms transfers, on chemical weapons, on force reductions in Europe, and others. With the exception of the SALT Treaty, which has not been ratified, none of these other arms control negotiations have come to anything.

How do you assess your Administration's arms control record after four years? What reason is there to believe you will be any more successful in negotiating with the Soviets in a second term?

Response:

Significant progress in arms control -- particularly in controlling and reducing strategic nuclear weapons -- has been one of the basic goals of my Administration from the outset.

Except for concluding the SALT II Treaty, not nearly as much has been accomplished as I had hoped. But, I am not going to turn away from my deep commitment to the pursuit of mutual arms control agreements which enhance the security of the United States and its allies, and which strengthen international stability and the hopes for peace.

The SALT Treaty

The most prominent arms control achievement of my Administration is, of course, SALT II. The SALT process, and the SALT II Treaty, which Governor Reagan would abandon in favor of an impossible pursuit of military superiority, is the product of three Republican and Democratic Administrations

all of which were convinced that limiting Soviet strategic arms strengthens U.S. security and reduces the risk of nuclear war.

Because SALT II limits competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the most dangerous arena, this Treaty is the single most important bilateral agreement of the decade:

- SALT II will permit us better to maintain strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons and devote our defense spending more on our highest priority needs for conventional force improvements;
- Without it, the Soviets can add more power to their forces and better conceal from us what they are doing;
- Without SALT II, and the beginning of SALT III, deeper cuts would take many more years to achieve; and
- Without SALT II, our efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be more difficult.

I believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because the Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of our Nation's security.

The successful negotiation of the SALT Treaty, of course, represents only one step -- although an enormously important one -- toward a very long-term goal. The short-

term milestone is a reflection of the treaty itself and I know that milestone seems to be getting farther and farther away instead of closer. I am determined to press on for greater reductions and tighter controls over strategic weapons in SALT III.

Other Arms Control Accomplishments

More broadly in the area of arms control, my Administration has made every effort -- against continuing adverse trends -- to reduce the international traffic in armaments and in that way to turn the funds which are spent in the Third World for swords into outlays for greatly needed plough shares. My Administration has also initiated the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and is pursuing negotiations on controlling chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. We have also established a negotiating forum for limiting Soviet anti-satellite capabilities.

Progress has been slow. But my determination to pursue the goal of arms control is undiluted.

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September 26, 1980

Arms Control - SALT Treaty

Q: What are the prospects for the SALT Treaty? Is it dead, or do you intend to seek its ratification if you are reelected? If this Treaty cannot be ratified, will you withdraw it from the Senate and try to renegotiate it with the Soviets? Why is a SALT Treaty that does nothing to reduce the Soviet threat or the levels of nuclear weapons worth so much effort? Might it be better to forget the treaty and start fresh negotiations for a real arms reduction treaty, as your Republican challenger says he wants?

Response

The SALT II Treaty is a major accomplishment of my Administration. It is not a favor we are doing the Soviet Union. It contributes directly and significantly to the security of the United States and our Allies. It is a fundamental element of political and strategic stability in a turbulent and dangerous world.

While the SALT Treaty is pending ratification, my Administration will observe its basic terms so long as the Soviet Union complies with those terms as well -- as monitored by us. I am determined to seek ratification of the Treaty at the earliest opportune time. I asked the Senate to delay voting on the Treaty not to kill it, but because I recognized that it lacked sufficient political support to win.

Governor Reagan and the Republican Party would abandon SALT and the arms control process built up by every President since Eisenhower. Instead, he would put

off negotiations with the Soviet Union until the US had achieved military superiority -- which in the real world means never.

I remain committed to the mutual, negotiated reduction and control of nuclear weapons. SALT II is such an agreement. The benefits of this Treaty to the security interests of the US are clear:

- o Under the Treaty, the United States will not have to reduce any strategic systems, while the Soviets will have to reduce 250.
- o Under the Treaty, the United States will be able to carry out all our planned strategic modernization programs, including the Trident I missile, the air-launched cruise missile, and the M-X land-based missile. The Soviets will be limited to deploying only one new land-based missile, instead of the four that they have been developing.
- o The Soviets will be limited to a maximum of ten warheads on their large land-based missiles, while the US will be able to place ten on the M-X when it replaces the current Minuteman missile which carries only three.

These are the benefits of the SALT Treaty. I want the American people to understand clearly what the consequences of a world without the SALT Treaty, a world which Governor Reagan apparently wants, would be like:

- o Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy over 3,000 bombers and missiles, instead of the 2,400 they are allowed under the Treaty.
- o Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy as many warheads on their large missiles as they are capable of carrying, fifteen or twenty or even more on each missile instead of ten.
- o Without SALT, the Soviets could target an additional three to six thousand more warheads on American cities and military targets than they would under the Treaty.
- o Without the predictability of SALT, defense planning by our military leaders would be much more difficult. The M-X programs, a central element in our planned strategic modernization, would be harder to design and to build, and more costly, because we could not know what the size of Soviet forces would be and would have to predict the worst.
- o Without SALT, our ability to monitor Soviet forces -- and thus to evaluate Soviet capabilities -- would be reduced, because the Soviets would be freed from the SALT constraints on deliberate concealment of strategic forces.
- o Without SALT, the likely increase in Soviet strategic capabilities would require us to spend even more on defense, perhaps on the order of

an additional \$30 billion over a 10 year period. This would compound our already difficult budget choices. We would of course spend what is necessary for our security, but with SALT, it would be less.

We did not negotiate this Treaty to make friends with the Soviet Union. We negotiated it because we are adversaries, and it is in our security interest to have reliable, effective and verifiable limits on Soviet forces. In a period of heightened tension, it is all the more necessary to have reliable constraints on the competition in strategic weapons.

After the SALT Treaty is ratified, I am determined to proceed in SALT III to more comprehensive and deep reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons and to more stringent qualitative controls on weapons development. SALT III must also bring in new categories of nuclear weapons, such as long-range theater nuclear systems in Europe.

SALT I marked the first step towards slowing the arms race. SALT II will bring actual reductions and qualitative limits on Soviet forces. SALT III must go on to produce even more drastic reductions and tighter controls over weapons development.

Governor Reagan on SALT

Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by both the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even before the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds it would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.

"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile...The best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement is to negotiate from a firmly established position. We should not be so eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite for more."

New York Times
February 11, 1976

Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become superior to the United States.

"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress...are negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and offense capability."

Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979

Reagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a standard campaign line.

"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory..."

New York Times
September 16, 1979

In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a new policy.

"...(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces nuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents a threat to the other."

San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979

Governor Reagan on SALT

By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of SALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority, and then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.

"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot negotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments. Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be equitable."

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Reagan also believes that the United States should not abide by the provisions of SALT II prior to its ratification:

"I believe the SALT II Treaty should be withdrawn, and I especially believe that the U.S. should not abide by its terms prior to ratification. To abide by the terms of the proposed agreement would violate Article XXXIII of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.

"SALT II is not Strategic Arms Limitation; it is Strategic Arms Build-up, with the Soviet Union authorized to add a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their arsenal, and the U.S. embarking on a \$35 billion catch-up program which will not be complete until 1990, if then, and there will be ten very dangerous years in between."

Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980

Finally, in August, he stated:

I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided nuclear arms buildup.

Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

September 27, 1960

Arms Control: Soviet Compliance

Q: There is a long record of serious charges of Soviet cheating on SALT I and the ABM Treaty, on the agreement banning biological weapons and on the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Recently, there have been questions about whether the Soviets are really abiding by all the limits in the SALT II Treaty while it is pending ratification.

What is your Administration's record on raising -- and satisfactorily resolving -- compliance issues with the Soviets? Has your Administration ever held back pursuing a SALT or other arms control compliance issues with the Soviets? Do you believe the Soviets abide by arms control agreements? In short, can they be trusted?

Response: I am appalled by the ill-informed -- and irresponsible -- charges by the Republican Party that my Administration is "covering up" Soviet violations of SALT I and SALT II, as well as other arms control agreements. It is an insult to my integrity and patriotism to allege that I, or any official in my Administration, would suppress evidence of a Soviet violation of an arms control agreement, or would fail to take appropriate action to resolve any outstanding question.

The simple fact is that the Soviet Union has, on certain occasions, pushed to the limits of the SALT I agreement. The Soviet Union seems to abide by the letter, certainly not the spirit of its arms control obligations. This is why my Administration, and all Administrations, Republican as well as Democratic, since President Eisenhower, have sought to negotiate carefully drafted arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. There were

unfortunate ambiguities in the SALT I Interim Agreement negotiated by President Nixon. In SALT II, my Administration has taken enormous pains to draft an agreement that avoids such ambiguities and loopholes.

The Soviet Union has abided by its obligations in the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty. And the Soviet Union continues to observe the limits of the SALT II Treaty, as is the United States, while it is pending ratification. United States monitoring and other intelligence capabilities are capable of detecting potential Soviet violations. I state categorically to the American people that my Administration has raised with the Soviets every serious compliance question which we were justified in doing on the basis of our monitoring and intelligence information. All of these SALT compliance issues have either been satisfactorily resolved, or are still under active consideration in the periodic meetings of the SALT Standing Consultative Committee, which meets regularly to consider compliance and other SALT matters.

September 11, 1980

Arms Control: TNF Negotiations

Q: Why did your Administration recently agree to meet with the Russians to have "preliminary discussions" about theater nuclear arms control talks in Europe? Wouldn't it be better to wait until after November 4 to begin such discussions? What do you hope to achieve by such talks? Aren't we really entering these talks to pacify our allies who fear a nuclear arms race in Europe? Do you believe there is any serious prospect of reducing Soviet SS-20 deployments?

Response

In an historic action last December, NATO decided to modernize theater nuclear forces with the deployment of 572 U.S. long-range Pershing ballistic missiles and Ground-Launched crisis missiles. These new missiles will be capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe.

The NATO decision was in response to an ongoing Soviet buildup of its theater nuclear forces, in particular with the new mobile, triple warhead SS-20 missile, and the Backfire bomber.

At the same time, NATO agreed that the U.S. should offer to negotiate equal limits on long-range theater nuclear weapons with the Soviets. The U.S. expressed its readiness to conduct such negotiations in the context of SALT III. Further, we stated our willingness to begin preliminary discussions of theater nuclear limitations even prior to the start of SALT III. I believe such preliminary exchanges could be helpful. Negotiations on

theater nuclear systems will be a new area, with new concepts to work out and new objectives to define.

However, the Soviets chose to set totally unacceptable preconditions to accepting our offer of negotiations. They demanded that NATO renounce or at least suspend its decision to deploy new missiles, before they would begin talks. The Soviets would continue their own SS-20 and Backfire deployments unabated. Clearly, the Soviet goal was to divide the Alliance on the modernization decision, which was politically very sensitive in several European countries.

We and our allies stood firmly together on our December decision. Finally, late this summer, the Soviets recognized the true extent of NATO's determination; and agreed to our December offer of talks. We immediately began consulting with our allies in preparation for the preliminary exchanges. With the agreement of our NATO partners, the initial exchanges will take place this fall.

NATO is firmly agreed that these talks, and subsequent negotiations will not delay in any way implementation of the December modernization decision. We are prepared to enter into an equal, balanced agreement limiting these weapons on both sides. But we will not hold up our essential TNF deployments while awaiting the outcome of negotiations.

These preliminary exchanges on TNF arms control are extremely important for the future of the SALT process.

They will take place in the framework of SALT III, and will deal directly with issues of vital concern to our NATO allies. This is another urgent reason for ratifying the SALT II Treaty and getting on to SALT III without delay.

September 17, 1980

Arms Control: Sverdlovsk and BW Convention

Q: What is your Administration doing to get to the bottom on the anthrax outbreak last year in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk? Why didn't you charge the Soviets with a violation of the Biological Weapons Convention at the Review Conference on this Agreement last March? Are you going to lodge a complaint at the UN Security Council? What do you intend to do if the Soviets refuse to give a satisfactory explanation? Will the US withdraw from the BW Treaty? Doesn't this episode prove the Russians do cheat on arms control agreements?

Response

Before I state my Administration's position on the Sverdlovsk incident, let me just put the Biological Weapons Convention into context.

In 1969, President Nixon ordered the unilateral destruction of all US biological weapons because it was clear that such weapons had no practical military value and were morally repugnant.

In 1975, the US joined a multilateral treaty or convention -- now signed by most nations, including the Soviet Union -- banning the development, production, possession or use of biological weapons. The Nixon Administration told the Senate, in seeking ratification, that the ban had only limited verifiability. Nevertheless, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Nixon believed, and the Senate agreed, that ratification was still in the US interests: we had already given up our own biological weapons, and it was hoped the Convention would discourage others from developing these ghastly and useless weapons.

Even though the limited verifiability of the Convention was deemed acceptable by an earlier Administration, I am deeply disturbed by evidence that an outbreak of anthrax in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, in the spring of 1979, could have been caused by an accident which released a deadly cloud of anthrax spores. This raises a serious question as to whether the Soviets were engaged in work banned by the Biological Weapons Convention. But beyond this, it raises very serious questions about Soviet willingness to cheat on arms control agreements, even ones of lesser importance where there are few or no advantages to such cheating. This episode underscores my determination not to enter into any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that is not adequately verifiable, as is the case with the SALT treaty.

My Administration raised this matter with the Soviets as soon as we had sufficient information to justify an approach. We proposed consultations to clarify the circumstances of that incident. The Soviets have refused such consultations and have explained that the incident was caused by people eating anthrax-infected meat, a common source of the disease. This explanation is not consistent with our information.

My Administration has not yet charged the Soviets with a violation of the BW Convention. We do not yet have sufficient information to do so. I have directed

the Intelligence Community to continue to collect and evaluate evidence about this incident. At the same time, I am reviewing alternatives for seeking a satisfactory resolution, including appropriate steps by the United States and other concerned nations in the United Nations. I will state categorically that my Administration will not let the matter rest with the Soviet rejection of our legitimate request for consultations under Article V of the Convention; and I will take appropriate measures when we determine the most effective course of action and coordinate our plans with other parties.

September 27, 1980

Arms Control: Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons in Afghanistan

Q: What is your Administration's assessment of the reports of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and by Soviet clients in Laos and Kampuchea? Why hasn't your Administration charged the Soviets with a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol? Why are you continuing negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty at the same time the Soviets are violating an international ban on use of CW by dropping gas on Afghan villages?

Do you believe the US should start modernizing its own stockpile with binary chemical weapons?

Response: There is significant evidence that the Soviet Union has used incapacitating -- and perhaps lethal -- chemical weapons against the villages of Afghanistan. If this evidence is true, the Soviets are engaged in a barbarous immoral and illegal practice which merits the repugnance of all humanity.

I have directed the intelligence agencies of the United States Government to seek intensively all possible information about reported Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Further, I have directed the State Department to engage in worldwide consultations with our Allies and friends, as well as the non-aligned to share and exchange information that is available regarding possible Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, as well as reports of use of chemical weapons by Soviet-supported regimes in Kampuchea and Laos.

Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos are not signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning first use of chemical

weapons, and technically are not protected by it. But such an argument is sophistry. International law and practice now universally condemns first use of chemical weapons.

U.S. CW Modernization

The United States maintains a chemical weapons capability as a deterrent to Soviet use of chemical weapons. Our chemical weapons are to retaliate against Soviet use against us or our Allies.

Congress has approved funds for beginning construction of a new chemical weapons production plant to manufacture the so-called "binary chemical weapons" (in which two relatively harmless chemicals are combined to make a toxic agent).

I did not request these funds. Building new chemical weapons is a complex issue with potentially significant military, foreign policy and arms control implications. Earlier this year, I directed that a major study be undertaken of chemical weapon modernization, including the military, foreign policy and arms control aspects.

For that reason, I believe Congress' action in funding construction of a production facility in the Fiscal Year 1981 budget was premature. When the chemical weapons study is completed, I plan to make specific recommendations in the FY 1982 budget process.

September 26, 1980

Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Q: The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Nine months later 85,000 Soviet troops are still there. The Soviets appear to be no closer to achieving their goal of subduing the Afghan people now than they were in December. Given this situation, would it not be fair to say that your actions to force the Soviets to end their aggression in Afghanistan have failed? What further actions should be taken?

Response

The Soviet effort to destroy the national independence of Afghanistan through military force must be sternly resisted by the international community. This attempt to subjugate an independent, nonaligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets have sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a nonaligned and sovereign state.

The firm actions the United States has taken in recent months -- on grain sales, on technology, on fishing rights, on exchanges and on the Olympics -- are meant to demonstrate that aggression bears a price. These actions are intended not to provoke confrontation, but to avoid confrontation by discouraging future Soviet adventures that could lead to new crisis. These are measured responses, not reckless proposals as Governor Reagan's suggestion that we should blockade Cuba with military forces until the Soviets are out of Afghanistan.

By the steps we have taken -- on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, on draft registration -- we have conveyed, clearly and concretely, the seriousness of the American people.

Most Americans support the steps we have taken. For they understand that we cannot express our national resolve without individual sacrifice -- from farmers, from businessmen, from athletes, and others. Governor Reagan apparently does not understand this. He has opposed many of the steps I have taken.

We have also moved to address the security situation in the Persian Gulf region. We have:

- increased and accelerated our military preparedness for contingencies in the area (greater naval presence in the Indian Ocean; RDF; prepositioning of equipment; new base and port access rights);

- placed potential adversaries on notice that we would regard an attempt to control the Persian Gulf region as an assault on our vital interests, to be met by any means necessary, including military force;

- worked to strengthen the security and stability of nations in the region (e.g. Western aid to Turkey, Pakistan; Camp David peace process).

And, finally, we have worked with other nations to strengthen the international response to this Soviet aggression:

- few nations have been so sharply and broadly condemned (104 nations in the UN; Islamic nations - twice);

- have pressed our friends and allies to support the direct measures we have taken and to sustain their own sanctions against the Soviet Union.

When we undertook these policies, we had no illusions that they would bring about an immediate reconsideration of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union is a superpower. It will take time for the Soviet Union to realize that its aggression against Afghanistan represents a major miscalculation. But the actions we have taken -- and those of our Allies -- are having an impact. For example, evidence continues to mount that the grain embargo is having a substantial, adverse impact on the Soviet economy, and, in particular, on the livestock industry. By suspending grain sales above the 8 million metric tons (MMT) required by our bilateral agreement, we denied the Soviets 17 MMT. We estimate that they will be able to make up only 8-9 MMT of this amount. As a result, meat production in the Soviet Union has suffered. Soviet plans to provide their citizens more meat and dairy products have been stymied.

But it will take time for the Soviet Union to reassess its policy. When it does, we are prepared to consider realistic arrangements to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would end our sanctions.

At this time, however, we must never be so unsure of ourselves that we fear negotiation with the Soviet Union. I do not believe that our national interests would be served if we adopted Governor Reagan's position of absolutely "no communication" with the Soviet Union until they are out of Afghanistan. We can protect our interests while we

seek to achieve balanced and enforceable agreements to limit the growth of arms. I intend to move ahead with preliminary talks with the Soviets to limit long-range, theater nuclear forces in Europe. I also intend to press for ratification of the SALT II Treaty -- an agreement that is clearly in our national interest -- as soon as that goal is achievable.

To conclude, I believe we will strengthen our long-term security, not through rhetoric as offered by Governor Reagan, but through a clear and lasting demonstration of our national will to oppose aggression. And we will also strengthen our security through a willingness to seek concrete agreements that serve our national interests.

Governor Reagan on the Response to the
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Of the three steps the President initiated to counter the Soviets, Reagan opposed both the grain embargo and draft registration, and he vacillated on the Olympic boycott.

Grain Embargo

Reagan has long been an opponent of selling wheat to the Russians. He has, on two occasions, advocated halting grain sales to the Soviet Union.

"But isn't there also a moral issue? Are we not helping the Godless tyranny maintain its hold on millions of helpless people? Wouldn't those helpless victims have a better chance of becoming free if their slave masters collapsed economically?...Maybe there is an answer -- we simply do what's morally right. Stop doing business with them. Let their system collapse, but meantime buy our farmers' wheat ourselves and have it on hand to feed the Russian people when they finally become free."

Radio Transcript
October 29, 1975

After disclosure of a Russian brigade in Cuba, Reagan said:

"If the Russians want to buy wheat from us...I wouldn't sell it to them."

L.A. Times
Sept. 30, 1979

However, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan Reagan commented:

"I just don't believe the farmer should be made to pay a special price for our diplomacy, and I'm opposed to what's being done (proposed Soviet grain embargo)."

Washington Post
January 8, 1980

Olympic Boycott

Reagan proposed boycotting the Moscow Olympics even before the Afghanistan invasion.

"What would happen if the leaders of the Western world told the International Olympic Committee and the Soviet Union that torch must be lit in some other country...If they don't and we participate in these games anyway, what do we say to our young athletes about honor?"

Radio Transcript
October 3, 1978

However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Reagan vacillated. First he opposed the boycott.

"...threats to refuse to attend the olympics are not responsive to the Soviet call of our hand."

Washington Post
January 25, 1980

Finally Reagan stated his support for the boycott:

"I support the boycott today. I supported it yesterday. And I supported it when the President first called for it."

Philadelphia Inquirer
April 11, 1980

The Reagan Response to Afghanistan

Opposing several of the President's actions, Reagan proposed his own plan to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soon after the invasion, Reagan advocated sending advisers and war planes to Pakistan. He also suggested that the United States send weapons to Afghanistan.

"(W)e ought to be funneling weapons through there that can be delivered to those freedom fighters in Afghanistan to fight for their own freedom. That would include those shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles that could knock down helicopter gun ships that the Soviets are using against them."

Washington Post
January 10, 1980

Reagan also proposed that the United States blockade Cuba in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Even though Reagan advocated military options to counter the Soviet invasion, he opposed draft registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

And finally, he recommended:

"So when they invaded Afghanistan, maybe that was the time for us to have said, 'Look, don't talk to us about trade. There will be none. Don't talk to us about treaties, like SALT II. We are not going to have any communication with you until (those forces in Afghanistan) are back in the Soviet Union.'"

Time
June 30, 1980

September 18, 1980

The End of Detente

Q: US-Soviet relations have reached the lowest point since the Cold War. Detente, for which the American people had so many expectations, is apparently finished.

US-Soviet relations have gone through a number of stages since World War II, with the emphasis on detente being the most recent. Are we, in fact, at the end of detente? What is the likely nature of this relationship in the years ahead, in view of the steady increase in the Soviet military buildup and in its expanding activities in the Third World, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan? Will the relationship be basically one of conflict and confrontation, or are elements of cooperation still possible?

Response

That relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are severely strained is undeniable. And that this strain is largely created by Soviet behavior is also undeniable.

What does this recent tension mean for the future? Let me make several points.

First, the relationship between the two great powers, both of whom have the power to destroy the other, is the most decisive single influence on peace in the world. And so a stable, balanced relationship between our country and the Soviet Union remains our goal. That is why I continue to favor arms control between our two nations, specifically the SALT II Treaty which Governor Reagan rejects.

Second, while we remain interested in lessening tension and broadening cooperation with the Soviet Union, detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to provide peace in the future. To assume that detente is

divisible, that aggression need be met only when it directly threatens one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere. The Soviets must understand they cannot recklessly threaten world peace -- that they cannot commit aggression -- and still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the United States and the West. They must understand the invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on world opinion, including here in America. We are prepared to impose costs on aggression for as long as necessary.

Having said that, a third point is necessary, namely that the way to better relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is clearly the path we prefer. We are prepared to accept the Soviet Union as a world power with its own legitimate interests. We seek no Cold War, no indiscriminate confrontation. We have no interest in holding the Soviet Union responsible for all the world's instabilities. We know the world is too complicated for such simple-minded notions as those advanced by my Republican opponent. But we will insist that Moscow respect the legitimate interests of other nations.

Finally, the American people, and its political leaders, must come to understand that our relationship with the Soviet Union has always contained elements of competition and confrontation as well as cooperation. Our differences are profound. But it is also true that our two countries share many important interests, survival being the most critical. We must, therefore, attempt to avoid the excessive swings in

our policies toward the Soviet Union, from detente one day, to Cold War the next. It is not a question of a "hard" policy or a "soft" policy, as Governor Reagan would like to simplify, but of a clear-eyed recognition of how most effectively to protect our security and further our mutual interests.

Gov. Reagan on Detente

Reagan believes detente was one way in which the Soviets exploited the West's weaknesses to their own benefit.

"Detente, which started our worthily and with a good purpose, has become a one-way street. I think the Soviet Union has become more truculent, more aggressive in the world. And we have been responding with preemptive concessions without getting anything in return. I think it is time for us to rebuild our strength and at the same time make detente if it is to exist a two-way street by telling the Russians that is the only way we will observe it."

Christian Science Monitor
June 3, 1976

Asked whether he wants to return the nation to cold war days, Reagan said:

"When did the Cold War end?"

Wall Street Journal
June 30, 1980

September 23, 1980

Nature of the Soviet Union

Q: Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan you stated that your opinion of the Russians had "changed most dramatically in the last week." And, in your Notre Dame address in 1977, you stated that we are now free of our "inordinate fear of communism."

The Republican party has taken issue with you on both of these statements. In their Platform the Republicans state: "Unlike Mr. Carter, we see nothing 'inordinate' in our nation's historic judgment about the goals, tactics and dangers of Soviet communism. Unlike the Carter Administration, we are not surprised by the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan..."

There would appear to be a fundamental difference in your views on the Soviet Union and those of the Republicans. Would you spell out how you see the Soviet Union today? What are its ultimate goals? Have these goals changed over the years? Do you believe they will change in the future, and is it possible for the United States to influence these goals?

Response

The Soviet Union of today is different from the country

we dealt with in earlier periods of acute US-Soviet discord.

The USSR has become a superpower. It is a strategic equal.

It defines its interests in global terms. For the first time, moreover, it possesses the military and other capabilities to advance those interests globally.

For some time now, we have witnessed the continued growth of a Soviet military machine in excess of any reasonable defense requirements. This has stimulated a heightened military competition that can only result in diminished security for itself and the rest of the world. At the same time, the Soviet Union has used its increasing military capabilities to seek to increase its influence in the Third World. With extraordinary shortsightedness, it has done so in the belief that these actions

would not destroy the trends toward moderating its relations with the United States and the West which had a modest beginning a decade ago.

As we have seen, this Soviet calculation was clearly wrong. Our relations with the Soviet Union have reached the lowest point in years, particularly accentuated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

We must recognize, however, that not all of our difficulties in the world today can be blamed on the Soviet Union, as Governor Reagan has suggested. The world is much more diverse, interdependent, and unstable than in the past. There is no question that the Soviets, when they feel they can get away with it, will take every opportunity to expand their influence at Western expense. But we do them undue homage, and ourselves a disservice, when we blind ourselves to the roots of the problems we face by fixing our attention too rigidly on the Soviets.

The profound differences in what our two governments believe about freedom and power and the inner lives of human beings are likely to remain for the indefinite future, and so are other elements of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition is real and deeply rooted in the history and values of our respective societies. But it is also true that our two countries share many important, overlapping interests. So long as the Soviet Union pursues its interests through accepted and peaceful means, and so long as it shows it is prepared to respect the legitimate interests of other countries, a cooperative relationship is possible between our two countries.

What we cannot accept is when the Soviet Union seeks unilateral advantage through means which challenge the international system built up since World War II.

Ahead lies the uncertainty of the directions in which a new generation of leadership will take the Soviet Union, in the solution of its internal problems, and the advancement of its interests abroad. We cannot directly affect the choices they will make, but we can continue to make it clear, with steadfastness and patience, that if future Soviet leaders see their national self-interest in a policy of restraint and responsibility, they will find the United States responsive to that course.

Our best hope of evoking such a response from the Soviet Union will be to demonstrate firmness and strength in the defense of our interests, together with a readiness to work toward a return to cooperation between our two countries when this becomes feasible.

Gov. Reagan on the Nature of the Soviet Union

Reagan repeatedly states his belief that the Soviets are engaged in a relentless drive for world domination, driven by their belief in communism and their basic expansionist tendencies.

"Every Russian leader, every Soviet leader from the very beginning has... proclaimed to their own people their belief in the Marxian philosophy that communism can only succeed if it is a one-world communist state...going to aid social revolutions all over the world until the whole world has been liberated to communism. And I think this explains what they're doing."

New York Times Interview
December 19, 1979

Reagan believes that the Soviet Union is responsible for nearly all of the world's troubles.

"We are blind to reality if we refuse to recognize that detente's usefulness to the Soviets is as a cover for their traditional and basic strategy for aggression."

Radio Transcript
October 31, 1975.

And, more recently:

"Let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in the game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980

September 16, 1980

Geopolitical Issues

- Q. The Republican party points to takeovers by the Soviet Union (or their clients) in several countries and regions of the world since you took office in 1977. These include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia and South Yemen. The Republicans further state that "The Soviet noose is now being drawn around southern Africa..." and "Soviet military power poses a direct threat to the petroleum resources of the Persian Gulf."

Have there been serious geopolitical losses since you became President? Do you believe the Soviet Union is attempting, either directly or indirectly through proxies such as Cuba and Vietnam, to extend its power and influence throughout the Third World? And, if so, what should be the response of the United States?

Response

For several years we have witnessed Soviet attempts to extend its influence -- either directly or indirectly through their Cuban and Vietnamese proxies -- into the Third World. And, last December, the Soviet Union sent combat forces into Afghanistan. This attempt to subjugate an independent, nonaligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the UN Charter. The United States has taken the lead in opposing this latest example of Soviet adventurism.

That the Soviet Union has moved to extend its influence abroad is undeniable. That the Soviet Union is marching to world domination according to some carefully orchestrated "master plan" -- as Governor Reagan would have us believe -- is nonsense. Over the past several years, the Soviet Union has lost as much influence in the world as it has gained, starting with the People's Republic of China in the late

1950s. Indonesia, Egypt and Somalia have all sent the Soviets packing. They are not alone. The Soviet Union has fewer friends in the Third World today than a decade ago. The brutal invasion of Afghanistan has reduced -- not increased -- Soviet influence among Moslem nations. I might also add that just a short time ago there was considerable alarm in the West about the spread of Eurocommunism. Portugal was seen as particularly vulnerable. Today we no longer hear these expressions of concern and Portugal remains solidly in the democratic camp.

There are other important elements of influence in which the Soviets simply are not in the running: the attraction of Western cultural values and our democratic political institutions; the appeal of Western educational systems, the Western tradition of scientific and technological innovation and experiment. These factors, too, draw countries toward the West and increase the ability of the United States and its allies and friends to exert influence.

I want to make clear, however, that by influence I do not mean political, economic or cultural control or predominance. One of the more significant factors in international relations in the last 15 or 20 years has been the emergence of a large number of new Third World countries determined to be free of dominance by either East or West. This has drawbacks, of course: We get

voted against in the United Nations; we get criticized for some of our policies. And it means older forms of influence must give way to leadership based on persuasion, example and cooperation. It is a more difficult world, perhaps, but the total sum of freedom is larger than in the days of colonial empires and political and economic domination by the great powers.

And, in this newer, freer world, I am convinced that the United States has more to offer than the Soviet Union, a nation with a bankrupt ideology, a repressive political system and an economy in shambles.

Gov. Reagan on Geographical Losses

"Then there is the Soviet, Cuban and East German presence in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and now the invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan. This last step moves them within striking distance of the oil-rich Arabian Gulf. And is it just coincidence that Cuban and Soviet-trained terrorists are bringing civil war to Central American countries in close proximity to the rich oil fields of Venezuela and Mexico? All over the world, we can see that in the face of declining American power, the Soviets and their friends are advancing. Yet the Carter Administration seems totally oblivious."

Veterans of Foreign Wars
May 18, 1980

* * * *

"One wonders why the Carter Administration fails to see any threatening pattern in the Soviet presence, by way of Cuban power, in so much of Africa, which is the source of minerals absolutely essential to the industrialized democracies of Japan, Central Europe and the U.S."

Human Rights and the Soviet Union
(including CSCE)

Q: The Republicans have charged that you have "ignored" human rights in the Soviet Union and that a Republican Administration will press the Soviet Union to end its "harrassment and imprisonment" of dissidents.

How would you respond to this charge? Do you believe you have "ignored" human rights in the Soviet Union? Do you believe that your human rights policy has been counterproductive for US-Soviet relations? What is the best approach the United States can adopt to enhance human rights in the Soviet Union?

Response: The Republican charge that I have "ignored" human rights in the United States is false, and Governor Reagan knows it. One of my first acts as President was to send a letter to Andrei Sakharov, expressing my admiration for him as one of the world's leading defenders of human rights. Since that time, my Administration has pressed Soviet authorities to adopt a less repressive human rights policy and to honor their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. In addition to my letter to Andrei Sakharov:

-- I and a number of my Cabinet members have personally met with leading Soviet dissidents.

-- I personally raised human rights issues with President Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit in June 1979.

-- At the Belgrade CSCE Review Meeting in the fall of 1978, we raised the full range of human rights violations by the Soviets.

-- We have presented annually a US list of divided families and, more frequently, a special list of hardship cases. We have also made frequent private representations to the Soviets on individual cases.

-- In the summer of 1978 we cancelled a number of high-level visits in response to the Soviet decision to try the leading Soviet dissidents, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Aleksandr Ginzberg.

-- And, in April 1979, we obtained the release of five leading Soviet dissidents: Valentin Moroz, Georgiy Vins, Aleksandr Ginzberg, Mark Dymshits, and Eduard Kuznetsov.

While pursuing our concerns about human rights, we have sought to make it clear to the Soviet Government that the commitment of my Administration to human rights is an integral element of our foreign policy.

Our policy is exactly what it appears to be: the positive and sincere expression of our deepest beliefs as a people. It is not directed against the Soviet Union. I regret to say, however, that the Soviet Government continues to view our human rights policy as undue interference in their internal affairs. Despite this, there has not been and there will not be any slackening in our commitment.

Specifically, we will continue to assert our policy

at the forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid. Governor Reagan, however, has suggested that we should stay away from Madrid, that we should drop out of the Helsinki process. He has even compared the meeting in Madrid to the Moscow Olympics, suggesting that since American athletes chose not to go to Moscow, that American diplomats should not go to Madrid. This reasoning is, of course, very confused. Such ideas spring from ignorance of the meaning of Madrid.

The Helsinki Accords commit the 35 signatories, including the Soviet Union, to respect human rights. To their dishonor, Soviet authorities have intensified their repression of the freedoms which they pledged at Helsinki. The banishment of Andre Sakharov into internal exile is the best known of such violations. It is not, however, the only one. More than 40 courageous men and women are now in prison or exile just because they took seriously the Soviet Union's commitments at Helsinki. Their only "crime" was to monitor Soviet compliance with the Accords.

The Helsinki provisions have also helped Soviet Jews to emigrate, although the encouraging record level set in 1979 is being reduced this year. At Madrid, we will seek an explanation for that decline and a commitment by the Soviet Union to reverse it.

To stay away from Madrid, as Governor Reagan has suggested, would be folly. It would only please those who are most guilty of violating the principles of Helsinki, including human rights. I do not intend to let the Soviet Union and other violators be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion. A Republican administration signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. My Democratic Administration is deeply committed to carrying out those agreements.

Gov. Reagan on CSCE

Reagan considers the Helsinki accords another means of legitimizing the Soviet Union's imperial ambitions by de jure recognition of the satellite empire.

"In signing the Helsinki pact we gave the Russians something they've wanted for 35 years. In effect, we recognized the Soviet Union's right to hold captive the Eastern and Central European nations they have ruled since World War II. We signed the pact apparently because of one clause which had to do with human rights. Those making the decision to sign claimed the Soviet Union by its signature had agreed to let people have some (if not all) of the rights the rest of us take for granted. They are (for example) supposed to be able to leave the Soviet Union and the captive nations if they choose. But the Russians make promises; they don't keep them.

Radio Transcript
January, 1978

In June, he announced that he was opposed to U.S. participation in the Madrid CSCE meeting:

"Frankly, I have an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by boycotting the Olympics. If the athletics can't go, why should the diplomats go?"

Time
June 30, 1980

September 27, 1960

Western Europe and NATO: US Leadership

- Q. Republicans and other critics say there has been a loss of European confidence in your personal leadership and in the reliability of the United States. Critics say your policies and leadership have been erratic, with sudden flip flops. The neutron bomb is one example; the stress on human rights in certain areas and not in others another, and our arms sales policies a third.

Do you have the confidence and trust of Allied leaders? How can you lead our allies in meeting the challenges of economic problems, energy vulnerabilities, Soviet military buildup and global interdependence if they do not respect or trust your judgment, steadiness and resolve?

RESPONSE

I think the NATO alliance is as strong today as it has been in any time in my memory, since the war. I also believe that the challenges from the alliance today are profound.

Under very difficult economic circumstances, the major nations in the alliance have committed themselves to a three percent real growth in defense expenditures. Under heavy pressure, and propaganda efforts by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations, the allies voted last December to go ahead with a modernization of theater nuclear forces -- a very difficult decision. And my own personal relationship with the leaders in those countries shows a very strong commitment to the alliance and very strong support for the United States.

Under U.S. leadership, NATO is acting decisively to deal with Soviet challenges. I have met with allied leaders

in five summits. I have had innumerable bilateral discussions with individual allied leaders on every issue confronting the alliance today. The record will show an unprecedented volume of correspondence and exchange at the highest levels with our Allies on major foreign policy issues, most of it quite sensitive. In short, no U.S. Administration has consulted as intensively with the Allies as has mine.

Over the past three and one-half years, NATO has developed a broad, coordinated and cohesive strategy for strengthening conventional and nuclear forces, for increasing real defense spending, and on redistributing security burdens in the Alliance so the U.S. can direct more effort at protecting our common interests in the Persian Gulf. This has been achieved under U.S. leadership. Without a vigorous effort by myself, my top foreign policy and defense advisors, and the concerted effort of my Administration, NATO could not have organized and begun the difficult task of implementing this tremendous effort. I am proud of what we have accomplished and I am determined that we shall do even more to strengthen the Alliance.

Gov. Reagan on Western Europe and NATO

Reagan states that as president he would consult with our European allies on important issues. He criticizes the Carter Administration for not consulting with our European allies on the Iranian rescue mission, and suggests that if we had handled the situation properly, the Europeans would have more effectively backed the United States on the Afghanistan and Iranian sanctions.

Reagan has suggested that NATO should expand its security responsibilities to include the Persian Gulf:

"There would be nothing wrong with us at the same time appealing to our NATO allies and saying, 'Look, fellows, let's just make this an extension of the NATO line and you contribute some forces in here too.' They're the ones who'd be worse off then we were if the oil goes. They would, if the oil goes, literally have to be like Finland and accept Finlandization by Russia...I happen to know that the Soviet Union has been appealing to West Germany to break away and sign its own agreement and treaty with them, and the bait that they have been holding out is Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil. I know that for a fact."

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Concerning NATO, Reagan's primary concern is that if the United States does not appear a strong and dependable ally, the nations of Europe will seek an accommodation with the USSR.

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with -- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

To prevent such action, Reagan proposes to consult with the allies and reassure them of our interest in preserving the alliance.

"I think the Reagan Administration, first of all, would do it by action, by consulting with them, making it evident to them that we do value that alliance and want to preserve it."

Time
June 30, 1980

September 12, 1980

Western Europe and NATO: Detente

Q: The Europeans seem to place a very high value on detente with the Soviet Union. They are reluctant to take strong actions toward the Soviets which might jeopardize it. In your view, are our allies too committed to detente and not firm enough toward the Soviets? Do you see signs, as Gov. Reagan apparently does, of "neutralism" in our allies, or a tendency to accommodate Soviet desires? If the US is moving away from detente and the allies remain committed to it, aren't our interests and policies beginning to diverge seriously? If they are unwilling to risk detente even after open military aggression by Moscow, how can there be US-Allied cooperation in dealing with the USSR?

RESPONSE

Unlike Governor Reagan, I do not accuse our allies of drifting toward "neutralism" or a desire to accommodate the Soviet Union. An Alliance which is vigorously implementing a Long Term Defense Program to improve its collective military capabilities, which is committed to increasing real defense spending by 3%, and which has decided to implement a major modernization of theater nuclear forces, is not trying to appease the Soviet Union. It is nonsense, and damaging to the Alliance, to make such a charge.

I understand our Allies' desire to preserve limited forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly where this can help ease the lot of their fellow Europeans in the East. We do not seek nor are we asking our Allies to dismantle the framework of detente. We ourselves are ready to resume the cooperative aspects of our relationship

with the Soviet Union. But this cannot be done against a background of callous disregard for elementary principles of international conduct.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future -- to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the need for deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. To assume that detente is divisible, that aggression need be met only when it directly threatens one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere.

Deterrence requires sacrifice. The United States is willing to bear its share. It is vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among all our allies -- for the sake of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and for the sake of the public support which makes those alliances strong.

The Soviet invasion is not only a challenge to our interests but to those of our allies as well. While there should be a division of labor, it must be an equitable one.

September 27, 1980

Western Europe and NATO: Alliance Disunity

Q: When your Administration began, you said strengthening the Atlantic Alliance would be one of your principal aims. Yet, over the last four years the US and the NATO allies seem to be drifting apart on a whole range of important issues: East-West relations, defense policies, energy problems, inflation and economic stagnation, relations with the Third World, the Middle East--the list could go on. Isn't it clear NATO is in serious disarray? Can the Alliance remain unified and effective in the face of such deep problems? What future do you see for NATO and for US relations with Western Europe?

RESPONSE

At the outset of my Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. The Atlantic Alliance, together with our Alliances with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, is now and will remain the bedrock of Western collective security. We have made important progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in the face of the Soviet military buildup and in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat to common Western interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.

What my Republican opponent would call "rifts and tensions" -- and what I would call "healthy expression of independent views" -- are inevitable in an Alliance of free democratic partners. We are not the Warsaw Pact, which rules by coercion and decree from a central ministry in Moscow.

This does not mean that there is no room for improvement in our consultative practices and in the coordination of our actions. Obviously there is, on both sides of the Atlantic. I feel that the record of my Administration has been very good in this respect; indeed, these past three and one-half years show an unprecedented volume of high-level contact with our major Allies both bilaterally and multilaterally on a broad range of issues of common concern: defense, economy, energy. In my term of office, I have met with Alliance leaders at five summits to coordinate our policies. I have had innumerable bilateral discussions with Western leaders. And we have agreed on vigorous steps to improve our collective defense and respond to Soviet challenges. Let me cite just a few examples.

-- My Administration launched a Long-Term Defense Program in NATO 18 months before the Soviet invasion. We also led an Alliance-wide effort to commit our governments to the three-percent real increase in defense spending. Last September many of the countries of NATO were having difficulty meeting that commitment. Today, the Germans, the Italians, the British, and the Canadians are meeting it, and the Dutch are quite close to meeting it.

-- We are working hard in NATO to ensure that the U.S. will have more flexibility and capability for moving military forces into Southwest Asia, and the Europeans have been quite responsive on measures to pick up the slack in Europe.

-- Last December NATO agreed in an historic decision to modernize theater nuclear forces.

-- Our Allies cooperated with us in substantially reducing the flow of wheat to the Soviet Union this year and we are making progress in reducing the flow of high technology to the USSR.

NATO is a healthy, strong alliance of free, equal and sovereign nations. From time to time, disagreements among free allies over the proper responses to the challenges we are facing is understandable. But, our common goals -- mutual security and preservation of our democratic way of life -- are deep and enduring. We should work even harder at coordinating our actions in Europe and wherever our interests are threatened. But the Alliance is dynamic and vibrant; it is not in disarray.

September 27, 1980

Western Europe and NATO: Defense Efforts

Q: We are trying to increase US defense spending significantly. Our European allies are very wealthy and could afford to spend much more on defense and allow the US to concentrate on other areas where our mutual interests are more immediately threatened. What are our allies doing to improve their contribution to Western defenses in light of the Soviet buildup, the invasion of Afghanistan, and threats to the Persian Gulf? Are the allies doing enough or are they letting us carry an unfair share of the burden while they devote a larger share of their economies to competing with us?

Should the US shift some of its forces out of Europe to strengthen our ability to protect US interests in Southwest Asia? Do you plan to seek an extension of NATO's geographic area of responsibility to cover threats to Persian Gulf oil, which is vital to Europe's security? What do our allies think about this idea?

RESPONSE

A central objective of my Administration has been to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance -- the bedrock of Western security. We and our NATO allies are responding vigorously to the Soviet military buildup, specifically:

-- At the 1978 NATO Summit, the NATO Allies agreed to join with us in increasing real defense spending by 3% every year until 1986. In general, our Allies are meeting the commitment, although, frankly, a few of them have not done all they should.

-- In 1978 we launched a Long Term Defense Program to improve NATO's capabilities in ten key areas, ranging from air defense to maritime posture. This program is being vigorously implemented.

-- NATO has made a historic decision to modernize theater nuclear forces with the deployment of long-range Pershing and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe which can strike the Soviet Union. This program will strengthen NATO's flexible response strategy and deny the Soviets the opportunity to try to exploit a gap in NATO defenses.

But, our Allies can do more. The commitments they made in 1978 are all the more important in light of the security situation in Southwest Asia. NATO must face the possibility that U.S. forces we previously had hoped would be available for the defense of Europe might have to be committed to a conflict or crisis elsewhere, especially Southwest Asia. I am not talking about a major diversion of U.S. resources or a drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe, but rather about some reinforcements and support.

We have recently discussed this situation with our Allies and have agreed with them that we need to accelerate implementation of critical Long-Term Defense Program measures, and some countries must make a renewed effort to achieve three percent real growth in defense spending. We are specifically looking to our Allies to provide more reserve forces, to build up their war reserve stocks, to provide airlift to assist us in deploying to Europe, and to take steps, such as increased land-based air capability

and to improve their naval forces. These steps will help ensure the security of Europe in the event of a conflict elsewhere involving U.S. forces.

The challenge to the NATO Alliance is great. Our response must be a collective one, with the burden fairly shared. I think the military contribution our allies make to collective defense is not always sufficiently recognized. Our Allies provide nearly half of NATO's defense spending, almost 60 % of its armed forces, about 75% of its tanks and more than 90% of its armored divisions. As the United States takes the lead to protect common interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, our allies will take on a greater share of NATO's strength in Europe.

And, let us not forget that our allies are true partners; several of them -- France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and Italy -- are important military powers in their own right. The Soviet Union, in contrast, cannot rely on any of its allies. The Warsaw Pact is more an organization to hold Eastern Europe under Soviet domination than it is an alliance of nations with common interests and values.

September 12, 19

Western Europe and NATO: Coup in Turkey

Q: Turkey, the anchor of NATO's Southern Flank, has been experiencing profound political, economic and social problems. Pressures have been building and some say there could be a radical Islamic or anti-Western revolution there. Now, the Turkish military have stepped in and overthrown the democratic government. What is your position on the Turkish coup: are you pressing the Turkish military for a return to civilian government?

What steps are you--and our NATO allies--taking to prevent the loss of Turkey and the unraveling of our position in the Eastern Mediterranean?

RESPONSE

Turkey is a reliable and important ally and friend of the United States. It is trying to cope with severe problems and we and other NATO allies have sought to help them. I regret that the Turkish military felt compelled to suspend the democratic institutions of that country. I hope that this step will be temporary and that there will be a return to civilian rule as soon as conditions permit.

The OECD has organized an economic aid package of over \$1 billion -- to which we contributed -- for Turkey. We have also concluded a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Turkey to help Turkey play its role in the common defense and to support important U.S. military activities in support of NATO goals. We will continue to help Turkey in every way we can.

(Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean)

The preservation of a strong southern flank in the Eastern Mediterranean is a vital U.S. and NATO interest. We strongly support the earliest possible reintegration of Greek armed forces into the NATO integrated military structure. General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has been given the task by our NATO allies of working out a formula to work out the military details of reintegration. We strongly support his important effort and have made this abundantly clear to all concerned.

(Cyprus)

Resolution of the Cyprus problem is vitally important. I have made personal efforts to achieve progress in solving this problem.

One of my first acts as President was to send a high-level mission to the Eastern Mediterranean to try to help with the Cyprus problem. I believe this mission, headed by Clark Clifford, contributed to progress in the Cyprus problem during the spring of 1977. In 1978, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and Canada, presented some ideas on the possible substance of a fair Cyprus solution. These ideas contributed to the UN's success in getting the talks resumed. I myself have met

with President Kyprianou as well as with Greek and Turkish leaders on this issue. Hopefully, the talks will continue on a sustained basis and lead to a solution to the problem acceptable to all Cypriots. My Administration supports the efforts of Secretary General Waldheim in this regard.

September 16, 1960

Western Europe and NATO: Poland

Q: Should the US and our Western allies give more open support to the Polish workers? What should the US, as leader of the West, do to support the aspirations of Poles and other Europeans for more freedom from Soviet domination? Do you accept the view that Eastern Europe is an integral part of the Soviet empire where we cannot interfere?

RESPONSE

All Americans have been filled with admiration for the peaceful determination of the working men and women of Poland to win a real place for themselves in deciding their own fate and future. We have expressed that feeling strongly but in a way that shows that we recognize that the decisions being made in Poland are ones for the Poles themselves -- and only for them -- to make.

I decided as a matter of national policy to make minimal comments about developments there in order not to exacerbate a very delicate and serious situation, or to strengthen any Soviet pretext to intervene. As I said, we believe that the internal problems in Poland are for the people of Poland and the Polish authorities to work out for themselves.

The United States has a real interest in the well-being of the people of Poland and in the stability of their economic development. We have been able to help, especially with agricultural credits, in past years.

Last year we gave Poland over half a billion dollars in food credits. In mid-September I approved a \$670 million Commodity Credit Corporation for Poland for FY81. We are encouraging others to help Poland with its economic problems. We will monitor closely the Polish government's compliance with its commitments to the workers. Failure of the Polish authorities to honor their agreement would obviously have to be taken into account in our willingness to give Poland further credits and loan guarantees.

We would be very disturbed by any effort by anyone outside Poland to interfere by force or in any fashion in Poland's domestic affairs. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, it earned the condemnation of the whole world, as it did when it entered Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. I do not believe it has forgotten.

September 16, 1980

Iran: Hostages

- Q. Fifty-two Americans remain captive in Iran. The response of the Carter Administration has been to try several diplomatic initiatives, invoke economic sanctions against Iran and attempt a military rescue mission. The latter, we know, was a failure. Less clear has been the effect of the diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions. Now, of course, we have the war between Iran and Iraq which will surely complicate the release of our hostages.

Now that you have had the perspective of time and thought, please evaluate for us the effectiveness of the diplomatic and economic measures you have taken, and the wisdom of the rescue mission and why it collapsed. Finally, what do you propose we do now to win the release of the hostages?

Response

No single international issue has caused me greater personal concern as President than the continued, illegal detention of our hostages in Iran. Since the first day the hostages were taken, we have kept two goals in mind. First, to preserve the honor and integrity of our nation and to protect its interests. Second, to take no action in this country that would endanger the lives or safety of the hostages nor interfere with their earliest possible release back to freedom. These goals have not changed during the long captivity of our hostages. Nor will they as long as their cruel torment continues.

We have pursued a policy of firmness and restraint. We have not issued ultimatums, as Governor Reagan has said he would do. Nor have we attempted to "literally quarantine" Iran as he has suggested. I believe such actions would be reckless and would pose a serious threat to the lives of the hostages.

International condemnation of Iran, and the economic sanctions which we have imposed, have raised the costs to Iran of their illegal actions and are bringing home to Iranians the fact that the holding of the hostages is hurting their country and bringing dishonor to their revolution.

But divisions within Iran have prevented progress and this has been my greatest frustration as President.

I do not regret having gone an extra mile to find an honorable solution to this problem. And I have no regret that we attempted to rescue our hostages. Our rescue plan was well conceived and had an excellent chance of success. To the families of those who died and were wounded, I again want to express my admiration for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow I personally feel for their sacrifice.

The current conflict between Iran and Iraq may again setback our efforts to gain the release of our hostages. We will, however, continue to work for their prompt and safe release and continue to hold the government of Iran responsible for their safety and well being.

Gov. Reagan on Iran

In reference to the fall of the Shah of Iran, Reagan asserted the revolution somehow could have been averted.

"I believe there was a time this revolt (against the Shah's government) could have been halted. I can't tell you exactly how. But I think it could have been done."

San Francisco Chronicle
November 15, 1979

In dealing with the hostage crises he has suggested:

"But some place along the line there had to be an ultimatum. Here again, because we have lost so much influence with friends and allies, we were not in a position to go to the rest of the world and say, look, this is a violation of international law, and present to them the idea of the world literally quarantining Iran."

Time
June 30, 1980

September 29, 1980

Defense of Persian Gulf -- Carter Doctrine

Q: You have stated that the United States will, if necessary, use military force to protect its vital interests in the Persian Gulf area. This statement implies, of course, that the U.S. is capable of defending its interests in that part of the world. Yet, outside analysts agree that the Soviet Union could bring far larger military forces to bear in the Persian Gulf area than could the U.S. A Defense Department study has reportedly admitted as much, concluding that the U.S. would have to use nuclear weapons to deny a Soviet victory.

Do you believe the U.S. can credibly defend its "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf?

Response:

In recent years the Persian Gulf has become vital to the United States and to many of our friends and allies. Over the longer term, the world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil is likely to increase. The denial of these oil supplies -- to us or to others -- would threaten our security and provoke an economic crisis greater than that of the Great Depression 50 years ago. Loss of this oil would create havoc not only in the world economy, but for the security of our alliances.

The twin threats to the flow of Persian Gulf oil -- from regional instability such as the current conflict between Iraq and Iran, and now potentially from the Soviet Union as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan -- require that we clearly state our intention to defend our vital interests if threatened. As I said in my

State of the Union address -- an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. The purpose of my statement was to eliminate the possibility of any gross miscalculations by the Soviets about where our vital interests lie, or about our willingness to defend them. I am sure this is well understood.

The fighting between Iran and Iraq represents a danger to the peace and stability of the region. There should be absolutely no interference by any other nation in this conflict. And, it is important that I add my own strong support and that of our nation to the declaration which the nine European community nations made recently. Freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf is of primary importance to the whole international community. It is imperative that there be no infringement of that freedom of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf region.

Should external aggression occur, however, the United States could and would respond with significant force in the Persian Gulf. Today, we have combat-ready forces in the region in the form of warships, carrier-based aircraft, and prepositioned ground force equipment. We also have

marine and light infantry forces, along with additional air power, which could move into action in the Persian Gulf in a matter of days. We have recently concluded agreements with Oman, Kenya and Somalia on access to additional air and naval facilities in the region.

Enhancing the security of the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East will require a sustained, long-term commitment. We are prepared to make such a commitment. We want to work with all of the countries in the region to achieve it. The present conflict between Iraq and Iran underscores the vital importance of this task.

September 29, 1980

Allied Support in Persian Gulf

Q: This Administration has correctly described the Western demand for oil as the reason stability in the Persian Gulf is so crucial to Western security. Yet the United States appears to be more concerned with the security of the region than the local states or our European and Japanese allies, whose interests there are greater than our own. Our pleas within NATO and in other forums have resulted in little action in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Isn't the security of the Persian and collective responsibility? Doesn't the current conflict between Iran and Iraq make it clear to our allies that they must assume their fair share of the burden? Isn't their unwillingness to follow the U.S. lead only an example of the larger failure of confidence in U.S. leadership?

Response:

As a result of the fighting between Iran and Iraq, and its potential impact on world oil supplies, I have been in contact with our key allies and friends. I have stated our willingness to host a meeting to review the status of oil supplies and international shipping in the Persian Gulf area. To date the conflict has not had a major impact on world oil supplies and shipping continues through the Strait of Hormuz. We will continue to watch this situation very closely and stay in contact with our allies.

Another major source of potential instability in the Persian Gulf area is Soviet behavior, as demonstrated by Afghanistan. As a superpower, the United States must be willing to bear the main burden of shoring up the region's security, along with cooperative local countries. But we do expect strong support from our European allies and from Japan, because they depend on the region's security and its resources even more than we do. Roughly one-quarter of the oil we import comes from this area of the world. For our allies the proportion is higher -- two-thirds in the case of Western Europe, three-fourths for Japan. Thus, we believe they can contribute a great deal, politically, economically, and, to some extent, militarily. We are making progress with our allies in securing such support. Specifically:

-- We expect them to give us strong political support in communicating our unwillingness to tolerate aggressive Soviet behavior, dangerous to all of us. They have done this. Our joint statement at the Venice Summit was a sharp denunciation of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

-- We expect cooperation from our allies in steps that reduce our mutual dependence on vulnerable oil supplies. They are doing this.

-- In the military sphere, we can also expect cooperation. Some, like the British and the French, have small but capable military forces that can play a stabilizing role. Others can allow us to use their airfields if we have to move forces into the region quickly.

-- Most important of all, we expect all of our allies to increase their total defense effort, as we are increasing ours, to meet the overall challenge to our security interests in Europe, in East Asia, and now in a very vital new theater surrounding the Persian Gulf. Our allies are moving in this direction.

September 16, 1980

Middle East: Future of the Peace Process

Q: There has been no progress in the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel. None is expected until after the November election, if then. Many believe that the autonomy issues are so intractable that the Camp David process is finished. The Europeans have apparently reached this conclusion.

Would it not be fair to say that the Middle East peace process is at a dead end? Would it not be better to start on a new approach? Also, how would you respond to the Republican charge that your Administration's "vacillations" on Middle East policy "have left friend and foe alike unsure" of where we stand?

Response

For 30 years, peace in the Middle East was only a prayer -- rejected four times by those who chose war. For 30 years, there were efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Except for some limited disengagement agreements, none of them worked.

It was just two years ago that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin joined me at Camp David to begin a process which almost no one then believed could bring us closer to peace. It did. Israel and Egypt are at peace for the first time in their modern history.

Throughout this process we have remained constant and unswerving on these fundamental principles:

-- Our unwavering support for Israel's security and well-being;

-- Our longstanding commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

-- Our support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts as the foundation of a comprehensive peace settlement;

-- Our conviction, shared by Egypt and Israel, that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;

-- Our firm position that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

In March, 1979, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat signed the Israel-Egypt peace treaty at the White House. Today that treaty has led to the transfer of two-thirds of the Sinai to Egypt -- along with the Sinai oil fields; ambassadors have been exchanged; borders have been opened; and normalization of relations is well underway. Israel has finally gained peace with its largest Arab neighbor.

Camp David led to the treaty between Egypt and Israel. It also established the framework for a broader peace -- a comprehensive peace among all parties in the region. Progress toward that goal is essential. Israel and Egypt have pledged themselves to it. The United States, at the request of Israel and Egypt, is involved as a full partner in the negotiations. As Camp David demonstrated, the United States can contribute in a major way to the peace process -- not by imposing its will -- but by acting as a catalyst, and by helping the

parties overcome difficult issues. The role of the United States is not to force solutions or prescribe answers. Nor do we envisage our role as that of policeman of the region. Within the framework agreed to by Israel and Egypt, the United States is committed and determined, more than ever, to help them in their negotiations.

Although we have made progress since Camp David and the peace treaty in the talks on autonomy for the West Bank, this progress has not been as fast or as far as we had hoped. But I am convinced -- as are Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat -- that Camp David can succeed. It is in the interests of all our countries and, when we are finished, in the interests of the Palestinian people, as well. The road is not easy; the issues are complex and difficult; and reflect more than a generation of conflict.

It is clear to me that any other approach to peace would also have to deal with these central problems, and follow this general approach. Camp David may be an imperfect process. But let me remind you of this. It is also the first time the twin issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli security -- issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- have been at the top of the agenda together. And no other approach has been suggested that can do that. As the autonomy talks continue, they will focus on the difficult issues that remain, building on the work that has been done in the past 17 months. With good will on all sides -- which does exist -- the answers can be found.

Gov. Reagan on the Middle East Peace Process

"...I would not like to see...the United States try to impose a settlement on the Middle East problems. I think we should stand ready to help wherever we can be of help, and whenever, in both the factions there, in arriving at a peaceful settlement--but we should not, as the great power, go in and attempt to dictate or impose the settlements."

Clifford Evans Interview
RKO General Broadcasting
April 10, 1980

Reagan likes to reduce the Arab-Israeli dispute to simple terms, saying that 80% of the territory once labeled Palestine now is Jordan and only 20% is under Israeli control. "It seems to me the Palestinian problem is 80% Jordan's and 20% Israel's," he says.

September 22, 1980

Middle East: The PLO

Q: The Republican platform refers to the Carter Administration's "involvement" with the PLO. Governor Reagan has stated that you refuse to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization and that your Administration has violated the 1975 agreement with Israel concerning our relations with the PLO.

Has your Administration been "involved" with the PLO and, if so, to what extent and purpose? What is your position on the PLO? Do you believe it will be possible to bring peace to the Middle East without eventually establishing an independent Palestinian state?

Response: From the day I became President, my position on the PLO, and that of my Administration, has been clear and firm: We will not negotiate with or recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization until it accepts Israel's right to exist and UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. Any suggestion that I have swerved from this position is a distortion of the record and untrue. Further, I do not believe that any efforts by other nations to change UN Resolution 242 or to establish relations with the PLO serve a constructive purpose.

I firmly believe that Camp David offers real hope to the Palestinians; and that their interests would be best served by joining the autonomy talks. At the very least, I hope that they will keep an open mind in judging the results of these negotiations to establish a Self-Governing Authority.

September 12, 1980

Middle East: US-Israeli Relations

Q: Many charge that Israeli intransigence on West Bank settlements and the status of Jerusalem are the real roadblocks to peace in the Middle East.

Do you agree with this assessment? If so, shouldn't the United States bring pressure to bear on Israel to change its policy on these issues? Also, what is your view of Governor Reagan's statement that "I do not see how it is illegal for Israel to move in (the) settlement."

Response

The United States will not -- indeed cannot -- pressure Israel to make concessions in the autonomy negotiations that are contrary to Israel's national interests.

In saying this, it is important to bear in mind two factors:

-- First, there can be no peace in the Middle East unless Israel is secure. We are committed to its security, and we provide it with great quantities of assistance and modern arms to that end. Nearly half of all US aid to Israel since its creation as a sovereign state -- more than \$10 million -- has been requested during my Administration. Seeking to weaken Israel through "pressure," therefore, could fly in the face of our concern for Israel's security, and would undermine Israeli political confidence in the peace process;

-- Second, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be a political process, reached through political decision. Thus any agreement in the autonomy talks, to have any value, must have the approval of the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Knesset, and the people of Israel. Therefore, there

is only one way to reach success: to work through each issue patiently and persistently, until there can be agreement that makes sense to both Israel and to Egypt. I am confident that that is possible, and will do all that I can to help.

We must also understand that the decisions and choices Israel is facing in the autonomy talks are among the most difficult in its entire history. It can only make those choices against a background of confidence in its security and its future. We are committed to helping provide that essential confidence. Israel needs our understanding at this difficult time. It will have it.

At the same time, I believe that, while the autonomy negotiations are being pursued, all of the parties must avoid unilateral actions that will prejudice the outcome of the negotiations or would have the effect of worsening the atmosphere for successful negotiations. That is why we have made known to all parties our opposition to Israeli settlements on the West Bank, which we believe is illegal. On Jerusalem, our policy, consistent under several Administrations, has not changed. We believe that Jerusalem should remain undivided, with free access to the holy places. The final status of Jerusalem should be decided in negotiations between the parties. That remains our position.

Gov. Reagan on Settlements

"Under UN Resolution 242, the West Bank was supposed to be open to all, and then Jordan and Israel were to work out an agreement for the area. Under those terms, I do not see how it is illegal for Israel to move in settlements." (Time, June 30, 1980)

September 13, 1980

Afghanistan

Q: Some have referred to Afghanistan as the Soviet's "Vietnam." Do you share this assessment? What motivated the Soviets to go into Afghanistan? What real effect is the United States having on Soviet policy toward Afghanistan? Are we aiding the Afghan insurgents? If not, shouldn't we be?

Response

Let me first review some of the harsh facts of life about Afghanistan today:

-- Thousands of political prisoners are locked up in Afghanistan's jails.

-- 85,000 Soviet troops occupy that country.

-- Another 25-30,000 Soviet troops are poised just across the border.

-- Because of the continuing collapse of the Afghan Army, Soviet troops are moving into the countryside. They are meeting fierce resistance.

-- Soviet casualties are estimated to run 500-600 per week.

-- There is mounting evidence that the Soviets are using incapacitating gas -- and some reports that they may be using lethal gas -- in the Afghan countryside.

-- Almost one million Afghan refugees have crossed over the border into Pakistan and Iran, and the total is increasing every day.

No one can state with certainty why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan other than to suppress a popular uprising against a repressive government which they backed. Nor can anyone state with certainty what their intentions are in the region.

The fact is that tens of thousands of Soviet troops have invaded a sovereign country. What is at stake is the freedom of a nation. What is also at stake is the security of other nations in the region and the world's access to vital resources and shipping routes.

By using Afghanistan as a foothold, the Soviets can exert increased political and military pressure on the countries of the Persian Gulf, and thus on those nations tied to the Gulf by a long and vulnerable tanker lifeline.

Our first purpose, then, has been to impose a heavy price on the Soviet Union for this aggression. The Soviet leadership must understand that the international reaction to aggression will be swift and firm. The steps we have taken -- on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, on fisheries, and in other areas -- convey our determination in the clearest terms.

The measures we have taken involve sacrifice -- for our farmers and our businessmen, our athletes, our scientists -- indeed, for all of us. But I believe the American people are prepared to make sacrifices for our long-term security. By opposing many of the steps I have taken, I believe Governor Reagan is sending the Soviets the opposite message.

The steps we have taken are also designed to move us toward our second goal: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. To encourage that withdrawal, we are ready to support efforts by the international community to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghan Government. With the

prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, we would be willing to join in a guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutrality and of noninterference in its internal affairs. Such a political settlement would put an end to brutality and bloodshed in Afghanistan.

Let me reaffirm, however, that the sanctions we have undertaken will remain in force until the Soviets withdraw their military forces from Afghanistan. Let me be equally clear that when those actions cease -- when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn -- then our intention is to remove the sanctions we have imposed. In contrast to Governor Reagan and the Republicans, we seek no return of the Cold War, of the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.

But let me be frank. There are no signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal. If anything, current signs point to the contrary, Soviet aggression continues, and permanent facilities are being constructed. For the foreseeable future, therefore, I see little progress toward a peaceful resolution of this international crisis. Thus, while we continue to impose costs on the Soviets for their aggression, we will continue to:

-- Mobilize international pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops among the countries of the Third World and support initiatives by the Islamic Conference to achieve total withdrawal from Afghanistan.

-- Urge our allies to continue to limit trade credits and high technology transfer to the USSR.

-- strengthened our position in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. In this regard, we have increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, signed agreements with nations in the area on US access to air and naval facilities, and strengthened our military capabilities -- through the Rapid Deployment Force -- to respond swiftly and effectively if our vital interests are assaulted.

As for direct US assistance to the Afghan insurgents, I have no intention of commenting on stories in the press that we are providing covert aid. As a matter of principle, the US Government never confirms or denies such allegations. I can say, however, that we are providing -- and will continue to provide -- a large share of the humanitarian support for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of whom are the families of the freedom fighters.

I can also say that the Soviet statements on outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan are lies. The Soviet Union is the aggressor in Afghanistan and the world knows it.

September 18, 1980

Aid to Pakistan

Q: Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Administration proposed a \$200 million military and economic assistance package for Pakistan. President Zia called it "peanuts" and turned it down. At the same time, President Zia called for a new security treaty with the United States but the Administration simply reaffirmed the 1959 Agreement.

What is the current state of our relations with Pakistan? Why do we want to have closer relations with a regime that violates human rights, stifles democracy, burned down our Embassy, spurns our offers to be helpful, and is building a nuclear bomb?

RESPONSE

Pakistan remains interested in working toward a better relationship with the U.S. It needs the strong support of its friends in order to resist Soviet pressure.

We have urged our Western allies, the Japanese, the Chinese and Pakistan's Muslim friends such as Saudi Arabia to increase their assistance to Pakistan.

For our part, we have reaffirmed the strong commitment to Pakistan's security embodied in the 1959 Agreement. Pakistan has welcomed this reaffirmation, while making it clear that they would like our commitment to be formally strengthened by conversion into a treaty. I do not believe this to be necessary.

Pakistan's decision not to seek military aid from us reflected a preference on their part to keep close relations with some of their neighbors and the non-aligned countries generally. The United States must be understanding

of such decisions. We can no longer impose our preferences on the nations of the Third World, as we attempted to do in the 1950's. We must not readopt the 1950's view of Governor Reagan and the Republicans that if a country is not with us, they are against us.

US-Pakistan relations have gone through some difficult times. We have our differences, but we also have a number of important shared interests, including Pakistan's security from Soviet pressure; the stability of South Asia; and the economic development of that country. We intend to work together with Pakistan on these matters of shared concern. At the same time we have made our views on non-proliferation known to the Pakistanis and that we look forward to a return of full democracy to that country.

September 18, 1980

Pakistan and India Nuclear Aims

Q: Your Administration cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan because of its efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities which could produce material for weapons. After Afghanistan, you wanted to resume military assistance to Pakistan without conditions on its nuclear program, which frightened India.

On the other hand, you now are trying to get Congressional approval to send nuclear material to India, even though that country also is building sensitive nuclear facilities and has already exposed a nuclear device. If the US continues to supply India with nuclear material, what effect will this have on Pakistan's nuclear aims?

One main reason India and Pakistan are pursuing these dangerous nuclear programs is their fear of each other. What is your assessment of the nuclear intentions of Pakistan and India? Do you expect either or both of them to conduct a nuclear explosion in the coming few years? What can you do to turn these countries towards the real threat from the Soviet Union, and away from each other and from efforts to build a nuclear weapons option. Do you have any plan to pursue some security arrangements in the region that would reduce incentives to go nuclear?

Response

I remain committed to the vigorous pursuit of our non-proliferation objectives. The spread of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of nuclear war and add to the dangers to mankind.

I am deeply concerned about the nuclear programs of Pakistan and India. I believe it is tragic that both nations have refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to accept international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. My Administration is committed to giving favorable treatment in peaceful nuclear cooperation to nations which adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Pakistan continues to develop nuclear facilities that can give it the capability to produce nuclear explosive devices. This is a matter of grave concern to us and we are continuing to explore all possibilities of averting such an outcome.

We have, however, conflicting priorities in Pakistan. Our non-proliferation goal remains important, but we are also concerned that Pakistan be able to stand up to the threat posed by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We will continue to work toward both ends, but at times we may have to make choices between our objectives. That is often the case in foreign policy. It is not as simple as Governor Reagan would have the American people believe.

I would also point out that over the longer term, a firm, lasting and cooperative relationship between Pakistan and the United States is possible only if the nuclear issue is settled. We have made this point to the Pakistanis.

India also refuses to accept international inspections of all its nuclear activities. But foreign policy and security interests dictate that with India, as with Pakistan, we try to have as good a relationship as possible. It is important that these nations recognize the long-term threat to their security from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and they work together and with other like-minded nations of the area to oppose further

Soviet encroachment. It was with these important US interests in mind that I approved the shipment of additional US nuclear fuel to India in accordance with the existing US-Indian nuclear cooperation. My action was consistent with US law and, I believe, with the maintenance of US influence in India. I would note, however, that the Republican party has stated its opposition to the shipment of fuel to India. If this advice had been followed, the United States would be the loser. A further obstacle to better US-India relations would have been constructed and we would have had less influence on the future of India's nuclear program.

Gov. Reagan on the Persian Gulf

Asked whether the United States should send the Soviets "a clear-cut ultimatum not to meddle" in Iran, thereby drawing the line there, Reagan stated:

"Maybe the signal we should send should be a little further back, and that might be Saudi Arabia...And if we send it, we should send it only with the collaboration of our allies, Japan and Europe, who are so dependent on OPEC oil."

New York Times
May 10, 1980

Six weeks later, Reagan elaborated:

Q: Is Saudi Arabia a place where we should "draw the line?"

Reagan: Yes.

Time
June 30, 1980

September 10, 1980

US Policy Toward China

Q: United States policy toward the People's Republic of China and toward Taiwan has already surfaced as a major foreign policy issue in the campaign.

Do you believe, as Governor Reagan apparently does, that it would be possible to upgrade our unofficial relationship with Taiwan without doing serious damage to our relations with the PRC? More generally, what do you see as the major benefits to date of your decision to normalize relations with the PRC? What impact do you believe the "China card" has had on US relations with the Soviet Union? Do you foresee the possibility of a military alliance with the PRC down the road?

RESPONSE

I am very pleased with the progress we have made in U.S.-China relations. In 1977 our relations were at a standstill. The deadlock was broken in December, 1978, when I announced that we would establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Since that time the benefits of normalization have become clear. Trade, travel, cultural exchange and, most of all, the security and stability of the Pacific region is greater now than at any time in this century. For the first time we have good relations with both China and Japan. Tension in the strait between Taiwan and China is at an all time low.

I am very concerned that Governor Reagan's ill-advised and confused statements on Taiwan and China may place these important accomplishments in jeopardy. Perhaps he does not understand that the resumption of an official relationship with Taiwan would not only be contrary to the

to the January 1979 Joint Communiqué we negotiated and agreed to with China, but would void all of the preliminary understandings beginning with the Shanghai Communiqué President Nixon agreed to in 1972. If the U.S. Government were to adopt Mr. Reagan's proposal, the damage to our important strategic relationship with China would be severe.

Goy. Reagan's concern about Taiwan also is ill-informed. Since derecognition our unofficial relations have worked remarkably well. At the time of normalization, I made clear that we would continue practical relations with the people on Taiwan, but without an official relationship, and that we would do nothing to jeopardize the well-being of the people on Taiwan. The clearest evidence that we have lived up to this pledge is that trade with Taiwan is at an all-time high and that tension in the Taiwan area is at an all-time low.

Concerning the so-called "China card," we are not improving relations with China for tactical advantage against the Soviet Union, although the nature of our relations with China will inevitably be affected by Soviet actions. The famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970's is no longer an adequate framework in which to view relations with China. We are developing our relations with China on their own merits. We want good relations with China

and the Soviet Union, but we will not slow down progress in U.S.-China relations just because Soviet behavior makes it impossible to move ahead with Moscow.

We will continue to pursue our interest in a strong, peaceful and secure China. A China confident in its ability to defend its borders enhances stability in the region and contributes to our security and that of our allies.

We do not sell arms to China or engage in joint military planning arrangements with the Chinese. The current international situation does not justify our doing so. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of selected items of dual use technology and defensive military support equipment. We have begun to do so.

In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests, the United States and China will remain -- as at present -- friends rather than allies.

Gov. Reagan on China and Taiwan

When the Carter administration began normalizing relations with Peking, Reagan stated:

"... (I) t's beginning to look as if our government is willing to pay the price Peking has put on 'normalization,' though it is hard to see what is in it for us."

Radio Transcript
July, 1978

Just after normalization of relations with China, Reagan began proposing a two China policy--where both China and Taiwan would have an official liaison office.

"If the Chinese Communists could handle embassy functions in Washington by calling it a 'liaison office' before January 1, why can't the Republic of China's embassy--handling much more work--be called a 'Liaison office' after January 1."

Radio Transcript
January, 1979

Reagan stuck to his two-China stand throughout the campaign.

"I want to have the best relations and have the Republic of China, the free Republic of China, know that we consider them an ally and that we have official relations with them... That liaison office is unofficial, it is not government. It is a private kind of foundation thing... I would make it an official liaison office so they knew they had a governmental relations."

Los Angeles Times
August 17, 1980

To clear up any misconceptions by the Chinese regarding Reagan's statements, Bush visited China as an emissary for Reagan. At a joint news conference, before the trip, Reagan restated his position.

"Yes I will advocate restoring official government status to the Taipei office."

Los Angeles Times
May 19, 1980

Gov. Reagan on China and Taiwan

After the trip he stated:

"I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official."

Associated Press
August 25, 1980

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

Q: Many observers view Vietnam today as the "Cuba of the East." Since the withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam in 1975, the Vietnamese have extended their domination to Laos and now Kampuchea. Recently there was an incursion into Thailand by Vietnamese soldiers. Soviet naval vessels now use, on a regular basis, the port of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.

Early in your Administration you seemed to be moving in the direction of recognition of Vietnam. Did you misjudge the aggressive tendencies of the leaders in Hanoi? What actions should be taken to end what the Republicans call Vietnam's "brutal expansion and genocide" in Southeast Asia? Would you commit United States military forces to Thailand if that country were invaded by Vietnam?

RESPONSE

At the beginning of my Administration, we made it clear to the Vietnamese that in order to put the hostility of the past behind us and to enhance the stability of Southeast Asia, we were ready to discuss the normalization of relations. That remains our objective. From the first meeting between our two countries in May 1977 we stressed to the Vietnamese that progress toward normalization would be affected by Hanoi's policies and actions toward its neighbors. Following the massive forced expulsion of the boat people and the December, 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, we halted further movement toward normalization.

The stability of Southeast Asia has been severely challenged by Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea. As is

true in other regions of the world, the Soviet Union must bear a major part of the responsibility for the human suffering and the increased instability in the region. The Soviet Union is providing Vietnam essential support for its military activities in Kampuchea.

We continue to encourage a political settlement in Kampuchea which will permit that nation to be governed by leaders of its own choice. We have taken all prudent steps possible to deter Vietnamese attacks on Thai territory by increasing our support to the Thais, reaffirming our commitment to their security, and by direct warnings to Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.

Let me conclude by stressing that the Vietnamese have it in their power to end the tensions and crisis in the region if they wish to. They are, truly, at a crossroads. They can be peaceful participants in the region, establishing good relations with ASEAN and seeking to reduce their tensions with China. Or they can become, whether they intend it or not, a Soviet stalking horse in Southeast Asia. It's their choice. The United States will respond accordingly.

September 18, 1980

Security and Human Rights in South Korea

Q: Early in your Administration you appeared to have two objectives with respect to South Korea. The first was the withdrawal of US military troops; the second was to press President Park to observe human rights and move toward political liberalization. Three and a half years later your troop withdrawal plan has been suspended, the leading opposition leader in South Korea, Kim Dae Jung, is on trial for his life, and a new military strongman, Gen. Chun, has just been installed as President.

Given the continuing threat to South Korea posed by the North, is it possible for the United States to press President Chun to respect human rights and open up the political process? Do we have any leverage over events in South Korea and should we exercise it? What action will you take if Kim Dae Jung is put to death?

RESPONSE

A new government has just been formed in South Korea, and I consider that a new chapter in our relations with that country has now started. U.S. policy toward South Korea, however, will remain constant. We will continue not only to fulfill our commitment to South Korea's security, which is important to Asian security as a whole, but to press for a more democratic government.

President Chun has assured me that he considers continued close relations with this country to be indispensable. I have made clear to President Chun our support for political change in Korea, and our human rights concerns. We will continue our frank dialogue as his government moves toward constitutional revision, and a presidential election next year.

I believe that the wisest role for us is to make clear to the South Koreans our support for the development of free institutions in that country, and our determination to keep any outsider from interfering with that process. It was for this reason that, after examining in detail new intelligence estimates of North Korean military strengths last year, I decided to maintain our troop strength in South Korea at its present level until at least 1981.

With respect to Kim Dae Jung, we have talked in private with the new Korean Government about the trial and the recent conviction and sentence. They are well aware of our strong views on this matter. Any more specific comment from me at this point could be counterproductive.

Japanese Defense Expenditures

Q: There has been a great deal of discussion about whether the Japanese should do more in the way of defense. Currently, they spend less than 1% of their GNP on the military.

Do you believe the Japanese should increase their defense spending? Since the United States has taken on heavier military responsibilities in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area, should we not expect Japan to assume greater responsibility for the security of the Western Pacific area, specifically the defense of her own sea lanes? Would you ever envision a military alliance among the United States, Japan, and the PRC?

RESPONSE

During the past three and a half years we have fostered the closest degree of security cooperation with Japan in the history of our two nations -- exemplified by joint planning for the defense of Japan, increase of Japanese contributions to our base costs in Japan, and large-scale Japanese purchases of U.S. defense equipment.

At the same time the Japanese have steadily increased their defense spending and capabilities. We are helping and encouraging them to continue these efforts which are particularly important now in view of our need to shift some of our naval forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

There is more Japan could do and Ambassador Mansfield, Secretary Brown and others in my Administration are in continuous consultations with the Japanese Government on this issue. For example, the Japanese air and naval

Self-Defense Forces are taking on more of the responsibility for patrolling the air and sea lanes of communication around Japan and the nearby ocean areas.

In addition, Japan has significantly expanded its economic assistance to a number of countries, including our close friends, Turkey and Thailand. This aid has been both generous and beneficial. We need to remember that the Japanese decision-making process is different from ours, that their constitution prohibits the maintenance of anything but defensive forces, and that the Japanese people not too long ago would not have supported anything like what they are doing today. As long as the present trends continue, and do not slacken, I will be basically satisfied with what the Japanese are doing.

I do not envision a military alliance among the United States, Japan and the People's Republic of China.

September 23, 1980

Central America and the Caribbean

Q: Perhaps the most volatile region in the world today is Central America. No country seems immune from the revolutionary fervor sweeping the region. The Republicans have sharply criticized your policy there. They state you have stood by while Castro's Cuba--assisted by the Soviet Union--arms, trains and supports revolutionary forces throughout the region. They further state: "We deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. We do not support United States assistance to any Marxist government in this hemisphere, and we oppose the Carter Administration's aid program for the government of Nicaragua."

On few foreign policy issues are the lines so tightly drawn between your policies and those of the Republicans. How do you account for this sharp policy difference? Do you believe, as the Republicans charge, that your Administration "has actively worked to undermine governments and parties opposed to the expansion of Soviet power?" Do you believe the Cubans and Soviets are responsible for the turmoil in Central America? How best can the United States influence the direction of the change sweeping through the region?

Response

Under my Administration, the United States will not sit by on the sidelines and abandon its friends in Central America to Cuba and its radical Marxist allies. Those who say that Nicaragua is already "lost" are the same people who said Portugal was lost five years ago. We do not agree with them, and we are encouraged that Nicaraguan moderates and businessmen have chosen to stay in Nicaragua and help work to make it a more democratic country. They have asked for our help, and we will not abandon them. They are struggling to preserve individual freedoms and political and economic

pluralism, and they have asked for our economic aid. We have provided it, most recently in the form of a \$75 million economic package to Nicaragua. We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold in Nicaragua. But if we turn our backs on that country, as Governor Reagan and the Republicans would do, we can help guarantee that democracy will fail.

Our challenge in El Salvador is similar. If reform fails, that country will become a battle ground between radical left and radical right. A moderate solution is still possible and we intend to help.

Those who are most concerned about the potential for radical revolution in Central America and growing Cuban influence in the region should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to help Nicaragua and El Salvador. But the Republicans are not. They seem to believe that Cuba is the cause of all the problems in the region. There is no question that Castro is assisting subversive efforts and we must deal with this. But we must also understand -- as Governor Reagan does not -- that the root problems in the region are extreme poverty, social injustice and repression and we must direct our efforts to address these problems as well.

The US was once identified with dictatorships and injustice in the region. Now we can be proud of our efforts to play a constructive role, assisting moderate and peaceful change. Now we are better positioned to keep the extremists isolated and on the defensive.

I might note, in closing, that while a lot of attention has been given by the Republicans to the Caribbean and the tiny island of Grenada, the winds of political change in that area are clearly blowing in a different direction. Recent elections in Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Antigua and St. Kitts have resulted in victories by moderate leaders friendly to the United States, and resounding defeats by leftists who are friendly to Cuba.

Gov. Peagan on Central America and the Caribbean

"Totalitarian Marxists are in control of the Caribbean Island of Grenada, where Cuban advisors are now training guerrillas for subversive action against other countries such as Trinidad-Tobago, Grenada's democratic neighbor. In El Salvador, Marxist totalitarian revolutionaries, supported by Havana and Moscow, are preventing the construction of a democratic government.

Must we let Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, all become additional "Cubas", new outposts for Soviet combat brigades? Will the next push of the Moscow-Havana axis be northward to Guatemala and thence to Mexico, and south to Costa Rica and Panama?"

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

September 18, 1980

US Policy Toward Cuba

Q: Early in your Administration a US Interest Section was established in Havana. Better US-Cuban relations appeared to be just around the corner. That, of course, is no longer the case. Fidel Castro is, once again, the subject of harsh US criticism. His troops remain in Africa. He is assisting revolutionary forces in Central America. And, most recently, thousands of his citizens fled Cuba for the United States. Added to this is the charge by your opponents that you have done nothing about the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba nor about the transfer of new Soviet offensive weapons to the island, such as modern MIG aircraft and submarines.

How do you account for this reversal in your initial policy toward Cuba? Did you misjudge Castro? How do you intend to deal with him in the future?

With respect to Soviet activities on the island, why did you reverse your position that the Soviet combat brigade was "unacceptable?"

Response

Over the past three years we have taken a number of steps to open lines of communication between Cuba and the United States. Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us little and has yielded some significant benefits. Ask the families of the 4,000 political prisoners who have been released from Castro's prisons if they agree. Ask the Cuban-Americans who, for the first time since the 1960s, are now allowed to return to the island for family visits if they agree.

While the Cubans have taken some encouraging steps, this has not been matched by any change in their foreign policy. While I have been disappointed in this, I have not been surprised. As a result, we have told the Cubans that there will be no further progress toward normalization.

until Cuba is prepared to accept the norms of peace and human rights of the international community. Cuba still has thousands of troops in Africa, serving as a vanguard for Soviet imperialism. It is exploiting for its own purposes the revolutionary climate in Central America and the Caribbean. It has refused to respect other nations' immigration laws. Until these practices stop, it is difficult to conceive of normal relations.

At the same time, the close Cuban-Soviet relationship continues. For the past several years the Soviet Union has been upgrading the equipment of the Cuban military. Unlike other Soviet military clients, Cuba pays nothing for this. It gets a free ride.

Several developments over the past two years have caused us concern:

-- In 1978, the Soviets delivered MIG-23s to Cuba. Certain types of MIG-23s can carry nuclear weapons. The ones delivered to Cuba cannot. They do not constitute an offensive threat to the United States.

-- We have been monitoring the construction of a new naval facility at Cienfuegos. We have no evidence that the Soviets are involved in the construction of this facility or intend to use it as a base.

-- And, last year, we confirmed the presence in Cuba of a 2,600-3,000 Soviet combat brigade. While the unit may have been in Cuba for some time, here again we were confronted with a matter of serious concern to us.

We have taken steps to insure that none of these activities constitute a threat to the United States or the region. I have increased surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in the region and established a full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force at Key West.

As I have said before, we do not accept these activities. We have responded to them -- and will respond to any future activities -- in an appropriate manner. Castro knows this and so does the Soviet Union.

Gov. Reagan on Cuba

Reagan has long held that Cuba is a mere proxy of the Soviet Union, and is behind most revolutionary movements in Africa, and Latin America.

"Despite the power the Soviet Union is able to exert over Castro, the Cuban dictator still fancies himself as a revolutionary leader who aids and inspires revolts in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The Russians aren't bothered by Castro's delusions of grandeur because much of his international interference fits nicely into their own foreign policy designs.

Jefferson City Post
October 26, 1979

In 1977, when the Administration was considering relaxing relations with Cuba, Reagan wrote:

"... (t)he U.S. decision on Cuban trade must rest on broader considerations. Our trade embargo of Cuba is a little like a long-running advertising campaign. Just as its full effects are being felt, the sponsor may get tired of it."

Jefferson City Post
October 26, 1979

September 19, 1970

Impact of Human Rights Policy

Q: The Republicans have charged that your policies toward Latin America "have encouraged a precipitous decline in United States relations with virtually every country in the region." The policy most singled out for criticism is your human rights policy. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are often cited as examples of countries which have turned away from the United States due to your policy on human rights.

Do you believe our bilateral relations in Latin America have suffered as a result of your human rights policy? What, in your view, have been the benefits of this policy? How do you respond to the Republican platform statement that: "We will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology"?

Response

Since my inauguration, I have worked hard to forge a new relationship with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean -- one resting on a firm commitment to human rights, democracy, economic development and nonintervention. For too long, the United States was associated with dictatorships which trampled on human rights and with the status quo even when that meant poverty, political repression, and social injustice. I do not believe, as the Republicans apparently do, that we should return to that association.

The trend toward democracy in Latin America is gaining strength. Ecuador and now Peru have returned to freely elected democratic governments. Brazil has maintained a steady course toward democracy. Uruguay will have national elections next year. The new nations in the Caribbean, with the exception of Grenada, remain models of democracy despite severe economic hardship. The only setback has come in

Bolivia, but even in Bolivia, where military coups are a tradition, one is encouraged by the strong new force of democratic groups.

The trend toward a greater regard for human rights is also gaining strength. Human rights violations have substantially declined in a number of countries. There are fewer reports of disappearances; political prisoners have been released in substantial numbers; the use of torture has declined sharply.

I do not believe, as the Republicans apparently do, that the pursuit of human rights is incompatible with our national security interests. We pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right, but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely.

Panama Canal Treaties

Q: The controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties has abated. The issue now appears to be holding Panama to a strict interpretation of the language of the treaties rather than trying to somehow overturn them.

Despite this, the Republicans have stated that although you assured the American taxpayers that the treaties would not cost them "one thin dime," they claim that implementing the treaties will cost them \$4.2 billion.

Is this true?

Response: The Panama Canal Treaties went into force on October 1, 1979. Today, almost a year later, the Panama Canal is working just as efficiently and safely as it did over the previous 65 years. The fears of those who so strongly opposed the treaties, including Governor Reagan, have not been realized.

I consider the Panama Canal Treaties a major accomplishment of my Administration. The treaties eliminated a serious irritant in our relations with Panama and with the nations of the Hemisphere. By returning this territory to Panamanian control, the treaties have established the basis for a new, cooperative relationship between our two countries. This would not have been the case if we had followed Governor Reagan's advice. At the same time our national security interests have been protected. The United States has the right to operate and defend the Canal until the year 2000 and, thereafter, the permanent right to defend the Canal against any threat to its open and secure operation. Our warships will continue to have priority passage.

There have been some differences of opinion over the implementation of the treaties, but these have been resolved -- and are being resolved -- in a non-controversial way. As I wrote to President Royo on the day the treaties went into force, "The United States is as committed to making these treaties work as we were to building the Canal itself." Panama shares this goal.

As for the Republican charge that the implementation of the treaties is costing the American taxpayer billions of dollars, this is patently false. Transfer expenses associated with the treaties are comparable with the expenses we incur throughout the world with our important foreign base operations. And, if there are any deficits associated with the operation of the Canal, these will be met by higher tolls. Such increases will involve no charge against the U.S. Treasury.

Gov. Reagan on Panama

Reagan has been at the forefront of those opposed to the Panama Canal Treaties. As negotiations were underway, Reagan stated his strong objection to the proposed Treaty.

"As I talk to you tonight, negotiations with another dictator go forward, negotiations aimed at giving up our ownership of the Panama Canal Zone...The Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is not a long-term lease. It is sovereign U.S. territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all the states that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase. We should end those negotiations and tell the (Panamanian head of state): 'We bought it, we paid for it, we built it and we intend to keep it.'"

Los Angeles Times
August 12, 1977

During the 1980 campaign Reagan has raised the issue of abrogating the Treaties on several occasions.

"If there is any possibility of keeping the Panama Canal, believe me I would do it because I believe it was one of the great mistakes we have made so far."

Bangor News
January 18, 1980

September 13, 1990

Majority Rule and Southern Africa

Q: Rhodesia is now Zimbabwe. A former guerrilla leader, Robert Mugabe, is now Prime Minister of that independent nation. Despite this change, the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa continues. The settlement on Namibia is stalled. Apartheid is still in place in South Africa.

What role do you believe the United States should take in pressing for majority rule in southern Africa. Should full economic sanctions be levied against South Africa? And, what assistance should we provide the new government of Zimbabwe?

Response

I am very proud of our record on Africa. In 1977 our relations were at their lowest point in decades. Secretary Kissinger had recently been refused permission to visit Nigeria. The United States had little credibility in black Africa. As a consequence, our attempts to bring an end to the war in Rhodesia were ineffective. We were becoming, in African eyes, irrelevant -- even antagonistic -- to African aspirations. All that has changed. My trip to Africa and subsequent trips by the Vice President and others have demonstrated that. The United States is once again welcome in Africa.

Our diplomatic efforts in Southern Africa and our support for British initiatives on Zimbabwe helped bring about a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesian war -- without further Soviet/Cuban expansion. We will assist in the reconstruction and development of an independent Zimbabwe. That assistance will be as much in our interests as theirs. So far, we have committed \$100 million for this effort.

I want to be sure the importance of this event is understood. We have a wide range of interests in Africa -- security interests, economic interests, an interest in political cooperation on all global issues. In my judgment no policy could have served those interests better than our strong support for the principle of majority rule, with minority rights, in Zimbabwe. And nothing could have weakened us more than to waver in this crucial effort. Strong Republican opposition in Congress did not help in this regard.

Although we have made a good beginning, much work remains to be done:

-- There has been very little progress on Namibia in recent months. We expect that the successful example of Zimbabwe should be helpful in setting a general precedent for Namibia. I believe the proposals set forth by the UN offer a reasonable basis for a settlement which would include UN-supervised elections. We are now awaiting South Africa's reply to Secretary General Waldheim's most recent proposals.

-- On South Africa, we continue to exert our influence to encourage peaceful -- but rapid -- change and an end to the racist system of apartheid. The South African government has a choice: to follow the difficult and courageous course of seeking cooperation with the forces for change, both internally and within the region, or to face the prospect of further conflict and violence. I hope they choose the former. We will do all we can to assist them in this.

A peaceful transition to majority rule in Southern Africa is a major goal of my Administration. Our active support for self-determination and racial equality in Southern Africa has enabled the United States to develop a continuing and effective dialogue with governments throughout the continent. We will continue to participate in their first priority -- economic development -- and to help Africans resolve their political problems and maintain stability in their continent.

September 18, 1980

Soviet-Cuban Influence in Africa

Q: The Republicans have charged that the Soviet Union and its surrogates--Cuban and Nicaraguan troops and East German secret police--are attempting to impose the "Marxist, totalitarian model" on Africa.

Do you believe this is an accurate statement? Have the Soviets and their surrogates expanded their influence in Africa during your term in office? Is there any evidence that Nicaraguan troops are now in Africa?

Response

Since the massive infusion of Soviet military equipment and advisers and Cuban combat troops into Angola in early 1976, and the subsequent similar movement into Ethiopia in 1977, there has not been a further direct expansion of Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa.

* * *

-- We worked very hard, and successfully, in cooperation with the UK and several African states to bring about the peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe that has precluded any role for the Soviets and Cubans in that country.

-- Similarly, in Namibia, we have been pursuing a policy that we hope can lead to independence, with no room for Soviet or Cuban meddling.

-- Presently, there are no other African nations which appear to be immediately threatened by Soviet-Cuban expansion.

-- During the past year, the Soviets have seen the removal of one of their clients, Idi Amin in Uganda, and the Cubans have witnessed the passing of one of their friends, Macias, in Equatorial Guinea.

-- There seems to be a growing awareness among the OAU States that Soviet-Cuban adventurism does not serve the best interests of Africa.

-- Finally, there is no evidence that Nicaraguan troops are now in Africa and I do not expect any. This is simply another example of Republican exaggeration.

September 18, 1980

Horn of Africa

Q: Once again the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region is in the news, as it was in 1977. Just recently your Administration signed an agreement with Somalia for the use of the naval base at Berbera in exchange for increased US military and economic assistance.

Doesn't this new relationship with Somalia have the potential for drawing the United States into the on-going conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia? Do you have any confidence in Somalia's assurances that they are withdrawing their military forces from the Ogaden? Will the United States come to Somalia's assistance if they are attacked by the Ethiopians?

Response: Our agreement with Somalia is a limited one. It is one of three we recently signed in the region. The other two were with Oman and Kenya. Each of these agreements will help us maintain a better military balance in that part of the world and therefore to protect our security interests and those of the states of the region.

We do not intend to involve ourselves in purely local conflicts of long standing, such as the Ogaden. We have made it clear that we favor political settlement of such conflicts; this policy has also been expressly stated by the Government of Somalia. We have also made it clear that we oppose military activity by any state in the region that jeopardizes the territorial integrity and legitimate security interests of its neighbors.

Our relationship with Somalia is not directed against Ethiopia. That country's security is being most directly jeopardized from within, by an authoritarian regime which is increasingly dependent on the USSR, to which it has granted extensive military rights.

-- We have provided nearly \$100 million annually in economic aid to Southern African countries which helped pave the way for the peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

-- Our aid is being used to support the efforts of the Governments of Nicaragua and El Salvador to bring peace and stability to their countries.

-- Our Food for Peace has been the difference between life and death for refugees in Southeast Asia and Africa.

-- U.S. technical assistance has helped farmers in developing countries grow more food and has contributed to a reduction in the rate of population growth.

Some argue that U.S. aid to foreign countries is a waste, that we receive nothing in return. This is a false, and dangerous, view. Our stake in developing nations has deepened. They supply us with essential materials. They are also our fastest growing markets.

Aid programs do not yield instant results. Success or failure is difficult to measure in any one four-year period. But I believe that our programs have helped people in developing countries and have contributed to the maintenance of peace in the world. By helping poorer nations and people in need to build a better future, we are both strengthening the world economy and enhancing the political stability which comes with economic, social, and political justice.

Foreign Assistance and Security Assistance

Q: During your Administration the U.S. has provided about \$40 billion in foreign aid. Yet, as you look around the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, both turmoil and poverty appear to be increasing -- not decreasing. What do we have to show for the billions we have spent for foreign aid?

Response: First, let me say that the aid figures you cite are less than two percent of the Federal Budget for those years. We spend much less for aid than many people believe. We rank 13th of the 17 major aid donors in percentage of GNP provided for official development assistance.

More importantly, I believe that the aid we have provided has helped our friends defend themselves against aggression and has helped alleviate the poverty which affects the lives of most people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

-- We provide more than \$3 billion each year to Israel and Egypt to help support military and economic stability as these two countries work to find a lasting solution to the Middle East conflict.

-- We have provided Thailand with military assistance to secure her borders against Vietnamese military incursions and have helped the Thai to feed the hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean refugees who came into Thailand.

Global Issues: Good Intentions, Few Accomplishments

Q: Your Administration began with a list of "global" issues on which it was going to make progress: human rights, nuclear proliferation and conventional arms transfers. After four years, there have been few positive accomplishments. US foreign policy interests have, in many cases, been damaged by overemphasis on a "global" approach to these issues which ignores the complexities of US interests in different parts of the world.

In a second Carter Administration, will you deemphasize these "global" issues and balance them against other, sometimes more pressing US foreign policy, security and economic interests? What has your Administration achieved in any of these "global" issues?

RESPONSE

Progress on the global issues of human rights, non-proliferation and conventional arms transfers remain in the forefront of my Administration's policy objectives. I do not deny that progress has been difficult or that there have been many problems in implementing our policies. But, in spite of the difficulties, we must persevere in pursuing our objectives in each of these areas. They are in our national interest.

I disagree with those who charge, as the Republicans have, that there have been no accomplishments. On the contrary, we have taken major steps in each of these pressing concerns:

On non-proliferation, we have, working closely with Congress, developed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which conditions U.S. nuclear cooperation on acceptance of key non-proliferation standards by our nuclear trading partners. We have successfully completed the two-year

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, with more than 60 nations participating in an effort to develop a common understanding of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. We have just concluded the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I believe that more progress will be made in the non-proliferation area when the SALT Treaty is ratified and SALT III negotiations begin, and when we conclude negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban. Governor Reagan is opposed to these arms control efforts. He should understand that non-proliferation and progress in nuclear arms limitations are linked.

On human rights, progress has also been made. I regard making human rights an essential element of American foreign policy and an item on the agenda of every major international organization a major accomplishment of my Administration.

-- Just in the past several years, we have seen the drive for a fuller voice in economic and political life achieve new expression ... in Portugal and Spain and Greece ... in Nigeria and Ghana and Upper Volta ... in Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican Republic ... and elsewhere.

These countries make a compelling case for the proposition that the tide in the world is running toward human rights and that it is in our interest to support it.

The United States cannot claim credit for these developments. But we can find proof in them that our policy of furthering human rights is not only consistent with American ideals. It is consistent with the aspirations of others.

-- I have worked to strengthen international organizations to promote human rights and, in the last two years, the UN and OAS human rights commissions have been improved. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has also proved to be an effective vehicle for pursuing human rights concerns.

-- I have signed and submitted for ratification four important human rights treaties: The Convention on Racial Discrimination; the International UN Covenants on Economic and Social Rights, and on Political and Civil Rights; and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.

On arms transfer restraint, progress has been slower and the problems even more intractable. Other nations have not responded cooperatively to our efforts to negotiate international restraints in arms transfer. This is deeply disappointing. Nevertheless, we have devised and put into place a coordinated, overall policy governing U.S. arms transfers. This policy makes arms transfers an instrument of U.S. security and foreign

policy interests, not of profit. In the name of anti-communism, Governor Reagan seems to be willing to provide U.S. arms to any regime, however oppressive, however unpopular with its own people, however shaky. I am not. Chance, the demand of peoples everywhere for their basic rights, cannot be suppressed by selling arms to dictators. We have vividly seen this in Central America.

U.S. national interests are best served by a careful policy of restraint, in which arms transfers must be justified by U.S. security or foreign policy interests. I believe we are doing this.

September 22, 1980

Global Issues: Human Rights Policy

Q: Your Administration has made espousal of human rights a central theme of your foreign policy. Some argue that you have persisted in advocating human rights even when it has damaged other US interests and weakened regimes friendly to the United States. The Republicans charge that you have pressed hardest on our friends and little on Marxist regimes with the worst human rights records, such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba.

You have contrasted your pursuit of human rights and "morality" in foreign affairs with the supposed indifference to these considerations by the previous Administration. In view of the harm to US interests in key areas, such as Iran, Central America and Africa, of your pursuit of human rights, do you intend to continue to assert this as a global, universal US objective? Are you now ready to show discrimination and weigh other US objectives as well, before attacking a regime for alleged abuses?

More generally, what do you believe is the role of "morality" or idealism in international relations? Do you believe nations act idealistically, or do they pursue their national self-interest?

Response

When I became President, I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights as a fundamental tenet on which our foreign policy was based. The commitment of mine is as deep and as important to me today as it was then. It is as central to America's interests now as when our nation was first born. Then, as now, our commitment to human rights persists in our own country and also worldwide. Beyond Europe, we have sought in Africa, Asia, Latin America, to stand behind basic principles of respect for the individual, for fair trials, for political liberty, and for economic and social justice.

We have made it clear the the United States believes that torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances, and that

officially sanctioned, so-called "disappearances" are abhorrent in any society. We have insisted on the right of free movement everywhere. So we have worked hard to give aid to the world's refugees, compelled to flee from oppression and hardship.

As we have maintained these policies as a government, sometimes they have been criticized as being incompatible with our national security interests. The Republican Party has stated that it will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend, without apology. I do not believe that we should simply drop our human rights concerns because a country is anti-communist. Not when that country imprisons and tortures its citizens. Throughout my Administration, we have maintained our opposition to such activities and we will continue to do so. We pursue these policies because we recognize that both our country and our world are more secure when basic human rights are respected internationally. In pursuing our values, we enhance our own security.

Let no one doubt that our words and actions have left their mark on the rest of the world. Many governments have released their political prisoners. Others have lifted states of seige, curtailed indiscriminate arrests, and reduced the use of torture. We have seen several dictatorships, some of them in this hemisphere change into democracies. And, because of our leadership, the defense of human rights now has its rightful place on the world agenda for everyone to see.

My own faith in the ultimate outcome of this struggle is undimmed. Our nation's role must be in doubt. One of the best ways to express this commitment is to quote from the words of Archibald MacLeish, "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It's the American dream."

Gov. Reagan on Human Rights

Reagan's attitude toward human rights stems from the belief that while the Soviet Union drives for world dominion, we confuse our friends and allies with the selective application of our policy of human rights, making it that much easier for the Soviets to attain their goals:

"While the Soviets arrogantly warn us to stay out of their way, we occupy ourselves by looking for human rights violations in those countries which have historically been our friends and allies."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Latin America

Reagan's disregard for the basic precepts of human rights is obvious in the admiring way he speaks on Argentina after three years of rule by a military dictatorship. Reagan quoted an economic advisor to the junta.

"...in the process of bringing stability to a terrorized nation of 25 million, a small number (of people) were caught in the cross fire, among them a few innocents."

Radio Transcript
August, 1979

African - Southern Africa

As for South Africa, Reagan favors a hands-off policy:

"Isn't it time we laid off South Africa for awhile?...As for letting South Africans work at solving their problems while we solve our own, all in favor say 'Aye.'"

Radio Transcript
October 22, 1976

Gov. Reagan on Non-proliferation

A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:

"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business."

Washington Post
January 31, 1980

Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:

"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium..."

Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980

September 18, 1980

Global Issues: Non-Proliferation Policy

Q: Your Administration seems to be retreating from its strong commitment to pursue tough nuclear non-proliferation policies. Many say the technological genie is out of the bottle, and that this is why your policy of denying US technology is a failure. How do you assess proliferation dangers now, after four years in office, and what actions do you intend to take to slow the spread of nuclear weapons in a second term?

Response

Non-proliferation has been a key objective of my Administration. It will continue to be. American leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and explosive technology is essential. Governor Reagan has stated that he does not believe non-proliferation is "any of our business." I could not disagree more. Non-proliferation is a vital American security interest. The spread of nuclear weapons could create or exacerbate regional instabilities. It multiplies the chances that nuclear weapons will be used.

Progress in non-proliferation is difficult. Nations are being asked to accept international inspection of their nuclear activities, and to forego the option of nuclear weapons. This is a great deal to ask of sovereign nations. That the vast majority have done this -- 114 nations have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- indicates widespread agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons or explosive technology adds to no one's security. But in return for this limitation, non-nuclear-weapon-states demand -- rightly, in my judgment -- that the nuclear-

weapon states make progress in curbing the nuclear arms race. Nonproliferation and nuclear arms control are inter-related, and I intend to continue to press forward on both fronts. Apparently Governor Peawan would not.

Important progress has been made toward U.S. non-proliferation objectives in the last four years.

-- Working with Congress, we have developed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which requires that nations working to enjoy the benefits of U.S. nuclear cooperation must accept controls on their nuclear activities.

-- We are renegotiating existing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements to bring them into conformity with the strong non-proliferation policies contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

-- The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which I initiated in 1977, successfully concluded in March 1980. It demonstrated that nuclear suppliers and recipients can work together, and it heightened international understanding of the technology, risks and economies of the nuclear fuel cycle.

-- We have concluded the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The conference reaffirmed the continuing value and importance of the NPT, and their determination to strengthen it. There was considerable dissatisfaction, which we share, with the pace of nuclear arms control negotiations. But progress was made on a number of issues, and I am convinced that the NPT regime remains fundamentally sound and healthy.

September 18, 1980

Global Issues: Arms Transfer Policy

Q: As a candidate in 1976 you stated that the United States should cease being the arms merchant of the world. Soon after you took office, a restrictive policy on conventional arms transfers was applied.

What has become of your goal of limiting conventional arms transfers? Haven't you abandoned this effort after it caused serious problems with friendly governments and lost US defense industry sales markets to European arms producers? What is present US policy on arms transfers? Are you going to take a more pragmatic approach to US arms transfers, giving arms to regimes which support US interests, even if they are not as democratic as we would like?

Response

I remain committed to a policy of restraint on arms transfers. This has been a principal objective of my Administration and it will remain so.

From the outset of my Administration, I have tried to make US arms transfer serve two basic goals:

- To facilitate those transfers that clearly serve the security interests of the United States, our allies and friends;
- To restrain transfers which are clearly in excess of legitimate security needs, which could promote regional arms races or increase instability.

In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security, not profit.

Frankly, I have been disappointed at the failure of other major arms suppliers to respond to our efforts to promote international restraint. Based on this lack of multilateral cooperation, this year I directed that the

ceiling on the dollar value of US arms transfers outside NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand not be reduced; it will remain at last year's level. In addition, I have approved the development and production of the FX export fighter. This exception to my policy of not producing weapons solely for export was justified by the need by our allies and friends for a sophisticated aircraft to replace the F-5E, but who do not need aircraft as advanced as the F-16.

I emphasize that these actions do not mean that our policy of restraint has ended. The basic guidelines for US arms transfers that I established in 1977 remain in effect, and I intend to continue to apply them.

-- We are working to encourage regional cooperation and restraint. I have sent to the Senate Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which will contribute to the lessening of nuclear dangers for our Latin American neighbors. I urge its ratification by the Senate.

-- The Senate has ratified the Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency to permit limited inspection of U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities, though not nuclear facilities with a national security significance. This action will help us strengthen the IAEA's inspections capabilities. It will also help us to argue to other states that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards are not discriminatory and that we, along with Britain and France, also accept them.

More countries will approach the nuclear weapons threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to develop safer ways to address legitimate energy needs is slipping away. Our non-proliferation efforts are more vital now than ever before.

September 29, 1980

Persian Gulf Oil

Q: In the energy field we import, as you know, 50 percent of our domestic petroleum requirements. The economics forced upon us are clear: we need to reduce demand and increase supplies. The hard part is doing this. How successful has the Carter Administration been?

What would happen to the U.S. economy if the Persian Gulf oil was cut off? What would happen to Europe's economy if its Persian Gulf oil was cut off?

Response:

The current hostilities between Iran and Iraq -- and the threat this conflict poses for world oil resources -- clearly demonstrates the need for stability in the Persian Gulf. This region supplies 60 percent of world oil imports, which is equivalent to:

- 40 percent of world oil consumption
- 15 percent of U.S. oil consumption
- 60 percent of Western Europe's oil consumption
- 85 percent of Japan's oil consumption.

The conflict between Iran and Iraq has caused considerable concern that world oil supplies might be severely reduced, therefore driving up oil prices and endangering the economic security of the consuming nations. This concern is not justified by the present situation. It is true that oil companies and shipments directly to Iran and Iraq have been interrupted or suspended during the outbreak of

the hostilities. But even if this suspension of Iran and Iraqi shipments should persist for an extended period of time, the consuming nation's can compensate for this shortfall.

Oil inventories in the world's major oil-consuming nations are now at an all time high. The world's margin of oil supply security is much greater today than in the winter of 1978 and 1979, when the Iranian revolution reduced oil supplies at a time when reserve oil supplies were very low.

Our greater security today is due in part to energy conservation and also to the substitution of other fuels for oil, both in the United States and in other consuming nations.

This has facilitated the building up of reserve stocks to much more satisfactory levels than in 1979. Hence, there is no reason for a repetition of the shortages or the price escalation that resulted in 1979. Of course, a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations who ship through the Persian Gulf region would create a serious threat to the world's oil supplies and consequently, a threat to the economic health of all nations.

It is for this reason that we must continue to reduce our dependence on foreign oil. We have been aware of this need for some time, since the 1973 oil embargo. Only within the last three years, however, have we as a nation taken action. Today, the United States is importing 20 percent less oil than the day I took office. That amounts to one-and-a-half million barrels of oil less every day. We cannot, however, rest on this accomplishment. We must do more. Our national security requires it.

September 29, 1980

North/South: Helping the Poor Nations

Q: Recent reports on the state of the world (the Brandt Report, e.g.) are bleak indeed, pointing to a growing gap between the rich and the poor countries, hinting at the inevitability of mass famine, and raising the spectre of wars of redistribution.

Is there any cause for optimism about the future of North/South relations? What, specifically, can the United States do to assist the world's poor? Has the United States moved toward meeting its part of the Bonn Summit commitment to increase development assistance?

Response:

The conditions in the Brandt report and other reports are not inevitable. The projections should be seen as timely warnings that will alert the nations of the world to the need for vigorous, determined action, at both the national and international levels.

To avert global disaster, I believe the United States must assist the developing world to:

- slow the rate of unchecked population growth;
- combat world hunger;
- increase energy production and conservation.

To do this, my Administration has taken the following steps:

-- U.S. bilateral programs administered by A.I.D. for agricultural and nutrition have increased from \$474 million in 1977 to \$758 million planned for 1981;

-- U.S. bilateral assistance to increase energy production in developing nations has doubled in the past two years.

We have also assisted the World Bank in its efforts to meet these problems:

-- World Bank lending for agriculture and rural development during the 1977-1979 period exceeded \$8 billion;

-- World Bank lending for fossil fuel development in poor countries is projected to reach \$5.6 billion over the next five years;

The problems that the Brandt report points to are of concern to every American. They can be solved only through cooperation among the developed and developing nations of the world. Let me give you an example of some successes we could have in the area of world food production. By the mid-1980's we could help Thailand export an additional five million tons of grain, bring four million acres under irrigation in Bangladesh, double cereal production in Peru, and bring a number of African countries to food self-sufficiency. I might add that in India, through the "green revolution" and the work of the International Rice Research Institute, agriculture has been built up sufficiently so that the country can now feed its huge population.

The United States, of course, cannot assure a world without poverty, disease, and deprivation. But we can be certain that without technical and financial assistance from us, these aims will become immeasurably more difficult to attain.

September 18, 1960

Trade: Disincentives

Q: Are there too many government "disincentives" in the trade area and, if so, which ones do you propose to curtail?

A: There may be disincentives that need to be pruned out of our laws and regulations to allow the United States a competitive opportunity in the world marketplace. My Administration has already overturned hindersome government regulations in the automobile industry and is presently reviewing other industries to see if outdated, unfair, or unreasonable regulations exist.

In a report I sent to Congress last month, I outlined several new initiatives in the export area. I have set in motion plans to provide tax relief for Americans working abroad for U.S. companies; we will work to remove ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and, we are determined to improve Eximbank financing. I have also taken steps to ensure that the Government stops issuing separate U.S. re-export licenses in cases where we already approved re-export of the same product as part of COCOM.

But, disincentives are only the tip of the iceberg; our trade problems are much more broadly based, and require a truly major effort on several fronts if we are to be successful in meeting this challenge.

In the auto industry, for example, we need a new tax policy, with major changes in depreciation and investment opportunities (including a refundable investment tax credit)

to spur the modernization of our nation's factories. We need more attention to research and development to stimulate the great American genius for technological innovation in the private sector, especially toward more fuel-efficient automobiles. Greater investment in R&D may lead to breakthroughs in battery technology which would make the electric car more competitive. We need increased attention to export promotion, using the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and other agencies more energetically in this field. The formation of trading companies, on the Japanese model, is also an intriguing possibility.

In a word, we need a new U.S. industrial policy, consisting of a unified effort by government, industry, and labor to restore the United States once more to its preeminent position as a world trader. One of the most hopeful signs I have seen in this regard are the recent efforts of management and labor in the auto industry to seek together new ways to work as a team, each dedicated to enhancing the quality of the product and the morale of the working man and woman.

September 22, 1980

Trade: Access to Foreign Markets

Q: Trade, ideally, is a two way street; yet, Japan exports in large volume to the United States but seems reluctant to open her market equally to our products.

Is this an accurate assessment and, if so, what would you do about it if reelected?

A: From 1950 through the early 1970s, Japan was a highly protectionist country. Lately, though, the Japanese have opened their market considerably in response to pressures from the United States and the Third World. Despite this encouraging sign, I intend to press upon the Japanese, through negotiations, the importance of prompt removal of residual barriers to imported automobiles and spare parts from the United States, as well as other products, including telecommunications equipment, processed foods, cosmetics, medical devices, and cigarettes. The trade barriers against U.S. agricultural products are particularly notorious. Japan must open its market more fully and do more to facilitate imports from our country if we are to continue our liberal trade relationship with the Japanese.

Nowhere could the Japanese demonstrate goodwill better than by a decision to adhere to the Government Procurement Code negotiated in Geneva -- including a decision to make all procurement of the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company subject to the obligations of the Code. The Japanese auto companies must also overcome their reluctance to pursue actively opportunities for marketing American cars in Japan and purchasing American-made new and replacement parts -- efforts which could help to reduce protectionist pressures against Japanese autos.

At the invitation of my Administration, a Japanese Auto Components Buying Mission visited the United States in September. The full benefit of this mission will not, of course, be realized overnight. With U.S. parts-making capacity readily available, however, it should be possible soon to see tangible results in the form of contracts in some cases, and in other cases, concrete steps toward contracts. I regard concrete results from this mission to be an extremely important contribution by Japanese firms to improving the present climate, creating jobs, and improving the prospects of the depressed U.S. auto parts industry.

A second mission from Japan also visited the United States in September to explore opportunities to license U.S. production of official Japanese auto parts, and to explore joint ventures or other forms of investment opportunities in the United States. This mission provided another opportunity for positive steps to restore better balance to automobile trade through economically viable production arrangements and investments in the United States.

The Japanese Government has agreed on the need for significant and lasting results from the auto parts buying and investment missions. Our two governments will monitor closely the missions' results.

The U.S. automobile industry must meet its responsibilities, too, by manufacturing automobiles

suitable for mass sales in foreign markets and adopting a more aggressive and intelligent marketing approach. As former Special Trade Representative Bob Strauss has noted, there are 1,250 to 1,500 representatives of Japanese firms in New York today and every one of them speaks English well and presents his products and sales arguments effectively. They are selling Japanese merchandise, and this is in New York City alone. In Tokyo, there are probably 20 or 25 -- certainly less than 100 -- Americans selling American products, and scarcely any of them speaks Japanese. We can do better than this.

With government, industry, and labor working more imaginatively together, we can compete with the best here and abroad.

September 29, 1980

Trade: Export Promotion

Q: The GOP Platform paints a dark portrait of the Carter Administration's competence -- and sheer interest -- in matters of export promotion. What has your Administration done to help U.S. trade performance?

Response:

The truth of the matter is that there has been almost twenty years of neglect in our export program, crossing party lines and the public and private sectors. Since the Kennedy Round in 1963, we have been slipping backwards.

We have had an accumulation of complacency, of ignoring the problem. There is enough blame to go around to industry, labor, various administrations and the Congress. We have had the luxury of a large market right here in the United States, and we have relied on it. Too heavily.

My Administration has begun to reverse these years of neglect. Under the direction of my Special Trade Representative, we brought to a successful conclusion the multilateral trade negotiations, the most ambitious set of negotiations to reduce barriers to international trade in a decade.

The reorganization of the Federal government trade agencies which I directed will assure more effective and prompt governmental action to exploit the export opportunities afforded by the MTN agreements.

On another front, the Administration and the United States coal industry are launching joint marketing efforts to make this country a major exporter of steam coal. With assurance of a reliable United States coal supply at competitive prices, many of the electric power plants to be built in the 1980's and 1990's can be coal-fired rather than oil-burning. Coal exports will help us pay for our declining but costly oil imports.

I have also directed the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to give special emphasis to export promotion in all of their new projects.

In this connection, it is important for us to keep in mind that American exports have been increasing more rapidly to Third World countries than any other nations except Japan. This new market means jobs for Americans. It also demonstrates why we must continue to work with the Third World and to assist these financial institutions, such as the World Bank, in their efforts to provide help to the developing nations.

September 19, 1970

Trade: Increasing Productivity

Q: There is a good deal of talk these days about the lack of investment and productivity by American industry. Certainly we lag behind our major competitors, especially the Japanese. What can the Federal Government do to increase investment and worker productivity, or is this a problem for industry alone to resolve?

Response: I am very pleased to see that in the United States there is a growing consensus in favor of developing a new industrial policy designed to rebuild our factories, regain a competitive edge in the world marketplace, and restore the reputation of our country as a place where high-quality products are manufactured.

Specifically, my Administration will accelerate its efforts to pass new investment tax policies in the Congress (such as a refundable investment tax credit), direct expenditures toward innovative research and development, and encourage new avenues of export promotion.

We need a new vision of our industrial future, a new partnership of labor, management, and Government working together to promote U.S. business abroad. We can no longer afford the antagonisms that have plagued industry for so long. Toward this end, industry and labor can do its part to enhance worker morale and the quality of the product; and the Government can help with needed tax provisions, increased R&D expenditures, export promotion, clarification of antitrust policy, and the elimination of unnecessary regulatory burdens.

September 12, 1980

Trade: Japanese Autos

Q: Does the Carter Administration support a temporary Orderly Marketing Agreement to curb Japanese auto imports?

Response: Trade Adjustment Actions

My Administration has sought to facilitate the retooling of our industry to permit production of small, fuel-efficient, competitive autos. We have also sought to reduce the burdens borne by workers during this transitional period. In cooperation with the Congress, We have provided special financial assistance to the beleaguered Chrysler Corporation and are developing, through tax policy, capital formation incentives.

In July, I announced a number of specific actions including relaxation of some regulatory requirements; new adjustment assistance benefits to aid communities severely affected by the changes in the auto industry; tax relief proposals; and a package of loan programs to aid automobile dealers. I also called for a joint industry, labor, and government Automobile Industry Committee to undertake a continuing dialogue on industry concerns. Members of this committee met in Detroit this September to organize and set their agenda. I have also encouraged Japanese investment in the United States in automotive manufacturing facilities. To date, Honda and Nissan have announced plans to produce cars and trucks in the United States. Nissan has yet to definitively pick a plant site. Toyota, the largest Japanese exporter to this market, continues to study investment possibilities here.

To promote an increase in our exports to Japan, we have reached an agreement with the Japanese Government on a number of measures designed to increase access to the Japanese market for U.S. made automobiles, parts and components. In May, the Japanese Government agreed to eliminate import duties next spring on most automobile parts, ameliorate the impact of certain Japanese standards, and send automobile parts buying and investment missions to the United States. These missions visited our country in September and the tangible results of these visits will be seen in the form of contracts and other arrangements to restore better balance to automobile trade.

Request for Import Relief

In spite of the adjustment actions taken by the Administration, the Congress, and most importantly, the industry itself, many Americans continue to be concerned that the unprecedented Japanese shipments during this transitional period will permanently alter the structure of our automobile market to the disadvantage of American companies and workers.

This situation has led to calls in our country for import restrictions. The United Auto Workers and Ford Motor Company have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission for temporary import relief under the provisions of Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. At my request, the ITC has accelerated the schedule for its decision. If the U.S. International Trade Commission finds that imports of automobiles are a substantial cause of injury, or threat thereof, and recommends import

relief, then I will be authorized under our domestic law to restrict auto imports by means of tariffs, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or orderly marketing agreements.

So the framework created by law to examine claims for import relief is presently engaged. This process should be allowed to operate. While that investigation is in progress, U.S. efforts to obtain restraints on Japanese imports would be inconsistent with the procedures set forth in the Trade Act of 1974.

Decline of the Dollar

Q: What is your response to the GOP charge that "the economic policy of the Carter Administration has led to the most serious decline in the value of the dollar in history"?

Response: When I took office in 1977, we had just experienced a long recession which had put a great strain on the world economy and on the international financial system. The origins of that recession were in a tangle of complicated economic decisions made by both parties over the last two decades. By late 1976, the world economy was in a very precarious situation. To put it bluntly, I had inherited a mess.

My Administration immediately undertook a program of economic expansion to end the recession. I recognized at the time that vigorous economic expansion in this country, without expansion in other countries, could worsen the U.S. trade position. I also understood that the resulting trade imbalance could lead to the depreciation of the dollar relative to some other currencies

It was necessary, however, for the United States to go ahead alone. Not to have done so would have courted far graver dangers for the world economy -- extreme financial difficulties for a number of countries and increasing protectionist actions in most of the industrialized countries.

Today the dollar has regained its strength, despite
Republican exaggerations to the contrary. The dollar
will be the world's leading currency for a long time
to come. The United States current account deficit,
which was \$16 billion in 1978, is near balance this year.
We have achieved a fundamental redirection.

September 18, 1980

Intelligence Reform

Q: The Republican Platform states that "ill-considered restrictions sponsored by the Democrats" have "debilitated US intelligence capabilities..."

Are the CIA and other intelligence agencies hobbled by restrictions imposed by Democrats?

What changes do you recommend to improve our intelligence capabilities?

RESPONSE

The charge made by Governor Reagan that our intelligence agencies no longer function effectively is dead wrong. We have the best intelligence services in the world and I intend to keep them that way.

In addition, over the past four years, I have worked for intelligence reform. It was a part of my campaign for the presidency in 1976, a part of the Democratic Platform that year, and a part of my legislative package each year. In 1978 we achieved the passage of a sensible statute on wire-tap authorization. This year we should have legislation -- long over-due -- to protect the identities of intelligence employees, and an oversight bill for foreign intelligence operations. In each of these measures, great care has been taken to ensure that no restraints are placed on the intelligence agencies that would interfere with their authorized duties.

Gov. Reagan on Intelligence ReformForeign Intelligence

Reagan believes the decline of America's intelligence capabilities is due to Congress and the President.

"...a Democratic Congress, aided and abetted by the Carter Administration, has succeeded in shackling and demoralizing our intelligence services to the point that they no longer function effectively as a part of our defenses."

Speech to Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

The Republic Platform calls for:

"A Republican Administration will seek to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for technical clandestine collection, cogent analysis, coordinated counterintelligence, and covert action.

"We will reestablish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...

"Republicans will undertake an urgent effort to rebuild the intelligence agencies...We will propose legislation to enable intelligence officers and their agents to operate safely and efficiently abroad.

"We will provide our government with the capability to help influence international events vital to our national security interests..."

1980 Republican Platform

Domestic Intelligence

Reagan would appear not to preclude the using of the intelligence agencies to spy on American citizens.

"...in insuring the security of the people and the nation, there may come times you have to spy on your own people.

Los Angeles Times
March 21, 1975

Gov. Reagan on Intelligence Reform

Reagan has also stated:

"I have commented before about what I think is the Justice Department's foolishness in rendering our FBI and CIA impotent, all in the name of privacy."

Reagan Radio Broadcast
February, 1979

September 21, 1980

Refugees

Q: Recently we have witnessed the spectacle of thousands of Cubans pouring into the United States illegally, some of them apparently criminal elements. What have you done to control this situation and, more generally, how can the US aid desperate refugees in the future?

Response

The problem of refugees and displaced persons is serious, widespread, and -- I regret to say -- growing. More than 15 million inhabitants of our planet have fled their homes in recent years because of wars, civil disturbances, persecution, or hostile government policies. The past year alone has witnessed the flight of more than 1.2 million Afghans, 1 million Somalis, and hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans and others who remain homeless and miserable. Ours is becoming an epoch of refugees.

Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over 600,000 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the past year alone, we have taken in well over 230,000 refugees; and this total does not include the over 150,000 Cubans and Haitians now in the United States, seeking to settle here. We are doing everything we can to assist refugees from around the world who look to us for help. For example, I remain deeply committed to the support of the massive relief program undertaken by the international community through ICRC/UNICEF for relief of the Khmer people inside Kampuchea and along the Thai border. We also fully support the UNHCR program to help the many Khmer in Thai holding centers.

But we need help if we are to help them. The massive burdens that are imposed when thousands of people migrate, as with the chaotic flow of Cubans into our country, require attention that transcends national boundaries. The task of resettlement must be shared on an equitable basis so that no single nation or group of nations is faced with the entire refugee burden. I am encouraging regional associations to work closely with international agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Inter-governmental Committee for Refugee Migration to develop procedures for coping with these complex problems.

And, despite the refusal of Cuba to cooperate in devising orderly, legal arrangements for dealing with the migration of Cuban refugees to this country, we are working tirelessly to resettle and accommodate these individuals as quickly and safely as their large numbers will allow.

I recently announced a new three-point plan to improve our response to this challenge. This plan acknowledges the federal responsibility for the refugee burden placed upon state and local government; strengthens law enforcement efforts to bar additional illegal immigrants; and, establishes a new and more efficient resettlement center, allowing the closure of some refugee sites.

Gov. Reagan On Refugees

Reagan supported a "Berlin airlift--massive and swift" to rescue those Cuban residents seeking political asylum from Castro. (Dallas Times Herald, April 10, 1980)

September 26, 1980

The United Nations

- 2: The United Nations has a league of critics, Governor Reagan among them. There are those who dismiss it as a drain on our resources, an impediment to our bilateral diplomatic relations, a theater of the absurd. More recently a special session of the UN spent several days attacking Israel. Critics say the UN is anti-American and anti-democratic. Many Americans have grown weary of handing out foreign aid to so-called friendly nations around the world only to see them vote against us on the floor of the General Assembly.

To what extent are these conclusions valid, and why should the United States continue to honor its legal obligations to the UN?

Response:

My Administration supports the United Nations and will continue to do so. I strongly oppose the view Governor Reagan once expressed that we should serve notice that we are going home to sit for a while.

Despite the myths surrounding the UN, many of which Governor Reagan seems to have accepted, the fact is the United States is not now, nor has it ever been, the outvoted victim of most United Nations resolutions.

In the area of human rights for example, what for some appeared to have been a lonely American concern, the United Nations today is a major forum for improving the standards of human rights and in promoting actions to protect them.

We don't always get our way, of course. The United Nations has almost a hundred new nations, each free of colonial bondage and fiercely independent. We are no

longer in the position of dictating our will. And, sometimes we strongly oppose actions taken by the UN. The 1975 UN condemnation of Zionism as racism was deplorable. The recent special session on the Middle East was totally one-sided and inexcusable.

Despite this, those who still think of the United Nations as an unfriendly and dangerous place should remember some of its recent acts, such as the decision of the International Courts of Justice on the hostages in Iran and the overwhelming condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our country needs the UN as much as it needs us.

Gov. Reagan on the U.N.

In the past, Reagan has, on special occasions, implied that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations. The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China to the United Nations was being discussed.

"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organization..I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service organizations surrounding it are doing good work."

Press Conference
October 26, 1971

In 1975, when the United Nations condemned Zionism as racism, Reagan suggested that if the U.N. continues its present conduct, the United States should serve notice "we're going to go home and sit a while."

Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975

Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO, Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave his reply.

"...UNESCO--the United Nationsl Educational, Scientific and cultural organization...May actually be a base for communist espionage."

Jefferson City Post
December 15, 1977

Reagan Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security

1. The Soviet Union surpasses us in virtually every category of military strength.
2. The only place we search for human rights violations is among our historically friends and allies.
3. We have been dishonored (by Soviet and Cuban adventurism, murdered US diplomats, captive hostages); we have lost our pride.
4. We have been apologetic at best about American capitalism as a model for economic development.
5. Our government taxes industry too heavily and undermines our international competitiveness.
6. Our antitrust laws harm US competitiveness and benefit foreign competitors.
7. The Democrats have neglected our military strength and only after Afghanistan have awakened to the Soviet threat.
8. Even after Afghanistan, Carter's military budget leaves us totally unable to match Soviet buildup (three times ours in strategic arms, nearly twice ours in conventional arms).
9. Our defense posture must be invigorated across the board.
10. We must have a faster remedy to our land-based missile vulnerability than Carter's complex and costly new missile system.
11. We need higher pay and better management of the all-volunteer force, not hundreds of new bureaucrats to administer or draft registration.
12. We have to maintain a superior Navy.
13. We must restore our intelligence agencies, shackled and demoralized by Democrats in Congress and the Carter Administration.
14. Carter meekly accepted a Soviet buildup in Cuba -- after saying it was "unacceptable."

15. We stand by idly as Marxists topple the dominos in Latin America, one after the other, leading toward Mexico in one direction and Panama in the other.

16. We pay the lion's share of a bloated UN budget only to see its members criticize us while gazing benignly on Soviet colonialism. (The recent UN condemnation of the invasion into Afghanistan failed even to mention the Soviet Union by name.)

17. We apologize, compromise, withdraw, and retreat, fall silent when insulted and pay ransom when we are victimized.

18. We must regain the reputation of reliability toward our allies.

19. We must rid ourselves of the "Vietnam Syndrome."

20. Detente is largely an illusion.

21. We must above all have a grand strategy.*

* These themes come from the March 17, 1980, Chicago speech. The last one, like many others, remains vague but mainly Reagan seems to mean by this that we must stand tough against Soviet and Cuban military ventures.

Most Notable Reagan QuotesOn Foreign Policy

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

On Military Superiority

"Since when has it been wrong for America to aim to be first in military strength? How is American military superiority "dangerous?"

American Legion
August 20, 1980

On SALT II

"I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided nuclear arms buildup."

Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

On the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

"So when they invaded Afghanistan, maybe that was the time for us to have said, 'Look, don't talk to us about trade. There will be none. Don't talk to us about treaties, like SALT II. We are not going to have any communication with you until (those forces in Afghanistan) are back in the Soviet Union.'"

Time
June 30, 1980

On the Soviet Union

"Let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in the game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980

"When did the Cold War end?"

Wall Street Journal
June 30, 1980

On CSCE

"Frankly, I have an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can't go, why should the diplomats go?"

Time
June 30, 1980

On Iran

"But some place along the line there had to be an ultimatum. Here again, because we have lost so much influence with friends and allies, we were not in a position to go to the rest of the world and say, look, this is a violation of international law, and present to them the idea of the world literally quarantining Iran."

Time
June 30, 1980

On US Allies

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with -- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

On China and Taiwan

"I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official."

Associated Press
August 25, 1980

Republican Platform Charges Against the
Carter Administration

General

Without a Coherent Strategic Concept
 Failure of Leadership, Incompetence
 Foreign Policy of Chaos, Confusion, and Failure
 Neglect of America's Defense Posture Without Parallel since 1930s
 Reduced the Size and Capability of our Nuclear Forces
 Defense Programs Cancelled or Delayed
 On the Road to a Military Catastrophe
 Danger Without Parallel since December 7, 1941
 Oblivious to the Scope and Magnitude of the Threat
 Lack of Meaningful Response to Use of Soviet Power
 Losing the Respect of the World and our Honor
 Endangered Energy and Raw Material Lifelines of Western World
 Lack of Meaningful Response to Terrorists

National Security

Massive Cuts in U.S. Defense Spending; Reduced Budget by over
 \$38 Billion from Ford's last Five-Year Defense Plan
 Cut Back Cancelled, or Delayed Every Strategic Initiative Pro-
 posed by Ford (Minuteman Missile Production Line, B-1 Bomber,
 All Cruise Missiles, M-X, Trident Submarine, Trident II
 Missile)
 Soviets are Achieving Military Superiority; Moved from Essential
 Equivalence to Inferiority in Strategic Nuclear Forces
 Failure to Challenge Soviet Use of Surrogate Cuban Forces in
 Africa and the Later Soviet Presence in Angola, Ethiopia,
 and South Yemen
 Mismanagement of Personnel Policy; Shambles of All-volunteer Army
 Failure to Maintain Combat Readiness; U.S. Armed Forces at
 Lowest State of Preparedness since 1950
 Failure to Fund Fully the Space Shuttle Program, As Well As
 Advanced Exploration Programs
 Ill-informed, Capricious Intrusions of OMB and DOD Office of
 Program Analysis and Evaluation have Brought Defense Plan-
 ning Full Circle to the Worst Faults of the McNamara Years;
 Inefficiency and Paralysis has Led to Huge Cost Overruns
 and Protected Delays

Morale of National Intelligence Has Been Eroded; Along with
Public Confidence; National Intelligence Has Underestimated
the Size and Purpose of the Soviet Union's Military Efforts
Fundamentally flawed SALT II Treaty; Cover-up of Soviet Non-
Compliance, Including BW Convention (Sverdlovsk)
Misguided Intentions to Deliver Nuclear Material to India

Foreign Policy

US-Soviet Relations

Present Danger is Greater Than Ever Before in the 200-year
History of the United States
Carter has Encouraged the Most Extensive Raid on American
Technology by the Soviet Bloc since World War II
Partial and Incompetently Managed Grain Embargo
Human Rights in the USSR Ignored
Misleading American People About Soviet Policies and Behavior

NATO and Western Europe

Erosion of Alliance Security and Confidence in the US
Vulnerability of US Increased by Carter's Unilateral Cancellations, Reductions, and Long Delays in the B-1, Trident, M-X, Cruise Missile, and Ship-building Programs, as Has
Fundamentally Flawed SALT II
Alliance Security Decreased by Reversals on Neutron Bomb, Treatment of Future Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, and Manner of Dealing with Terrorist Actions Against Americans Abroad
Caused Disunity in the Alliance; Lack of Close Coordination Regarding Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Olympic Boycott, Nuclear Proliferation, East-West Trade, Human Rights, North-South Issues

Middle East, Persian Gulf

Carter Administration Involvement with the PLO

The Americas

Precipitous Decline in US Relations with Virtually Every Country in the Region
Undifferentiated Charges of Human Rights Violations
Stands by While Castro Supports Forces of Warfare and Revolution Throughout the Western Hemisphere

Dangerous and Incomprehensible Policies Toward Cuba
 Implementing the Panama Canal Treaties will Cost US Taxpayer
 \$4.2 Billion

Asia and the Pacific

Balance on the Korean Peninsula has Sifted Dangerously Toward
 the North

Africa

Soviet Bases, Tens of Thousands of Cuban Troops, and Soviet-
 Bloc Subversion Unacceptable

Foreign Assistance and Regional Security

Carter Administration has Diminished the Role of American
 Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales in our
 Foreign Policy

International Economic Policy

International Trade and Economic Policy

Largely Ignored the Role of International Economics
 Most Serious Decline in the Value of the Dollar in History
 Placed Exporting at the Bottom of its Priority List
 Passive Approach to Trade
 Failure to Pursue Negotiations Designed to Improve the Access
 of American Exports to Foreign Markets has Contributed, in
 part, to Protectionist Sentiment
 Over-burdensome Government Regulations, Excessive Taxation,
 Inflationary Monetary Policy, Unstable Economy

The Security of Energy and Raw Materials Access

Too much Concern has been Lavished on Nations Unable to Carry
 out Sea-bed Mining, with Insufficient Attention Paid to
 Gaining Early American Access to it

New Proposals in the 1980 Republican PlatformNational Security

Will seek military superiority

Earliest possible deployment of the M-X missile

New manned strategic penetrating bomber

Deployment of an air defense system

Accelerate deployment of cruise missiles on aircraft, land, ships, and submarines

Research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system

Early modernization of our theater nuclear forces

Deployment in Europe of medium-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, enhanced radiation warheads, and the modernization of nuclear artillery

A permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean

Restoration of tactical aircraft development; increase in stocks of ammunition, spare parts, and supplies

Increase airlift capability; increase our aerial tanker fleet

Restore Navy fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by Ford

Improve all-volunteer force; no draft (or draft registration)

Correct the great inequities in pay and benefits of career military personnel

Increase funding for R&D

Support a vigorous space research program

Improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action

Support legislation to invoke criminal sanctions against anyone who discloses the identities of U.S. intelligence officers abroad; support amendment to the FCIA and Privacy Act

Repeal ill-considered restrictions sponsored by Democrats, which have debilitated U.S. intelligence capabilities while easing the subversion efforts of our adversaries

Foreign Policy

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Oppose the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites

Call for the immediate lifting of the grain embargo

Insist on full Soviet compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki agreement

Publicize to the world the fundamental differences in the two systems through RFE/RL

End the cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II

NATO and Western Europe

Categorically reject unilateral moratoria on the deployment by the U.S. and NATO of theater nuclear weapons; oppose arms control agreements that interfere with the transfer of military technology to our Allies

Call for the integration of Spain into the North Atlantic Alliance

Middle East, Persian Gulf

Reject any call for involvement with the PLO

Keep Jerusalem an undivided city

The Americas

Oppose the aid program for Nicaragua

Return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology; make it clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that their subversion and their build-up of offensive military forces is unacceptable

Admit Puerto Rico to the Union

Seek a North America Accord between the U.S., Canada
and Mexico

Asia and the Pacific

Strongly support a substantially increased Japanese
national defense effort

Provide full economic aid and military material to assist
Thailand in repelling Vietnamese aggression

No expanded relations with Vietnam

Press for full accounting of Americans still listed
as missing in action

Regard any attempt to alter Taiwan's status by force
as a threat to peace in the region; give priority
consideration to Taiwan's defense requirements

Africa

Devote major resources to development on a bilateral
basis

Rebuild U.S. military assistance and foreign arms sales

International Economic Policy

Adopt an aggressive export policy

Will not stand idly by as the jobs of millions of Americans
in domestic industries, such as automobiles, textiles,
steel, and electronics are jeopardized and lost

Elimination of disincentives for exporters, including
inhibitive statutes and regulations

Work with trading partners to eliminate subsidies to
exports and dumping

Eliminate excessive taxation of Americans working abroad

Revitalize merchant marine

Domestic economic and regulatory policy must be adjusted
to remove impediments to greater development of our
own energy and raw materials resources

Anderson Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security

1. Maintain a stable balance by preserving essential equivalence with the Soviet Union.
2. US must put its economic house in order; rebuilding economy is starting point for international recovery.
3. US must restore historic alliances; rely heavily on collective security arrangements with our principle allies in NATO and Japan.
4. Must modernize and diversify our strategic arsenal.
5. No MX -- "American ingenuity can devise a more flexible and more cost-effective solution."
6. Will take steps to complete SALT II process; invigorate the international quest for arms control.
7. Superpower relationship cannot be allowed to degenerate further; must maintain "active communications" with the Soviets, particularly when tensions are high.
8. Emphasize versatile and usable forces to counter any conventional attack on our vital interests.
9. Establish and maintain peace in the Middle East; oppose Palestinian state; move US Embassy to Jerusalem.
10. Carefully nurture new relationship with China.
11. No more important partner than Mexico.
12. Providing economic aid to Nicaragua promotes an atmosphere of moderation.
13. Open a wider window to India.
14. Cooperate with the developing nations in ways which respect their individuality and independence, and which serve our mutual interests in trade and development.
15. Urges Japan to expand its foreign aid and its security role; encourages Japan to build more plants in US, and remove curbs on US goods (especially in telecommunications, computers, semiconductors).

16. Would continue present informal military and economic relations with Taiwan.
17. Greater IMF help for LDC's energy development.
18. Discourages US investments in South Africa "whenever possible in cooperation with our allies;" encourages compliance with UN arms embargo.
19. Strong human rights stance; urges continued denial of foreign aid to governments violating human rights; criticizes US banks and corporations for underwriting US policy by providing loans and investments to nations ineligible for government aid.
20. Linkage of trade with Soviet bloc to emigration flows.
21. Urges that foreign assistance be channeled through multilateral agencies wherever possible.
22. Claims "benign neglect" has characterized export administration, and proposes various remedies including:
 - expanded Eximbank financing;
 - reduced taxes on Americans abroad "engaged in export activities;"
 - support for export trading companies to help small and medium-sized firms enter export markets.

KEY FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES:

CONTRASTS AMONG THE CANDIDATES

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>Carter</u>	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Anderson</u>
M-X	Yes	Yes	No
Aid to Nicaragua	Yes	No	Yes
SALT II	Yes	No	Yes
Comprehensive Test Ban	Yes	No	Yes
Draft Registration	Yes	No	No
Military Superiority	No	Yes	No
Neutron Bomb in Europe	No	Yes	No
Permanent Indian Ocean Fleet	No	Yes	No
600 Ship Navy	No	Yes	No
More Large Aircraft Carriers	No	Yes	No
Lift Grain Embargo	No	Yes	No
Bilateral Over Multilateral Aid	No	Yes	No
Nuclear Materials to India	Yes	No	No

Key Proposals in the Anderson Platform, 1980National Security

Essential Equivalence
 Improve Command, Control, and Communications
 Improve Warning Systems
 Trident, Air-launched Cruise Missiles
 R & D on New Bomber
 Reject M-X ("American ingenuity can devise a more
 flexible and cost-effective solution. . .")
 Redress Grave Personnel Problems
 Pre-position Equipment Overseas
 Increase Air and Sealift Capability
 Allocate More Resources to Naval Forces
 Complete SALT II Process
 R & D on an Anti-satellite Capability
 Greater Defense Role for Japan

Foreign Policy

Reinforce NATO
 Stabilize US-USSR Relations
 Support Camp David Accords
 Strengthen Ties to Japan
 Nurture Relations with PRC
 Joint American/Mexican Commission
 No Cuban Military Involvement in Hemisphere
 Economic Aid to Nicaragua
 Wider Window to India
 Anti-apartheid Measures Toward South Africa

Economic Policy

Work Toward a More Equitable International Economic Order

Gov. Reagan on Foreign Policy

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

Gov. Reagan on Intervention

Reagan's record is filled with examples of suggestions -- some explicit, some implied -- that U.S. intervention be used to resolve international disturbances.

Angola

In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war, Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:

"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting, or you're going to have to deal with us."

New York Times
January 6, 1976

Cuba

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan said:

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Cyprus

Reagan has said that, in a manner similar to Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Ecuador

In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:

"(T)he U.S. government next winter should send along a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say, 13 miles off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to "talk softly, but carry a big stick."

San Diego Union

Gov. Reagan on InterventionLebanon

In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Middle East

Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan said:

"I think this might be a very, very good time for the United States to show a presence in the Middle East. I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it looks like anyone bullying..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

North Korea

In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, Reagan said:

"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone in the United States government, particularly the President, has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor in 24 hours or we are coming in after it.'"

Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968

Pakistan

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.

"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be."

St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980

Reagan also proposed sending "a squadron of planes" to

Gov. Reagan on InterventionPortugal

To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent or discourage" the Communists, adding "it was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Rhodesia

To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:

"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not I don't know."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

North Vietnam

The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

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DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIALS

- DOMESTIC -

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DEBATE BRIEFING MATERIALS

- DOMESTIC -

PART II

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7. MAJOR REAGAN-BUSH DIFFERENCES
8. KEY REAGAN QUOTES
9. QUESTION SUBJECTS IN PREVIOUS DEBATES

ANSWER AND REBUTTAL OBJECTIVES

1. Present Presidential image and experience -- make clear that there is a marked difference between you and Reagan in knowledge and experience -- and leave no doubt why you are now President and what you have learned as President. The next four years will be better because of the unique learning experience you have acquired.
2. Draw contrasts between your approach to problem-solving with Reagan's -- you are moderate, he's not; you are cautious, he may not be; you are now trained for the job, he's inexperienced; you understand complexities; he doesn't.
3. Through repetition, leave audience with clear impression of your themes. Your answers should follow a clear format (past, present, future) and your rebuttals to Reagan should follow a clear pattern.
4. Present your achievements (largely unrecognized) in a positive, forceful -- not defensive -- tone. Turn attacks back by comparing our policy for the future with Reagan's. Stress your record. Be forthright on your disappointments (No President gets everything he wants. Neither have I).
5. Make evident the substantive weaknesses and unrealities of Reagan's positions while indicating he is a decent and honest person.
6. Focus the audience's attention on the difference between the future you will give the Nation with what Reagan will give. Make clear that you are mainstream Democrat, while Reagan is representative of a small part of the Republican Party. The Democratic vs. Republican emphasis is critical. Stress that Reagan has the same beliefs Republicans have always had.
7. Present your personal qualities of greatest appeal -- integrity, sincerity, openness, intelligence, steadiness and common-man touch.
8. Use catch phrases which people can remember (e.g. Kemp-Roth is a "rich man's tax cut which would flood the country with dollars as fast as the printing presses could print them".) (We will provide them to you)

ONE

Present Presidential image -- make clear there is a difference between you and Reagan in knowledge and experience -- and leave no doubt why you are now the President.

You will have the same basic problem that Ford did in the 1976 debates -- how to appear Presidential (how to separate yourself from the challenger) when you are in a setting in which each candidate appears of equal rank. This problem can be overcome by the manner and substance of your answers. They should convey the fact that you are President, are forced to make the decisions others only talk about, are fully conversant with all issues, are able to point out the unrealistic, non-Presidential perspective of Reagan, are able to keep your cool in what may become heated exchanges, and are in the process of taking certain Presidential actions to solve certain of the problems being debated.

It will also be important to stress your experience and how it has taught you to be a better President (e.g., you have learned the bitter lessons of inflation and how deep-seated it is and that is why you so strongly oppose Kemp-Roth and support your effort to improve investment incentives and productivity or (e.g., you have learned how the Congress works and have developed close relations with its leadership and by committee chairmen.)

TWO

Draw contrasts between your approach to problem-solving with Reagan's -- you are moderate, he's extreme; you are cautious, he's a hip-shooter; you are trained for the job, he's inexperienced; you understand complexities, he's simplistic.

One of the best ways to emphasize that you are Presidential and Reagan is not is by contrasting your styles in solving problems, particularly the type of critical, life-or-death issues that come across a President's desk. You should use appropriate occasions to point out how a President must fully weigh his words and actions for the impact will be felt not only in this country but throughout the rest of the world. You should emphasize, as well, the experience you have developed in solving national and international problems, and how that experience -- from which you have learned a great deal -- cannot be gained elsewhere or through any other job.

THREE

Through repetition leave audience with clear impression of your themes.

If the experience of previous Presidential debates holds, viewers will remember almost nothing about the substance of what the candidates say (unless there is a glaring error of the magnitude of Ford's in the second debate). They will remember the style, tone, forcefulness, and appearance to a much greater extent. That may be Reagan's saving grace. The best hope for getting the audience to remember our substantive points is repetition of the key positive and anti-Reagan themes. Ideally, every answer should begin with one of the positive themes and contain, later in the answer, one of our themes against Reagan. Every answer should talk about the past (the record and what you inherited), the present (trends in right direction), the future (contrast your program with Reagan's). It may be hard to attain the ideal. But repeated use of the key themes is the only way to leave the viewers with the basic messages we want to convey. This can be done with your rebuttals to Reagan's answers as well, wherever appropriate (e.g., "that answer simply won't solve the problem").

FOUR

Present your achievements in a positive, forceful -- not defensive -- tone.

Incumbents always face the danger in a debate of appearing defensive by necessarily having to defend their record. That was certainly the case with Ford. There is obviously no way for you to avoid having to spend part of the debate responding to charges about your record. But you should not appear defensive about some of the weaknesses in the record. That can be avoided by a positive, forceful presentation of your record in the area under attack (e.g., Yes we have had problems with inflation, but it's on a clear downward path and the consumer price index has averaged ___% over the last ___ months, and it's my realization the dangers of inflation which lead me to so strongly oppose Mr. Reagan's economic policy based on Kemp-Roth because it is so inflationary.)

FIVE

Make Evident the substantive weaknesses and unrealities of Reagan's positions.

You should make it clear that Reagan is a decent and honest man but without the solutions to the problems of the 1980's. Throughout the campaign, Reagan's substantive positions have gone largely unexamined by the press. You therefore need to work to point out in the debate the weaknesses of his basic positions. The point here is to drive home the message that his policies are simplistic and/or unrealistic, and that, unfortunately, Reagan does not understand the complexities of the problems involved.

SIX

Focus the audience's attention on the difference between the future you will give the Nation with what Reagan will give. Make clear that you are a mainstream Democrat, while Reagan is representative of a small part of the Republican Party.

Throughout the debate you should try to use every available opportunity to draw a stark contrast between what the consequences for the future of your positions versus the consequences for the future of Reagan's positions. For example, "I intend to see that, shortly, every American will have the protection of national health insurance; my opponent opposes NHI, and it will not be available to help the poor and the elderly if he has his way." Or, "I intend to seek SALT II ratification and to continue our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. My opponent wants to abandon SALT II and engage in a nuclear arms race as a bargaining card." Or, "I will continue to pursue economic policies which will effectively bring down our basic inflation rate during the 1980's; my opponent supports a tax cut of such massive amounts that inflation can only skyrocket as a result during the coming years."

It is important that you draw the political party contrast with Reagan. That is one of the best ways to counter the impression of many Anderson supporters and those currently undecided that there is no real difference between you and Reagan. You need to emphasize that one of the differences is that you are a Democrat -- in the mainstream of the Party of Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy -- while Reagan is not only part of the Party of McKinley, Harding, Hoover and Nixon, but he is a representative of a small element of that Party.

Aside from talking about your Democratic predecessors, one way to include Democratic Party references is to refer to the Democratic Party traditions and ideals and to the Democratic Party platform (especially in comparison to the Republican platform).

Stress that Mr. Reagan's views are not unusual - they are what one would expect from Republicans. Show in your answer how your policies fit within the Democratic Party tradition and Reagan's (e.g., tax cuts to benefit predominately the wealthy) are consistent with Republican ideals. You have been doing this very effectively in your speeches.

SEVEN

Present your personal qualities of greatest appeal -- integrity, sincerity, openness, intelligence, steadiness and common-man touch.

From the start, the polls have shown that the public most admires many of your personal qualities -- integrity, sincerity, openness, intelligence, steadiness and common-man touch. These are qualities which are conveyed in many ways and over a period of time. It is not easy to convey such qualities in a brief, restricted debate format. However, an effort should be made to do so, both in the manner and style of your answers, as well as in their content. For instance, you might sprinkle throughout your answers references to your telling the truth to the public about our problems, to your discussions of Town Hall meetings at other places with average citizens, to your commitment to informing the public about the government's actions, and to your applying a steady hand in times of domestic uncertainty and international crisis.

ANSWER AND REBUTTAL THEMES

1. RECORD -- I have compiled a sound record of accomplishment -- one largely unreported and unrecognized.

I have:

- o PROTECTED THE PEACE -- through strong defense and diplomatic skills;
- o tackled tough, long-ignored and politically difficult issues (energy, inflation, government bureaucracy);
- o restored important values to government (ethics, integrity, openness, concern for human rights abroad and equal rights at home);
- o demonstrated compassion for problems of poor, minorities, unemployed, elderly.

Reagan has:

- o developed no national record and left a record as California Governor at odds with his claims about reduced taxes and less government.

2. EXPERIENCE AND PRESIDENTIAL SKILLS -- I have acquired the experience and the Presidential skills and knowledge needed to lead our Nation into the 1980's; Reagan has neither the experience nor the skills.
I want to use the experience the American people have given to me.

I have:

- o learned from experience; that experience will naturally make me a better, wiser President during the second term;
- o begun policies which can be continued into a second term (Mideast peace, energy) without interruption or the need to become familiar with or educated about the major issues involved in those policies;
- o shown myself to be a cautious, moderate, balanced decision-maker -- one who understands the complexities of the problems facing a President and willing to put in the time and effort to deal with them directly and personally.

Reagan has:

- o not acquired the experience needed by a President -- not held national office; no substantial foreign policy background;
- o not demonstrated that he understands the complexities involved in Presidential decisions or in national and international affairs; that he takes simplistic positions, with surface appeal;
- o indicated he would undo much of the progress of the Democratic and Republican Administrations, ensuring a lack of continuity in our government.

3. DEMOCRAT -- I am a Democrat, in the tradition of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson and am committed to the principles of our Party; Reagan is a leader of an extreme part of the Republican Party -- and the most conservative wing at that.

I have:

- o continued the traditions of my Democratic predecessors and have been in the mainstream of the Democratic Party;
- o put forward a program -- over the past 3-1/2 years and for the '80's -- which meets the ideals of the Democratic Party (peace, jobs, compassion for the disadvantaged, concern for working men and women, civil and equal rights).

Reagan has:

- o been a leader of the most conservative part of the Republican Party;
 - o running on the agenda of that conservative wing -- ERA opposition, balanced budget amendments, school prayers, litmus tests for Federal judges, nuclear superiority.
4. RESPONSIBLE, SECURE FUTURE -- I have a vision of the future which continues and builds on our progress, which is responsible, which is safe, which offers security to Americans; Reagan's agenda offers uncertainties, unrealistic promises, and a retreat from the '60's and '70's.

I have:

- o put forward a program and offered a vision for the '80's which builds on progress made by this Administration and by previous Democratic and Republican Administrations;
- o put forward a program which is prudent, responsible, and safe; it offers realistic hope and realistic security for the future, and BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE AND FOR NON-INFLATIONARY ECONOMIC GROWTH.

Reagan has:

- o offered an agenda that will disrupt the progress and programs developed under recent Democratic and Republican Presidents;
- o made proposals which are unrealistic and which offer uncertainty for the future.

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ECONOMY
JUN 27 1983

THE ECONOMY

Question: Hasn't your economic policy been an abject failure? Hasn't the misery index gotten twice as bad during your term? Given our problems with unemployment, recession and inflation, why do you believe your handling of the economy merits another four years? What policies would you follow in the next four years?

Answer:

THEME

THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN HARD FOR OUR NATION BUT RECESSION AND INFLATION HAVE ABATED. I HAVE LEARNED FROM HARD EXPERIENCE ABOUT INFLATION. WE'VE HAD SOME SUCCESSES AND SOME DISAPPOINTMENTS TOO. THAT'S WHY I HAVE PROPOSED AND ~~BEGUN~~ AN ECONOMIC RENEWAL PROGRAM AND AN ENERGY PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S THAT WILL CREATE JOBS AND STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S INDUSTRY WITHOUT REKINDLING INFLATION. MY OPPONENT, BY CONTRAST, PROMISES TO SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMY PRIMARILY BY ONE SINGLE, SIMPLE AND WRONG IDEA: A RICH MAN'S LARGE ACROSS-THE-BOARD TAX CUT THAT EVEN HIS OWN RUNNING MATE ADMITTED WOULD BE INFLATIONARY AND A MISTAKE.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

We did not do a perfect job, and we have learned some hard lessons. I underestimated the underlying inflationary forces and could not forecast the huge increase in oil prices or the large drop in productivity. I share the disappointment with the American people at the high inflation rate and of the recession we have just gone through. But we have had successes in the economic area;

- o I led the Nation out of the 1976 recession I inherited - the deepest recession since the Great Depression as a result of the programs I put into effect.
- o During my Administration the United States has had an unparalleled record in creating jobs: nearly 9 million new jobs have been created. Employment has grown more in the United States than in any other major industrial nation. It has grown more under my Administration than any comparable period in our history.
- o Similarly, industrial production in the United States has grown more than in any other industrial nation except Japan -- and we were not far behind them.
- o We have met head-on the primary cause of inflation as well as unemployment -- excessive dependence on foreign oil.

- We have put in place the Nation's first energy program. It includes a conservation and solar bank, a synthetic fuels corporation, and an end to the dangerous practice of keeping oil and gas prices artificially low.
- As a result, we import about 25 percent less oil than we did when I took office. More oil and gas wells are being drilled. And we use energy more efficiently than ever before.
- o I have cut the growth of Federal spending in half, while increasing support for our Nation's defense as well as other critical needs such as energy conservation and youth unemployment.
- o The dollar is now strong. And the United States -- unlike all other oil importing nations -- has been reducing its balance of payments deficit.
- o We have eliminated regulations which stifled free enterprise in airline, trucking, and railroad industries and in the banking and financial institutions.
- o Obviously, I am not pleased with the record on inflation nor with the current rate of unemployment. But the trends are in the right direction. We were not able to absorb completely the shock of doubled OPEC prices. And I would have to admit that, early in my Administration, we underestimated the strength of inflationary forces which had been building for the previous ten years. Inflation has been reduced sharply. The consumer price index has averaged percent over the last months. Unemployment has dropped the past several months and should continue to do so. Auto sales, industrial production and homebuilding are up.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o I have learned a great deal from my experience. Most importantly, I have learned the dangers of over-stimulating the economy. That's why I opposed an election year tax cut and it's why I so strongly oppose the Reagan Kemp-Roth massive tax cut. Governor Reagan's proposals stand in sharp contrast to mine. He clearly has not learned the lessons of the past few years on inflation. Instead of a targeted program of investment incentives, about 90% of his program is the Kemp-Roth notion of a single across-the-board personal income tax cut. It is a rich man's tax cut which would flood America with excess dollars. This proposal is so poor an idea that the Governor's own running mate opposed it. So did many of his own economic advisers. So did former President Ford. When Republicans refuse to support the economic program of their own nominee, you can bet they have good reasons. And they do.

- It would be inflationary. Unless accompanied by enormous budget cuts -- cuts that the Governor keeps promising but never spells out -- his plans would cause budget deficits of over \$100 billion and increase inflation. His own running mate called the proposal "economic voodoo" and said it would raise the inflation rate to 30 percent. Inflation is so difficult to root out of our system that we cannot afford to gamble on an economic program that so many knowledgeable people believe to be very inflationary.
- It would be unfair. His proposal would give \$175 to a teacher making \$12,000, but the corporate officer making \$200,000 would receive \$15,000. It is, simply stated, a rich man's tax bill.
- It provides tax relief for consumption, not investment and productivity. Only 10 percent of his tax program is devoted to stimulating the investment we need for productivity.
- o My opponent also claims that he will cut spending enough for the nation to afford this enormous tax cut and still balance the budget. But for some reason he cannot name a single cut. That will make it pretty hard to balance the budget. And in the past few weeks, he's been promising new programs that will make it even harder. At last count he was at \$140 billion in 1983 and still promising.
- o My opponent seems to believe that government should play almost no role in the economy at all. While I worked with the steel industry to help solve the problems of this vital industry, he seems to think government should keep hands off. I suppose that's why he thinks we can solve our energy problem by giving it all to the oil companies.
- o I don't think a person who believes that the minimum wage is one of the principal causes of unemployment - as Mr. Reagan said - can develop answers to reduce unemployment.

B. Carter

- o My economic renewal program concentrates on investment and productivity incentives to create jobs -- so we grow without rekindling inflation by a massive stimulus to consumers. I have founded my economic program on three principles:
 - First, that we must achieve energy security through the comprehensive energy program now in place. This has reversed the decades of growing dependence on foreign oil. Every year of my Presidency we have imported less foreign oil than the year before. Here I differ strongly with Governor Reagan, who has said repeatedly that all we need to do to solve our energy problem is to leave it in the hands of the oil companies.

- Second, we must continue to control the growth of Federal spending, and reduce the burden of regulation and taxation. I have already proven that we can do this, by cutting the rate of spending growth to half that of my Republican predecessor. My proposal to offset social security taxes will help reduce inflation in the immediate future. We will continue to deregulate the economy as I have done with airlines, rails, trucking and banks.
- I am strongly opposed, however, to committing the government to hundreds of billions in tax cuts with no specific plan to reduce spending. Here again I differ sharply from Governor Reagan, whose Kemp-Roth tax cut would be highly inflationary.
- Third, I believe that in the years immediately ahead America is going to have to invest heavily in its own future
 - o both to modernize its industry, create jobs, and
 - o to build the new facilities we need to make our energy future secure.
- o That is why the Economic Revitalization Plan I have proposed the Congress enact next year is carefully targeted to increase business investment. It is a program that will put people - one million new jobs within two years - to work and increase productivity to maintain our economic strength without rekindling inflation. And here again I differ from Governor Reagan: almost 90 percent of his massive tax cuts are for consumption-oriented tax relief and only 10 percent go to promote investment incentives.
- o Ours is the most productive economy on earth. Working together, it will remain so.

HANDLING OF ECONOMY

Question: Given our problems with unemployment, recession and inflation, why do you believe your handling of the economy merits another four years?

Answer:

THEME

THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN HARD FOR OUR NATION, BUT RECESSION IS OVER AND INFLATION HAS ABATED. WE HAVE HAD MANY SUCCESSES AS WELL AS DISAPPOINTMENTS. I HAVE PROPOSED AND BEGUN AN ECONOMIC RENEWAL PROGRAM AND AN ENERGY PROGRAM THAT WILL CREATE JOBS AND STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S INDUSTRY. I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO FIGHT INFLATION AND I HAVE PROPOSED NEW PROGRAMS TO CONTINUE THIS FIGHT. MY OPPONENT, BY CONTRAST, PROMISES TO SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMY PRIMARILY BY ONE SINGLE, SIMPLE AND WRONG IDEA. A LARGE ACROSS-THE-BOARD TAX CUT THAT EVEN HIS OWN RUNNING MATE ADMITTED WOULD BE INFLATIONARY AND A MISTAKE.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Our nation's economy has suffered from rising inflation for fifteen years due to the costs of the Vietnam War, the Soviet grain sale of 1972, OPEC price shocks in 1974 and 1979, and declining productivity. In the last two years, the nation's oil bill has more than doubled, making the problem worse. We have learned through hard experience the tenacity of inflationary forces and the importance of opposing them continually, intelligently and well.
- o In the past four years, I proposed and began the nation's first real energy program to help meet this challenge. And we are beginning to do so. Today, we buy two million barrels a day less oil from OPEC than we did in 1977. This means our nation's economy will be more stable and have lower inflation in the future.
- o To increase productivity in our basic industries, I have brought together business and labor to meet with government and solve problems cooperatively. In the coal industry, working together for the first time, we reached agreement on ways to make mining better and more efficient. And we have begun to do this in the automobile and steel industries.
- o I have worked to reduce paperwork (15% reduction) and cut red tape that can frustrate our natural enterprise. My programs for deregulation of the trucking, airline, railroad and banking industries mark the most important restructuring of relations between government and industry since the New Deal. For the first time, I have set strict limits on agency paperwork requirements.

- o My program of budgetary firmness has meant a decline in the rate of growth of federal spending I inherited.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o The key is I have learned from hard experience the difficulty of fighting inflation and the dangers of over-stimulation. Mr. Reagan would repeat the errors of the past by a highly stimulative, consumption-oriented tax cut for the wealthy. Governor Regan's proposals stand in sharp contrast to mine. Instead of a targeted program of investment incentives, about 85% of his program would be Reagan-Kemp-Roth notion of a single across-the-board personal income tax cut. This proposal is so poor an idea that the Governor's own running mate opposed it. So did many of his own economic advisers. So did former President Ford. When Republicans refuse to support the economic program of their own nominee, you can bet they have good reasons. And they do.
 - It would be inflationary. Unless accompanied by enormous budget cuts -- cuts that the Governor keeps promising but never spells out -- his plans would cause budget deficits of \$100 billion or more, and increase inflation. His own running mate called the proposal "economic voodoo" and said it would raise the inflation rate to 30 percent.
 - It would be regressive. In 1983, his proposal would give \$175 to a family making \$12,000, but \$15,000 to a family making \$200,000.
 - It provides the vast majority of its tax relief for consumption, not investment and productivity. Although his program does include a proposal for accelerated depreciation, most of his tax relief is not tied to the investment we need for productivity.
- o My opponent also claims that he will cut spending enough for the nation to afford this enormous tax cut and still balance the budget. But somehow he can't come up with any programs to cut. In fact, in the past few weeks, he's been promising more wherever he travels. At our last count, he was at \$140 billion in 1983 and still spending.

B. Carter

- o I am committed that ours remain the most productive economy on earth.
- o I have proposed an economic renewal program for prompt enactment next year that would help increase productivity and create jobs (1 million within 2 years) without increasing inflation as well. It includes:
 - vastly accelerated depreciation schedules for plant and equipment to encourage modernization (40%);

- targeted tax programs for investment;
 - aid to workers and communities;
 - public investment in our transportation system and in the scientific research that maintains our economic leadership;
 - a new partnership between government and industry, to solve problems cooperatively through an Economic Revitalization Board;
 - a reduction in Social Security taxes by an income tax credit that reduces inflation and leaves the Social Security Trust Fund secure.
- o Furthermore, we have begun to find new ways to fight inflation. My proposal to offset social security tax increases will reduce inflation in the immediate future. I am also exploring other ways to use the tax system to help moderate wage and price behavior.

ECONOMIC PROPOSAL COMPARISON AND OVERVIEW

Question: How would you compare your economic revitalization program with Governor Reagan's tax cut proposal? How does your economic revitalization program help the average working person or family? Won't the additional Federal spending be inflationary?

Answer:

THEME

MY RECORD IN ECONOMIC POLICY IS NOT AS GOOD AS I WOULD LIKE, BUT THE ECONOMY IS IMPROVING IN MANY AREAS. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH DURING MY TERM HAS BEEN FASTER THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. I HAVE PUT INTO PLACE A SERIES OF POLICIES WHICH WILL LEAD TO A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND LESS INFLATIONARY AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE FUTURE. MY ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION PROGRAM IS PRUDENT, RESTRAINED, AND CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO INCREASE INVESTMENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT, AND TO REDUCE INFLATION. MY OPPONENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS PROPOSED A SINGLE, SIMPLISTIC ANSWER TO THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH FACE OUR NATION -- A MASSIVE, ACROSS-THE-BOARD INDIVIDUAL TAX CUT WHICH WOULD BE REGRESSIVE, INFLATIONARY, AND COMPLETELY UNRESPONSIVE TO THE CRITICAL NEED TO INCREASE INVESTMENT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SPUR FASTER PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 80'S.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o We have had a difficult year but the trends are favorable. I have led this Nation out of one recession which I inherited and we are coming out of one which hit during my Administration. Inflation, while still too high, has come down and has averaged % over the last months.
- o During the first three years of my Administration, 8.8 million new jobs were created -- more jobs than were created in any other Administration in history and twice as many as during the previous Republican Administration.
- o Against formidable political opposition, I have put into place a comprehensive and coherent National Energy Program, and its effects are now evident: we have cut our foreign oil consumption by two million barrels since I took office and no other nation on earth can match that record.
- o I have put into place policies to increase the productivity of our economy. From 1976 to 1979 investment has increased 25%. Perhaps even more important has been my success in reducing inefficient, productivity-reducing regulations: we have deregulated the airlines, the railroads, trucking and the banking industries. These actions have already saved consumers billions of dollars as they increase competition and the efficiency of the American economy.

- o I have implemented a prudent and responsible fiscal policy, and after decades during which other administrations only talked about spending restraint, I have achieved it: the growth in real Federal budget outlays has been cut in half compared to the rate of the previous Republican Administration. And, in 1981 the Federal deficit as a percent of GNP will be less than half what it was in 1976.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o I have learned the bitter lessons of inflation. I will not over-inflate the economy but Governor Reagan's Kemp-Roth tax cut would do so.
- o In contrast to my balanced, moderate approach to economic policy, Governor Reagan has proposed one single, simplistic proposal to deal with all of the complex economic problems of our country -- a massive, across-the-board, 30% individual income tax cut -- a rich man's tax cut which would flood the Nation with excess dollars. There is no recognition of the crucial need to reduce our vulnerability to OPEC oil price increases.
- o There is no emphasis in his program of the critical need to encourage private investment in plant and equipment. I believe that the tax code must provide investment incentives so that our workers will be equipped with the most modern and efficient capital in the world. That is apparently less important to Governor Reagan, since he devotes only 10 percent of his tax cut to investment incentives.
- o Further, Governor Reagan's tax cuts would benefit the rich at the expense of the rest of us. A person earning \$200,000 would receive 35 times as large a tax cut under the Reagan proposal as a person earning \$20,000 a year.
- o Most importantly, Governor Reagan has not learned the lessons of the past few years about inflation. We cannot afford to fuel inflation. Yet, his proposal is extremely inflationary -- his own running mate said it would bring 30% inflation. That is not unlikely when you cut taxes by \$1 trillion over the next years, and remain committed to massive defense spending, protecting entitlement programs, and promise new spending programs.

B. Carter

- o I, too, am committed to reducing personal tax burdens, but spending restraint is an essential prerequisite. Massive tax cuts which primarily benefit the rich and which pick the pockets of the rest of Americans by generating huge, inflationary pressures cannot be tolerated.

- o My economic program for the eighties, in contrast, is restrained, responsible and designed to promote the long-term growth of the economy. It devotes 50 percent of the tax cuts to investment incentives and another 1/3 to offset increased Social Security costs on business, compared to Reagan's 10 percent. I would simplify and accelerate depreciation to promote investment. I would make the investment tax credit partially refundable so that firms which have no earnings but still have substantial investment needs, can benefit from the investment tax credit at the time when it will be most helpful to their cash flow.
- o I would expand public investment as well in long-term investments in our Nation's highways, ports and railroads. I have also proposed an expansion in human resources programs; no investment has a higher payoff than an investment in workers' skills and experience. I have proposed an expansion in support for research and development which underlies industrial innovation and productivity growth. And I have proposed public investments in conservation and weatherization that will increase our economic and national security.
- o I believe that the complex economic problems that will face our Nation in the 80's require not a retreat by the Federal government, but rather a new partnership among the government and the private sector. To foster the cooperation necessary to master the economic challenges of the 80's I will establish a new advisory body, comprised of representatives of business, labor and the public; the President's Economic Revitalization Board, and will continue to work with our labor-business-government boards for steel, autos and coal.
- o I recognize that economic policy must also address the immediate difficulties faced by workers and their families in changing economic circumstances. I have proposed a new, temporary Federal Supplemental Benefits program to provide an additional 13 weeks of unemployment assistance. For the longer term, a 10 percent tax credit for investments in areas suffering from a declining industrial base will be proposed. Passage of my Economic Development Proposal now before the Congress will provide productive employment for those in distressed areas, and passage of my youth bill will provide training and employment for 450,000 young people when fully implemented.
- o Finally, to reduce personal tax burdens on those most afflicted by inflation and the rise in social security taxes for 1981 I have proposed an 8 percent tax credit to offset the rise in social security taxes in 1981, an expansion of the earned income tax credit for those families who pay social security taxes yet earn too little to pay income taxes, and a special tax deduction will be offered to help offset the "marriage penalty."
- o This program will enable us to meet our underlying economic problems, to re-industrialize, and to avoid fueling inflationary pressures.

CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY

Question: Hasn't your economic policy been one of continuous new policies, new budget directions, new anti-inflation initiatives? Why haven't you been able to stick with a single economic policy?

Answer:

- o The press has exaggerated the number of policies. I'm required to submit a new budget for each fiscal year to deal with the expected economic circumstances. This does not mean we had a new economic policy each year. Even minor changes in my voluntary wage-price guidelines were counted by some as a new policy.
- o My basic economic philosophy and my approach to economic policy have been quite consistent over the past four years. My aim is:
 - to encourage healthy economic growth;
 - to do so carefully and prudently so as not to make the government itself an engine of inflation;
 - to meet quickly and decisively any new inflationary threats from abroad -- like last year's massive oil price increase;
 - to restrain the growth of Federal spending so as to be able to provide responsible and noninflationary tax reduction for the American people;
 - and to make our country less dependent on foreign oil.
- o My basic policy goals have not changed. But economic circumstances at home and abroad do change, sometimes very swiftly and unpredictably. And specific budgetary, monetary and other economic measures have to be promptly set in motion to deal with those changes. Consistent economic policy does not mean sticking one's head in the sand. It would be the height of irresponsibility to stand idly by while inflationary or recessionary forces run unchecked. All Presidents have recognized this and changed their economic policies accordingly.
- o Let me give an example. In March of this year, as the last surge of oil price hikes was underway, inflation threatened to get out of hand. Even though I had just sent a new budget to the Congress, I convened Congressional leaders to work with me on cutting additional amounts of Federal spending, in order to deal with the intensified inflation. The medicine worked. While inflation is still too high, it has receded sharply from that in the early months of this year.
- o In all of this, I did not change my basic approach. But I did move quickly with specific new policies to meet a new threat to our country's economy. F.D.R. said he would continue to experiment in dealing with an intolerable problem until he found the right solution. He wasn't accused of inconsistency.

- o In my first two years I concentrated on ending the recession and restoring solid growth. Since then I have placed primary emphasis on fighting inflation.
- o Finally, experience has taught me to be even more aware than I was four years ago how stubborn and persistent inflation is. Because of that heightened awareness, I have been especially vigilant in the past year to prevent actions that might lead to renewed inflation. I successfully opposed a ~~surprise~~ election year tax cut. I have proposed to the Congress for enactment next year a very careful and prudent economic recovery program that is in sharp contrast to the massive and inflationary ~~across-the-board~~ tax cuts that are the centerpiece of Governor Reagan's economic policy. I wish he had learned as much as I have over the past four years about the strength of inflation. If he had, he would not be proposing a tax cut that will cost \$1 trillion over the next seven years.

AUTO IMPORTS

Question: Do you favor restrictions on the number of Japanese autos imported into the U.S.?

Answer:

THEME

WE HAVE A GOOD SOUND RECORD OF WORKING TO REVITALIZE THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. I AM COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF CONTINUING TO HELP THE INDUSTRY REGAIN ITS STRENGTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD. I WILL AWAIT THE DECISION OF THE ITC BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION. BUT I WILL BE PREPARED IF THEY FIND INJURY TO OUR INDUSTRY FROM IMPORTS. BUT I HAVE ASKED THE JAPANESE NOT TO EXPAND THEIR PRODUCTION CAPACITY TO SELL MORE CARS TO THE U.S. AND TO BE SENSITIVE TO AMERICAN JOBS IN THEIR EXPORT POLICY.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o In 1977, I strongly urged the leaders of the U.S. auto industry in the Cabinet Room to begin building fuel-efficient cars. My warnings went unheeded.
- o I worked with the Congress to pass tough fuel economy standards. This got the industry to start making fuel-efficient cars earlier than they would have otherwise done.
- o My Administration has done a great deal to revitalize our domestic automobile industry. We have reduced the regulatory burden on the automobile industry by more than \$600 million; we have accelerated the government's purchases of autos and trucks and taken steps to ensure that every car and truck the government buys is made in America; we have proposed new tax incentives to help the industry retool for the future; and we have provided substantial new aid to the workers and communities most affected by the rapid changes in the automobile industry.
- o We also are working to open the Japanese markets to American made cars and parts, and to encourage Japanese automakers to make additional investments in this country.
- o I am extremely concerned about the level of Japanese auto imports and their effect on the U.S. auto industry and its workers.
- o I already have asked the U.S. International Trade Commission to accelerate its investigation of the auto industry. The ITC will report to me on November 10 whether the auto industry has been injured by imports. If the ITC finds injury, they will submit their recommendations for relief to me on November 24.
- o In anticipation of the ITC's decision, I have asked my Special Trade Representative to complete the necessary staff work so that I can respond immediately to the ITC's reports.

- o If the ITC finds injury, I will ask my Trade Representative to initiate high-level contacts with the Japanese government immediately. I will seriously consider all possible options, including measures to restrict imports.
- o Whatever the ITC recommends, however, I am confident that we will lick the problem of Japanese imports.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o My opponent has not given us any cohesive policy for addressing the problems of the automobile. He has blamed almost all of the problems of the industry on government regulations.
- o After first saying he was against any steps to restrict imports Governor Reagan stated in Michigan that something must be done to stem the flow of Japanese imports, but has not specifically advocated restraining Japanese imports.

B. Carter

- o I see a bright future for the U.S. auto industry - one that's already starting. We will increasingly make the most fuel-efficient, safest, soundest cars in the world.
- o The key to the revitalization of our auto industry is the industry's effort to produce more small, fuel-efficient cars in this country. With the new 1981 models, we are well on our way to achieving this goal.
- o To ensure that government is doing everything possible to help the auto industry put American auto workers back on the job, I have established an Auto Industry Committee. On this Committee, business, labor and government will work together to help restore the auto industry to full health.
- o This Committee will address the full range of issues affecting the auto industry, including imports, regulations, tax policy and other critical issues. There is no question in my mind that, working together, we can lick the problems of the auto industry and Japanese imports.

BUDGET QUESTIONS: GENERAL APPROACH

THEME

I HAVE A SOLID RECORD OF CUTTING THE REAL GROWTH IN THE BUDGET BELOW THAT OF PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS. I ALSO HAVE FOUR YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ESTABLISHING NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MAKING THE TOUGH BUDGETARY DECISIONS TO MEET THEM. MY POLICY OF FISCAL RESTRAINT IS ESSENTIAL TO REDUCING INFLATION AND BUILDING A SECURE ECONOMIC FUTURE.

MY OPPONENT HAS NO EXPERIENCE IN MAKING THESE HARD CHOICES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL. HE APPARENTLY DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT TOUGH CHOICES EXIST. SO, HE PROMISES HUGE TAX CUTS, MASSIVE INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING, MAINTAINING ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS AND BALANCING THE BUDGET AT THE SAME TIME. THE RESULT WOULD BE HUGE BUDGET DEFICITS, AND WORSE INFLATION, IN THE 1980s.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o The budget must be viewed in terms of real program expenditures in relation to the size of the economy. The record shows budgetary restraint.
 - In my four budgets real outlays have grown at an average rate of 1.6%. In the two previous Republican Administrations the rate was 2-1/2%.
 - Real defense outlays have grown by nearly 3-1/2% each year; in the Nixon-Ford Administrations they fell by nearly 3-1/2% per year.
 - The budget deficit for the current fiscal year is projected to be 1 to 1-1/2% of GNP. When I ran for office the deficit was over 4% of GNP.
- o Within this overall context of restraint, I have directed budget expenditures to programs of highest national priority.
 - Real defense spending has increased by almost 3-1/2% per year after a steady eight-year decline under two Republican Administrations.
 - Major new initiatives in energy conservation and supply, funded by the windfall profit tax, have established a long-overdue energy policy to reduce our dependence on oil imported from insecure foreign sources.

- Real outlay growth in basic research will secure our technological base for future growth and development.
- Employment and training programs, especially for our youth, will enhance the skills and productive capacity of our people.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan has promised massive tax cuts, higher defense spending and a balanced budget -- but the numbers do add up.
- o He has recently proposed additional spending increases which make large future deficits and inflation even more likely -- examples: Social Security earnings test removal, tuition tax credits, inheritance tax repeal.
- o He has promised big spending cuts, but refuses to tell us which programs will be cut. All he can say is that waste will be eliminated. In the current Fiscal Year he has promised cuts of \$13-\$19 billion, but still has provided no details.
- o He presided over real expenditure growth as Governor of California that was the highest in the State's history -- 126% increase in spending.

B. Carter

- o Inflation is the most serious threat to our economic security. We must not run the risk of large, inflationary budget deficits from massive across-the-board tax cuts.
- o Moderate tax cuts, consistent with fiscal restraint and emphasizing investment and industrial growth, not consumption, is the responsible approach.
- o This approach will allow us to create a million new jobs by the end of 1982, but still bring down inflation.
- o In the longer term, budgetary goals require strong, non-inflationary economic growth. This requires savings, investment, and attention to structural change in the economy. My program addresses these problems. The Reagan program instead offers a massive consumption-oriented tax cut.

Farm Policy

Question: Haven't your farm policies produced lower incomes and prices for farmers in recent years? How do you propose to remedy this without fueling inflation?

Answer:

THEME

IN ASSUMING THE PRESIDENCY, I INHERITED A FARM ECONOMY THAT WAS IN A STATE OF SERIOUS DECLINE, MADE WORSE BY THE CONFUSED AND CONTRADICTORY FARM POLICIES OF PRIOR REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATIONS. MY ADMINISTRATION HAS SUCCESSFULLY TURNED THIS SITUATION AROUND. NOT ONLY DO WE HAVE CLEAR, CONSISTENT SETS OF FARM POLICIES THAT WORK, WE HAVE THE RESULTS TO PROVE THAT THEY WORK -- HIGHER PRICES, HIGHER INCOMES, HIGHER EXPORTS.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o When I entered office, grain prices were in a tailspin, cattle producers were liquidating their herds after four years of heavy losses, the bottom was dropping out of farm income, consumers and producers were engaged in open confrontation, and our nation's reputation as a reliable exporter of farm products had been seriously tarnished.
- o We immediately began to correct this. I began by appointing a farmer as Secretary of Agriculture. We then took a number of steps to eliminate governmental interference in those decisions that were better left to the individual farmer. We established this nation's first farmer-owned grain reserve. We brought farm price supports in line with rising production costs. We re-established our reputation within the world market and negotiated across-the-board reductions in foreign trade barriers.
- o The results speak for themselves. By every meaningful measure -- total gross farm income, total net farm income, total production, total consumption, total farm exports -- the record of the first four years of this Administration top any previous four-year period in history.

NOTE: Reagan is likely to point to the drop in net farm income between 1979 and 1980 (we now estimate a 24 percent drop). Counter-points, if he does are:

- (1) since farm income varies significantly year-to-year, the only meaningful comparisons are across periods of at least 3-4 years,
- (2) even with the decline, it will be over 25% above the last year of the Republican Administration, and
- (3) thanks to very strong markets, here and abroad, it is already on the rise and will be significantly higher next year.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o It is difficult to know what my opponents' view of farm policy really is. Earlier this year, he said he was not familiar with parity. He once said about farm price supports, "You subsidize the inefficient when you put a floor under the price." About dairy farmers, he said, "My view on dairy subsidies is that we are subsidizing those who could not compete at the expense of those who could possibly bring the price down in the market place."
- o Despite his life-long opposition to traditional farm programs, Governor Reagan's campaign statements imply that he would not try to dismantle farm subsidies. However, one cannot be very optimistic that they would receive the continuing attention and adjustment they require, especially given the Republican record.
- o Republican farm policies never have been noted for their vision. Rather, they have been characterized by confusion and contradiction. They have always preached free markets, but the record shows that they practiced price controls and export embargoes. They vetoed price support legislation, usually when it was most desperately needed. They repeatedly raised our import quotas to allow foreign dairy products to flood our markets. They cut food aid to hungry nations when it was most needed. In short, it is a sorry record. Not only does it display a lack of respect for the functioning of market forces, but it reveals an insensitivity to the economic and human problems of the ordinary farm family.

B. Carter

- o While I am pleased that my Administration has turned around the disastrous situation we inherited and I am proud of the policy we constructed in doing so, there is more to be done. American agriculture is on the threshold of a whole new era -- an era of tightening world food supplies, mounting pressures on our land and water resources, continued strains on our transportation and marketing system, the need to press forward on developing new technologies and production practices, an even more pressing need to safeguard agriculture's access to limited energy supplies and to nurture the development of alternative sources. While this will be an era of excitement and opportunity, it will also be one of rapid change and adjustment.
- o In this era of opportunity and change, I intend to pursue policies built on the solid foundation we have already laid, but giving particular stress to:
 - ensuring that farm prices and support levels keep pace with rising production costs;
 - further actions to deregulate agriculture;
 - the promotion of farm exports, including stepped-up promotion of "value added" products like meat, poultry, breeding animals,
 - an intensive effort to restructure and rebuild our agricultural transportation system.
 - the continued accelerated development of alternative energy sources (gasohol, farm crops.

SOVIET GRAIN SUSPENSION

Question: Hasn't the grain embargo hurt our farmers more than it has hurt the Soviets? Under what circumstances would you be prepared to lift it?

Answer:

THEME

I TOOK THIS ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE AFGHANISTAN PEOPLE AND THE THREAT THAT IMPLIED FOR WORLD SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME I SUSPENDED SHIPMENT OF SOVIET GRAIN, I ACTED TO PROTECT AMERICA'S FARMERS FROM BEARING A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE BURDEN. BOTH THE SUSPENSION AND THE OFFSETTING ACTIONS TO PROTECT FARMERS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. I WILL LIFT THE EMBARGO ONLY IF IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT: (1) IT HAS BECOME INEFFECTIVE OR (2) THE SOVIETS HAVE ALTERED THEIR BEHAVIOR.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o In the 1976 campaign, I promised America's farmers I would resort to an embargo only if our national security or our foreign policy interests were threatened ... that I would never embargo grain shipments just to keep farm prices down as the Republicans did on at least three occasions. I have kept that promise.
- o Armed Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan last year. I was faced with three options: (1) do nothing, (2) respond militarily, or (3) use economic sanctions. I chose the latter.
- o In addition to suspending all grain shipments above the 6 million ton level called for in the grain agreement, I ordered a curtailment of Russian fishing privileges in our waters, cut off the sale of high technology products, halted the sale of phosphate fertilizers, and called for a boycott of the Moscow Olympic games.
- o At the same time, I directed the Secretary of Agriculture to take whatever actions were necessary to ensure that American farmers did not bear a disproportionate share of the resulting burden. This was accomplished by isolating from the market slightly more than 17 million tons of grain.
- o By every measure, the suspension has accomplished its purpose. It has shorted the Soviets of 8 to 10 million tons of badly needed feed grains for their livestock. It has caused the Soviets to draw-down their stocks of grain to rock-bottom levels. It has caused meat and dairy production to fall. It has been a major embarrassment to Kremlin leaders. It has even caused worker unrest, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

- o The measures taken to protect America's farmers have also been successful. Not only did our isolation of grain provide needed support to farm prices, but through the aggressive promotion of farm exports, we increased the level above what we had expected before the suspension. Farm prices are up. As a result, we will set our fourth straight farm export record this year, \$40 billion ... a net positive contribution to our balance of payments of \$23 billion. We have expanded our world markets - e.g., to Mexico and China.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan has taken different positions on this issue at every turn. Just three months before I suspended grain shipments to the Soviet Union, he said, "If the Russians want to buy wheat from us ... I wouldn't sell to them."
- o Yet, when it came time to campaign among farmers in the Iowa caucus, Governor Reagan had changed his position, saying the embargo shouldn't have been ordered, wouldn't hurt the Soviets, and would only hurt our farmers.
- o Beyond their vacillation, my Republican critics seem to forget their embargoes of 1973, 1974, and 1975 - embargoes that were totally unprovoked and were taken against some of our most trusted friends. They also fail to mention that these Republican Administrations never did a thing to protect our own farmers against the price depressing effects of those embargoes. Indeed, the reason for the embargoes was to drive down domestic farm prices.

B. Carter

- o I am convinced of the correctness of my decision to suspend the shipment of grain to the Soviets.
- o There are only two circumstances that would lead me to lift the suspension, neither of which currently prevail: (1) convincing evidence that the embargo is no longer effective or (2) a belief on my part that the Soviet threat to the rest of the world was being alleviated and that there was progress being made in the Soviets' withdrawal of their occupying troops from Afghanistan.
- o The future of the Soviet grain agreement, which expires September 30, 1981, has not been determined and will be considered later next year.

NOTE:

The Soviets have nearly completed their purchases for shipment during the fifth year of the agreement (beginning October 1), with contracts now signed for 4.8 million tons of corn and 1.0 million tons of wheat. Although the International Longshoremen are once again threatening not to load the Soviet grain, we anticipate that the courts will keep the grain flowing with minimal delay.

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

ENERGY: NUCLEAR POWER

Question: What do you see as the future of nuclear power in this country? Do you accept the Democratic Platform's position that existing nuclear plants can be phased-out as alternative fuel sources become available?

Answer:

THEME

WE MUST PUT SAFETY FIRST IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER. FOR THE NEXT 20 YEARS OR SO, UNTIL WE HAVE DEVELOPED MORE SYNTHETIC FUELS AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES AND HAVE DEVELOPED FUSION. WE SIMPLY CANNOT MEET OUR ECONOMY'S NEEDS WITHOUT UTILIZING EVERY DOMESTIC SOURCE OF POWER AVAILABLE TO US -- INCLUDING NUCLEAR POWER. HOWEVER IT SHOULD BE A LAST RESORT, AND ULTIMATELY, WE HOPE WE CAN PHASE IT OUT.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o After the accident at Three Mile Island, I moved promptly to appoint the Kemeny Commission to make a careful study of that incident. They submitted an important set of recommendations, and I took a number of immediate steps to ensure that nuclear power plants were operated safely:
 - Reorganized the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and nominated a new Chairman.
 - Established the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee, an expert advisory group to monitor the progress of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, other Federal agencies and others in improving the safety of nuclear power plants.
 - Put the Federal Emergency Management Agency in charge of all off-site emergency activities, and had them complete a review of all emergency plans.
 - Accelerated the program to place a resident Federal inspector at every reactor site, and I can now report that there are such inspectors at every operating reactor.
- o I have also established the Nation's first comprehensive radioactive waste management program:
 - Submitted my comprehensive program to the Congress and have worked with them to enact nuclear waste legislation.
 - Established the State Planning Council to provide an effective role for State and local governments in the development and implementation of our nuclear waste management program.

- o Plants are now being licensed again but under much stricter safety standards.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan simply does not understand the complicated issues presented by nuclear power. For instance, he always speaks in terms of speeding up the licensing process for nuclear power plants rather than emphasizing making sure that they are truly safe.
- o And just this year, Governor Reagan said that "all of the waste in a year from a nuclear power plant could be stored under a desk." That obviously is not true. This cavalier attitude completely ignores the responsibility of the Federal Government to find and to establish a safe nuclear waste disposal program.

B. Carter

- o I am committed to ensuring that nuclear reactors are operated safely. I receive regular reports from the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee that I established, and I will take any actions that I can to guarantee the American people that their power plants pose no threat to their health or welfare.
- o I am committed to the passage of nuclear waste legislation implementing the comprehensive program that I sent to the Congress last February.
- o I am committed to the rapid development of alternative fuels to ensure that we are not overly dependent on nuclear power. I hope ultimately we can phase-out nuclear power but this cannot be done in the short-run.

ENERGY: RELATIONSHIP WITH OPEC

Question: Haven't you let OPEC dictate our energy policies? What are you prepared to do if OPEC announces another doubling of oil prices?

Answer:

THEME

WHEN I TOOK OFFICE IN JANUARY 1977, OPEC HAS A STRANGLEHOLD ON THE OIL-DEPENDENT ECONOMIES OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD. WE HAVE REVERSED -- IN A HISTORIC WAY -- THE DECADES OF GROWING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL SINCE WORLD WAR II. MY ENERGY POLICY HAS STEADILY FREED OUR NATION FROM THE GRIP OF THIS DANGEROUS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL. EVERY YEAR I HAVE BEEN IN OFFICE WE HAVE REDUCED OUR DEPENDENCE ON OPEC, AND I HAVE LED THE WAY TO INCREASING COOPERATION AMONG MAJOR CONSUMING NATIONS TO BE READY TO RESPOND TOGETHER TO ANY UNREASONABLE PRICE INCREASES.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Despite the experience of the oil embargo in 1973, the Republican Administrations that preceded me did little but talk about energy policy while our dependence on imported oil steadily increased. When I took office, the United States imported nearly half of the oil we used -- 8.8 million barrels per day.
- o Within 90 days after I took office, in my first major address to the Nation, I announced a comprehensive energy policy to increase domestic production and decrease energy consumption. These policies have decreased our oil imports by 2 million barrels per day since I took office; there is no better way to avoid having OPEC dictate our national choices and policies than by cutting down the only real weapon they have -- their oil supply. Production of coal, natural gas and crude oil are up. Solar and synthetic energy is being accelerated. Conservation is working.
- o I have also tried to lead the major industrial democracies to make a similar commitment, to reduce their oil imports and to develop alternative resources. In Tokyo in 1979, and then in Venice this past summer, we reached agreements that allow us to withstand -- together -- any challenge in the world.
- o As recently as this month, the member nations of the International Energy Agency agreed to moderate their activity in the spot market and to prevent market disruptions that the Iraq/Iran conflict might have caused. This effort could not be effective if it were attempted by just one nation, but the cooperative structure that we have forged has proved very effective in this tense period. Spot market prices remain calm and there are no indications of panic buying or hoarding. This shows the progress we have been making very clearly -- we are now prepared for the type of shortfalls caused by the war.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan opposes my programs to provide Federal assistance in order to increase production or decrease consumption: he opposes the Windfall Profits Tax, the Department of Energy, the commitment to Solar, the importance of conservation. Governor Reagan believes that we can solve our energy problems alone, just by "turning the oil companies loose" to find more oil in this country.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to provide substantial Federal assistance for energy conservation and for increased energy production programs. Further decreasing our dependence on foreign oil is the very best way to escape OPEC dominance and demands.
- o I will also continue to strengthen the cooperative structure that I have forged with our allies, so that we can work together to resist any attempts by OPEC to make unreasonable changes in their price or supply conditions.
- o I hope to develop a constructive dialogue with moderate OPEC producers to assure greater certainty of price and supply on world crude oil markets.
- o I want to complete the few remaining pieces of my energy program (Utility Oil Backout bill; Energy Mobilization Board).

ENERGY: ROLE OF HIGHER ENERGY PRICES
IN YOUR ENERGY PROGRAM

Question: Hasn't your energy program caused trouble for you with Democrats because it is essentially the traditional Republican program of inducing greater conservation and production through higher prices?

Answer:

THEME

ENERGY POLICY OPTIONS CANNOT BE SO EASILY PLACED INTO PARTISAN PIGEONHOLES. MY POLICIES HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE NEED TO BALANCE THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF AN INCREASINGLY SCARCE RESOURCE AGAINST THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS FOR ASSISTANCE OF THOSE WHO ARE BEING HURT BY THE RISING PRICES.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o My energy program has been enacted over these last four years with bipartisan support.
- o I made it clear from my first energy message in 1977 that the price of imported energy was certain to increase. That is a fact of life. To accomplish our goals I have supported the deregulation of energy prices. We cannot have the production and conservation we need with artificial controls on energy. But I have decontrolled on a gradual basis and have gotten the Congress to pass the Windfall Profits Tax to insure that all of the additional profits from decontrol do not go into oil company coffers. That revenue (\$227 billion over ten years) will be used to develop and to conserve more energy here in America, and to help the poor who are most affected by the energy price increases.
- o The only way to combat the increasing energy price tag -- up to \$85 billion sent overseas for foreign oil this year -- is to increase domestic production and to decrease consumption. And my policies have succeeded in both of those goals:
 - More new oil and gas wells this year than ever before.
 - The highest coal production in our Nation's history.
 - Imports of oil down 2 million barrels since I took office.
 - Consuming 8% less gasoline than one year ago.
- o These policies ultimately will assure lower prices than if we continued to be more and more dependent on OPEC.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

Governor Reagan's energy policy is purely and simply to "turn the oil companies loose", and let them keep virtually all of their windfall profits. He would ignore the need to invest in increased conservation and in alternative energy resources and technologies.

B. Carter

- o I recognized in April of 1977 that doing what was needed in the energy area would not enhance my popularity. I was right.

I was prepared to take ~~the heat~~ for unpopular energy actions, and I will continue to be. But, we now recognize the importance of the steps taken, and that is a vital part of getting the cooperation needed for further progress.

- o Because of the investments that we are making today in energy conservation and in increased production from alternative energy sources, further increases in the price of foreign oil will eventually have a much less serious effect on our Nation's economy.
- o I will continue to provide funding for programs to increase energy conservation and energy production, to ensure that we escape from our dangerous dependence on foreign oil.
- o I want to pass the two remaining pieces of my energy program - The Utility Oil Backout bill to provide incentives for our utilities to produce electricity from American coal rather than foreign oil; and the Energy Mobilization Board, to cut the red-tape out of moving forward with major energy projects while protecting our environmental laws.

ENERGY: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Question: You say that you want America to have "energy security," but you have done nothing to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve until the Congress forced you to act. How do you justify this?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PUT OUR NATION'S FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM IN PLACE. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL ENERGY PROGRAM EXCEPT TURNING THE OIL COMPANIES "LOOSE." I HAVE MOVED TO FILL THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE (SPR) AS RAPIDLY AS THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET SITUATION HAS ALLOWED, AND I AM NOW FILLING IT AT A VERY RAPID RATE -- WELL ABOVE THE LEVEL CONGRESS AUTHORIZED. BECAUSE OF OUR POLICIES, WE NOW -- IN THIS COUNTRY -- HAVE A RECORD LEVEL OF OIL RESERVES IN PRIVATE STOCKS.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o When I took office there was no effective Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program (SPR). There had been severe mismanagement and real technical problems with the pumps. I began to store crude oil in the SPR during the fourth quarter of 1977 and had reached a level of 91.2 million barrels at the end of 1979. This slow fill rate was necessary because of the tight international oil supply due to the cut-off of oil from Iran. If we had purchased large quantities of oil for the SPR, we would have contributed to the increase in oil prices and the shortage of oil supply. As a result of our policies, prices have stabilized and private stocks are at all-time highs.
- o We have this month purchased 24 million barrels of oil for delivery this year and early next year. We have also asked for bids on an additional 12.5 million barrels and expect to award those contracts within a week, for delivery early in 1981.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan claims that he would have filled the SPR rapidly all along, as I am now doing. This is typical of the Governor's failure to understand that energy is really a world problem, in which an apparently simple solution for one nation can actually create much larger problems in the world oil markets that will eventually hurt everyone.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to fill the SPR at above the level required by the statute, after careful consideration of the world oil market situation.
- o This policy is responsible and will ensure that we have a secure energy

CAMPAIGN PROMISES

Question: Why should the public attach much value in your campaign promises this year, since you appear to have disregarded so many of your 1976 campaign promises?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE A SOUND RECORD IN HONORING MY MAJOR CAMPAIGN PROMISES. I LEARNED FROM MY EXPERIENCE AS PRESIDENT, THOUGH, THAT SOME OF MY '76 COMMITMENTS WERE EITHER NOT REALISTIC OR WERE NOT IN OUR COUNTRY'S BEST INTEREST. THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING PRESIDENT HAS TAUGHT ME WHAT CAN REALISTICALLY BE ACHIEVED OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS, AND I HAVE NOT PROMISED MORE THAN THAT. MY OPPONENT CONTINUES TO PROMISE MORE THAN CAN BE ACHIEVED.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I was the first President to compile and disclose publicly all my campaign promises; that was done to allow the public to judge my performance against the promises.
- o Any objective assessment of my performance shows that I have honored an extraordinary number of the promises, and done everything possible to honor most of them:
 - Comprehensive energy policy
 - Comprehensive urban policy
 - Appointments -- affirmative action
 - Humphrey-Hawkins
 - Preserving Social Security System
 - Increased education assistance and a Department of Education
 - Supporting human rights
 - Peace between Egypt and Israel
 - Improved relations with China
- o In some cases, Congressional resistance has made impossible the fulfillment of promises during my first term -- National Health Insurance, Welfare Reform, Tax Reform. But I am determined to pursue these matters over the next four years.
- o In some instances, I have departed from my '76 commitments because of the realities I have faced in office and because of the new facts I have learned. For instance, I decided to decontrol oil prices to increase domestic production. I was not able to balance the budget because of the recession. And I have increased defense spending beyond the levels I discussed in '76 campaign due to the poor state of our armed forces and the continued Russian buildup.

- o I have learned much better over the past four years what can be achieved and what cannot, what is in our national interest and what is not.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan has not had the benefit of that experience. I can understand, therefore, why he has made some of his promises.
- o In my view, many of his promises are unrealistic and naive. They have no chance of being enacted or implemented.
- o For instance, he has promised to tear up the SALT II Treaty and begin new negotiations with the Soviets. But the Soviets will never agree to that. I found that out in 1977. He has promised to reduce government spending, balance the budget, protect defense spending, and cut taxes by 30% -- without fueling inflation. It simply is not possible, as I believe most Americans realize.

B. Carter

- o Because I have learned from the previous four years, I have not been going around the country making promises to every group I speak before; unlike my opponent I have not been telling every group what it wanted to hear.
- o I have set forth realistic goals for my second term that I am determined to pursue:
 - Continued peace, and strengthened defense.
 - SALT II ratification.
 - Continued reduction in our dependence on foreign oil.
 - ERA ratification.
 - Clean environment.
 - National Health Insurance.
 - Welfare Reform.
 - Continued efforts to bring women and minorities into government.

EXPERIENCE

Question: What have you learned from your experience?

Answer:

THEME

THERE IS A REAL VALUE TO EXPERIENCE IN THE OVAL OFFICE. NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE CAN PREPARE SOMEONE ADEQUATELY. WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN HAVING THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING PRESIDENT IS SHOWING THAT YOU HAVE LEARNED FROM THAT EXPERIENCE. I HAVE. THAT IS WHY I WILL BE A BETTER PRESIDENT OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I have learned a great deal about the Presidency, about our country, about the government, about our role in the world over the past four years. That experience could not have been duplicated elsewhere.
- o I have learned first-hand that no prior experience can adequately prepare someone for the Presidency - certainly not in this ever-demanding government and complex, changing world.
- o The difference between now and 1976 is that I have clearly learned from my experience - learned the importance of extensive consultations with Congress, gotten to know the Congressional leaders and developed friendships with leaders around the world. I have learned to target priorities, the dangers and force of inflation, and the fragility of peace. And I believe I am a better President because of this, and because of the changes I have made.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan would face many of the same problems I did when I took office - a background in State government, a need to put together an entire new Administration, a need to develop an entire new legislative program, a need to get to know well the Members of Congress, a need to meet the world leaders.
- o All of that takes precious time, and all of it means that progress we are already making to solving economic and other problems will be interrupted.
- o And, of course, Governor Reagan will have the added burden of being a Republican, having to deal with a Democratic Congress.

B. Carter

- o I do not claim that, because I have had the experience of being President and have learned from that experience, the future will be all wine and roses. There certainly will be tough problems ahead.
- o My point, though, is that the experience I have had - the truly unique experience - has made me a better President. And during a second term I will be able to do things I did not or could not do in the first term.
- o As a second term Democratic President dealing with a Democratic Congress, I am convinced that we can ratify SALT II, pass National Health Insurance and enact my Economic Revitalization Program (including the job creation element, the credit for Social Security taxes, the elimination of the marriage penalty). These would never see the light of day if my opponent were elected. I am convinced that we can begin to implement my energy program and continue our progress on Middle Eastern peace.

FRUSTRATION AT CARTER-REAGAN CHOICE

Question: Why do you believe so many Americans appear frustrated at the prospect of an election matching Carter and Reagan? Do you believe this frustration is likely to affect voter turnout?

Answer:

THEME

THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOVERNOR REAGAN AND MYSELF IN WHAT WE OFFER FOR THE FUTURE. AS THE PUBLIC INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES THIS FACT, AND RECOGNIZES THAT A STARK CHOICE EXISTS, INTEREST IN THE ELECTION IS PICKING UP.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Over the past 4 years I have had to deal with a great many problems that previous Presidents ignored -- like energy. The decisions I had to make were not popular. That has naturally produced criticism of my policies -- from the many groups and organizations that would like the Federal government to provide them with 100% of their goals, be it increased benefits, grants, loans, wages, prices or contracts. And that is not possible.
- o I am consoled by the fact that I am not the first President to be heavily criticized -- that occurred with Jefferson, with Lincoln, with Truman, with Johnson and others.
- o I believe that, as the election draws closer, the American people are recognizing the realities facing me, and that the decisions I had to make were very tough and not readily subject to simple, politically popular decisions. As that has occurred, I think the "frustration" or "concern" over the choice being offered has dissipated. Support for Mr. Anderson has declined in large part because the public now recognizes it does have a real choice between Governor Reagan and myself. The focus has turned instead to making the right choice.

2. THE FUTUREReagan/Carter

- o The choice facing the electorate is stark -- the differences between the candidates are greater probably than at any time since Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater ran against each other. And the result, over the next four years and beyond, is two vastly different futures.
- o On the major issues, Reagan and I differ sharply:

- SALT II
- Nuclear Arms Race
- ERA
- Reagan-Kemp-Roth
- National Health Insurance
- Windfall Profits Tax
- Department of Education

- o These differences are becoming much better known to the public. This debate will help. I wish we could have had it sooner.
- o As the differences do become better known, the public's interest in the election will increase. And I predict the voter turnout will be substantial -- better than 1976.
- o Finally, let me urge all Americans to exercise their right to vote -- it is precious, it ~~was~~ hard-earned and preserved, it is the basis of our great democracy. No matter who your choice is, please vote on November 4.

GOALS

Question: What are your goals for the country by the end of your next term?
Where do you want this country to be?

Answer:

THEME

I AM DETERMINED TO PURSUE A PROGRAM BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE IN OFFICE WHICH CONTINUES AND BUILDS ON PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TO DATE, WHICH WILL ENSURE A SAFE, SECURE, PROSPEROUS FUTURE, WHICH HELPS EXTEND THE BOUNTY OF AMERICA TO THE DISADVANTAGED.

1. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I have said many times in this campaign that the public has a choice to make between two futures → the future that I see for this country, or the future that Governor Reagan sees.
- o This point is starkly made by my description of my goals for the next four years. In most instances, they are directly opposed to Governor Reagan's goals:
 - He's opposed to SALT II.
 - He's suggested we play the card of a nuclear arms race.
 - He's not supported the Camp David process.
 - He's for a massive tax cut for the wealthy that is inflationary and does not create jobs like my Economic Renewal program does.
 - He's against ERA.
 - He's against National Health Insurance.
 - He's against a strong Windfall Profits Tax, and he's for turning the oil companies loose.
- o Time after time, Governor Reagan and I disagree on the way our country should move forward. That is the real issue in this campaign.

B. Carter

- o We have made good progress in a number of areas during my first term and had disappointment in other areas. But, clearly, everything I wanted to accomplish has not been accomplished. I want to

serve another term, not just to be President for 4 more years, but to use those 4 years to reach the high goals the Democratic Party and I have set for the country.

o My goals would be:

- Energy security, building on and implementing my comprehensive energy policy, and continuing to reduce America's dependence on foreign oil.
- Preservation of peace -- 8 uninterrupted years of peace.
- Reduction in nuclear armament by mutual reductions, through ratification of a SALT Treaty.
- Middle East Peace, fulfilling the Camp David process I began.
- Passage of Economic Renewal Package to revitalize American industry.
- Continued reduction of inflation and unemployment.
- ERA ratification.
- National Health Insurance.
- Increased opportunities for minorities and women.
- Continued fiscal strength of Social Security.

SACRIFICE

Question: Is it going to be necessary for the American people to sacrifice over the next four years? How will you be asking the American people to sacrifice during the next four years? Will they respond?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE ASKED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO MAKE SOME SACRIFICES OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS AND THEY HAVE RESPONDED WELL. WITH SOME FURTHER SACRIFICES, WE CAN BUILD ON PROGRESS WE HAVE ALREADY MADE AND HAVE A SECURE FUTURE - FREE OF CRIPPLING INFLATION AND FOREIGN OIL DEPENDENCE.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I told the American people from my first months in office that sacrifice would be necessary to free ourselves of energy dependency on OPEC - that we would have to conserve, stop our wasteful appetite for oil, drive our cars more frugally.
- o The American people have responded. We are importing 25% less oil now than we were in 1977. A large part of that reduction is due to conservation - better insulation, more efficient autos, changed life styles, and a greater attention to energy use.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I know that Governor Reagan disagrees with my view that energy conservation is an essential sacrifice that the American people can make. His view is that the oil companies, when turned loose, can produce all the energy we need. I disagree.
- o I also disagree with the Governor's apparent posture in the campaign against asking the American people to sacrifice. I say that because, place after place, event after event, wherever Governor Reagan goes he indicates what additional Federal benefits he will provide (lower inheritance taxes, greater Social Security benefits, a massive increase in defense spending).

B. Carter

- o I believe the American people will continue to need to sacrifice in a number of important areas over the next several years if we are to beat the problems of foreign oil dependence and inflation and to ensure a secure future and a sound economy.

- o I will ask the American people to:
 - Continue their efforts at energy conservation - at home, at work, at leisure;
 - restrain their wage and price increases - this is essential if we are to reduce the underlying inflation rate;
 - recognize that domestic programs cannot be expanded at the rate needed to meet all pressing needs - and to recognize that real defense increases will continue to be needed in the future.

TONE OF CAMPAIGN

Question: Don't you think your attacks on Governor Reagan - for warmongering, for racism, for dividing the country - have been primarily responsible for the generally low-road tone of the campaign?

Answer:

- o I have at times resorted to characterizations, and I regret that the tone has not always been what I would prefer. But I have tried to focus on the sharp differences between us on the great issues of the day. I do regret, though, that some of my statements in this campaign have been misconstrued. I gather from Governor Reagan's public comments that he regrets as well that a number of his statements during this campaign have been misconstrued and misinterpreted. I am pleased we can now focus on the issues and the different futures for the country that our two candidacies represent.
- o I have always tried to campaign on the issues and on the positive reasons why I believe I deserve someone's vote. I did that in 1976 against President Ford and I am trying to do it again this year. I wish that my statements on the issues received one-tenth the coverage from the press as the polls or campaign tactics do.
- o What is vital from this point forward is that we have a full airing of the issues and a full opportunity for the voters to decide which type of future they would prefer. I believe this one-on-one debate is a major step forward in that process. I wish we could have had it earlier and more often. But I certainly appreciate Governor Reagan's decision to join me in this debate.
- o I think that over the last few weeks, the tone of the campaign has shifted to the important issues of whether we want SALT II ratified or discarded, whether we want an economic revitalization program or a massive tax cut for the wealthy, whether we want to ratify ERA or not, whether we want National Health Insurance or not, whether we want to keep the Windfall Profits Tax or not, whether we want to abolish the Department of Education or not, and - perhaps most importantly - whether we want to engage in a nuclear arms race or whether we want to reduce tensions and nuclear armaments. These are the issues we need to debate.

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Question: How do you explain your failure to reduce the number of government agencies by the magnitude you promised in 1976 (down to 200)? Do you dispute the view that your reorganization effort has generally been a failure?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVEN'T DONE EVERYTHING. I HOPED BUT I HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN MAKING THE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFICIENT. I AM DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THAT EFFORT IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY IN A SECOND TERM.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

No President before me paid any serious attention to streamlining government and reducing government regulations and paperwork.

- o When I talked about reorganizing the government in the last campaign, I promised to make improvements in the management and organization of government a high priority of my Administration. I kept that promise. To improve the productivity of the Federal worker, I carried out the most far-reaching reform of the civil service system in a hundred years; to develop a foundation for carrying out energy policy, we consolidated scattered energy programs and launched the Synthetic Fuels Corporation; to give education the priority it deserves and at the same time reduce HEW to more manageable size, I gave education a seat at the Cabinet table, to create a stronger system for attacking waste and fraud, I reorganized audit and investigative functions by putting an Inspector General in major agencies. Since I took office, we have submitted 14 reorganization initiatives such as those and had them all approved by Congress. We have not done as much as I would like but we have done more than anyone expected.
- o Some efforts -- civil service, energy, inspectors general -- received a lot of attention; others -- such as Federal disaster assistance and enforcement of equal employment laws, have gone largely unnoticed, except by the storm victims and minority job applicants directly affected.

- o We have tried to eliminate obsolete and ineffective agencies where politically feasible (last year's figures show net reduction of over 400 -- mainly advisory committees, but some more substantial ones -- LEAA and CAB are on their way out; current numbers are probably less favorable). Sometimes the special interests defending such agencies were too strong. One thing I have learned as President -- there is no agency so obscure or incompetent that a special interest will not rise to defend it.
- o Of course, reorganization is not really a numbers game. I accept some of the blame for characterizing it that way in 1976, but I have learned from my experience as President. I have learned that reforming the management systems of government is often more important than changing its architecture.
- o Since 1977, we have devoted as much attention to reorganizing Federal personnel management, more cost-conscious regulatory management, and an expanded and independent audit and investigation system as we have to moving boxes around.
- o Much more important than the number of agencies and personnel is the burden of paperwork and regulatory requirements imposed by the Federal government on its citizenry. I have reduced the paperwork burden by 15% and imposed a new paperwork budget for Federal agencies which promises to reduce it more. A strong management program to ensure the most-effectiveness of new regulations and the sunseting of old ones is now in place. Through airline, rail and trucking deregulation, we have taken far-reaching steps to reduce unnecessary government interference in the marketplace.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Reagan clearly is running against government -- and in doing so, he is running down its people and its institutions. In proposing a total freeze on Federal employment, he ignores the fact that a hiring freeze is already in place -- but a responsible freeze that provides for exceptions for emergencies and vital programs.
- o By threatening to dismantle the Departments of Energy and Education and to reassess the synthetic fuels program, Reagan will plunge these vital programs into confusion and waste precious energy in a fight he could not win.
- o Reagan's proposal to pay thousands of outside auditors to assess all government programs is wasteful and naive. I have already put independent Inspectors General with expanded audit and investigative resources in major agencies. The General Accounting Office, an independent arm of Congress, provides audit and inspection of Federal agencies.

B. Carter

- o Improving the quality and efficiency of Federal programs through reorganization and management reforms will continue to be a high priority.
- o Major areas of our emphasis:
 - Passage of Paperwork Reduction bill and implementation of new paperwork budget.
 - Improving the structure of government to support reindustrialization and economic development.
 - Putting into place a "fast track" process for expediting government decisions and permits for critical energy facilities and projects. (E.M.B.)
 - Reform of Federal administrative services to eliminate waste in the government's overhead.
 - Renewal of reorganization authority to reform the structure of government. I will seek additional authority to eliminate functions and programs.

JUDGE SELECTIONS

Question: What standards do you use in selecting judges? What standard would you use in selecting a Supreme Court Justice?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE A SOLID RECORD OF SELECTING JUDGES SOLELY ON THEIR MERIT AND QUALIFICATIONS. I HAVE NOT USED SOMEONE'S VIEWS ON AN ISSUE AS A STANDARD. I WOULD CERTAINLY AVOID DOING THAT OR PROMISING APPOINTMENTS IN ADVANCE TO CERTAIN GROUPS, WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPREME COURT.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

Politics was a chief criterion in judicial selections before my Administration.

- o In 1976 I promised to appoint judges on merit, and I have done that. I have established judicial nominating panels for Circuit Court appointments and have urged Senators to establish their own panels for District Court appointments. This process has worked well. I believe most objective analysts, like bar associations, would agree that my appointments have been unrivalled in quality and diversity.
- o And I have been very concerned about diversity. I have been concerned that so many classes of people have been virtually excluded from the Federal bench. I have reversed that. I have appointed more women, Blacks, and Hispanics to the courts than all Presidents from Washington to Ford combined. However this election is decided, that will be what I regard as one of most significant legacies, for these judges will be interpreting the laws and protecting our rights into the next century.
- o In not a single one of my court appointments have I asked a potential nominee his or her views on an issue, or sought that information. My concern has been quality.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I regret that my opponent has taken a different approach to judicial nominations.
- o In California, he appointed his appointments Secretary to the State Supreme Court even though the bar association said the man was completely unqualified. And his diversity of appointments was not very good: of 600 nominees, only 12 were women and were minorities.
- o What is even more troubling to me is Governor Reagan's views of the independence of the judiciary.

- o When the courts decide that a law he favors is unconstitutional, Governor Reagan criticizes the judges. When the Chief Justice he appointed to the California Supreme Court wrote the Court's opinion that a California death sentence statute was unconstitutional, Governor Reagan criticized the decision and publicly regretted appointing the Chief Justice.
 - o Last February he attacked the present Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, even though six out of nine were appointed by Republican presidents. He was angry with the Court over a minor procedural point -- the Court's decision not to stay a lower court ruling on the funding of abortions while it was being appealed. He accused the Court of "an abuse of power as bad as the transgressions of Watergate." He said the President should put "new justices in the court, men and women who respect and reflect the values and morals of the American majority."
 - o In both cases, Governor Reagan was attacking the independence of the courts. He was doing the same thing when he said, earlier this year, that his judicial nominees would have to oppose abortion and when he initially indicated support for the abortion litmus test in the Republican platform. He now says he disagrees with the platform, but his critical views still trouble me greatly.
- B. Carter
- o I will continue the merit selection process if re-elected. I will also work to preserve the independence of the judiciary - that is one of the bulwarks of our freedom.
 - o When a Supreme Court opening occurs, I will continue my record of quality appointments and judicial independence. I am determined to have the best people our country has on the Court.
 - o But I will not commit in advance to appoint a member of any group to the Court. Governor Reagan has promised to appoint a woman. The political purpose underlying that commitment is obvious. I will not engage in that type of political campaigning. I respect the Court too much to use it as a bargaining chip to get votes. My judicial appointment of women stands for itself as testimony to my positive position of women on the Federal bench.

URBAN POLICY

GOVERNMENT
JUN 17 1983

Question: What would you do to reverse the decline of our Nation's cities? Hasn't your urban policy failed to improve the lives of the residents of our Nation's cities?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE A SOLID RECORD OF AIDING THE CITIES. WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE THE NATION'S FIRST COMPREHENSIVE URBAN POLICY. OUR URBAN POLICY AND MY ECONOMIC RENEWAL PROGRAM WILL ALLOW OUR CITIES TO CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE DECADE OF THE 1980's.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

There was no urban policy before I became President. The doors of the White House were not fully open to Mayors. The Federal government was insensitive to the needs of our urban areas.

- o The health and stability of our Nation's cities has been one of my principal concerns as President. When I traveled our Nation in 1976 as a Presidential candidate, I found that eight years of Republican neglect had broken the economics and the spirits of our Nation's cities. Through the policies of my Administration, we have reversed this trend of neglect and decline.
- o We have put into place the Nation's first comprehensive urban policy. Urban aid is up more than 40 percent during my Administration.
- o The future of our cities is in the private sector, and my Administration has provided the tools that our cities need to develop their private sector economies to their fullest. We have increased the incentives for private investment in our cities by 3000 percent, (e.g. UDAG) and have generated more than \$10 billion of new investment in our cities and more than half a million new jobs.
- o In addition, we have greatly expanded jobs and training money for the unemployed and disadvantaged, particularly our Nation's youth.
- o We have provided large increases in aid for mass transit, neighborhood aid, housing, education and other programs that are essential to the health of our cities.

2. THE FUTUREReagan

- o Governor Reagan represents the least moderate element of a Republican party that consistently has been insensitive to the needs of the cities.

- o Governor Reagan himself has said this year "urban aid programs are the biggest phonies in the Federal system." I disagree.
- o The entire Reagan urban program consists of two proposals, both of which have been at least partially implemented by the Carter Administration.
- o The first - urban homesteading - was enacted by a Democratic Congress in 1974 as a demonstration program. I have expanded the program until 93 cities now are participating.
- o The second Reagan proposal - "enterprise zones" - involves offering tax incentives for private investment in high unemployment areas. We have effectively already done this as well. Working with the Congress, we extended the investment tax credit to urban rehabilitation in 1978 and I have proposed an additional ten percent investment tax credit for high unemployment areas in my economic renewal program.
- o Finally, Governor Reagan has proposed the transfer of numerous and unspecified Federal programs back to the States and cities. This will have one effect and one effect only - it will increase State and local taxes, especially the property tax. In my view, it would be a serious error to increase the already excessive property tax burden on our Nation's citizens.

B. Carter

- o While great progress has been made during the past four years, more remains to be done.
- o First, I will work closely with the Congress to enact several critical pieces of legislation during the post-election session: the counter-cyclical aid bill, general revenue sharing, the private sector economic development programs and the youth employment and training bills.
- o Second, my Economic Renewal program offers substantial new incentives for private sector revitalization in our cities.
- o Finally, I intend to maintain my partnership with the leaders of our great and small cities. Our cities now have a friend in the White House; someone who listens to their concerns and responds. I intend to continue that relationship.

WASTE IN GOVERNMENT

Question: Mr. President, in 1976, you pledged to cut out government waste and over-regulation, and to reduce the number of Federal agencies from 1900 to 200. Obviously, you haven't done that. Governor Reagan recently charged that under your administration, the number of pages of new regulations has risen fifty percent on an annual basis, spending for regulatory agencies has increased another fifty percent, and the economic cost of regulation for industry has gone from \$66 billion to \$100 billion. He also says there is \$50 billion of "waste" in government spending that he would cut. How do you respond?

Answer:

THEME

MY ADMINISTRATION HAS DONE MORE TO REDUCE WASTE AND INEFFICIENCY THAN ANY ADMINISTRATION IN HISTORY. I AM COMMITTED TO CONTINUING THIS RECORD WITH RESPONSIBLE CUTTING AND REALISTIC CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I have a record in improving government efficiency which far surpasses that of previous Administrations.
- o We have challenged the special interests and achieved deregulation in virtually every regulated industry -- airlines, trucking, rail, banking, communications, securities, energy. Airline deregulation saved consumers \$2.5 billion in its first year alone and trucking deregulation will save consumers \$8 billion annually. Since I signed the Trucking Deregulation bill this year, 50 major trucking companies have already cut their rates by 10%.
- o We have reduced the amount of time American citizens spend filling out Federal forms by 15%.
- o Two years ago, we enacted the Civil Service Reform Act, the first comprehensive overhaul of the Federal personnel system in nearly a century.
- o We have established independent inspectors general in all the major departments and agencies, with broad powers to audit and investigate waste and abuse.
- o We have eliminated over 300 agencies and advisory committees. We have consolidated government functions in key areas such as education, energy, and equal opportunity enforcement.
- o We have improved cash management practices, saving billions of dollars a year for the Federal government.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan now says he would cut out more. And indeed he will have to do so, if he is actually going to implement a 30% tax cut and balance the budget at the same time. To do all that would require eliminating \$130 billion from current government programs -- virtually the entire discretionary part of the domestic budget.
- o Governor Reagan has provided no specifics about what he would cut; he says nothing more than we need to eliminate waste and abuse. Everyone agrees with that. There is not \$130 billion in waste and abuse. In California, Reagan made a similar promise, yet government spending went up 126% during his term -- the largest real increase in California history.
- o Governor Reagan has said a great deal about waste in government during this election campaign, but sometimes he seems not to have all the facts. Recently, he complained that the number of pages in the Federal regulation book had grown during my Administration. But that is because I had the size of the type-face increased so people could more easily read and understand what the government was proposing. The number of rules has not increased.
- o I have learned in the last four years that there is always a powerful special interest supporting every rule, and every wasteful government function. These pressures can be enormous and no one can hope to cut waste in government without the courage to fight. But I noted that Governor Reagan has not taken a forthright position supporting trucking deregulation and has implied his appointees to the ICC would come from the very industry which opposed deregulation.

B. Carter

- o I am proud that my Administration has put across the broadest, most comprehensive program to cut out waste and improve efficiency in our country's history. In the next four years, we will continue with those efforts. I am confident we can achieve even more deregulation and better government at less cost.
- o But I want to draw a sharp and clear line between my program, my vision of the future, and those for whom "eliminating waste" sometimes sounds like a code word for eliminating government completely. I have no intention of abandoning citizens of our cities who would like to look forward to a future without smog. I will not abandon families who worry that chemical wastes may infiltrate the soil under their homes. I will not abandon workers who know that substances in their workplaces may someday bring illness down on them or their children.
- o We are a great and civilized nation, and we do not need to buy prosperity by sacrificing the health of our citizens or the beauty of our environment. I pledge never to make such a trade-off.

SECONDARY QUESTIONS

ECONOMY

Wage and Price Policy

Question: Are you planning to continue your wage and price guideline program next year and beyond? Would you consider any tightening of the guidelines? Wouldn't you concede that they have not been very successful in restraining inflation?

Answer:

- o The voluntary wage and price standards have been an important part of my program.
- o The voluntary wage and price standards did work. Quantitative estimates show that the rate of wage inflation in 1979 was 1-14 percentage points less than it would have been.
- o The wage and price standards program was critical in our ability to prevent the 125% increase in OPEC oil prices in 1979 from driving us to a permanent underlying inflation rate of over 10 percent. Policies to encourage wage and price restraint are important in our fight to bring down the underlying rate of inflation.
- o When I announced the Economic Revitalization Program on August 28 I explicitly noted that my advisors would be examining ways to extend the voluntary program for private wage and price restraint. In addition, I said that as there is room for further tax reductions in the coming years we must look for ways to use those tax reductions to encourage wage and price moderation. There will be some voluntary incomes policy for next year.
- o By contrast Governor Reagan has absolutely no proposal for slowing the underlying rate of inflation. Indeed, he proposes massive tax cuts which would only create huge deficits and rekindle inflation.

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

ENERGY: CONSERVATION

Question: You are putting a lot of Federal money into energy conservation programs. What are you really getting for your investment?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PUT IN PLACE OUR FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL ENERGY PROGRAM EXCEPT LETTING THE BIG OIL COMPANIES "LOOSE". CONSERVATION IS THE QUICKEST, CHEAPEST WAY TO DECREASE OUR DANGEROUS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL. MY CONSERVATION PROGRAMS HAVE SHOWN DRAMATIC RESULTS AND I WILL BE PROUD TO CONTINUE THEM.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o We are consuming almost 2 million barrels per day less than when I took office (from 18.4 mmb/d in 1976 to 16.5 mmb/d in 1980). Two-thirds of the savings comes from conservation and only a small part is due to the recession. We are consuming 8% less gasoline than one year ago.
- o These changes are in large part a result of the policies that I have put into place in these last four years, such as:
 - The National Energy Conservation Policy Act which provides grants and other incentives for energy conservation in schools, hospitals, residences, automobiles, and major home appliances.
 - The Energy Tax Act, which established the first tax incentives for residential conservation. Over 10 million Americans have used this new tax credit to insulate their homes.
 - For low-income Americans, a Federal program is weatherizing more than 23,000 homes every month.
 - The mandatory Building Temperature Regulations for non-residential buildings have saved between 200,000 and 400,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.
 - Domestic automakers have exceeded Federal automobile fuel efficiency standards in 1978, 1979 and 1980. Increasingly stringent standards will save some 500,000 b/d by 1985 and over 1 million b/d by 1990.
 - The new Energy Conservation and Solar Development Bank will encourage conservation by low interest loans.

- the 55 mph speed limit has saved 228,000 b/d of gasoline, and has saved 40,000 lives, according to the Department of Transportation.
- In Fiscal Year 1981, the Federal Government will spend more than \$2 billion to promote energy conservation, yielding more than \$5 billion in nationwide residential and industrial conservation investments.
- o Some say that these decreases in consumption were actually caused by the recession. But last year, when real GNP grew 2.3%, our total energy consumption dropped, for the first time in a non-recessionary year in almost 30 years. Gasoline consumption dropped 10% last December, several months before the recession really hit.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan regards some of these programs as "government meddling." His party's platform is against the 55 mile per hour speed limit, against the fuel efficiency standards in cars, and against Federal conservation programs. He places little emphasis on conservation.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to implement my programs to encourage the American people to conserve energy. I believe conservation is an essential ingredient of a responsible energy program. My program will lead us to energy security.
- o The new Energy Conservation and Solar Development Bank in H.U.D. will soon be started to speed conservation.

ENERGY: CRUDE OIL DECONTROL

Question: Wouldn't we produce more oil if we immediately decontrolled crude oil prices? Why do you oppose that?

Answer:

THEME

MY RECORD IN ENCOURAGING INCREASED ENERGY PRODUCTION IS VERY SOUND, OVER HALF OF OUR DOMESTIC OIL PRODUCTION IS ALREADY FREE FROM PRICE CONTROLS, AND THE REMAINING CONTROLS ARE NOT A SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT ON PRODUCTION. FURTHER, I AM CERTAIN THAT IF I HAD CHOSEN "OVERNIGHT" DECONTROL IN 1979, AS IS NOW URGED BY GOVERNOR REAGAN, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A PROFOUND AND UNACCEPTABLE SHOCK TO OUR ECONOMY. I AM PHASING OUT PRICE CONTROLS CAREFULLY, IN A PHASED-WAY, TO AVOID INFLATIONARY SHOCK.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT (RECORD)

- o On April 5, 1979, I directed that domestic crude oil price and allocation controls be ended by September 30, 1981. Over half of U.S. oil production is already free from price controls, and the decontrol schedule is steadily releasing additional volumes.
- o The remaining price controls are not a serious constraint on domestic crude oil production today. The number of operating oil and gas rigs reached an all-time high this month (3,164) and there are more new wells being drilled this year than any year in history. The real constraint on production today is the availability of drilling rigs.
- o The Department of Energy estimates that if I had imposed the immediate decontrol of all crude oil in April 1979, it would have caused about a 1-1/2% increase in our Nation's inflation rate in 1980 above that caused by phased decontrol.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

Governor Reagan has called for the immediate decontrol of all oil prices. But he has offered no specific information on how much of an increase would result, or at what price to our economy. Such an action now would be very inflationary. I do not believe he fully understands the consequences of his proposal.

B. CARTER FUTURE

- o I will continue to move in a responsible manner toward complete decontrol, taking into account economic effects as well as energy policy.
- o I am convinced we will be able to continue our high record of exploration and development.

ENERGY: EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL AUTHORITY

Question: Would you consider reimposing oil price controls in the event that OPEC prices began to skyrocket? Would you seek the extension of the price control authority just in case it were necessary to use it some time in the future?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PUT OUR FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM IN PLACE. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL ENERGY PROGRAM EXCEPT TO TURN THE OIL COMPANIES "LOOSE". DOMESTIC PRICE CONTROLS HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO IMPACT ON SKYROCKETING OPEC PRICES; THEY MERELY DISCOURAGE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL. HOWEVER, IN THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS, I EXPECT TO ADDRESS THE MANY IMPACTS OF THE END OF CRUDE OIL CONTROLS IN SEPTEMBER 1981. I EXPECT TO SEEK CERTAIN APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY IN CASE OF A SEVERE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SUPPLY EMERGENCY.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I look forward to September 1981 as the culmination of the phased decontrol of crude oil that I announced in April 1979.
- o If OPEC prices were to increase today, the reimposition of price controls would not be the answer. Domestic price controls have no impact on OPEC prices, except that they may hold down domestic production and so increase our dependence on imported oil. I would consider the use of emergency allocation measures, however, to ensure that the available supply was fairly distributed.
- o I am concerned that I retain the necessary standby authority to deal with a severe energy supply emergency, in case one should arise after September 1981. I expect that I will seek such authority in the next session of Congress.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

Governor Reagan claims to be absolutely opposed to all controls on crude oil, so he would presumably not want any emergency authority to be continued. He has never explained how he would deal with a severe energy supply interruption.

B. Carter

I intend to phase out all domestic crude oil controls on schedule, but I also plan to remain equipped with the necessary authority to respond to an energy supply emergency.

This is a responsible approach; it is an approach which will provide us with needed energy security.

Energy: "Lock-Up" of Federal Lands
And Resources

Question: If you really want to increase domestic energy production, why do you hold back so much Federal land with valuable energy resources?

Answer

THEME

I HAVE PUT OUR FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM IN PLACE; GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL PROGRAM EXCEPT TURNING THE OIL COMPANIES "LOOSE". THE CHARGE THAT I HAVE "LOCKED-UP" THE ENERGY RESOURCES ON PUBLIC LANDS IS SIMPLY MISTAKEN. UNDER MY ADMINISTRATION, I HAVE OPENED UP MORE FEDERAL LANDS FOR MINERAL DEVELOPMENT THAN WERE EVER AVAILABLE BEFORE. THERE MUST BE A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN MAINTAINING OUR NATIONAL PARKS AND SCENIC AREAS AND ENERGY EXPLORATION. I HAVE PROVIDED THAT BALANCE.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Some have charged that the Administration sponsored Alaska Lands Bill will make that State's energy resources unavailable. In fact, our legislation leaves over 90% of the promising oil and gas acreage available for development, and 100% of the Outer Continental Shelf (where most of the oil and gas will probably be found) is available. Further, we have submitted separate legislation calling for private leasing of the National Petroleum Reserve.
- o Onshore Oil and Gas Development:
 - Of the 822 million acres of Federal mineral estate, approximately 500 million acres are available for oil and gas leasing.
 - In addition, 100 million acres are under lease and less than 1% of all oil, gas and geothermal leases have surface occupancy restrictions.
- o Wilderness Areas:
 - Of the 174 million acres of public lands reviewed for wilderness characteristics, 124 million acres have already been determined to be better suited for multiple-use management.
 - Ninety percent of the lands under lease have already been released from wilderness review and are available for mineral development.

o Outer Continental Shelf Development:

- My new five-year leasing program offers more acreage (45 million acres) than all acreage offered since the program began in 1954.
- Although only 2% or 3% of the total Outer Continental Shelf area has been leased, only a very small part of the OCS has any oil and gas potential. The most promising OCS areas (Alaska, Santa Barbara Channel, Gulf of Mexico and parts of the Atlantic) have been leased ~~already~~ or are scheduled for leasing.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan says that he would accelerate the leasing of Federal lands. But he has no plan proposed to do that. And he has made no provision for environmental protection.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to develop all Federal mineral resources as rapidly as possible, consistent with our environmental requirements.

ENERGY: SOLAR GOAL

Question: Isn't your goal of 20% solar and renewable energy by the year 2000 an unrealistic one?

Answer:

THEME

AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF MY COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY POLICY, I ESTABLISHED A NATIONAL GOAL OF SUPPLYING 20% OF OUR ENERGY NEEDS FROM SOLAR AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES BY THE YEAR 2000. THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS TARGET WHICH WILL REQUIRE THE ACTIVE EFFORTS OF BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, BUT I REMAIN COMMITTED TO MEETING IT.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

There was practically no solar or gasahol program when I took office.

- o I have more than tripled the Federal budget for solar and renewable resources to more than \$1.5 billion for fiscal year '81. This includes substantial investments in research and development in commercialization.
- o I have proposed and enacted the first tax credits to encourage the use of solar technologies in residential and commercial buildings, including the 40% credit passed this year.
- o Those policies are working. Ten times as many households have solar technology in place today as when I took office.
- o The Conservation and Solar Energy Development Bank that I proposed will provide a total of \$7.5 billion (1980-90) to spur conservation and solar energy investment.
- o We have quadrupled gasahol capacity over the last 24 months.
- o But Federal efforts alone cannot meet the ambitious 20% solar goal. The private sector must also commit its resources to pursuing these important energy resources.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I regret Governor Reagan has never shown much interest in solar and renewable energy sources. He has offered no concrete development proposals for these alternative resources. The Republican Platform calls only for continued government support for research.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to strengthen programs now in place to encourage the increased use of solar and renewable resources to ensure that the Federal Government is doing everything it can to meet the 20% goal.
- o I will also push for new programs to encourage such use if they are needed. For example, I will continue to seek a tax credit for passive solar technologies.

Energy: Synfuels

Question: How can you justify spending \$88 billion to produce a few synthetic fuels?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PUT OUR FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM IN PLACE. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL PROGRAM. THE SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION IS CHARGED WITH DEVELOPING THE SYNTHETIC FUELS INDUSTRY TO PRODUCE AT LEAST 2 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL EQUIVALENT BY 1992. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ACTUALLY PRODUCE ANY OF THESE FUELS ITSELF; WE WILL ACT INSTEAD AS A CATALYST FOR THE TALENTS AND INVENTIVENESS OF AMERICAN PRIVATE INDUSTRY, ABSORBING SOME OF THE SPECIAL RISKS OF THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THEIR DEVELOPMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOT SPEND THIS MUCH. THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IS LIMITED TO STANDING LOAN AND PRICE GUARANTEES.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Synthetic fuels will play an important role in freeing our Nation from its dangerous dependence on imported oil. We need to have them available on a commercial scale as soon as possible. The private sector will develop and produce these fuels, but because of the high business risk inherent in these new technologies, they cannot move as rapidly as we need.
- o I established the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to serve as a catalyst for the private development of synthetic fuels. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation will provide loan guarantees and price or purchase guarantees to selected synfuels projects in order to decrease the risk to the companies that build them. This partnership of public and private capital will bring us a commercial-scale synthetic fuels industry much more rapidly than could the private sector alone.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

I think Governor Reagan's stand on synthetic fuel is very short-sighted. Governor Reagan would "turn the oil companies loose" to develop synthetic fuels, if they felt like doing so. He would abolish the Synthetic Fuels Corporation and end all government investment in synfuels. This would be a tragedy for our energy future.

B. Carter

I will continue to provide risk-minimizing financial support for synfuels projects in order to meet our goal of 2 million barrels/ equivalent per day of synthetic fuels by 1992.

The steps I am taking will provide a secure future for our country.

ENERGY: WINDFALL PROFITS TAX

Question: Wouldn't we produce more oil if we limited or repealed the Windfall Profits Tax? Why do you oppose that?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PUT OUR FIRST ENERGY PROGRAM IN PLACE. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NO REAL PROGRAM EXCEPT TO TURN THE OIL COMPANIES "LOOSE". I AM PROUD THAT WE SUCCEEDED IN ENACTING THE WINDFALL PROFITS TAX TO ENSURE THAT THE OIL COMPANIES DID NOT PROFIT EXCESSIVELY FROM THE DECONTROL OF CRUDE OIL AND TO FUND OUR VITAL NATURAL ENERGY POLICIES. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THIS TAX IS CONSTRAINING THE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF OIL.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o I decided to decontrol domestic crude oil in order to increase domestic oil production. We simply could not continue discouraging the development of American oil resources while we subsidized the increasing imports of foreign oil.
- o But rather than let all of the increased profits go to the oil companies, we enacted the Windfall Profits Tax. This tax will bring in over \$227 billion in 1980-90 to finance the development of alternative energy sources, triple our investment in mass transit and assist low-income households in meeting rising energy costs. The oil companies still keep 29¢ of every \$1 of income from decontrol after all taxes are paid -- a handsome return.
- o There is absolutely no evidence that the Windfall Profits Tax has held down domestic crude oil production. The number of operating oil and gas rigs reached an all-time high this month (3,164) and there are more new wells being drilled this year than any year in history. The real constraint on production today is the availability of drilling rigs.
- o Where specialized, marginal domestic production was more likely to be discouraged by high taxes (tertiary, newly discovered and heavy oil), the tax is applied at a very low rate.
- o We are continuing to make adjustments for unintended inequities in the Windfall Profits Tax. For example, we will support a \$1,000 tax credit for small royalty owners.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

Governor Reagan supports immediate, total crude oil decontrol and the repeal or weakening of the Windfall Profits Tax. This would drain the purchasing power of consumers through high prices, award massive profits to the oil companies and do nothing to help low-income families cope with the rising cost of energy or provide the revenues for an alternative energy program for mass transit.

B. Carter

I will continue to invest the revenues from the Windfall Profits Tax in securing our Nation's energy independence for mass transit and in aiding our poorest citizens. This will provide us with energy security.

OVERVIEW

ANDERSON

Question: How do you think Congressman Anderson will affect the election?
Do you think he has damaged the two party system?

Answer:

- o Congressman Anderson will definitely have some effect on the election; precisely how much I do not know. But, based on all of the data I have seen, there really is no doubt that his votes are being drawn disproportionately from me, rather than Governor Reagan.
- o That is so because many Independents and Democrats have felt that Congressman Anderson, because of some very recent changes in position, represented a more liberal approach to governmental matters than I do. And those Independents and Democrats make up the bulk of the Congressman's constituency.
- o I harbor no ill-feelings to John Anderson. He is a determined campaigner, and a good man. I think it is clear his positions are infinitely closer to mine than to Mr. Reagan's. Indeed, his positions on some issues are virtually indistinguishable from mine. But I do not think it is healthy for the two party system to have candidates defeated in the primary and caucus process become candidates in the general election. The stability of the two party system is one of our government's greatest virtues and should be preserved.
- o I do not know what the future impact of the Anderson candidacy will be on the two party system. My hope is that it will be preserved as we have known it.

DEATH PENALTY

Question: What is your position on the death penalty?

Answer:

- o As President, I am sworn to uphold the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has determined that, in the appropriate circumstances, the death penalty is constitutional.
- o The issue, therefore is not whether we can constitutionally employ the death penalty. The issue is determining what offenses, if any, warrant the death penalty.
- o This is principally a matter for the State legislatures to determine. My personal view, which I expressed in my last campaign, is that there are a very limited number of circumstances where the death penalty might be appropriate -- such as the murder by an inmate of a prison guard. That remains my position today.

FEAR OF REAGAN

Question: Do you believe the Democratic constituencies will now be rallying around your candidacy for any reason other than fear of your Republican opponent? Isn't that fear becoming the critical element of your campaign, pushing you to run an essentially negative campaign?

Answer:

THEME

I AM A MAINSTREAM DEMOCRAT IN THE TRADITION OF ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON. MY OPPONENT IS A VERY CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZING THIS FACT AND I BELIEVE THEY ARE INCREASINGLY SUPPORTING ME BECAUSE OF THE FUTURE THAT I AM COMMITTED TO PROVIDING THE NATION.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o Over the past 4 years I have developed a record in the tradition of Democratic Presidents -- commitment to peace, to creating new jobs, to helping the elderly, to protecting the poor and disadvantaged, to ensuring equal rights, to helping working men and women.
- o Like my Democratic predecessors, I have not been able to accomplish everything I wanted. And I have learned, from the experience of being President, how difficult it is to accomplish all that I would like.
- o But I believe the Democratic constituency is increasingly recognizing what we have accomplished and it is now rallying around the Democratic nominee for the same positive reasons that they have behind every Democratic nominee.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I cannot deny that some Democratic voters are very concerned about Governor Reagan's positions and the direction in which he would like to take the country.
- o They are concerned about his opposition to SALT II, to ERA, to National Health Insurance, to the Windfall Profits Tax, to urban aid programs, to the Department of Education, to labor law reform, to Humphrey-Hawkins, to the minimum wage -- all of these programs are part of the Democratic Platform and my own agenda.

B. Carter

- o I am not trying to emphasize Governor Reagan's positions to the exclusion of my own, or my record.
- o I have always tried to give my audiences a clear picture of the contrasts between the two very different futures the country faces if Governor Reagan or I am elected. In doing that I emphasize what I am for and my opponent is against.
 - SALT II
 - Reduced Nuclear Arms Race
 - ERA
 - National Health Insurance
 - A strong Minimum Wage
 - Economic Revitalization -- particularly of the auto and steel industries
 - Continuation of Camp David process
 - Continued Normalization of Relations with China

FLIP-FLOPS

Question: You have accused Governor Reagan of flip-flopping during the course of the campaign. Haven't you flip-flopped a great deal over the past four years? What is the difference?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE LEARNED FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING PRESIDENT, AND I HAVE CHANGED SOME THINGS I DID EARLIER IN MY TERM. BUT THOSE CHANGES WERE MADE OVER TIME, AS THE PROCESS OF GOVERNING WENT FORWARD. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS CHANGED HIS POSITIONS DURING THIS CAMPAIGN ON A VARIETY OF POSITIONS HE HAS TAKEN OVER A 20-YEAR PERIOD.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o As President, I have learned a great deal. Some of what I have learned has caused me to modify positions I had or approaches I took early in the term. For instance, I have adopted not a tougher anti-inflation program than I thought was necessary in the beginning. I decided to decontrol oil because of the increased importance of reducing our dependence on foreign energy. And I accelerated considerably our defense spending program because of the state I found our armed forces.
- o But all of this was done after a clear examination of the facts, and a careful, deliberate weighing of all the alternatives. In nearly every case, the change was not likely to increase my political standing and in fact none of them did.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o By contrast, Governor Reagan has dropped, virtually overnight, positions he has held for nearly 20 years during an election campaign.
- o Let me give some examples:
 - Aid to New York City
 - Aid to Chrysler
 - Two China Policy
 - Minimum Wage
 - OSHA Abolition
- o I think the American people should be concerned about whether these new-found positions are the ones they would see implemented if Governor Reagan were elected, as opposed to the positions he has held for nearly 20 years.

B. Carter

- o I do not want to claim that I will never again change a position. I expect that I probably will at some point in a second term, as I learn more or circumstances change.
- o But I can say that my basic philosophy will never change:
 - passion for peace
 - overriding commitment to nuclear arms reduction
 - concern for the disadvantaged
 - commitment to help the working man and woman
 - dedication to equal rights and justice

GUN CONTROL

Question: Do you support greater gun control? If so, why have you not done more to achieve this?

Answer:

- o I support increased handgun controls. I support eliminating Saturday Night Specials -- which are so frequently used in violent crimes -- and I support improved registration requirements for handgun purchases. I do not believe, for instance, that any individual -- regardless of previous handgun or other criminal offenses -- should be allowed to purchase handguns. Strengthened registration requirements can help to prevent this.
- o I would not support any type of increased controls over long-guns. They are used for hunting and are not for criminal purposes. As a hunter, I know the value and importance of allowing long-guns to be purchased without Federal restraints.
- o This position is the one I outlined in my 1976 campaign. It is the position of our current Democratic Platform. It remains my position.
- o I regret that progress in this direction has not been achieved, but the lobbying pressure on Congress on this issue has been so intense that no action has been possible. In fact, the only action that we were able to initiate -- administrative tightening of some handgun registration requirements -- was effectively overturned by Congress.
- o I think the position advocated by Governor Reagan is dangerous, particularly for those who live in high-crime areas. The Governor believes that there should effectively be no restrictions on gun purchases. He supports the Republican Platform's call for repeal of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which was passed after Robert Kennedy was killed.
- o In my view, a position which does not regulate Saturday Night Specials or handguns is not one which recognizes reality. The ready availability of those guns to those who might not otherwise so easily obtain them is not a sound way to protect innocent people.

INTEGRITY

Question: In light of the Bert Lance and Billy Carter affairs, how can you honestly claim to have restored integrity to the White House?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE WORKED LONG AND HARD TO OVERCOME THE STAIN OF WATERGATE AND ITS AFTERMATH AND OUR RECORD INDICATES WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. I INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR STRONG, FORTHRIGHT RECORD IN THIS AREA DURING A SECOND TERM.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o When I took office, the Presidency was suffering from the problems associated with the Vietnam War, Watergate, the CIA revelations. There was a sense of distrust of the Presidency. There was a decline in respect of the Presidency. There was an abhorrence of the secrecy and heavy-handedness that surrounded the Oval Office.
- o We have changed that. We have worked to restore integrity, through legislation now requiring full financial disclosure of Federal officials, the appointment of Special Prosecutors in appropriate cases, the end of the "revolving-door" syndrome in Washington.
- o We have put Inspectors General in each of the Departments to root out fraud and waste.
- o We have established an independent Justice Department -- one with virtually no contact with the White House.
- o We have established blue ribbon Commissions to take politics out of judicial appointments.
- o We have been open -- held 30 Town Hall Meetings (no other President has ever done so), 60 press conferences; we have provided greater access to the White House and Cabinet Departments for all citizens than ever before.
- o When there have been problems - as with Billy Carter - I have been honest and aboveboard about the situation.

2. THE FUTURECarter

- o I am committed in the future to taking further steps to ensure the integrity and openness of our government -- that is among my highest priorities.
- o I am committed to:
 - continued appointment of qualified, honest individuals to key Federal positions;
 - passage of lobby law reform -- to provide the public with greater information about lobbying activities;
 - preserving sunshine rules and requirements; and
 - continuing an independent Justice Department.

QUOTES OF REAGAN

Question: Do you think it is fair to repeat old quotes of Governor Reagan's - many of the quotes are from the 1960's - when he has changed his positions since these quotes were made? Aren't you taking them out of context as well?

Answer:

- o On a few occasions early in the campaign I was justly criticized for trying to characterize Governor Reagan's positions. So I decided to avoid that problem by simply quoting Governor Reagan. That way there could be no basis for complaints of mischaracterization.
- o When I do quote him, I try to indicate the date, so the audience can judge for itself the timeliness of the Governor's statements.
- o But generally, I have been quoting Governor Reagan's most current quotes, because they best represent his latest views and because some of them trouble me the most.
- o For instance, it was this year - 1980 - that Governor Reagan has said:
 - "High unemployment is in large part due to the minimum wage."
 - "The minimum wage has caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depression."
 - "Urban aid programs are one of the biggest phonies in the system."
 - "I don't think nuclear non-proliferation is any of our business."
 - "Air pollution is substantially under control."
 - " % of pollution comes from trees."
 - "We should use the nuclear arms race card."
- o These positions show a lack of understanding of the complexities our Nation faces and that a President faces.
 - The minimum wage has helped millions of Americans and I am wholeheartedly committed to it.
 - Urban aid programs have revitalized our urban areas and helped our most disadvantaged citizens, and I am committed to their growth.
 - Nuclear non-proliferation is our business - it is vital to all of us.
 - Air pollution is not under control though progress has been made; but we must remain vigilant in this area. And it doesn't come from trees.
 - And a nuclear arms race is a reckless proposal.

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Question: Why have you had so much difficulty in dealing with Congress and in getting your major programs adopted in the form you propose? Why would you be any more successful during a second term?

Answer:

THEME

MY RECORD WITH THE CONGRESS HAS BEEN GOOD - A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF MY MAJOR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ENACTED. GOVERNOR REAGAN WOULD NOT DO NEARLY AS WELL - AS A REPUBLICAN AND A NEWCOMER. MY EXPERIENCE SHOULD MAKE THE NEXT FOUR YEARS EVEN BETTER.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o No President has ever had a Congress approve every item of his legislative program - that would make Congress a rubber-stamp, and that is not what the Founding Fathers intended and that would not be healthy.
- o There certainly have been tough legislative fights - and they have received a good deal of publicity - but the bitter feelings and all-out war between Congress and the President which existed during the Nixon-Ford years has never occurred.
- o We have probably not done a good enough job letting the public know how successful we have been with Congress. A look at the record of what has been passed during the past four years shows how much progress and cooperation there has been. In fact, a substantial majority of my major legislative programs have been enacted - and that is a record which about equals my Democratic predecessors:
 - Energy program - there was none
 - Urban policy - there was none
 - Civil Service Reform
 - Deregulation of airlines, trucks, rail, and banks
 - Saving of Social Security System
 - Humphrey-Hawkins
 - Minimum Wage Increases
 - Department of Education
 - ERA deadline extension
 - Increased Defense Spending
 - Taiwan-U.S. Relations Act

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o I do not believe Governor Reagan would be able to improve that record.

- o As a Republican, he will be dealing with a Democratic Congress - producing the type of stalemate and confrontation we saw in the Nixon-Ford years.
- o As a newcomer to Washington, Governor Reagan would have to go through the same long trial and error period that I did - and as a Republican that period would be even more difficult.
- o There are so many pressing problems now before the Congress that we cannot afford a 1-2 year hiatus.

B. Carter

- o I have not been able to pass all that I proposed, but I am going to keep pursuing my legislative agenda - as I did with my energy program - until we are successful. I now know the Congress and the key people in it.
- o I have a clear legislative program for the future:
 - SALT II
 - National Health Insurance
 - Economic Renewal Package
 - Welfare Reform
 - Job Creation Programs
 - The last pieces of our energy program (Utility Oil Backout, EMB)
- o Progress toward enacting these measures has been made. The foundation has been laid. I have the experience and know-how to get them enacted, without undue delays and interruption. I am determined to do that.

MASS TRANSIT

Question: What do you plan to do to improve our nation's mass transit system?

Answer:

THEME

A MAJOR GOAL OF MY ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TO IMPROVE THE FLEXIBILITY OF OUR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND OFFER BETTER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES TO ALL AMERICANS. I HAVE PROPOSED A TEN YEAR, \$43 BILLION PROGRAM TO INCREASE MASS TRANSIT CAPACITY BY 50 PERCENT AND TO PROMOTE MORE ENERGY EFFICIENT VEHICLE USE, IN THE NEXT DECADE. I ALSO HAVE ESTABLISHED A GOAL OF MAKING MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS ACCESSIBLE TO ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING THE ELDERLY AND THE HANDICAPPED.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

Mass transit had been the step-child of the transportation system until my Administration.

- o I have proposed a ten year, \$43 Billion program to increase mass transit services and to provide more energy efficient transportation. This program will be funded partially from revenues raised by the Windfall Profits Tax.
- o I also have submitted legislation to the Congress to restructure the mass transit capital and operating assistance programs. This bill will:
 - increase the efficiency of Federal operating assistance;
 - encourage cities to achieve major national priorities, such as reducing costs and increasing energy efficiency; and
 - provide greater aid to the communities with the most effective transit systems.
- o These proposed changes in the urban mass transit formula aid program will result in additional funds for cities and counties with large, existing mass transit systems.
- o In addition, we as a nation cannot retreat from our commitment to make public transportation accessible to the elderly and the handicapped. I am committed to the goal of making public transportation accessible to all elderly and handicapped citizens.
- o But public transportation is not just urban mass transportation. My Rural Development Policy which I announced last year has led to the first Small Community and Rural Area Transportation Initiative to be implemented by the Department of Transportation.

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2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan has said, "urban aid programs are the biggest phonies in the Federal system," but he has not defined an urban or rural mass transportation policy.
- o He has proposed returning mass transit funding from the Federal government to State and local communities. That would increase local property taxes enormously.

B. Carter

- o Much progress has been made over the past four years, and much remains to be done.
- o First, I will work closely with the Congress to insure passage of the Public Transportation Act Amendments which includes the reformulation of urban mass transit funding grants - the most significant change in the formula program since its inception in 1979 - and the largest authorization in the history of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, \$24.7 billion over the next five years.
- o Second, my 1981 budget for the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, passed by the Congress this month as part of the DOT Appropriations Act, reflects the largest level of public transit support ever, over \$4 billion in federal aid to urban and non-urban areas.
- o We must begin now to insure that funds for mass transit over the next decade are wisely spent, and the promise of mass transit to bring our cities and towns closer together is finally kept.

SCHOOL BUSING

Question: Do you still support busing as a vehicle for school desegregation?

Answer:

- o I do not believe busing is the solution to ensuring that our schools are integrated in a constitutionally permissible way.
- o My preference would be that less disruptive ways might be found to ensure integration. And I believe that is the preference of the vast majority of parents of school-age children, both black and white.
- o However, in many cases busing may be the only way a Federal court can find to ensure school integration. If a court makes that determination, and I hope a court would make that determination only as a last resort, I believe we have no choice but to obey the court order.
- o I am sworn to uphold the Constitution and believe it would be in violation of my oath if I in any way sought to circumvent the court order. I would never do that.
- o Finally, let me say that I do not support the view which my opponent has advocated a number of times — that a Constitutional amendment be adopted to prevent the use of busing. Such an amendment might impede the ability of the courts to enforce the Brown v. Board of Education decision by the Supreme Court. And I strongly support that decision.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

Question: ' In what areas affecting State and local governments do you think the Federal government should assume a greater role? A lesser role?

Answer:

THEME

MY ADMINISTRATION HAS DONE A GREAT DEAL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. IN GENERAL, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE BURDEN ON THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM AND TO ENSURE THAT ALL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL POLICE, FIRE AND SANITATION SERVICES.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o One of my domestic policy goals has been to give States and localities greater flexibility to manage the aid that the Federal government provides. Whether it is revenue sharing, community development, education, housing, transportation or other programs, we have increased the flexibility the States and cities have to manage these programs so that they can meet the needs of our citizens. And we have cut through red tape to make these programs easier to use.
- o In a number of areas, we have expanded the Federal government's responsibility. A good example is welfare reform. There is no question that reducing poverty is national concern that must be addressed by all of us. It simply is not fair to place the burden of financing welfare on property tax payers throughout our Nation. This service should be financed by all of us, and on a reasonably equitable basis.
- o One principal that I have sought to enforce is to reduce the demands to provide services on the local property tax. By increasing aid for education, fiscal relief and other services, we have helped to hold the line on property tax increases. This has been an important goal to me, because no tax falls more cruelly on the elderly, the sick and the disadvantaged than the property tax.
- o Without question, any major transfer of programs to the States and cities will cause massive and disastrous increases in local taxes, and particularly in the property tax.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o Governor Reagan has proposed a massive but unspecified transfer of Federal programs to the States and cities. He has been no more specific about the proposal than he was about many of his other campaign proposals. But this proposal could only have one of two effects.

- o Either the services transferred (presumably education, mass transit, housing) will be eliminated or cut severely; or State and local taxes will increase dramatically to pay for them. Nothing could be worse for our Federal system than the massive and uncontrolled increases in property taxes that this proposal would cause.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to work with State and local governments to build on our previous progress and achieve the following:
 - 1) provide even greater flexibility to States and cities in managing Federal programs.
 - 2) cut through red-tape so that the Federal programs are more efficient; and
 - 3) refine the responsibilities of the Federal, State and local governments.
- o I feel very strongly that a massive transfer of programs to the States and cities will only increase the already excessive burden of the property tax. I will oppose that type of program.

HUMAN NEEDS

HEALTH AND WELFARE - GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

Question: Don't your major welfare and health proposals demonstrate that your Administration basically favors a bigger Federal government, and given that the public and the Congress seem to be moving in the other direction, can you tell us how you can have any more success with them in a second term than you did in the first term?

Answer:

THEME

THESE PROPOSALS REPRESENT SOLUTIONS TO VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS -- RISING HEALTH COSTS, LACK OF ADEQUATE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND AN INEFFICIENT INEQUITABLE WELFARE SYSTEM. GOVERNOR REAGAN HAS NOT PROPOSED REAL SOLUTIONS.

WHILE THIS LEGISLATION DID NOT PASS IN MY FIRST TERM, VERY REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND WE HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF PASSING THESE MEASURES IN MY SECOND TERM.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o My health insurance proposal would guarantee that all citizens were protected against catastrophic expenses, that Medicare benefits for the aged are improved, and that basic insurance coverage for the poor would be expanded. My proposal would build on the current partnership between public programs like Medicare and private insurance.
- o Although this measure did not pass, it stimulated the first serious Congressional committee consideration in nearly a decade in the Senate Finance Committee.
- o Until my Administration, no serious effort to reform the Nation's welfare system had been attempted in almost a decade. Working within the framework of our existing welfare system, the welfare reform package offers an achievable means to increase self-sufficiency through employment rather than welfare, to provide more adequate assistance to people who are unable to work, and to remove inequities in coverage under current programs.
- o With the cooperation of the Congress, the Social Welfare Reform Amendments Act has passed the House, and hearings have been held on the Work and Training Opportunities Act. I consider welfare reform one of my most important legislative initiatives, and will continue to press for final enactment.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o In spite of the 20 million people without any health insurance and the 80 million with inadequate coverage, my opponent has said "There is no health care crisis" and "I'm opposed to National Health Insurance".
- o Governor Reagan proposes to transfer all functions to the States along with the tax sources to finance them.

B. Carter

- o I am committed to enactment of my carefully phased-in National Health Plan, and I am confident given the serious committee consideration the issue received this year that we will be able to build on those efforts and achieve enactment this year.
- o I will press for final enactment of welfare reform. In the meantime, I will continue to pursue all reasonable efforts administratively within the latitude provided by present law, to achieve coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness in our welfare system.

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

Question: What is your position on National Health Insurance?

Answer:

THEME

THE NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN I HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS IS SOLID EVIDENCE OF MY COMMITMENT TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ALL AMERICANS. MY NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN FOLLOWS IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN, WHO CHALLENGED CONGRESS TO SECURE FOR ALL AMERICANS ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH CARE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND PRESIDENTS KENNEDY AND JOHNSON, WHO LED THE CONGRESS TO ENACT MEDICARE AND MEDICAID. MY OPPONENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, BITTERLY OPPOSED THE ENACTMENT OF MEDICARE, JUST AS NOW HE OPPOSES NHI. UNDER MY ADMINISTRATION, NHI HAS RECEIVED THE FIRST SERIOUS CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION IN OVER A DECADE; WITH THIS EXPERIENCE WE HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF OBTAINING PASSAGE OF A BILL IN MY SECOND TERM.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o The first phase legislation which I have submitted to the Congress lays the foundation for universal, comprehensive health insurance by:
 - providing comprehensive coverage for the poor;
 - limiting expenses for the elderly;
 - providing comprehensive coverage for all pregnant women and young children; and
 - assuring catastrophic coverage for everyone.
- o At the same time, it recognizes that such a major new program must be carefully phased in, with essential cost containment features.
- o It provides a substantially increased role for private health insurance (through increased underwriting and administrative services) and provides strong incentives for competition.
- o It responds to a glaring need -- 20 million Americans have no health insurance, another 20 million have inadequate basic insurance, and yet another 40-50 million have inadequate catastrophic insurance.
- o The Senate Finance Committee has done extensive mark-up of a bill which closely resembles my proposal, and it expects to complete that task in the next session of Congress. Under a Democratic Administration, the chances of passage are excellent next session.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o My record here is in stark contrast to the views of Governor Reagan. He opposes NHI, and helped lead the unsuccessful fight to defeat Medicare when it was being considered by the Congress.
- o The substantial progress we have made toward enactment of NHI over the past 4 years would be wasted under Governor Reagan.
- o Governor Reagan has publicly stated that "There is no health care crisis today", and further, that "Virtually all Americans have access to excellent medical care today." The facts simply do not support these assertions.

B. Carter

- o With the help of Senator Kennedy, who has devoted a substantial chunk of his Congressional career to improved health care, Senator Long and other Congressional leaders, the chances of passage in Congress are excellent for the next session.
- o I am committed to the ultimate enactment of universal, comprehensive NHI, to be phased in as economic conditions permit. I feel it is one of the major unfinished items on America's social agenda. The proposal which I have submitted to the Congress creates both the framework and the momentum to reach that long-sought goal.

Savings

Question: What specific incentives would you provide to encourage greater savings? What would you do to encourage savings?

Answer:

Private savings stems from both businesses and individuals. The liberalized depreciation plan I proposed as part of my revitalization program will contribute directly to an increase in business saving. As for individuals, the best way to encourage Americans to save more is to allow them to earn a fair return on their savings dollars. My Administration has already taken steps to give small savers and households more opportunities for higher interest on their savings accounts opportunities that were available only to large savers.

- o We helped to introduce new savings instruments -- such as the 6-month money market certificate and the 2-1/2 year small saver certificate -- that pay the higher interest rates only those with very large amounts of money could earn.
- o As part of my deregulation program last April I signed into law a proposal to phase out all (Regulation Q) limits on interest paid to small savers. This means that household savings accounts could earn the same rate as interest banks pay the huge accounts of businesses.
- o I signed into law a bill which provides a \$200 tax exemption for individuals and a \$400 exemption for couples on interest earned in a savings account.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Question: What actions do you propose to ensure the continued fiscal strength of the Social Security System?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE A SOLID RECORD -- IN THE TRADITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY -- IN PROTECTING THE ELDERLY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. MY OPPONENT, BY CONTRAST, HAS REPEATEDLY TAKEN POSITIONS THAT, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD HURT THE ELDERLY AND WOULD WEAKEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. I AM COMMITTED TO POLICIES WHICH IN THE FUTURE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE ELDERLY.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

The Social Security System is much sounder now than when I took office.

- o The elderly have been among my principal concerns as President. I am determined to make certain that they are free from discrimination and are able to continue living happy and useful lives.
- o For those reasons I have signed legislation to virtually eliminate mandatory retirement restrictions due to age, strengthened the protection of pensions, increased funding for elderly housing and nutrition, and worked to achieve Hospital Cost Containment to protect the elderly from skyrocketing medical costs.
- o One of my first acts as President was working with the Congress to provide financial stability to the Social Security System and to rescue it from near-bankruptcy.
- o This year I proposed and the Congress adopted further action to assure the short-term stability of the retirement fund.
- o The full faith and credit of the U.S. government stands behind the Social Security System. No retiree will ever go without the benefits to which he or she is entitled while I am President.

2. THE FUTUREA. Reagan

- o My record here is in stark contrast to that of Governor Reagan. He opposes National Health Insurance and Hospital Cost Containment, and helped lead the fight to defeat Medicare when it was being considered by the Congress.

- o Throughout the 1960's and as recently as his last campaign for President, Governor Reagan discussed the possibility of making the Social Security System voluntary -- if that were to occur, the System would certainly be bankrupt in a short period of time. While the Governor now indicates his opposition to making Social Security voluntary, the fact that he could even consider such a proposal is of concern to me.
- o Further, Governor Reagan supports a tax cut, which to balance the budget will require him to cut \$130 billion in spending in 1983. He says he won't touch Social Security but how else can he pay for his tax cut?

B. Carter

- o I am committed to preserving a sound Social Security System in the future. To ensure that, I have appointed a commission to provide recommendations to me about further steps that might be taken to protect Social Security recipients.
- o After receiving the commission's recommendations and after consulting widely with the Congress and leaders of elderly organizations, I will, in my next term, make recommendations for further improvements in the Social Security System.
- o I have not yet formulated the recommendations I will make but I have established broad guidelines by which the recommendations will be governed:
 - no taxing of Social Security benefits;
 - no raising the age limit for Social Security eligibility;
 - no reducing Social Security benefits; and
 - no capping of the cost-of-living adjustment for Social Security.
- o I am determined to make certain that the Social Security System remains the pillar of fiscal strength that we need and that the needs of all Social Security recipients are met.
- o I am also determined to help reduce the burden of high Social Security taxes. That is why I have proposed an extension of the earned income tax credit and an 8 percent credit for employers and employees on their income tax form; that credit will essentially eliminate the burden of increased Social Security taxes next year -- and it will do so without taking a dollar from any of the Social Security trust funds.

WELFARE

Question: For years public attention as well as government attention has focused on problems in the welfare system without much success in solving those problems. You have described the welfare system as "inequitable and archaic". Welfare recipients and State and local governments also have criticized the welfare system, generally for different reasons. What would you do to solve the problems in the welfare system?

Answer:

THEME

I HAVE PROPOSED A SET OF WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS WHICH I BELIEVE WOULD MAKE MAJOR PROGRESS IN SOLVING THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS IN OUR WELFARE SYSTEM. THESE PROPOSALS HAVE STRONG WORK INCENTIVES, STRONG PRO-FAMILY INCENTIVES, AND ESTABLISH A UNIFORM PAYMENT STANDARD. I AM COMMITTED TO THEIR PASSAGE AS A WAY OF HELPING OUR MOST DISADVANTAGED CITIZENS.

1. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

- o The reforms I have proposed are employment-oriented. They place major emphasis on job and training opportunities and strong work incentives for people who are able to work. 400,000 jobs would be created to give those on welfare jobs.
- o My reforms also would establish a national minimum benefit reflective of the current living increases cost for the poorest families with dependent children.
- o Working within our existing welfare system, not to expand, but to coordinate programs for more efficient management and more effective service, we can rout out waste and abuse, increase self-sufficiency through employment, and provide adequate assistance to those who really need it -- many of whom are young children and elderly citizens.
- o My welfare reforms also recognize the deepening fiscal burdens on many State and local governments which, through no fault of their own, have larger than average welfare populations. Fiscal relief is provided.
- o I have also taken separate measures to improve several programs which have been of great value to poor people in this country.

- I have strongly supported the Food Stamp program.
- I proposed and Congress enacted a program providing help to poor people in meeting their increased home energy costs and coping with energy-related emergencies.
- Just this year we enacted legislation to remove abuses in the child welfare and foster care programs for poor children and to help those homeless children find permanent homes with loving families.
- I have established an inspector general program under which I appointed an Inspector General in most Federal departments to rout out fraud, abuse, and waste in Federal programs.

2. THE FUTURE

A. Reagan

- o My opponent has recommended shifting our national welfare problems onto the shoulders of State and local governments, and said that he would transfer welfare back to the States along with the tax sources to finance it. I believe that the responsibility of taking care of poor people in this country is a responsibility of both the Federal and State governments, and given the problems the system faces, transferring welfare problems to the States is not reform.
- o My opponent opposes the ERA. Most of the adults on welfare are women. Equal rights for them both legally and economically would help to get them and their children off welfare.

B. Carter

- o I will continue to press for final enactment of welfare reform, which passed the House of Representatives last year.
- o In addition I will take all reasonable administrative measures to achieve improvements in the welfare system and to assure that welfare does not compete with employment, but does provide a viable system of support for the poor who cannot work.

REBUTTALS TO REAGAN STATEMENTS

Based on his interviews, speeches and previous debates, the assertions and claims Reagan will make on a particular subject can be reasonably predicted.

Set forth below are the key assertions and claims, along with suggested rebuttal information.

<u>Reagan</u>	<u>California Record</u>	<u>Rebuttal</u>
1. Rebatred \$5.7 billion to taxpayers.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Largest tax increases (3) in California history. o \$20 billion tax increase. o Near tripling of tax collections.
2. Almost no growth in government.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o 20% increase in State employees (counting higher education and mental health, which Reagan does not). o Greater per capita increase than under predecessor.
3. Held down government spending.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Highest real growth rate in State's history. o 126% increase in State budget.
4. Stopped bureaucracy's growth.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Created 30 new State agencies and boards. o "No significant State program was eliminated." <u>L.A. Times</u>
5. Reformed welfare - saved \$2 billion; caseload dropped.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Welfare costs tripled. o No one will confirm \$2 billion savings. o Fought in court Congress' mandated cost-of-living increases for welfare recipients. o Last time we debated -- at Governors' Conference in 1973 -- he argued against increased welfare assistance (on behalf of Nixon's position). o Caseload dropped because economy improved

Reagan

6. Had toughest anti-smog laws in country when he left office.

Rebuttal

- o Were passed over his objections.
- o League of Conservation Voters said he undermined the State's pollution program.

Economy

1. Kemp-Roth is not inflationary; does what John Kennedy's tax cut did; supported by all economists who have analyzed it.

- o Own running-mate once said it would cause 30% inflation; cannot cut \$1 trillion over next 6 years and not be inflationary.

- o Kennedy's cut occurred when inflation was 11-2%; was much smaller cut (24% over two years); and was only a business tax cut.

- o No reputable economists not supporting Reagan support it, and his own economists have tried to get him to soften his support for the bill.

- o Ford does not support R-E-R.

2. Taxes doubled since 1976.

- o Shows lack of understanding of government figures.

- o Total receipts will double, but tax burdens have not gone up much (1976 - 18.5% of GNP; 1981 - 21.8%), and some of increase is due to Windfall Tax.

- o Burdens will be reduced after Revitalization Program is enacted.

3. Budget deficit for last four years is highest in history.

- o Budget deficit as a percentage of GNP is less than half of what was inherited.

- o Inherited largest deficit in history and have made spending restraints which will ensure further reductions in deficit.

- o Current deficit is directly due to recession - if unemployment was now where it was two years ago (6%) we would be in balance.

Reagan

4. Inflation rose from 4.3% in '76 to 18.1% in first three months of this year.
5. Unemployment is worse than when you took office; 8 million unemployed.
6. Real take home pay of average worker has fallen 10% (this relies on statistic called "real spendable weekly earnings").
7. Unemployment has been at Depression levels.
8. Record numbers of Blacks are unemployed.

Rebuttal

- o No denying inflation is up -- largely because of OPEC.
- o Misleading to look at only a few months figures -- underlying rate is no more 18% than the 0% we saw in July.
- o Underlying rate -- according to all economists -- is about 9%, or only 1-1/2 points above what we inherited.
- o Nearly 9 million new jobs created.
- o Employment grown more rapidly than any Administration in history (twice as fast as Republican predecessors).
- o Minority youth employment has increased 17 times as fast as previous four years.
- o Unemployment declined in each of previous three months
- o Using statistic which is seriously flawed in economists' view.
- o Best measure is real, after-tax income per person.
- o That shows that real income has averaged growth of 1.6% per year during my Administration (or about 6% since '77).
- o Unemployment during Depression went as high as 25%.
- o Never reached 8% during my Administration.
- o Did reach 8.5% during previous Administration.
- o 1.3 million new jobs held by Blacks.
- o 13% more Blacks employed today.
- o Employment grown at twice the rate it did during Nixon-Ford years.

Reagan

9. Government spending has not been controlled, and has been principal cause of inflation.
10. Broke '76 campaign promise to get inflation and unemployment down to 4%.
11. Social Security tax increase was largest tax increase in history.

Rebuttal

- o Real growth in Federal spending has been cut in half.
- o Deficit as percentage of GNP is less than half what I inherited.
- o Still are our goals.
- o OPEC and recession made impossible.
- o Better chance of reaching if avoid massive tax cut and if pursue my job-creating Economic Revitalization program.
- o Tax increase protected System from bankruptcy.
- o 8% credit will eliminate next year's scheduled increase.

Energy

1. Pursued anti-production policies throughout Administration.
 - o Decontrol of oil and natural gas are directly responsible for production increases -- by 1985, 400-700,000 b/d of oil and 2 trillion cubic feet per year of natural gas more than there would be if controls were continued.
 - o Oil and gas exploration will set new record in '80 -- 3,164 rigs in operation this month. Oil and gas wells drilled will reach 60,000 in '80 -- 66% above 1976.
 - o Coal production will reach highest level, exceeding 800 million tons for the first time in history -- 15% above 1976.

ReaganRebuttal

2. Excluding Alaska, oil production has declined every year of this Administration.
3. More dependent on OPEC than before.
4. There is no energy shortage -- there is still more oil in the ground than we have taken out.
5. SPRO has been mismanaged.
- o Including Alaska, which is still a part of the United States, domestic oil production has gone up in 3 out of 4 years in office.
 - o More new wells are being drilled this year and more rigs are active today than at any time in our Nation's history.
 - o Imports of foreign oil down 2 million barrels per day since '76, or 23%.
 - o Reduced dependence has enabled us to avoid shortfalls that might have resulted because of Iran-Iraq War.
 - o During previous 2 Republican Administrations (1968-75) imports of foreign oil increased from 2.8 million barrels per day to 8.8 million barrels per day.
 - o We have produced about 120 billion barrels of domestic oil so far. Assuming that enhanced oil recovery methods such as secondary and tertiary recovery reach their full potential, the total volume remaining to be produced is about 73 billion barrels.
 - o No authoritative estimate has ever claimed that secondary and tertiary methods could bring total production up to 120 billion barrels.
 - o We made a careful decision, based on the international market situation, not to buy vast quantities of oil for the SPRO last year. To have done so would just have driven up the world oil price.
 - o We have now started filling rather rapidly (24 million barrels now being delivered) and a number of tests have proved that the system works smoothly.

Reagan

6. There is no need for government role in synfuels development.
7. Prohibited exploration on possibly productive lands.
8. Windfall Tax is not a tax on oil companies -- but a tax on consumers.
9. One year's waste from a nuclear plant could be stored under a desk.

Rebuttal

- o Without government role, there has been no synfuels production; now on target to produce 2 million barrels of synfuels per day by 1992.
- o Government will only help with financing -- absorbing the risk of new technology -- no operating or management role.
- o Our Alaska Lands bill leaves 90% of the promising oil and gas land available for development and 100% of the Outer Continental Shelf, where most oil and gas will probably be found.
- o My new 5-year Outer Continental Shelf leasing program offers more acreage (45 million acres) than all acreage offered since the program began in 1954. Though only 2-3% of the OCS is ~~not~~ leased, less than 10% has any possible oil or gas reserves.
- o Of the 822 million acres of Federal mineral estate, about 500 million acres are available for lease.
- o The Windfall Tax reclaims some of the increased profits that the oil companies will make from consumers when oil is decontrolled. It creates the revenues we need to increase domestic production of energy and to help our poor citizens afford the rising costs of energy.
- o This ignores the serious responsibility that the Federal government has to establish a safe nuclear waste program.
- o Most nuclear plants create more waste than this in a year, but size is irrelevant; a cyanide capsule or a time bomb are small, too, but that does not mean they are safe.

EnvironmentReagan

1. EPA is dominated by "no growth" advocates -- EPA wants you to live in birds nests or rabbit holes.

2. Clean Air Act has forced closing of steel mills.

3. Environmental regulations have hurt auto industry.

Rebuttal

- o At my direction, EPA has devised innovative regulatory approaches, such as the bubble policy, economic incentives, emissions banking and deadline extensions, to allow growth to continue while keeping environmental costs at an acceptable level.
- o EPA's activities are essential if we are to have the kind of growth we all want -- healthy growth that does not despoil our air and water for future generations.
- o Not even the steel companies claim that Carter's steel program provides case-by-case balance between needs of steel and environmental goals. Even the industry admits that our program solves the industry's major environmental concerns.
- o The vast majority (about 83%) of industry expenditures for Federal regulations are for fuel economy -- not for environmental protection. Consumer demand is forcing the industry to make these investments regardless of Federal requirements.
- o Obviously some investment for environmental regulation is necessary to protect the health of our citizens -- as recent victims of Los Angeles' smog episode will attest.
- o My Administration has worked to ensure that regulations are cost-effective. EPA has modified several rules to save the industry as much as \$600 million without sacrificing air quality.
- o Moreover, environmental regulation has encouraged the development of new technology benefitting the industry and consumers; for example, the new electronic devices which save fuel as well as curb pollution.

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Reagan

4. EPA is anti-coal.

5. Air pollution is substantially under control. Mt. St. Helens and trees cause more pollution than cars.

6. Carter has closed off too much of Alaska to energy exploration.

7. Sagebrush rebellion will become Reagan Administration policy.

Rebuttal

- o EPA believes that coal can be burned cleanly with the appropriate pollution control technologies, and they are funding studies to develop better and cheaper devices.
- o EPA has shown its flexibility in dealing with coal-burning pollution time and time again -- most recently by extending the 30-day averaging provision in Ohio so that Ohio utilities can burn Ohio coal.
- o Anyone who lives in an urban area knows that air pollution is not under control. In fact, when Reagan made that claim, Los Angeles was under a several-week pollution alert.
- o Mt. St. Helens emits sulfur oxides, which cars do not. Power plants in the U.S. do, though, but they emit 50 times as much in a day as Mt. St. Helens. Trees emit harmless sulfur oxides, not the nitrogen dioxide that comes from cars and can cause serious heart and respiratory illness.
- o 90% of land in Alaska with potential oil reserves is open to exploration, and 100% of the Outer Continental Shelf where most oil and gas probably will be found.
- o Reagan would give away millions of acres of land that is now owned by all of the people in the country to a few private interests.
- o I would continue to open these lands for commercial development as appropriate, but I would not give up the American peoples' right to enjoy natural resources.

Reagan

8. 55 MPH speed limit should be eliminated.
9. Toughest anti-smog laws in Nation were enacted during his term as Governor.

Rebuttal

- o Saved 40,000 lives and 228,000 barrels of gasoline per day.
- o He opposed the laws while they were going through the Legislature.
- o League of Conservation Voters said he undermined tough enforcement of environmental laws.

Regulation and Government Reform

1. Trucking, airline and banking deregulation are merely publicized examples of showcase deregulation.
 - o Most significant change in government relationship with business since the New Deal.
 - o More real regulatory reform in last 34 years than in preceding 34 decades.
 - o Airline deregulation saved \$5 billion for consumers in first two years.
 - o Trucking deregulation will reduce shipping costs by \$5-8 billion a year.
2. Greatest regulator in history; hasn't done anything to stop regulation growth.
 - o Deregulated airlines, rails, banking, trucking and communications (administratively).
 - o Reduced paperwork burden by 15%.
 - o Deregulated oil pricing and natural gas pricing.
 - o Regulations now written in easy-to-understand English.
 - o Reformed regulatory process -- cost of regulations reviewed for first time in Nation's history.
3. Federal Register pages have increased.
 - o There are more pages because we now require large print for easy reading and a simplified explanation that the average person can understand.
 - o There has not been any real increase in the number of new regulations (those being issued are largely the product of statute enacted before I took office).

COPY

Reagan

4. Nothing has been done about the \$50 billion in fraud and abuse in government programs.

Rebuttal

- o Inspectors General appointed in every Department.
- o Civil Service Reform improved ability to detect problems.
- o Reagan has never indicated precisely how he would cut out this problem or precisely what programs are involved.

Agriculture

1. Agricultural policies are an unprecedented disaster.

- o Agricultural exports have set records every year -- this year will rise by \$8 billion to \$40 billion.
- o Farm income was up in each of last 3 years.
- o Last year farm income reached record-setting level.
- o Past four years -- record yields in six major crops.
- o First farmer-owned grain reserve.
- o Opened up new trade markets -- in China, Mexico.

Grain embargo has hurt farmers more than Soviets.

- o Soviet feed grain imports are off by 8-10 million tons.
- o Soviets now forced into meat shortage situation.
- o Farmers were made whole for any losses through grain purchase program.

- KEY LINES TO USE AT BEGINNING OF COMMENTS ON REAGAN

1. Simplistic Solutions That Won't Work in the Real World

- Governor Reagan simply does not understand the consequences of his proposal.
- Governor Reagan's program has an initial, surface appeal, but I've learned as President to look beneath the surface.
- Governor Reagan's proposal provides a simplistic and erroneous solution to a very complicated problem.
- I do not believe Governor Reagan would make that proposal if he appreciated the complexities involved.
- I had a similar view before I became President and learned first-hand the complexities involved.
- I have learned a great deal from the experiences of the last 4 years. I wish that the Governor had learned as well.
- I wish the matter were as simple as the Governor has portrayed it. It would have made my job a lot easier these past four years.
- I would have said the exact same thing myself -- four years ago. Fortunately for the country, I have learned that

2. Troublesome

That kind of thinking has gotten us into trouble before.

3. Republican

That is a good example of age-old Republican doctrine. (NHD, Minimum wage, Medicare)

4. Ignores Consequences

That sounds fine. But let's look at the consequences.

5. Reliance on Experts

Governor Reagan cites what he calls "expert" opinion (on Kemp-Roth, military needs). As President, you get "expert" opinion on both sides. The President must be the final judge.

6. Negative

Anyone can list problems. We need to understand them.

7. Knee-jerk

Governor Reagan seems to have a predictable, knee-jerk response to every situation. Kemp-Roth is his answer whether the economy is expanding or contracting. Military power is always his answer, necessary or not.

8. Vague

The Governor paints a rather vague picture. I would like a few more details. I would like to know ... when ... where ... how ...

9. Elitist

That is a great idea -- if you make \$200,000 a year!

10. Pro-Business

The Governor says we should rely on the private sector alone. That is the approach Herbert Hoover took. The private sector alone can't be depended upon to protect worker safety and health or the environment or to solve our energy problem or provide medical care for the aged.

11. Quoting Democrats

I notice that Governor Reagan likes to quote Democratic Presidents whose programs he opposed.

12. Women's Issues

I do not think many working women would agree with that.

13. Flip-Flops

I salute Governor Reagan for moderating his position. It makes good political sense. Unfortunately it contradicts entirely what he has stood for these past 20 years.

14. Attacks on Record

Governor Reagan fails to mention something: Before we came along, this country did not even have -- (an energy policy; a Camp David peace process; human rights program).

15. Hostages

Does Governor Reagan seriously believe that I have not done everything I could to get those hostages out safely? If he had a solution, I feel confident he would have offered it long ago -- just as any American citizen would.

16. "Secret Plans"

Our country learned in 1968 how dangerous it was to believe in "secret plans" to end international disputes.

17. Democratic Party

Governor Reagan appears to accept Democratic solutions about a generation after they were first proposed. (Civil Rights Act, Medicare, Social Security)

At this rate, he will be supporting ERA and national health insurance sometime in the 21st century!

18. Clear-Out Choice

That is one position. Fortunately, the American people have a clear-cut choice this year. My position is that...

19. Progress

Governor, you used to say on T.V., "progress is our most important product." But what you've just said isn't progress.

20. The GOP Platform/ERA

Harry Truman said that "... party platforms are contracts with the people." I agree.

The women of America should know that the platform of the Republican Party deprives them their rightful place in our Constitution.

21. Women--ERA

The Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution is just as vital and necessary today as were the Civil Rights Amendments to the Constitution of the last century. Anything less is a half-measure.

22. Economy

Kemp-Roth is a rich man's tax cut which would flood the country with excess dollars, and which his own Vice-Presidential candidate has called "voodoo economics".

The Republican economic philosophy is trickled down. I'm with Hubert Humphrey who said Democratic economics percolate up.

Governor, your tax proposals give the largest tax breaks to the people who need them least -- the rich.

Your economic program is survival of the richest.

23. Economy (Labor, Social Security or Medicare)

I think the American working family can tell the difference between an old friend and a new-found friend.

24. Statistics

Those numbers just don't reflect reality.

Governor Reagan's statistics on are
about as accurate as his statistics that "90 percent pollution came from trees."

25. Energy (Windfall Profits)

Governor Reagan apparently doesn't believe that the oil companies make enough money.

26. Defense

Governor Reagan's defense proposals mean one thing -- a multi-billion dollar arms race the American people don't need, don't want and can't afford.

JUN 24 1983

First-Hand Accounts

(These can be used to take advantage of your training and experience)

1. Peace in the Nuclear Age.

I served as an engineer on a nuclear submarine.

I know what nuclear power and nuclear weapons can do.

I know that all the laws of combat changed when the first atom was smashed.

I know that the age of the six-gun is over.

I know you cannot go charging up San Juan Hill with today's weapons.

2. Building Peace

I have learned first-hand how to build peace between Nations.

It is not simply by avoiding war.

You build peace by establishing mutual respect, by finding areas where Nations can cooperate and benefit each other.

I learned this lesson in building peace between Israel and her most powerful Arab neighbor -- a peace of economic technological cooperation, a peace that will grow into a strong regional partnership.

I have worked first-hand with Sadat and Begin to build this peace. I am thrilled to see these two countries cooperating for mutual benefit, to watch on television and see Egyptian ships being received at Israeli ports, to see the Jerusalem Post on sale in Cairo.

3. Building Energy Security

I have learned first-hand there is more to security than simply military hardware.

I have had to plan for energy contingencies. I have had to "sell" the American people on the energy challenge. I have had to confront difficult regional differences in Congress.

4. Government Efficiency

I came to the White House believing that the best way to improve efficiency was to consolidate Governmental units.

I have learned first-hand that the key lies in building a responsive, productive Federal Civil Service. The people make the difference, not the organizational structure. I have pushed through the most sweeping overhaul of the Civil Service in a century. The new system offers real incentives for good management performance. It has received strong bi-partisan support and praise.

5. Dealing with Experts

I have learned you get "expert" opinion on both sides of every issue. Finally, the President must be the "expert".

FOR PRESIDENT CARTERQUESTIONS TO ASK GOVERNOR REAGANA. Overview

1. Which specific domestic initiatives of the past 4 years would you seek to have Congress repeal?
2. How can you say your positions have not changed in light of your current stands on New York City aid, Chrysler aid, abolishing OSHA, eliminating the minimum wage, and China?
3. Can you explain how you planned to divide responsibility with former President Ford when you were considering him as your running mate?
4. Do you disavow any parts of the Republican Platform?
5. Why should people believe that you were serious about cutting Federal spending when you have spent so much of the campaign making promises which cost so much money (inheritance tax removal; tuition tax credit etc.)?
6. What audience have you addressed in this campaign and called upon them for sacrifice, rather than promised additional aid or assistance?
7. How can the American people believe that equal rights would be protected as well by statute if hundreds of statutes would have to be changed by Congress and hundreds by State legislatures?

B. California Record

1. Why should voters believe you will reduce the size of the Federal government, reduce taxes or reduce the number of government employees when you failed to achieve any of these goals in California?

C. Economy

1. Why have you not named yet a specific program that you would cut in this year's budget, in light of the fact that you are proposing to cut \$13-19 billion out of this budget as soon as you take office?
2. Will you oppose further increases in the minimum wage?

3. What evidence do you have that there was any White House role in changing the PPI method of calculation?
4. Why have you not told the American people your unemployment and inflation projections for next year? (The Senate Budget Committee forecast is not based on your Kemp-Roth proposal).
5. In light of the positions you took until just recently on the minimum wage, OSHA, and applying the antitrust laws to unions, why should working people believe your current positions reflect your true views?
6. If you are so concerned about providing investment incentives, why did you drop your support of the 10-5-3 proposal and provide only 10% of your tax cut for investment purposes?
7. Can you tell us why President Ford and your own running mate have not supported your tax cut program?

D. Energy and Environment

1. Can you explain again to the American people why you believe 93% of air pollution is caused by trees and how it is that pollution has been "substantially controlled"?
2. Would you repeal the Windfall Profits Tax or have you changed your position on that tax now?

E. Government

1. Are you still standing by your earlier positions that you will seek to abolish the Departments of Energy and Education or have you changed your positions?
2. What specific powers and functions would you return to the States and what do you mean by "tax sources to pay for them"?
3. Since you opposed the Chrysler and New York City assistance programs when they were being considered by the Congress, what would you have done to deal with those problems?
4. Why do you believe a total freeze of Federal hiring would be any more productive in reducing the number of Federal employees than was your freeze in California? Are you aware I have had such a freeze on for several months?

F. Human Needs

1. Why have you failed to support the Fair Housing bill now being considered by the Congress?
2. Why have you failed to support the Unemployment Compensation Extension now being considered by the Congress?
3. Why do you oppose any form of National Health Insurance?

CHALLENGES

(You may want to use the technique of challenging Reagan to provide an answer, which he obviously will not know or will not want to provide.)

Examples:

1. I challenge Governor Reagan to deny that in this campaign he has changed his 20-year-long position on
2. I challenge Governor Reagan to deny that he once said
3. I challenge Governor Reagan to name any expert (not on his payroll) (not supporting his candidacy) who will support that statement.
4. I challenge Governor Reagan to tell us specifically which programs he would begin eliminating next year.
5. I challenge Governor Reagan to let us know if he still plans to dismantle the Departments of Education and Energy upon assuming office.
6. I challenge Governor Reagan to tell us his inflation projections and his specific plan to fight inflation.
7. I challenge Governor Reagan to explain how changing hundreds of Federal and State statutes is a better and quicker way to ensure equal rights than ERA?
8. I challenge Governor Reagan to deny that he led the effort to oppose (Medicare).
9. I challenge Governor Reagan to be specific about his program to transfer programs back to the States and to tell us how that will be financed and how it differs from his \$90 billion transfer program of 1976.
10. I challenge Governor Reagan to deny that he made the same charge about the U.S. becoming No. 2 militarily against Gerald Ford in 1976.
11. I challenge Governor Reagan to let us know why he has not yet indicated his support for the Fair Housing bill in the Senate, which is now opposed by the Republicans following his lead.
12. I challenge Governor Reagan to explain why he opposed a grain embargo against the Soviet Union when he now supports a total trade embargo or why he could now support a total quarantine.
13. I challenge Governor Reagan to deny that taxes and spending doubled while he was Governor.

- o He tends to stay above the fray, leaving his opponents to try to throw the haymakers.
- o He responds to criticism or attack, either by making light of it or by appearing hurt. In the Anderson debate, for example,
 - when Anderson implied he was against conserving energy, he responded: "Well, as I've said, I am not an enemy of conservation. I wouldn't be called a conservative, if I were.
 - when Anderson attacked some statistics he used, he responded: "Well, some people look up figures, and some people make up figures. And John has just made up some very interesting figures." (He also looked very pained that his figures were being challenged.)
- o He regularly appeals to his audience's patriotic pride, both with anecdotes and in his closing statements in every debate.
- o He occasionally injects a light touch into the debate, including some self-deprecating humor. For example,
 - when the moderator asked for a one sentence response to a question and then called Reagan for responding with two sentences, he responded: "I thought I put a semicolon in there."
 - when he referred to Ancient Rome and the moderator made a comment about being young then, Reagan popped back: "Im' the only one here old enough to remember."
 - when asked his position on ERA, he responded: "I'm for ER. I can't go along with A."

In sum, Governor Reagan's style is to carry on a conversation with his viewing audience. He is very disarming, always general, and often loose with his facts. His answers nearly always revert to his anti-government themes. He appears to be appealing to his audience's common sense; but more often appeals to patriotism and national pride.

MAJOR CARTER ACCOMPLISHMENTSDOMESTIC

1. Comprehensive Energy Program.
2. Restored Openness and Integrity to Government.
3. Restored economic growth after deep recession of '74-'75; and increased employment overall, as well as for minorities, women and youth.
4. Rescued Social Security System from bankruptcy.
5. Expanded and improved major "people" programs - health, housing, social services.
6. Deregulated airline, trucking, railroad and banking industries.
7. Government Reform -- Civil Service Reform; simplified regulatory process; reduced paperwork burden.
8. Reduced size of Federal government (40,000 fewer full time employees) (Note: temporary and part-time more than employees have increased).
9. Appointment of record number of minorities and women to judgeships and top policy management positions.
10. Expanded government efforts on behalf of equal opportunities and equal rights.
11. Education - substantial expansion of key programs and creation of Department of Education.
12. Comprehensive Urban Policy.
13. Protected the Environment.
14. Strong Farm Policy.

(FACTS AND FIGURES ON THESE DOMESTIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES.)

FOREIGN

1. Peace
2. Camp David Accords/Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
3. Completion of SALT II Negotiations
4. Ratification of Panama Canal Treaties
5. Majority Rule/Free Elections in Zimbabwe

6. Normalization of Relations with China
7. Real Increases in Defense Spending, reversing years of decline
8. Strengthened NATO Alliance
9. Firm opposition to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
10. Negotiation and Congressional approval of Multilateral Trade Agreement - most substantial trade agreement of our generation

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COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PROGRAMKey Elements

1. Production
 - o Comprehensive Energy Act of '78 (including phased deregulation of natural gas prices).
 - o Decontrol of oil prices.
 - o Coal Production and Conversion Incentives.
 - o Alaskan Natural Gas Pipeline (supplying 5% of our gas).
 - o Mexican Natural Gas Agreement.
2. Conservation
 - o Standby Gasoline Rationing Plan.
 - o Tokyo and Venice Energy Conservation and Consumption Commitments of Allies.
3. Solar and Gasohol
 - o Conservation and Solar Bank (providing \$3 billion in loans over next 4 years).
 - o First Solar Energy Tax Credits.
 - o Solar Commitment of 20% by year 2000; solar funding tripled.
 - o Windfall Profits Tax.
4. Safer Nuclear Power
 - o Implementation of Kemeny Commission Recommendations.
5. Synthetics
 - o Synthetic Fuels Corporation (target of 2 million barrels per day by 1992): biggest peacetime program in history to achieve energy security.

Key Results

- o Imports declined every year I've been in office -- historic reversal of increasing dependence every decade since WW II, which I inherited.

- o Importing 2.2 million barrels per day less than in '77 (25% less) (in 3 years before you took office oil imports rose 44%). (In 1980, oil imports are down by 1.4 million barrels per day compared to 1979.)
- o Gasoline demand down 10% (750,000 barrels per day) since 1978.
- o Domestic crude oil production this year will reach 7 year high of over 8.6 million barrels daily (10% increase over '77) (in 3 years before you took office production declined by 7% or 600,000 barrels per day).
- o Oil and gas exploration efforts will set new record in '80 with an estimated monthly average 3,000 rigs in operation -- 70% increase over '76.
- o Coal production in '80 will reach 50 million tons -- 25% above '76 (between '72-'76, production grew only by 13%) -- all-time high.
- o Coal consumption in '80 will be 17% above '76, and coal's share of total U.S. energy needs in '80 will pass 20% while oil's share will decline for second consecutive year; coal exports in '79 reached 5-year high, and will set another record in '80 (84 million tons). For first time over 50% of our electricity comes from American coal and not OPEC oil.
- o Use of solar energy in households has increased tenfold in past 4 years.

OPENNESS AND INTEGRITYKey Elements

- o Executive Order requiring financial disclosure of government officials and prohibiting revolving-door practices.
- o Ethics in Government Act - putting into statute the requirements of the Executive Order; also establishment of Special Prosecutor procedure.
- o Inspectors General - placed in each Cabinet Department to identify fraud and waste; identified \$1 billion in wasteful expenditures; over 600 fraud convictions to date.
- o Executive Order reducing over-classification of government documents - increases amount of classified material to be released over next decade by 250 million pages.
- o Held 31 Town Hall Meetings - none held by previous Presidents.
- o Held 59 press conferences.

Key Results

- o Restored openness and integrity of earlier Democratic Administrations.
- o Greater public access than ever to government decisionmakers and government information.
- o Ensured feeling by American people of integrity of their governmental leaders.

RESTORED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCREASED EMPLOYMENTKey Elements

- o \$21 billion economic stimulus package in '77.
- o \$20 billion tax cut in '78 (that cut plus the \$8 billion cut in the stimulus package are valued at \$40 billion in 1980).
- o Reduction by one-third of capital gains rate.
- o MTN Agreement and Export Policy.
- o '77 Economic Stimulus Package -- \$21 billion program to stimulate economy and create jobs.
- o Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act.
- o Increased public service employment funds by 115% and jobs by 150,000 (from 300,000 in '77 to 450,000 in '80).
- o Increased youth employment funds by 230% (providing 1 million youth with training and jobs).
- o Private Sector Jobs Program (\$400 million annually -- 120,000 will get private sector jobs in '80).
- o Targeted Employment Tax Credit -- (tax credit for hiring hard-core unemployed).
- o Summer jobs programs -- 1 million jobs annually.
- o Doubling size of Job Corps.

Key Results

- o GNP is up by more than 12% since '76 (between '72-'76, rose by only 7%).
- o Industrial production rose 15% from the end of 1976 - end of 1979 (between '72-'76 industrial production rose only 6-1/2%).
- o Corporate profits taxes rose from 1976-1979 by 58% (between '72-'76, corporate profits rose by 54%).
- o Real business investment in new plant and equipment has grown at an annual rate of 4.7% since '76 (this is 4 times greater than the rate for the previous 8 years).

- o New home construction has averaged 1.7 million units since '76 (during previous comparable period (3 yrs 9 months) average was only 1.5 million units).
- o Got country out of recession you inherited (and will lead out of one we now have).
- o Employment is now 97.2 million -- highest in history.
- o 8.8 million new jobs created since December '76 -- nearly double the number (4.4 million) created in the previous 4 years under Nixon-Ford. (Note: stress that unprecedented growth is labor force kept unemployment up).
- o Employment of adult women increased by 16% -- 5.6 million new jobs since December 1976.
- o Employment of Blacks increased by 13% -- 1.3 million new jobs.
- o Employment of Hispanics increased 25% -- 1 million jobs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMKey Elements

- o Proposed and signed legislation to strengthen financial status of all of the Social Security Trust Funds.
- o Proposed credit to negate effect of next year's Social Security tax increase - without reducing in any way Social Security Trust Funds.
- o Opposed efforts to tax Social Security benefits, cap Social Security cost-of-living increases, raise the retirement age for Social Security.

Key Results

- o Not a single check to any of the 35 million Social Security recipients was delayed a day.
- o System was able to afford 14% cost-of-living increase this year.
- o Proposed credit has provided way to ensure continued fiscal integrity while reducing inflationary impact of the Social Security taxes.

DEREGULATIONKey Elements

- o Passage of Airline Deregulation.
- o Passage of Trucking Deregulation.
- o Passage of Banking Deregulation (small savers reform).
- o Passage of Railroad Deregulation.
- o Administrative action on Communications Deregulation.

Key Results

- o The 40-year government push for greater government regulation has been reversed - most fundamental restructuring of relationship between government and industry since New Deal.
- o Airline deregulation has produced a record number of flights and passengers; first year consumer savings - \$2.5 billion.
- o Trucking deregulation will enhance competition and reduce energy consumption; saves consumers \$5-\$8 billion a year.
- o Banking deregulation has allowed banks and savings and loan associations to increase the interest they pay to those with relatively small savings.
- o Rail deregulation will save America's railroads from bankruptcy.

#6

REDUCED SIZE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTKey Element

Last March, you imposed a hiring 2-1 freeze. This was the third one since 1977.

Key Result

By October of 1980, there will be 44,000 fewer full-time Federal employees than when you took office. By comparison, during the four previous years, the number of full-time Federal employees grew by 57,000 workers.

(Note: Part-time hire increased by about 80,000)

JUN 21 1982

APPOINTMENTSKey Elements

- o Appointed more women, Blacks and Hispanics (over 80) to federal judgeships than all previous Presidents combined.
- o Appointed more women, Blacks and Hispanics to senior government positions - Cabinet, sub-Cabinet, Agency Head, White House staff - than any previous President.
- o Appointed three of the six women to ever serve in Cabinet positions.
- o Appointed 40 women judges (there were only 5 women judges at the beginning of the Administration).
- o Appointed 38 Black judges (only 17 Black judges before).
- o Appointed 16 Hispanic judges (only 5 Hispanic judges before).
- o One third of all judicial appointments have been women or minorities; when you took office women and minorities represented just 5% of the federal judiciary.
- o Appointed four Blacks to Cabinet positions, and over 50 to key sub-Cabinet positions.
- o Number of senior management positions held by women has doubled.

Key Results

- o Real progress made for first time in our history in having women and minorities appointed in numbers much more representative of their proportion to the population.
- o Have appointees whose quality is as high or higher than federal government and the federal judiciary has ever had.
- o Have placed women and minority judges in position to be interpreting our laws into the next century.

EDUCATIONKey Elements

- o Creation of Cabinet-level Department of Education (combining 150 existing Federal programs into one organization).
- o Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments (extension of Act, expanding and targeting Federal aid to disadvantaged).
- o Middle Income Student Assistance Act.
- o Increase in Education budget since '77 -- 73% -- largest increase in comparable period in history.
- o Increased funding of key education programs:
 - Basic Skills Training -- 86%
 - Bilingual and Education -- 100%
 - Higher Education and Student Aid -- 48%
 - Education for the Handicapped -- 57%
 - Head Start -- 73%

Key Results

- o You are The Education President.
- o Education represented at the Cabinet-table for first time in history.
- o Greater Federal assistance -- without Federal involvement in local schools -- than at any time in history.
- o No student denied a college education because of access to needed financial assistance.
- o Greatly increased emphasis on the basic skills -- reading, writing, computation.

URBAN POLICYKey Elements

- o Creation of Urban Development Action Grant Program (first \$1.3 billion of UDAG grants have already stimulated \$7.5 billion of new investment in our Nation's cities and created more than 400,000 new jobs).
- o Expansion of Economic Development Administration funding from \$60 million annually for urban areas to nearly \$1 billion per year.
- o Creation of a rehabilitation tax credit to encourage businesses to rehabilitate their facilities in urban areas (nearly \$2 billion of rehabilitation will be assisted this year through the credit).
- o Executive Order requiring Federal facilities in urban areas to be located in the central business area (resulting so far in relocation of more than 200 government facilities).
- o Executive Order requiring Federal agencies to target their procurement activities to high unemployment areas (this year \$1.2 billion of Federal contracts will be targeted to these areas).
- o Reauthorization of General Revenue Sharing.
- o \$1 billion in counter-cyclical aid.
- o Increase funding by nearly \$1 billion for the Community Development Block Grant Program.
- o Commitment to provide \$50 billion for capital investment in mass transit during the 1980's (compared to \$15 billion in the 1970's).
- o Funding for 300,000 subsidized housing units in FY '81, a 25% increase.

Key Results

- o Nation has a comprehensive urban policy for the first time.
- o Grants-in-aid to States and localities have increased by almost 35% since '77 (from \$68 billion to \$91 billion).
- o Funding to increase private sector jobs and investment in our urban areas has increased by nearly 3000% (\$60 million to \$1.8 billion).
- o This funding (UDAG, EDA, investment tax credit for industrial rehabilitation, Federal procurement targeted to high unemployment areas) will produce \$6.5 billion in private investment and 400,000 new jobs this year.

PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENTKey Elements

- o Executive actions and progress in legislation to protect Alaska lands.
- o Enactment and implementation of Nation's first Stripmining law.
- o Strengthening and reauthorization of Clean Air and Water Acts, and their effective enforcement at EPA.
- o Enactment and implementation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in context of overall policy of halting push toward plutonium and commercial breeder reactors.
- o Development of comprehensive, environmentally sensitive nuclear waste management policy.
- o Initiation of new policies and program to reform water resource development; opposition to wasteful water projects.
- o Establishment of goal of a 20% solar U.S. for the year 2000.
- o Establishment of energy conservation as cornerstone of national energy policy.
- o Steady expansion of system of protected national lands: parks, trails, wilderness areas, scenic rivers.
- o Appointment of environmentally-concerned individuals to key government positions.

Key Results

- o Reversal of previous 8 years of environmental neglect by Executive Branch.
- o Government and environmental community now working together to solve problems and protect the environment.
- o Unanimous endorsement by environmental community leaders.

STRONG FARM ECONOMYKey Elements

- o Food and Farm Act of '77 -- comprehensive 4 year farm bill.
- o Placed farmers in key decision-making positions at USDA.
- o Established Nation's first farmer-owned and controlled grain reserve.
- o Promoted U.S. agricultural exports, including the development of new markets (such as China).

Key Results

- o Farm prices have gone through a dramatic recovery:

In January, 1977 . . .

corn was \$2.34 per bushel and falling (it eventually reached \$1.60)

-in August 1980 it was \$2.93 and rising

wheat was \$2.43 per bushel and falling (it eventually bottomed-out at \$2.00)

-in August 1980 it was \$3.86 and rising

beef cattle were \$32.20 per hundredweight

-in August 1980 they were \$65.10 and rising

milk sold for \$9.65 per hundredweight

-in August 1980 it was \$12.80 and rising

- o Agricultural exports have risen 82% since 1977, setting new records each year. This year, farm exports will reach \$40 billion, compared with \$32 billion last year (and \$22 billion in 1977) -- the largest one-year increase in our Nation's history. This will result in an agricultural trade surplus of \$21 billion this year.
- o Farm income rose during each of the first three years of your Administration, rebounding from the steady decline that had occurred during the latter years of the Nixon-Ford Administration. In 1979, net farm income reached a record-tying high \$33.3 billion. While net farm income is being squeezed this year by the effect of OPEC oil price rises, stronger farm prices are already beginning to provide relief. Despite this squeeze, farm income will be higher this year than it was when this Administration came into office.
- o For alcohol fuel, we have set a production capacity goal of 500 million gallons by the end of 1981. This represents an over six-fold increase from the 1979 level and will provide gasohol (90/10 mixture) equivalent to about 10 percent of U.S. unleaded gasoline consumption.

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MAJOR CARTER LEGISLATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS1. Economy and Workers

- o Economic Stimulus Package - '77
- o Social Security Refinancing - '77
- o Tax Cut - '78
- o Humphrey-Hawkins Act - '78
- o Minimum Wage Increases - '78
- o New York City Assistance - '78
- o Chrysler Assistance - '80

2. Energy

- o Department of Energy - '77
- o Comprehensive National Energy Act '78
(including natural gas deregulation, energy tax incentives,
conservation and conversion incentives)
- o Windfall Profits Tax - '80
- o Synthetic Fuels Corporation - '80
- o Solar Bank - '80
- o Low-Income Energy Assistance - '79
- o Stand-by Gasoline Rationing Plan - '80

3. Government Reform

- o Reorganization Authority - '77
- o 12 Reorganization Plans
- o Ethics in Government Act - '78
- o Omnibus Judgeship Act - '78
- o Department of Education Act - '79

- o Airline Deregulation - '78
- o Inspectors General Act - '79
- o Trucking Deregulation - '80
- o Banking Deregulation (Small Savers Reforms) - '80
- o Rail Deregulation - '80
- 4. Human and Social Needs
 - o Food Stamp Reform
 - o Food and Farm Act - '77
 - o Increased Education Spending
 - o Urban Policy - '78
 - o Consumer Cooperative Bank Act - '79
 - o Mental Health Act - '80
- 5. Rights and Liberties
 - o D.C. Voting Rights Amendment - '79
 - o EPA Deadline Extension - '79
 - o Anti-Boycott Act - '77
 - o Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act - '78
 - o Age Discrimination Act Amendments (mandatory retirement) - '78
- 6. Natural Resources
 - o Strip Mining Act - '77
 - o Clean Air and Clean Water Act Amendments - '78
 - o Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act
 - o Omnibus National Parks Act
- 7. Foreign and Defense Policy
 - o Panama Canal Treaties - '78
 - o Taiwan-U.S. Relations Act - '79
 - o Multilateral Trade Negotiations Act - '79
 - o Increased Defense Spending - '78 - '81
 - o Egyptian-Israeli Treaty Assistance Act - '79

CARTER INITIATIVES ENACTED DESPITE WIDESPREAD
INITIAL PREDICTIONS OF DEFEAT

- o Windfall Profits Tax
- o Natural Gas Deregulation
- o Civil Service Reform
- o Chrysler Assistance Packages
- o New York City Loan Guarantees
- o Panama Canal Treaties
- o Airline Deregulation
- o Trucking Deregulation
- o ERA Ratification Deadline Extension
- o D.C. Voting Rights Amendment
- o Multilateral Trade Negotiations Agreement
- o Lifting of Turkish Arms Embargo
- o Repeal of Byrd Amendment (Rhodesian imports)
- o Stopping the funding for B-1 bomber
- o Rail Deregulation

1976 CAMPAIGN PROMISESKEY POINTS

1. You were first President to compile and publicly disclose all your campaign promises: this was done to allow public to judge your performance against the promises.
2. Any fair-minded, objective assessment of your performance shows that you have honored an extraordinary number of the promises, and worked to honor virtually every one. In those areas where your efforts have not been successful, one of the principal reasons has been Congress' failure to act -- not your failure to do what is within your power. However, in some cases, promises have not been honored because circumstances have changed, new facts have become apparent, and you have changed your position as a result. There is no reason to be defensive about this: it should be used as a positive point -- that things looked simpler to you in some ways before you became President and now you know more (implying that Reagan's simplistic solutions also suffer from a lack of full information about the problems involved).
3. Finally, you have done a better job of honoring your promises than many predicted four years ago, and a far better job than many of your predecessors in honoring their campaign promises.
4. Major Promises Honored:
 - o Comprehensive energy policy
 - o Comprehensive urban policy
 - o Appointments -- bringing more women and minorities into the government at senior positions
 - o Reorganization -- more than dozen reorganization plans, new Departments of Education and Energy
 - o Preserving Social Security System
 - o Deregulating Airline Industry
 - o Civil Service Reform
 - o Greater public access to government information and officials
 - o Improved relations with State and local governments
 - o Reforming and strengthening OSHA
 - o Increasing public service job opportunities and youth employment programs
 - o Increasing Minimum Wage
 - o Increasing Federal commitment to public education

- o Using voluntary wage and price policy
- o Pardoning Selective Service violators
- o Supporting human rights around the world
- o Strengthening NATO alliance
- o Bringing peace between Israel and Egypt
- c Improving relations with China
- o Eliminating waste in the military
- o Halting the B-1 bomber

5. Promises Not Kept Because of Congressional Resistance:

- o National Health Insurance
- o Welfare Reform
- o Tax Reform
- o Consumer Protection Agency
- o Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns
- o Post-card voter registration
- o New SALT Agreement

6.** Promises Where Positions Can Reasonably Be Said to Have Changed or We Have Not Delivered:

- o Balancing Federal budget by end of first term
- o Seeking 4% inflation rate by end of first term
- o Opposing decontrol of old oil
- o Permitting deregulation of only new natural gas
- o Reducing government agencies from 1800 to 200
- o Opposing sale of arms to Egypt
- o Not relinquishing actual control of Panama Canal
- o Reducing our weapons sales to other countries
- o Reducing defense spending (here frankly state you found a profoundly different situation than you had expected as a candidate. You found USSR building bigger and our own Armed Forces in greater need of repair)

ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION PROGRAMResults

Cost: Tax package - \$27.6 billion in 1981 (calendar)

New Jobs Impact: - 500,000 new jobs in first 12 months without rekindling inflation.
- 1 million new jobs within two years

Real Investment Impact: Increase by 10% over '81-'82 period

GNP Impact: Will add 1 percentage point to real GNP growth.

Inflation Impact: Reduce inflation because of Social Security tax credits (short term) and investment and productivity incentives (long term)

Deficit Impact: '81 budget deficit increased by only \$6 - 7 billion

SITUATION INHERITED IN JANUARY 1977

(It is important to always remind the audience of the situation you inherited.)

1. Deepest recession since the Great Depression.
2. Unemployment at 8% (November '76) and averaging 8.5% for all of 1975.
3. A shortage of fuel for heating (especially natural gas) in the Winter of '76-'77 in the Northeast and Midwest U.S.
4. No national energy policy, with oil imports increasing and U.S. production declining.
5. Social Security System on the verge of bankruptcy.
6. "Real" defense spending declining, by 14% between '72-'76 and by 35% between '68-'76.
7. NATO defenses weakening.
8. Highest deficit in U.S. history.
9. Rising Federal employment.
10. Egypt and Israel poised for further war.

KEY ELEMENTS1. Industrial Revitalization:

- SIMPLIFIED, LIBERALIZED DEPRECIATION
- REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT (UP TO 30%)
- 3% REAL GROWTH IN GOVERNMENT R&D FUNDING (to encourage innovation and research)

2. Business-Labor-Government Cooperation:

- PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION BOARD
- INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
- TRIPARTITE COMMITTEES IN STEEL AND AUTOS AND COAL COMMISSION WITH ALL PARTIES

3. Community Assistance:

- TARGETED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (10%)
- \$1 BILLION COUNTERCYCLICAL REVENUE SHARING

4. Reducing Individual Tax Burdens:

- SOCIAL SECURITY TAX CREDIT (8%)
- INCREASED EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (to 12% from 10%)
- "MARRIAGE PENALTY" DEDUCTION (deduction of 30% of lower spouse's earnings)

INDICATORS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC RECOVERY

1. 670,000 new jobs added in past 3 months (June-September); manufacturing employment is up by 175,000 over past 2 months.
2. Index of Leading Economic Indicators - has risen for 3 straight months; the 3-month rise has been at a rate larger than any other 3-month rise for 31 years.
3. Housing starts are up for 4 consecutive months (now at annual rate of 1.6 million units); are up 70 percent above their May level; rose 9% last month.
4. Real GNP rose by 1% in 3rd quarter (official estimate) -- would mean we have had shortest recession in our history.
5. Domestic auto sales are 19% above their June level.
6. Three out of the four major indexes of stock values are at or very close to their all-time highs.

COMPARISON OF U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH MAJOR ALLIES

The OPEC oil price increases over the past few years have had an adverse impact on the economies of the U.S. and many of its major industrialized allies as well. However, a number of major indicators reveal that the U.S. has adjusted and fared better than many of our Allies.

Employment Growth

Over the past 3-1/2 years, U.S. employment has grown by almost 9 million jobs or 10%, as opposed to 4% in France, 0% in Great Britain, 1% in Germany, 4% in Japan, and 2% in Italy.

Real GNP Growth

Between 1976 and 1979, real GNP in the U.S. grew 12.5%; France was 9.9%; West Germany was 11%, Italy was 9.7%, and Great Britain was 5.5%.

Rate of Inflation (GNP Deflator)

The GNP price deflator in 1979 has the U.S. rate at 8.8% compared to 10.3% in France, 15.1% in Italy; 14.4% in Great Britain; and 9.9% in Canada.

Latest Inflation (CPI)

Latest 12 months: U.S. (13%); France (14%); Italy (19%); U.K. (16%); Canada (11%); Japan (9%); Germany (5%).

CARTER AND REAGAN INFLATION PROJECTIONS

CEA does forecasts for 1980 and 1981. The midsession budget update (July) contains projections (really assumptions) for 1982-85.

We project that inflation will steadily decline from 1981 to 1985, averaging 8 percent over this period. This does not take into account inflation-lowering effects of the Economic Renewal proposals.

Governor Reagan projects an average inflation rate of 9 percent -- before his massive tax cut which, CEA estimates, could add another 4-6 percentage points in each year from 1983 to 1985.

Key Points to Make Defending Economic Record (By Schultze)

1. During my administration, the United States has a record of providing jobs and employment that is unparalleled among other large industrial countries and unmatched by any previous administration. Employment in the United States in the past 3-1/2 years rose by nearly 10 percent. The closest country is Japan with an increase of 6 percent while employment in other major countries like Germany, France, and England has not increased at all. Similarly, industrial production in the United States during the 3 years before this recession began -- and the recession is temporary -- rose by more than any other major industrial country except Japan, and we were not far behind them.

My employment record is much better than that of the Ford Administration. The average unemployment rate during the worst four months of the last 3-1/2 years was lower than the average unemployment rate for President Ford's entire 29 months in office!

2. Our economy is vulnerable to OPEC price and supply actions. Energy policy and economic policy are tightly tied. With respect to energy the United States has made outstanding progress.
 - o Starting 1-1/2 years ago we began to phase out controls on domestic oil and gas prices. We ended the incredibly dangerous practice of holding United States oil and gas prices below the world market and thereby subsidizing wasteful consumption. Oil and gas decontrol was a painful and difficult but absolutely necessary step.
 - o Working with the Congress we put in place the foundations of a comprehensive National Energy Program to increase energy production and conserve energy use, and levied the windfall profits tax to help pay for it.
 - o These policies have begun to have dramatic results. The United States is now importing 25 to 30 percent less oil than it did 1 and 2 years ago; our consumption of energy products has dropped 8 to 10 percent, and while some part of that drop is due to the recession, most of it reflects real energy conservation. There are now 70 percent more drilling rigs in operation than there were when I took office and the number of oil and gas wells being drilled has reached a new record.
3. Despite massive increases in oil prices in the past two years the United States -- unlike other oil importing countries -- has been reducing its balance of payments deficit. We are now moving into a surplus position.
4. After a period of weakness in the value of the U.S. dollar overseas, I took decisive action 2 years ago to stabilize the dollar -- in cooperation with the German, Japan, and Swiss governments. Since then, in a world of sharply changing events and disruptions in oil supply, the United States dollar has remained strong, and has indeed risen in value compared to the German mark and Japanese yen.

5. In the past four years, working with the Congress, my Administration has eliminated regulation where it stifles free enterprise. We have cut price-propping and competition-deadening regulation from a number of critical industries and opened them up to the fresh winds of competition. We have made more progress in this area than at any other time in the 20th century. In the face of widespread opposition and skepticism, especially at first, we have deregulated airlines, trucking, railroads, and large parts of the banking and financial institutions and we are on our way to doing the same for the communications industry.
6. With respect to inflation, the record is not so good. When I came into office the underlying rate of inflation in business costs -- which ultimately determines what happens to prices -- was about 6-1/2 to 7 percent. Now it is at about a 9 percent rate. Obviously that is not good.
 - o But you judge a doctor not by whether his patient has any physical problems or not, but by how serious was the illness or injury through which the doctor pulled the patient.
 - o The United States in the past 18 months suffered a major and harmful shock to its economic system because of the massive increase in world oil prices. Oil prices rose last year by much more than they did after the first Arab oil embargo (in 1973), and we ourselves were painfully but necessarily decontrolling our own domestic oil prices.
 - o Yet instead of the worst recession in 40 years -- which is what happened after the first Arab oil shock -- this time we had the shortest recession.
 - o Inflation did for a while increase very sharply but together with the Congress I took a series of tough and difficult action last March, and since then inflation has come down sharply. It is still a problem that we have to continue fighting but it is being controlled.
 - o We did not do a perfect job and we have learned a great deal in the process. But, considering the shock that our economy was dealt and the long history of inflation, my Administration did a highly creditable job in dealing with the problem. I have gained invaluable experience from this episode. I am absolutely committed to pursuing careful and prudent policies that will put people back to work in this country but will do so in ways that will permit us to reduce inflation still further.

MAJOR GOALS OF SECOND CARTER TERMDOMESTIC

1. Passage of Economic Renewal Package strengthened economic growth, increased investment, improved productivity, reduced tax burdens.
2. Continued record-level rate of job creation and reduced unemployment rate.
3. Continued reduced inflation rate.
4. Reduced dependence on foreign oil, increased development of domestic and new energy sources.
5. National Health Insurance.
6. Ratification of Equal Rights Amendment (and D.C. Voting Rights Amendment).
7. Increased economic and government opportunities for minorities and women.
8. Continued fiscal strength of Social Security.
9. Continued revitalization of our nation's urban areas.
10. Stable farm prices, increased farm exports.
11. Welfare reform.

FOREIGN

1. Maintenance of Peace -- eight years of uninterrupted peace.
2. Continued real growth in our defense spending, and strengthening of defense capabilities.
3. SALT II Ratification.
4. Continued Human Rights Policy.
5. Broadened Middle East Peace.
6. Continued development of relationship with People's Republic of China.
7. Continued strengthening of NATO.
8. Recognition by Russians they have more to gain by improved relations with U.S.

PLATFORMS

The attached domestic platform comparison shows the stark contrast between the two parties' philosophies and principles. The main point to be made in any platform reference during the debate is simply that you support a platform of progress and hope and a platform in the traditions of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, while Governor Reagan supports a platform that seeks to repeal progress and a platform written by an extreme faction of the Republican Party.

PLATFORM COMPARISON FOR DEBATE (DOMESTIC)

	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Republican</u>
A. <u>ECONOMY</u>		
1. Humphrey-Hawkins	Commitment to meet its goals.	Silence.
2. Tax Reductions	Commitment to targeted, non-inflationary tax cuts.	Kemp-Roth, 30% tax cut.
3. Federal Spending	Spending restraint is important economic weapon, but must be sensitive to those who look to Federal Government for aid.	Support for constitutional amendment to balance the budget; limit government spending to fixed percentage of GNP.
4. Anti-Recession Assistance	Commitment to \$12 billion spending stimulus (Minority Report)	Kemp-Roth tax cut.
5. Rebuilding American Industry	Commitment to a program to rebuild American industry.	Kemp-Roth tax cut.
6. Worker Protection		
o OSHA	Opposes legislation to weaken OSHA.	Supports legislation to weaken safety programs.
o Minimum Wage	Opposes youth sub-minimum; supports future increase.	Supports youth sub-minimum; silence on future increases.
o Plant Closings	Supports legislation to help workers affected by sudden, unexpected plant closings.	Silence.
E. <u>GOVERNMENT AND HUMAN NEEDS</u>		
1. National Health Insurance	Supports.	Opposes

	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Republican</u>
2. Abortion	Supports 1973 Supreme Court decision; supports government funding (Minority Report).	Seeks constitutional amendment overturn Supreme Court decision.
3. Welfare	Supports welfare reform, with goal of eliminating burden of welfare costs on local governments and reducing burden on States.	Seeks to transfer entire welfare responsibility to States, along with tax sources to finance it.
4. Education	Supports Department of Education. Supports increased assistance to private schools.	Seeks to eliminate Department of Education. Supports tuition tax credits.
5. Equal Rights Amendment	Strongly supports ratification; DNC sanctions on non-supporters who are candidates (Minority Report).	Silent on ratification (reversing 40-year record of support).
6. D.C. Voting Rights Amendment	Strongly supports ratification.	Silent.
7. Civil Rights	Condemns Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party.	Ku Klux Klan endorsed Republican Platform.
8. Appointments (Judicial)	Supports policy of appointing women and minority judges at all levels, including Supreme Court.	Supports policy of appointing judges who "respect sanctity of innocent human life."
9. Martin Luther King Holiday	Supports.	Silence.
<u>C. GOVERNMENT OPERATION AND REFORM</u>		
1. Tax Reform	Supports	Silence.

	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Republican</u>
2. Law Enforcement	Supports improved controls over handguns and Saturday night specials.	Supports repeal of key provisions of Gun Control Act of '68.
3. Public Financing of Congressional Elections	Supports.	Opposes.
4. Consumer Protection Agency	Supports.	Opposes.
5. <u>ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND AGRICULTURE</u>		
1. Synthetic Fuels	Supports development of synthetic fuel industry.	Opposes synthetic fuel industry.
2. Windfall Profits Tax	Strongly supports.	Favors nearly wholesale repeal.
3. 55 M.P.H. Speed	Supports (saves 2 billion gallons of gasoline a year and saves 5000 lives a year).	Seeks repeal.
4. Grain Embargo	Supports.	Opposes.

MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES WITH REAGAN

1. SALT II
 2. Nuclear Arms Race as a Bargaining Card/Need for Nuclear Superiority
 3. Threatening Use of Troops
 4. Commitment to Camp David Process
 5. Size of Defense Budget
 6. Current Defense Capabilities
 7. ERA
 8. National Health Insurance
 9. Kemp-Roth
 10. Windfall Profits Tax
 11. Department of Education
 12. Minimum Wage
 13. Need for Environmental Protection
 14. Constitutional Amendment on Abortion
 15. Welfare Reform
 16. Labor Law Reform
 17. Commitment to Solar Energy
 18. Role of Oil Companies in Energy Solution
 19. 55 M.P.H. Speed Limit
 20. Consumer Protection Agency
- APR 27 1984

PRESIDENTIAL VETOES

<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>TOTAL VETOES</u>	<u>VETOES OVERRIDDEN</u>
Roosevelt, F.	635	9
Truman*	250	12
Kennedy	21	0
Johnson	30	0
Nixon	43	5
Ford**	66	12
Carter (to date)	225	2

* Before Carter, Truman was last Democratic President to be overridden (1952).

** Ford was the most overridden President in terms of the percentage of vetoes overridden with the exception of Andrew Johnson.

CARTER RECORD AS GOVERNOR

1. Bureaucratic Growth - cut employee growth rate by 60% below predecessor's; averaged 5% per year
2. Taxes - no income, sales or property tax increases
3. Budget - grew by 52% (revenues grew by 58%)

THEMES REAGAN WILL USE IN DEBATE1. Economy Ruined/Kemp-Roth Would Solve

Carter has ruined the economy - provided high unemployment, record inflation and interest rates, and a deep recession.

Reagan could manage the economy better; Kemp-Roth would be a major step toward solving our economic problems.

2. Defense Weakened/Reagan Would Strengthen

Carter has allowed our defense posture to weaken - he has let us become almost defenseless against Soviets, and has cut back on needed defense programs.

Reagan is for a strong defense - one that is not second to the Soviet Union, one that has substantially increased defense spending, one that provides the necessary weapons, training, and personnel incentives to strengthen our defense.

3. Inconsistent Foreign Policy/Reagan Would Re-establish Pre-eminence

Carter has provided an inconsistent, weak, passive foreign policy - we are no longer respected abroad and the U.S. role as a world leader has been severely diminished.

Reagan would re-establish the U.S.'s pre-eminent role in the Free World and would make certain the U.S. was respected by our allies and feared by our enemies.

4. Bloated, Interfering Government/Reagan Would Reduce Government Regulation

Carter has not kept his promises about making government more efficient, smaller, less bureaucratic - the government has grown, waste and abuse have not been reduced, and the government has become more deeply involved in the lives of Americans through constant, increasing and unnecessary regulation.

As Governor, Reagan was successful in restraining government size and spending, and he can do the same in the Federal government. He will also be successful in reducing government regulation and would get government off peoples' backs.

5. Weak Leadership/Reagan Would Provide Strong Leadership

Carter has not provided the Nation with the type of strong, Presidential leadership needed to solve the tough problems facing us.

Reagan is a stronger leader, who will not get bogged down in details but who will concentrate his attention on the major issues and will make decisions which are not repeatedly changed.

6. Wrong Values/Reagan Would Re-establish Needed Values in Government Policy

Carter's values have changed during his Administration, and he is not as committed now as he once was to the values of family, neighborhood, community, work and freedom.

Reagan is deeply committed to these values and will work to re-establish them in government policy and throughout the Nation.

REAGAN CURRENT POSITIONS

(DOMESTIC)

A. ECONOMY1. Tax Cuts

- o Supports full 3 year, 30% Kemp-Roth tax cut; believes government will get more money in the end because of the increase in prosperity -- multiplier effect is enormous; has dropped support (without explanation) for 10-5-3 depreciation cuts.

2. Inflation

- o Believes inflation's real cause is government -- spending and regulation (cutting regulations on business would instantly cut inflation in half).
- o Believes Kemp-Roth will promote non-inflationary growth.

3. Minimum Wage

- o Has stated that high unemployment is in large part due to the minimum wage -- "caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depression;" but now appears to support minimum wage, with a sub-minimum for youth.

4. Unemployment

- o Believes a principle cause is the minimum wage. (With this belief of the problem, how can he propose sound solutions?)
- o Currently appears to favor unemployment compensation -- previously called such compensation "prepaid vacations."

5. Government Spending

- o Has favored Constitutional Amendment to balance the budget; more recently has backed away from Amendment -- says Congress could always circumvent by raising taxes to reach balance.
- o Now appears to favor a legislative limit on the annual federal share of GNP the government can take in through taxes.
- o Supports 2% annual cut in Federal spending through elimination of waste and abuse.
- o Believes the GAO is right in saying there is at least \$50 billion in waste in government that could be saved; if waste cannot be eliminated from a program, whole program must go.

6. Controls

- o Opposes wage and price controls.

7. Auto and Steel Industries

- o Believes Carter enforces strict environmental regulations with little regard for their economic impact; this has hurt auto and steel industries.
- o Has not ruled out trade quotas for autos.
- o Supports Chrysler assistance now, though initially opposed.
- o Believes steel industry's problems are due to over-regulation by government, particularly by EPA.

3

B. ENERGY1. Energy Production

- o Favors turning energy industry "loose" to produce more oil and gas.
- o Opposes any oil import quotas -- increase domestic production instead.
- o Believes SPRO has been severely mismanaged -- but feels key to our security is increasing domestic production.
- o Has said there is more oil in Alaska than in Saudi Arabia (means more "potential oil reserves" in Alaska than proven to exist in Saudi Arabia).
- o Believes windfall profits tax will encourage domestic producers to shift their resources abroad, will cost us 840,000 barrels of oil per day (CBO), and will actually increase our reliance on foreign oil. (Republican Platform -- favors weakening of Windfall Profits Tax; favors addition of pickback provision).
- o Believes can and should increase coal production -- turn coal companies free and they will produce necessary amount.

2. Energy Regulation

- o Favors relaxation of Clean Air Act of burn more coal.
- o Favors immediate decontrol of oil and natural gas pricing.
- o Has favored elimination of Department of Energy in the past; position now is vaguer.

3. Energy Conservation

- o Believes energy conservation means we only will run out of energy a little more slowly (believes more production can solve need for conservation).
- o Believes Carter has made conservation the linchpin of our energy program -- but that has been proven inadequate to solve the problem.
- o Favors repeal of 55 mph (assuming he supports Republican Platform).

4. Synthetics

- o Does not favor large synthetics industry; supports only limited demonstration projects (Republican Platform).

4

5. Solar

- o Believes solar power still faces technological barriers and is not ready for extensive use; sees it as a next generation of energy sources.

6. Nuclear

- o Supports continued operation and construction of nuclear plants.
- o Believes nuclear offers our greatest energy hope for next two-three decades.
- o Believes Three-Mile Island offers proof of the safety of nuclear power; it showed how well system worked despite human errors.
- o Believes the amount of space needed to store nuclear wastes is small (a year's worth can be stored under a desk).
- o Supports Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
- o Believes surplus of government is responsible for the delay in licensing of nuclear power plants.
- o Has stated in the past that anti-nuclear forces are being manipulated by forces sympathetic to Soviet Union.
- o Believes nuclear power is cheaper and, when operated properly, is among the safest means of energy production.

C. ENVIRONMENT1. EPA

- o Believes primary responsibility for protecting environment should be returned to the States.
- o Believes power of EPA should be weakened.
- o Believes steel industry's decline is due in part to EPA-imposed regulations.

2. Air Pollution

- o Believes it is substantially under control.
- o Believes 93% of pollution is caused by trees.

3. Federal Land Ownership

- o Believes that large scale ownership by Federal government of public lands is unconstitutional.

4. RARE II

- o Opposes RARE II as an effort to lock-up scenic lands for privileged few; believes in multiple-use designations for these lands.

5. Alaska Lands

- o Opposes Alaska Lands legislation because of disruptions which will be caused to oil and timber industries.

6. Energy Exploration

- o Believes government should make it easier for oil companies to drill on public lands or in coastal waters.

7. Clean Air Act

- o Supports revision of Clean Air Act regulations.

8. Auto Emission Standards

- o Believes Federal standards have nearly killed auto industry.
- o Has called for immediate moratorium on all new Federal auto regulations.

D. LABOR1. Minimum Wage

- o Has stated that high unemployment is due in large part to the minimum wage (which he feels has caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depression); now appears to support minimum wage for youth.
- o Supports elimination of the minimum wage or instituting a sub-minimum wage.

2. Government Aid to the Unemployed

- o Now appears to support unemployment compensation programs.
- o Has previously indicated such programs are "prepaid vacations".

3. Humphrey-Hawkins

- o Sees Humphrey-Hawkins as an attempt by the Federal government to regulate the economy.
- o Once called Humphrey-Hawkins a design for fascism.

4. Labor Law Reform

- o Opposes labor law reform as unfair to business; believes it hurts working men and women and puts government in cooperation with hierarchy of organized labor.

5. Common Situs Picketing

- o Objects to Common Situs Picketing; believes it forces compulsory unionism.

6. Davis-Bacon

- o Has opposed Davis-Bacon protections as inflationary and as gift to privileged workers; now appears to favor some tightening, but not repeal.

7. 14-B

- o Supports 14-B; believes its elimination would force compulsory unionism.

8. OSHA

- o Believes OSHA over-regulates; supports using OSHA as laboratory where business could voluntarily study how to improve hazardous conditions.

D. LABOR (con't)9. Unions

- o Has supported covering labor unions by antitrust laws (now rejects earlier position).

10. Food Stamps to Strikers

- o Opposes providing Food Stamps to strikers.

E. SOCIAL ISSUES1. Abortion

- o Strongly opposes abortion (states that his decision to sign an abortion law was premised on an understanding that the law would be interpreted in a conservative way; in fact, the law has been interpreted liberally, making California's abortion law about the most liberal in the country; also states that various groups of medical professionals are violating the law in unethical ways).
- o Supports passage of Constitutional Amendment to ban abortion.
- o Opposes using Federal money to pay for abortions unless the life of the mother is endangered.

2. Affirmative Action

- o Opposes quotas or Federal guidelines to be used in helping to provide equal opportunity.
- o Believes that the quota system reduces reverse discrimination, which is a distortion of the principle of equal rights (but appears to support the Bakke decision as a way of reconciling the reverse discrimination problem).
- o Has defended his limited number of women appointments as the result of making appointments based on qualifications only (only 12 of his 600 judicial appointments were women).

3. Busing

- o Opposes busing and believes it should be ended by legislation if possible, by Constitutional Amendment if necessary.

4. Family

- o Believes government is single greatest cause of erosion of the family.
- o Believes Federal government encourages teenagers' abortions, welfare fathers to leave home, unmarried couples to live together.

5. Constitutional Amendments

- o Supports balanced budget, school prayer, abortion, busing amendments.
- o Opposes ERA and D.V. Voting Rights.

F. HEALTH

- o Opposes National Health Insurance as idea whose time is past; as a program taxpayers neither need or want; and as inflationary.
- o Believes health care problems are caused by government intervention.
- o Believes any health care plan is opening wedge for more government.
- o Believes Hospital Cost Containment reduces services, not cost.
- o Favors private fee for practice as providing the best care.

G. EDUCATION1. Government Role

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- o Believes government is responsible for decline in educational quality.
- o Has said Department of Education should be abolished (though now wavers on this); believes educational funding programs should be transferred back to States and local school districts, along with needed tax resources.

2. Religion

- o Believes prayer should be returned to public schools.
- o Supports tuition tax credits.

3. Bilingual

- o Has opposed bilingual education in the past, but now appears to favor.

H. WELFARE

- o Supports transferring welfare programs from the Federal government to State and local governments, along with the tax resources needed to pay for the programs.
- o Has said the Food Stamp program is nothing but a welfare program which does not work.

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I. HOUSING1. Fair Housing

- o Opposed Fair Housing legislation in California -- said unnecessary because discrimination in housing did not exist.
- o Has taken no position on Federal Fair Housing legislation.

2. Public Housing

- o Believes Federal public housing program has been a failure.
- o Sees public housing programs as type of welfare.

3. Urban Homesteading

- o Supports using urban homesteading program -- selling abandoned homes for \$1 if the new owner will refurbish and occupy -- as a means of making housing available to low- and middle-income Americans (apparently does not realize this program is already in effect).

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J. URBAN POLICY

1. Urban Aid -- has opposed urban aid programs; has said it would be more efficient for local governments to raise the money they plan to spend; now appears to support having Federal government collect taxes but provide to urban areas in block grant form -- no-strings-attached.
2. New York City -- opposed special New York City assistance; now favors.
3. Enterprise Zones -- supports creation of urban enterprise zones (taxes and regulations to be reduced).

K. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE1. Gun Control

- o Opposes all proposed restrictions on gun ownership; believes gun control does not deter criminals.
- o Supports Republican Platform position calling for repeal of Gun Control Act of '68.

2. Marijuana

- o Opposes decriminalization.

3. Death Penalty

- o Believes is justified as fair retribution and as deterrent.

4. Judiciary

- o Committed to appoint Supreme Court Justices who respect and reflect values and morals of American majority; committed to appoint a woman.
- o No longer supports Republican Platform provision calling for judges supporting traditional family values and sanctity of unborn; says he will have no litmus test.

5. Civil Rights

- o Has called the '64 Civil Rights Act a "bad piece of legislation"; has now stated that he was opposed to certain features of the law which he felt infringed on Constitutionally-guaranteed rights of citizens. He has recently said it should be strengthened.
- o Opposed Open Housing legislation in California.
- o Opposes any type of codification or legislation protecting homosexual rights (though he did oppose the anti-gay Briggs initiative in California in 1978).
- o Believes First Amendment was written not to protect people and their laws from religious values but to protect those values from government tyranny.
- o Opposes a Constitutional Amendment on D.C. Voting Rights.
- o Opposes the Equal Rights Amendment; supports eliminating discrimination against women through State-by-State statute changes; now states that he supports the concept of equal rights for men and women.

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L. GOVERNMENT ETHICS1. Watergate

- o Supports Ford's pardon of Nixon.

2. Election Reform

- o Supports repeal of contribution limits.
- o Sees no legal problems with the independent campaign organizations helping his candidacy.

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M. AGRICULTURE

1. Price Supports -- supports ending of government price supports, returning farming to free market. Now has changed - says he supports the program
2. Parity -- supports 100% parity -- but imposed not through government but through marketplace.
3. Milk Support -- opposes dairy industry subsidies; they just subsidize those who cannot compete in marketplace at expense of those who could bring prices down.
4. Tobacco -- supports assistance programs -- believes they raise prices and thereby discourage smoking.
5. Grain Embargo -- opposes current grain embargo as hurting our farmers more than Soviets (however, on previous occasions, like discovery of Russian brigade in Cuba, he did advocate using the grain weapon).

N. SPECIAL CONSTITUENCIES1. Blacks

- o Believes Democratic Party philosophy has been to offer handouts (i.e. spending programs) to Blacks in return for their vote.
- o Believes Blacks must be made more economically independent -- economic growth will be best assured this way.
- o Has rejected endorsement of Ku Klux Klan.
- o Believes in "states' rights" -- restoring to states power that properly belongs to them.

2. ElderlyA. Social Security

- o Has previously supported making Social Security voluntary; now denies having done so.
- o Has supported investing Social Security funds in the private sector, much like any other pension program.
- o Supports elimination of earnings test for recipients who work.
- o Committed to appoint a task force of experts to examine the long-range financing problems of the system.

B. Medicare

- o Opposed Medicare as a step toward socialized medicine; now supports.

3. HispanicsA. Farm Workers

- o has opposed the organizing efforts of farm workers.
- o has opposed applying principles of National Labor Relations Act to farm workers.
- o was supportive of the Braceros program while Governor.

B. Bilingual Education

- o has opposed bilingual education; now favors.

N. SPECIAL CONSTITUENCIES (con't)C. Immigration

- o believes aliens coming from Mexico are a needed safety valve for that country.
- o believes we should make it possible for aliens to come here legally with a work permit and to leave when they want.

D. Cuban Refugees

- o supported massive airlift for Cubans seeking political asylum from Castro.
- o supports bringing Cuban refugees into country, but favors careful screening to eliminate Castro agents.

4. Youth

- o Believes high youth unemployment would be relieved through youth-sub-minimum wage.
- o Opposes decriminalization of marijuana use.
- o Opposed extending voting and majority rights to 18-year-olds.

REAGAN CHARGES AGAINST CARTER

(Domestic)

Attached are brief descriptions of the basic domestic charges Governor Reagan has made against you during the primary.

His basic attacks can be characterized as follows:

1. There has been no strong leadership, no central vision, positions are frequently changing and campaign promises are ignored.
2. Economy has been ruined through high inflation, high unemployment, and a deep recession. Your economic policies have been a disaster, he contends.
3. Government has been allowed to grow, over-regulate, over spend, over-tax, interfere increasingly in people's lives.
4. Energy policies have hindered domestic energy production and not really helped reduce dependence on foreign oil.

In foreign policy he is likely to attack you for:

1. Weakening our defense posture, cancelling the B-1, having a majority of fighting units not ready to fight.
2. Having a vacillating, confusing, weak foreign policy with multiple voices.

REAGAN CHARGES AGAINST CARTER
(DOMESTIC)

GENERAL

1. Talks as if someone else had been in charge for past 3½ years.
2. Told we must accept a national "malaise".
3. Used excuse that Federal government has grown so big and powerful that it is beyond control of any President.
4. His real failure has been failure of ideas, an inability to break away from failed policies, to move boldly in new directions--rooted in out-of-date philosophy.
5. Have consistently made more proposals for more Federal government.
6. Violated nearly every campaign promise he every made.
7. Has not had a central vision to his policies.
8. Has changed directions without pause or explanation.
9. Has shifted from '76 positions and gone completely with liberal line.
10. Was not a good Governor--did not streamline government.
11. Broken sharply with the views and policies of Truman, Kennedy, and many contemporary leaders of the Democratic Party; dominated by McGovernite wing of the Party.
12. Crisis facing us is not one of failure of American spirit--failure of leaders to establish rational goals.

ECONOMY

1. Allowed this economic situation to occur:
 - o 8 million out of work
 - o inflation at 7.8% for first quarter.
 - o black unemployment at about 14%--highest ever
 - o four straight major deficits
 - o highest interest rates since Civil War--at times reaching 20%
 - o through inflation has raised taxes by 30%--real income increased by only 20%
 - o imposed largest single tax increase in history

2. Had 5 economic programs in 3 1/2 years.
3. Has discovered American workers after 3 years of neglect, misery, unemployment, inflation, high taxes, dwindling earning power, inability to save.
4. Called for increase in unemployment in '80 to fight recession.
5. Said in '76 would bring unemployment and inflation to 3%--unemployment now around 8%, inflation is at 12 1/2%. Broke '76 promise to lower inflation rate and unemployment rate to 4%.
6. Allowed tax burden to reach highest percentage of personal income in our history--115% increase.
7. Has highest percentage today of outmoded industrial plant and equipment of any industrial nation in the world.
8. Allowed savings to fall to lowest level in last 30 years--Japanese worker can save 5 times his earnings as American worker can.
9. Proposed to balance budget by increasing taxes.
10. Fought inflation with recession (also referred to as "Depression").
11. Have been at war with business community.
12. Imposed deliberative policy of squeezing Nation into recession, at expense of workers.
13. Used OPEC as alibi for our economic woes.
14. Economic renewal program is "crazy quilt" of obvious election year promises.
15. Economic policies are "an American tragedy".
16. Changed groundrules in determining PPI index figures.
17. Cited "family suffering index" which combines "average annual rate of mortgage interest, the rate of price increases in food and gasoline and the unemployment rate"; was 24.2% 4 years ago and is now "an incredible, reconscionable 77%."
18. "Made shambles of economy--tripled inflation rate, doubled interest rate, increased government taxes and spending more than any other President, and produced enormous budget deficits."

GOVERNMENT

1. Has allowed total number of government workers to grow by 63,000.
2. Has been biggest spender there has ever been in the White House.
3. Has not cut Federal spending.
4. Favors further expansion of Federal government.
5. Run a government where \$50 billion is wasted every year.
6. Launched vendetta (by IRS) against independent schools.
7. Has biggest White House staff in history.
8. Done nothing about eliminating waste and fraud in Federal government (which GAO says could be between \$5-\$50 billion).

ENERGY

1. Presided over worst energy shortage in our country's history.
2. Developed energy policies geared toward decreasing demand, regulating markets, lower growth.
3. Proposed energy program which will lead to nationalization of energy industry.
4. Created an Energy Department with a budget as big as total profits of major oil companies.
5. Pursued policies which discourage discovery and production of energy in this country.
6. Broke '76 promise to deregulate natural gas.
7. Claimed figures have been made up to mask decline in energy production (were it not for Alaskan production, domestic oil production would continue to show a steady decline).

AGRICULTURE

1. Increased farm aid but decreased farm income.
2. Pursued agricultural policies which are "unprecedented disasters".
3. Imposed a grain embargo which hurt American farmers more than Soviets; embargo was a grandstand play for votes at farmer's expense.

AUTO INDUSTRY

1. Offered industry only more trade adjustment and more unemployment compensation.
2. Pursued economic and regulatory policies which are to blame for the auto industry's problems.

STEEL INDUSTRY

1. Did not enforce laws that would benefit steel industry; economic renewal program has only "half-hearted measures" to revive industry.
2. Waited until just recently to talk about steel industry's plight and to take actions to help steel industry (many of which Reagan had earlier proposed).

EDUCATION

Reneged on '76 promise to support tuition tax credits.

ENVIRONMENT

1. Pursued regulatory policies which are responsible for steel plant shut-downs in Ohio; "biggest regulator in history."
2. Allowed EPA to overregulate.

REGULATORY REFORM

1. Deregulation occurred only because of Congressional demands.
2. Deregulation accomplishments are only "highly publicized examples of showcase deregulation."

ELDERLY

1. Indifferent to problems of the elderly.
2. Economic policies are a threat to Social Security System.
3. Misrepresented Reagan's views on Social Security.

VETERANS

1. Run most anti-veteran Administration in history.
2. Steadily cut VA budget (and cut health personnel).

REAGAN FLIP-FLOPS

1. ERA - once supported, now opposes.
2. Chrysler assistance - once opposed, now supports.
3. New York City assistance - once opposed, now supports.
4. Olympic boycott - initially opposed, later favored.
5. China-Taiwan - once supported governmental relations with Taiwan, now supports status quo.
6. Social Security - favored making -- or considering making Social Security voluntary, but now apparently does not.
7. Auto Imports - once opposed any type of trade protectionism, but now appears to favor some type of restraints on Japanese imports.
8. Bilingual Education - once opposed bilingual education, now favors.
9. 10-5-3 Depreciation Tax Cut - once supported, now has modified.
10. Gold Standard - has supported return to gold standard in the past, now has dropped it.
11. Department of Education - once called for its abolition, but now appears to have dropped that call.
12. Davis-Bacon - once sought its repeal, now just needs some tightening.
13. Antitrust and Unions - once favored applying antitrust laws to unions, now does not.
14. OSHA - once supported its abolition, now favors only "reform" for OSHA.
15. Clean Air Act - within one day said he favored amending Clean Air Act to weaken it and then later opposed doing that.

REAGAN RECORD AS GOVERNORCLAIM vs. REALITY

Reagan has frequently been caught grossly misstating or exaggerating his record as Governor. Several months ago, he was caught by the press, and became somewhat more careful. But he still uses misleading statements about his record, and ignores completely any unfavorable statistics about his 8-year term.

In the debate, he can be expected to repeat his favorite claims about his record. If left rebuttaled, those claims will seem very impressive. While no one recommends that you engage Reagan in an extensive debate over his gubernatorial record, you should not let pass some of the most superficially impressive of his claims before going on to make your positive points.

The following pages compare the most popular of his claims with the actual record, or in some cases the more relevant facts and figures.

The most important points to make are that, despite his claims and promises in California, taxes rose by the largest amount in the State's history (\$20 billion, a nearly 300% increase); the number of State employees grew by 30%; and State spending grew by 126% (highest real growth rate in State's history).

REAGAN'S CALIFORNIA RECORDCLAIMSFACTS1. TAXES

Gave back \$5.7 billion in tax rebates and credits to people in California.

- o Reagan presided over the heaviest tax increases in California's history; tax rates increased for income, sales, inheritance, estate, capital gains, liquor, cigarette and corporate income.
- o Only two rebates occurred, amounting to about \$1 billion; there was other tax relief -- like assistance with local property taxes and assistance to local governments -- but not other rebates or fiscal devices to give money back to taxpayers.
- o Rebates were possible because Reagan raised taxes 3 times (1967, \$1 billion; 1971, \$500 million; 1972, \$1 billion); the first hike was the largest single tax hike in California's history.
- o By end of Reagan's term, State income tax collections had nearly tripled (to \$20 billion).
- o Taxes increased much more rapidly during Reagan's terms than during Pat Brown's terms; per capita tax burden doubled.

2. SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Had grown 75% during 8 years prior to his Administration; he presided over virtually no growth in the government, even though California's population was increasing faster than any other State.

- o Reagan's figures ignore half of state employees -- those in higher education and mental health.
- o When they are included, there was a more than 30% increase (158,000 to 203,000); moreover, this growth rate was on a per capita basis greater than it was under Pat Brown, though Brown's annual average was 7,500 new employees to Reagan's 4,200.

- o There was one state employee for every 120 residents when took office and one for every 103 when he left.
- o All of this occurred despite Reagan's initial action of imposing a hiring freeze.

3. GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Held down government spending -- faced a budget deficit of \$194 million when he took office and left a budget surplus of \$554 million.

- o Reagan had highest real growth rate in government spending in California's history.
- o State budget went from \$4.6 billion to \$10.4 billion -- 126% increase.
- o State Operation budget -- that part of the budget over which Governor has real control -- grew faster under Reagan than under ~~Gov~~ Brown (41% vs. 32%).
- o projected deficit in '67 was averted by \$1 billion tax increases.
- o surplus left in '74 was due to higher income and sales tax rates.

4. GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

Growth of bureaucracy was stopped.

- o In addition to the growth in employees, the State government grew by its number of agencies.
- o Reagan's own description of his California accomplishments shows that he created over 30 new state offices, Boards or Councils.
- o That description does not include one Reagan creation -- the California Energy Commission (no doubt because it was criticized for some failings as DOE later was, particularly by Reagan).
- o LA Times said of Reagan's terms: "No significant State program was eliminated".

5. WELFARE REFORM

Reformed welfare program -- caseload went from 40,000 per month increase to 8,000 per month decrease -- saved taxpayers \$2 billion -- increased grants to truly needy by 43%.

- o Reduction in caseload was due not to reforms but to improving economy, smaller welfare families, and 215,000 Medicaid-funded abortions permitted under Reagan's abortion law.
- o Welfare costs actually increased -- tripled during his terms.
- o \$2 billion "savings" is calculated on absurdly high caseload assumptions (by 1984 every resident in State would have been on welfare if assumptions were met); actual savings -- about \$10 million a year.
- o Grants to "truly needy" did increase -- though by about half of Reagan's claim -- because Reagan lost his court suit against Congressionally-mandated cost-of-living increases (he fought the increase for 4 years).

6. AIR POLLUTION

State had toughest anti-smog laws in country when he left office.

- o Tougher laws were passed during his terms, but over his objections; moreover, he did not enforce the laws.
- o League of Conservation Voters: "Reagan was responsible for undermining what could have been the most far reaching air pollution program in the country... Reagan's program was so weak that EPA rejected it on five counts, the main objection being lack of enforcement."

7. ELDERLY

Senior Citizen's Property Tax Assistance Program was enacted to refund portion of local property taxes for the elderly.

- o Reagan opposed the bill, vetoing it once.
- o He finally signed it because it was tied to another tax bill he wanted and because he was able to limit its application.

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8. CONSUMERS

Created a Department of Consumer Affairs.

- o Initially gave Department only one staff person for consumer work.
- o Became widely known as Department of Business Affairs.
- o Reagan's own consumer advisor admitted the Department helped business more than consumers.

9. APPOINTMENTS

Appointed great number of public members to sit on regulatory boards and commissions; appointed more minorities than any previous Governor to major positions.

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- o Reagan tended to appoint one token public member to key boards, ensuring they were always out-voted.
 - o Of 3,709 appointments to new state jobs, only 9 went to Blacks.
 - o Of 600 judicial appointments, only 12 were women.

TURNING BACK THE CLOCK - KEY DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES
REAGAN CURRENTLY WANTS TO REPEAL OR WEAKEN OR WITHDRAW

1. SALT II (withdraw)
2. Windfall Profits Tax (weaken)
3. Department of Education (repeal - apparently)
4. Department of Energy (repeal - apparently)
5. OSHA (weaken and change its mission)
6. Clean Air Act (weaken)
7. Minimum wage (weaken, through subminimum)
8. China Normalization (weaken in the view of People's Republic of China)
9. ERA (oppose ratification)
10. Humphrey-Hawkins (apparently would not follow it)
11. Welfare and Education programs (weaken by returning them completely to States)

MAJOR REAGAN - BUSH DIFFERENCES

1. ERA - Reagan opposes; Bush supports.
2. Constitutional amendment on abortion - Reagan supports; Bush opposes.
3. Vamp-Bath - Reagan supports; Bush opposes (called it "voodoo economics" which would lead to 30% inflation).
4. Blockade Cuba in response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - Reagan supported; Bush opposed.
5. Turning energy companies loose as the solution to our energy problem - Reagan supported; Bush disagreed.

KEY REAGAN QUOTES

1. Nuclear Arms Race - "The one card that's been missing in these SALT negotiations has been the possibility of an arms race." AP Interview, Oct 1, '80.
2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation - "I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business." Washington Post, Jan 31, '80.
3. Response to Afghanistan - "One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out." NY Times, Jan 29, '80.
4. Sending Troops - While you need not read the quotes directly, you can repeatedly list the countries or areas to which Reagan has said he would send American troops -- Cuba ('80), Cyprus ('76), Ecuador ('75), Lebanon ('76), Middle East ('80), North Korea ('68), Pakistan ('80) and Rhodesia ('76).
5. After disclosure of Russian brigade in Cuba - "If the Russians want to buy wheat from us, I wouldn't sell it to them." LA Times, Sep 30, '79.
6. China - "Yes I will advocate restoring official government status to the Taipei office." LA Times, May 19, '80.
7. Vietnam War - "Was a noble cause." Aug 18, '80.

War and Nuclear Threats - "No one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons ... But ... the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night afraid that we might." LA Times, July 3, '67.
8. Minimum wage - "The minimum wage has caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depression." Wall Street Journal, January 30, '80. (Also see #28).
9. Unemployment Insurance - "Legitimate working men and women are being sacrificed to provide prepaid vacations for a segment of our society which has made this a way of life." April 26, '66.
10. Humphrey-Hawkins - "Carter's approach to unemployment: he's for the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. If ever there was design for fascism that's it. Fascism was really the basis for the New Deal." Time Interview, May 17, '76.
11. Labor Law Reform - "/ Labor law reform would result in / ... a largely unorganized management pitted against an efficient and effective union effort." Las Vegas Sun Interview, June 4, '78.
12. Davis-Bacon - "Davis-Bacon ... a needless burden on local tax-payers, a gift of tax funds to the privileged workers." Jefferson City, Missouri: Post Interview, Oct 18, '79.

13. Unions - "I believe that labor union leaders themselves have accumulated power that we should look very closely at whether they should not be bound as business is by the antitrust laws." New York Times, April 23, '80.
14. Evolution - "I have a great many questions about evolution ... And I think the recent discoveries over the years have pointed out great flaws in it." Dallas Times Herald, Aug 23, '80.
15. Religion and Schools - "let's get government out of the classroom and maybe we can get God back in." Rocky Mountain News, June 7, '78.
16. Constitutional Amendments - While you need not repeat the quotes, you can point out that Reagan has indicated support for Constitutional amendments to prohibit abortion, permit school prayer, prohibit busing, and require a balanced budget.
17. '64 Civil Rights Act - "a bad piece of legislation." Quoted in The Rise of Ronald Reagan, '68.
18. States' Rights - "I believe in states' rights. Philadelphia, Mississippi, Aug 4, '80.
19. New York City - "As a matter of fact, I have included in my morning and evening prayers every day, the prayer the federal government will not bail out New York City." Interview, Oct 8, '75.
20. Urban Aid - "Urban aid programs are one of the biggest phonies that we have in the system and have had for a number of years." Interview, Feb 1, '80.
21. Chrysler Loan - "What's wrong with bankruptcy?" Newsweek, Oct 1, '79.
22. Energy - "What needs to be done is for the government to repeal the energy legislation and then turn the industry loose." LA Times, May 16, '76.
23. Anti-Nuclear Advocates - "I've already spoken about the anti-nuclear power people and the fact that behind the scenes they are being manipulated by forces sympathetic to the Soviet Union." Radio Broadcast, July, '79.
24. National Health Insurance - "I'm opposed to National Health Insurance. There is no health care crisis in America." U.S. News & World Report Interview, March '76.
25. The Unemployed and Welfare Recipients - "... Freeloaders wanting a prepaid vacation plan." San Francisco Chronicle, April 22, '66.
26. Income Tax System - "The entire [graduated income tax] structure was created by Karl Marx. It has no justification in getting government needed revenue." Interview, Jan 7, '63.
27. Air Pollution - "Has been substantially controlled." October '80.
28. Minimum Wage - "High unemployment is in large part due to the minimum wage" N.Y. Times, January 2, 1980

SUBJECTS OF QUESTIONS IN '76 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
(not including rebuttals)

D E B A T E O N E
(DOMESTIC POLICY)

Carter

Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy
Reorganization
Reorganization
Nuclear Energy
Energy Conservation
Tax Reductions
Tax Reform/Reductions
Economy - Personnel

Ford

Economy
Economy
Vietnam Amnesty
Vietnam Amnesty
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D E B A T E T W O
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Carter

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Arab Boycott
Defense Spending
Defense Spending
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Panama Canal
Arab Boycott

Ford

Communism Containment
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
China
China
SALT
SALT
Human Rights
Mayaguez
Vietnam MIA's

D E B A T E T H R E E

(ALL SUBJECTS)

Carter

Nature of Campaign
 Yugoslavia after Tito
 Staffing of Administration
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 Constitutional Amendments
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 Supreme Court Appointments
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Ford

Prospective on Future
 Economy
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 Justice Investigation of Ford
 General Brown of JCS
 Environment
 Blacks
 Gun Control
 Economy
 Economy

R E A G A N - A N D E R S O N D E B A T E

Reagan

Economy
 Energy
 Military Manpower
 Urban Policy
 Economy
 Church and State

Anderson

Economy
 Energy
 Military Manpower
 Urban Policy
 Economy
 Church and State

Presidential Debate Briefing Paper
Foreign Policy and National Security

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COPY
 JUN 27 1983

*Portugal
 Zimbabwe*

Rick Inderfurth
 Eric Newsom

October 20, 1980

Mr. President, a widespread and persistent complaint in this country and abroad about foreign policy under your Administration is that it lacks coherence, steadiness and consistency. It is said that the various strands of policy are unrelated to one another, and that you have lurched indecisively from one approach to another, pushed by events. Your critics say you have flip-flopped on the withdrawal of U. S. troops from South Korea, the neutron bomb, the Soviet brigade in Cuba, support for the Shah, among others. They say you cannot lead this country and the West in dealing with an aggressive Soviet Union, the energy crisis, and a faltering global economy.

The Republican Platform charges "For three and one half years the Carter Administration has given us a foreign policy not of consistency and credibility, but of chaos, confusion, and failure. It has produced an image of our country as a vacillating and reactive nation, unable to define its place in the world, the goals it seeks, or the means to pursue them." "No failure of the Administration has been so catastrophic as a failure of leadership," concludes the GOP platform. Governor Reagan has said that under your Administration America's economic, military and strategic strength is eroding.

Mr. President, how do you respond to the charge that you have not provided leadership, that we are no longer respected or trusted, and that you have not devised effective policies to deal with the serious problems that threaten us?

A: 1. THEME

I believe that leadership is:

- Tackling real problems, unpopular problems;
- Strengthening our defenses;
- Keeping cool in crises and staying out of wars;
- Standing up to our adversaries where we must, but cooperating if we can;
- Placing America on the side of change, on the side of human rights and justice.

2. ABOARD

We have tackled the real problems. In 1976:

- There was no international energy policy. No real cooperation in conservation. No American energy program to work to free us from dependence on foreign oil. Now there is.
- There was no peace in the Middle East. Now we have the Camp David Accords and the Israel/Egypt Peace Treaty.
- We were still estranged from China. Normalization had bogged down. We broke through the logjam and have a strong growing relationship with China.
- Insurgency threatened the Panama Canal. Today it is operating smoothly and effectively.
- In Africa, America was seen as opposing racial justice. Today we have the closest possible relations with Africa because of our commitment to majority rule and racial justice.
- The world economy was threatened by protectionism but we negotiated the multilateral trade agreement and got it through Congress.
- The threat of the spread of nuclear weapons was ignored. Now we have made it high on the world agenda and built new cooperative arrangements to contain this threat.
- The developing world in which most of mankind lives was trapped in poverty and drifting towards increasing violence. We have dramatically strengthened international banks and lending institutions to help meet their crying economic needs.
- Finally, there was the prospect of an unlimited arms race. SALT I was running out. SALT II was bogged down. We have strengthened the proposed SALT II Agreement and we have signed it. Because I am determined to tackle real problems, I am determined to see SALT II ratified.

Strengthening Our Defense. When I came into office:

- Real defense investment had declined over the previous eight years by 37%. I have increased it 10%.
- Purchases for new aircraft (fighters and attack aircraft) and for army equipment had declined by two-thirds. I have increased them by 50%.
- There was no answer to the Soviet threat to our fixed ICBMs. Now we have the mobile MX.
- There was no answer to Soviet air defenses. We were stuck with the obsolete B-1. Now we have the cruise missile.
- Our Navy had been cut in half and the shipyards were in a mess with enormous backlogs of naval vessels needing overhaul. We cleaned up the mess in the shipyards. We cut the backlog in half and we are now building more than 90 new ships at a rate of 70% greater than during the previous Republican Administration.
- There was no NATO defense program. I negotiated a commitment of our Allies to 3% real growth and we have adopted a long-term defense program to strengthen NATO.
- We had no capability to do anything quickly in the vital area of the Persian Gulf. Now we have a Rapid Deployment Force. We have facilities in two areas in the region and are strengthening our base in Puerto Rico. We pre-positioned equipment for 12,000 Marines and munitions for 500 aircraft and added three combat brigades. We have two carrier task forces on station at all times to keep open the Strait of Hormuz and defend our friends and our vital interests in the region. None of this existed before.

Staying Out of Wars. The issue is what is done with this military power:

- It is easier to get into a war as we have all learned than it is to get out of one.
- In the last three and a half years we could have involved ourselves directly in more than one-half dozen wars, revolutions or conflicts -- Iraq/Iran, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Angola, Somalia/Ethiopia and Cambodia. We did not do so.

*Successful
CIVILIS
management
means not
having to go to war*

4

- At the same time, we have called in the last several years for involvement in such places. In particular, in Angola, Lebanon as well as in ludicrous places like Ecuador. Leadership is knowing when to exercise restraint.

Standing Up To Our Interests. And often America must draw a line.

- It must not be afraid to say that the Persian Gulf is an area of vital interest. It must not be afraid to lead a boycott of Moscow as the site for the Olympics.
- Leadership is having the political courage during the Presidential campaign of invoking a grain embargo even if it is politically unpopular.

Human Rights and China. Above all, leadership is placing America in the forefront of history.

- This means being on the side of change and not wishing we could return to the 1950's.
- This means supporting human rights and democracy and not coddling dictators including racial oppression in Africa and the need for human rights throughout the world.
- When I came into office America was losing its place as the beacon of hope and a force for human rights and basic decency in the world. That has changed. We must not turn back the clock.

REAGAN

- All these major achievements were gained by careful diplomacy and patient negotiation. None were won by threats of military force or intervention, or by nostalgic talk about American economic or military superiority.
- Governor Reagan appears not to favor the step-by-step approach of negotiation and diplomacy. His first answer to foreign policy problems is to advocate some military response:

He has called for sending U. S. military forces or issuing of ultimatums in crises involving Cuba, Angola, Vietnam after the U. S. military withdrawal, North Korea, Lebanon, Ecuador, Rhodesia, Pakistan, Cyprus, the Middle East and others.

- I am not going to send American forces to fight Ecuador over tuna. I will use military force only when vital American interests are threatened by military force.
- Governor Reagan would junk the SALT II Treaty, which took seven years and three Administrations to negotiate, and would launch us on an uncontrolled arms race in the hopes of frightening the Soviets into a new agreement. I think this would destroy the arms control process and cause a nuclear arms race with incalculable results.
- Governor Reagan believes Alaska has more oil reserves than Saudi Arabia, and his energy policy would be to free the oil companies from taxes and environmental constraints and urge them to find all the oil we need at home. This is fantasy. Reality is that we must conserve energy and develop new sources, while continuing to protect our environment.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

- America is strong militarily, politically and economically, and we are growing stronger. My record in all these areas in foreign and national security policy is good.
- I will continue to pursue policies such as advocacy of human rights which identify the United States with justice, democracy, and a decent life for all peoples, and which help promote peaceful change.
- I intend to continue my policy of combining measures to strengthen our defense with efforts to negotiate fair and verifiable limits and reductions in armaments.
- In contrast, Governor Reagan's preoccupation with weapons, military power and assertive behavior is likely to antagonize or frighten our allies and friends, provoke a nuclear arms race, destroy the SALT process, and involve the U. S. in trouble all over the globe.

- - - Military Balance

Q: President Carter, your Administration has been accused of allowing the military balance with the Soviet Union to deteriorate to a position of U.S. inferiority and ushering in a period of grave danger to U.S. interests around the world. The Secretary of Defense has said that even with the post-Afghanistan defense spending increases, it would require 40 years to catch up to Soviet expenditures. The Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer, recently stated that we have "a hollow Army."

How do you view the trends -- and the implications of these trends -- in the military balance? Are we, as Governor Reagan has charged, "second to one; namely, the Soviet Union" in military strength today?

A: 1. THEME

We have turned around our defenses from a decade of decline in spending. But we are not going to embark on a wasteful crash program or provoke a dangerous arms race. Historically, arms races have always ended in war.

2. RECORD

I reversed a decade of decline in spending on our defenses from 1968 to 1976.

- Defense spending declined by 37 percent. I have increased it 40 percent. My program for the next five years calls for appropriations of over one trillion dollars for defense.
- Purchases of combat aircraft and army equipment dropped two-thirds in those eight years. I have already increased such purchases by 50 percent.

Strategic forces are our deterrent to nuclear war. But when I came into office:

- There was no answer to the Soviet threat to our fixed ICBM's. Now we have one -- the mobile M-X missile.
- There was no answer to Soviet air defenses. The B-1 bomber was already growing obsolete. We had no strategic cruise missile program, but now the first strategic cruise missile will join the strategic air force next year.

In Europe, there was no allied program to strengthen our defenses.

- I personally negotiated with allied leaders a commitment to three percent real growth, and we have developed a long-term NATO defense program.

There was a growing nuclear gap in Europe.

- We are closing it with a US-led program to deploy long-range missiles in Europe.

Our forces in Europe were not ready. They were undermanned. They were threatened by overwhelming Soviet tank superiority.

- I increased our Army by 15 percent -- 26,000 men.
- We have deployed in the last three and a half years more than 50,000 anti-tank missiles. That is equal to the entire Warsaw Pact tank threat against NATO. And we are deploying more at a rate five times faster than the Soviets are deploying tanks.

When I came into office, our Navy had been cut in half by the Republicans. The shipyards were a mess with almost \$3 billion in disputed claims.

- We cleared up the mess, and we are now building 70 percent more ships per year than the average under the Republican Administration.

Finally, we had no capability to rapidly protect our interests in the vital area of the Persian Gulf.

- Now, we have a Rapid Deployment Force. It will begin exercising next month.
- We have facilities in four areas in the region and a base at Diego Garcia that we are strengthening.
- We have pre-positioned equipment for 12,000 Marines and munitions for additional combat brigades and for more than 5,000 tacair sorties.
- We have two carrier task forces on station in the region at all times with air and naval preponderance to keep open the Straits of Hormuz where half of the nations' oil must flow.

This is a good record. It is a record of steady, determined and prudent strengthening of our defenses together with our allies. It provides us with an increasingly strong military posture consistent with strengthening our economy.

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan's charge that we are now second to the Soviet Union in military strength reminds me that in almost every national campaign a candidate charges that the Soviets are ahead of us. After the election, those charges are either forgotten or are found to be false. If our nation were neglecting its defenses, it would be the duty of all informed people to sound the alarm. But false declarations of weakness only intensify the dangers we face. They can cause our friends to doubt us and our enemies to discount us.
- While we want to build our security for the future, the Republicans would have us invest more today on even obsolete weapons. Governor Reagan has continued to cite the B-1 as a plane that should have been built. The fact is it would be obsolete almost as fast as we could deploy it. The Republicans wanted to revive the ABM system which President Nixon discarded. They want a new air defense system which is an anachronism in the missile age. They even want to recommission mothballed ships. This is a program of obsolescence that would waste billions of defense dollars and simply let the Soviets catch up to us in advanced technology.
- Governor Reagan will not tell us how much his arms race would cost. Conservative estimates suggest that next year alone, it could equal the size of the FY 81 deficit.
- If we embark on such a crash program, what will happen to the economy? What will happen to the dollar? Our economy and the strength of the dollar are also vital elements of our nation's security.
- Governor Reagan said he would tear up the SALT II Treaty. The Department of Defense has estimated this could cost the American people up to \$100 billion in additional defense spending with no increase in security. That is approximately equal to Governor Reagan's proposed defense increase.

- A strategy of tearing up arms limitations agreements and then having to spend \$100 billion to compensate for these agreements is not only wasteful and foolish, it is extremely dangerous. Unlike Governor Reagan, I do not believe in threatening an arms race. The Governor should look at history and answer a basic question. What arms race did not end in a war?

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- The question facing Americans is not whether we should respond to these developments. All agree that we must. The real question is whether we will continue with a well-conceived and measured response tailored to the actual threats we face, or whether we will run off wildly in all directions at once, spending vastly greater sums to no positive effect -- and provoke an arms race in the bargain.
- My Administration will preserve our national security. We will improve our capabilities as necessary to maintain the military balance that exists today between the United States and the Soviet Union. We will continue to make steady and sustained increases in defense spending to build the capabilities we need. We will buy only the weapons systems that best serve our needs, not every glamorous weapon system that comes along. And, we will continue to seek arms control agreements -- like the SALT II Treaty -- to limit the growth in Soviet military power, and to avoid spending resources unnecessarily in an uncontrolled arms race.
- All of America's Presidents in the post-war period have agreed with John Kennedy's maxim. John Kennedy said it well.

While maintaining our readiness for war, we must exhaust every avenue for peace. Let us always make clear our willingness to talk, if talk will help, and our readiness to fight, if fight we must. Our foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind.

We have and are building further the strength to make mankind safe.

SALT

Q: President Carter, Governor Reagan calls the SALT II Treaty flawed and says he would drop it and go directly into SALT III negotiations. He says our allies do not really support the Treaty and that it was dead in the Senate even before Afghanistan caused you to shelve it. You continue to assert that the SALT II Treaty is in the interests of the United States and its allies. You say you will press for its ratification in the new Senate.

Mr. President, why do you believe the SALT II Treaty is still in U.S. interests? Do you still believe it can be ratified with Soviet troops in Afghanistan? Even if you are reelected, won't it be necessary to renegotiate parts of the Treaty?

A: 1. THEME

- Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the President of the United States.
- An all-out nuclear arms race increases the risk of nuclear war.
- The Treaty is in the interests of the United States and our allies. I will seek its ratification as soon as feasible after the election.
- I intend then to go on in SALT III for deeper reductions and greater qualitative constraints on new weapons.
- Tearing up SALT II will unleash an arms race that will threaten our security and cost us billions. It will divide us from our allies, all of whom support SALT II.
- Governor Reagan's proposals to go on to SALT III without SALT II is naive and empty. His professed support for arms control contradicts a history of no discernable support for the arms control efforts of previous Democratic and Republican Presidents.

2. RECORD

- The SALT process, and the SALT II Treaty, which Governor Reagan would abandon, are the products of three Republican and Democratic Administrations all of which were convinced that limiting Soviet strategic arms strengthens U.S. security and reduces the risk of nuclear war.

Run SALT I,
Tabbed.

- The benefits of this Treaty to the security interests of the U.S. are clear:
 - Under the Treaty, the United States will not have to reduce any strategic systems, while the Soviets will have to reduce 250 and it will prevent them from deploying 600 or 700 new ones.
 - Under the Treaty, the United States will be able to carry out all our planned strategic modernization programs, including the Trident I missile, the air-launched cruise missile, and the M-X land-based missile.
 - SALT II will permit us to spend more on our highest priority needs for conventional force improvements.
 - Without SALT, we would be divided from our allies, all of whom support SALT and see it as a cornerstone of their own security.
 - If we abandon SALT, we will give the Soviet Union an enormous propaganda stage and undermine our efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations of the world.
- These are the benefits of the SALT Treaty. I want the American people to understand clearly what the consequences of a world without the SALT Treaty, a world which Governor Reagan apparently wants, would be like:
 - Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy over 3,000 strategic bombers and missiles, instead of the 2,250 they are allowed under the Treaty.
 - Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy as many warheads on their large missiles as they are capable of carrying, fifteen or twenty or even more on each missile instead of ten.
 - Without SALT, the Soviets could target an additional three to six thousand more warheads on American cities and military targets than they would under the Treaty.
 - Without SALT, defense planning by our military leaders would be much more difficult. The M-X program, a central element in our planned strategic modernization, would be harder to

design and to build, and more easily, because we could not know what the size of Soviet forces would be and would have to predict the worst.

- Without SALT, our ability to monitor Soviet forces -- and thus to evaluate Soviet capabilities -- would be reduced, because the Soviets would be freed from the SALT constraints on deliberate concealment of strategic forces.
- Without SALT, the likely increase in Soviet strategic capabilities would require us to spend even more on defense, perhaps on the order of an additional \$30 to \$100 billion over a 10 year period. This would compound our already difficult budget choices. We would of course spend what is necessary for our security, but with SALT, it would be less.

We did not negotiate this Treaty to make friends with the Soviet Union. We negotiated it because we are adversaries, and it is in our security interest to have reliable, effective and verifiable limits on Soviet forces. The Treaty helps reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Art - dust

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan says he will withdraw the SALT Treaty from the Senate and "immediately open negotiations on a SALT III Treaty" for arms reductions.

lean up SALT II

playing card of arms control

under security

At the same time, Governor Reagan will launch an effort to outbuild the Soviets in an attempt to frighten them into negotiations for a new agreement.

Governor Reagan says our allies do not really support the Treaty. He says it was dead in the Senate before Afghanistan.

- Nothing Governor Reagan has said betrays more clearly his dangerous misunderstanding of foreign affairs than his statements on SALT.
- What would we do if the Russians tore up SALT and threatened an arms race and asked for immediate negotiations? Governor Reagan is naive if he thinks the Soviets would react differently. Governor Reagan's course means one thing: renewal of the nuclear arms race, and collapse of the negotiating process.

- What would the Governor propose on SALT III? He wants a buildup in strategic forces, but he also wants reductions. He should tell the American people what U.S. systems he is prepared to dismantle if he is sincere about getting further Soviet reductions.
- The Governor is reported to have over 100 people working on the so-called October Surprise Committee. Well, the surprise is that Governor Reagan is in favor of arms control. He certainly has never before favored any of the arms control accomplishments of any Presidents -- Republican or Democrat.
- The Governor's argument that the allies' secretly are against SALT is a dangerous misperception, perhaps more dangerous than his misunderstanding of China. Throwing out SALT II will divide us from our allies and give the Soviets the propaganda windfall. Our efforts to modernize theater nuclear forces in Europe will be put in jeopardy. The Europeans will seek to disassociate themselves from Governor Reagan's arms race policy. The result will be a divided alliance and a dangerous increase in Soviet influence.
- Governor Reagan's assertion that SALT II was dead before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan shows that he has at least one thing in common with the Soviet Union. They now also make the claim as a way of justifying their invasion of Afghanistan.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- I believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because the Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of our Nation's security. It forces the Soviets to reduce, while we carry out essential strategic modernization.
- Governor Reagan and the Republican Party would abandon SALT and the arms control process build up by every President since Eisenhower. He would sacrifice the important contributions the Treaty makes to U.S. security.
- Governor Reagan would leave us in an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. There is no way to predict how long it would take to reconstruct the arms control process. The risk of nuclear war would increase.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q: Mr. President, why has your Administration failed to manage successfully the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the key factor in international relations? How have we reached this point of tension, deteriorating relations and renewed military competition? What would you do in a second Administration to put U.S.-Soviet relations back on an even keel?

A: 1. THEME

- That relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are severely strained is undeniable. And that this strain is largely created by Soviet behavior is also undeniable.
- A stable, balanced relationship with the Soviet Union remains my goal.
- But, stable relations -- detente -- cannot be divorced from deterrence. The Soviets must understand that they cannot at the same time threaten world peace and still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the U.S. Cooperation or competition -- the choice is up to the Soviet Union. The United States will respond to either.
- But not all problems in this world are carried by the U.S.S.R. Dealing with poverty, hunger, political oppression, the spread of nuclear weapons are also vital to our security and cannot be ignored.

2. RECORD

- The Soviet Union has used its increasing military capabilities to seek to increase its influence in the Third World. With extraordinary shortsightedness, it has done so in the belief that these actions would not undermine detente with the United States and the West.
- This Soviet calculation was clearly wrong. Our relations with the Soviet Union have reached the lowest point in years, particularly accentuated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- This attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people is a violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace.
- The firm actions the United States has taken in recent months -- on grain sales, on technology, on fishing rights, in exchanges and on the Olympics -- are meant to demonstrate that aggression bears a price.
- Most Americans support the steps we have taken. For they understand that we cannot express our national resolve without individual sacrifice -- from farmers, from businessmen, from athletes, and others. Governor Reagan apparently does not understand this. He has opposed many of the steps I have taken.
- When we undertook these policies, we had no illusions that they would bring about an immediate reconsideration of Soviet policy.
- It will take time for the Soviet Union to reassess its policy. When it does, we are prepared to consider realistic arrangements to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would end our sanctions.
- We must recognize, however that not all of our difficulties in the world today can be blamed on the Soviet Union, as Governor Reagan has suggested. The world is much more diverse, interdependent, and unstable than in the past. There is no question that the Soviets, when they feel they can get away with it, will take every opportunity to expand their influence at Western expense. But we forget our world leadership role when we blind ourselves to the realities of the problems we face by fixing our attention too rigidly on the Soviets.
- The profound differences in what our two governments believe about freedom and power and the inner lives of human beings are likely to remain for the indefinite future, and so are other elements of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition is real and deeply rooted in the history and values of our respective societies.

- But it is also true that since our two countries can destroy the world, we share many important, overlapping responsibilities. We will seek to translate these into concrete understandings, if the Soviet Union is prepared to exercise restraint. If not, we shall be prepared for any challenge to our interests.

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan has a very simple view of U.S.-Soviet relations: The Soviet Union is behind all the unrest in the world; if they would behave, there would be no "hot spots" in the world.

He also says it is a fact that the failure of his policy is making it up with the USSR. He knows it.

Does he believe they are behind the world?

Governor Reagan has an equally simple answer to Afghanistan: blockade Cuba, cut off all communication with the Soviet Union, send U.S. advisers and military equipment to Pakistan, and funnel arms to the Afghan insurgents.

But, when it came to action instead of words, Governor Reagan opposed and temporized on many of the specific measures I took to bring home to the Soviets the costs of aggression:

- He opposed the grain embargo, though he has long advocated halting grain sales to the Soviet Union as a moral issue. He wanted to stop grain sales after the disclosure of the Soviet brigade in Cuba.
- Governor Reagan at first suggested an Olympic boycott, then he swung against it, then finally said it was for the athletes to decide.
- He opposed draft registration, one of the most convincing signals of our determination.
- Governor Reagan believes the Cold War never ended, so he would see no loss in a return to an arms race and to the end of detente.
- Governor Reagan believes the Soviets are marching with the tide of history. This is nonsense. Over the past several years, the Soviet Union has lost as much influence in the World as it has gained, starting with the People's Republic of China in the late 1950s. Indonesia, Egypt and Somalia have all sent the Soviets packing. They are not

we have gained 2 who are Egypt, Somalia, China, Hungary, and others.

People who have lost their religion and are in decline??

alone. The Soviet Union has fewer friends in the Third World today than a decade ago. We have moved America to the forefront of world history not only because of our technology, but also because our dedication to democracy, human rights and human justice makes us a beacon to the oppressed everywhere.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- The way to better relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is clearly the path we prefer. We seek no Cold War, no indiscriminate confrontation. But we will insist that Moscow respect the legitimate interests of the United States and of other nations.
- The American people understand that our relationship with the Soviet Union contains elements of competition and confrontation as well as cooperation. Our differences are profound. But it is also true that our two countries share many important interests, some of which being the most critical. We must, therefore, attempt to avoid the excessive swings in our policies toward the Soviet Union, and pursue a steady, firm course of cooperation where it serves our interests, as in the SALT Treaty, and be prepared for confrontation in competition if this is necessary.
- Ahead lies the uncertainty of the directions in which a new generation of leadership will take the Soviet Union, in the solution of its internal problems, and the advancement of its interests abroad. With steadfastness and patience, we can affect the choices they will make, but if we give way to fear and if we cut off all communications as Governor Reagan urged after Afghanistan, we may well see the next generation of Soviet leaders fulfilling our worst nightmares.

*Very something
about the new
Soviet leaders*

CONFIDENTIAL

Q: President Carter, Republicans and other critics say there has been a loss of European confidence in your personal leadership and in the reliability of the United States. Critics say your policies and leadership have been erratic, with sudden flip flops. The neutron bomb is one example; with stress on human rights in certain areas and not in others another, and our arms sales policies a third.

Governor Reagan has said: "I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with -- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

When your Administration began, you said strengthening the Atlantic Alliance would be one of your principal aims. Yet, over the last four years the U.S. and the NATO allies seem to be drifting apart on a whole range of important issues: East-West relations, defense policies, energy problems, inflation and economic stagnation, relations with the Third World, the Middle East -- the list could go on. Isn't it clear NATO is in serious disarray? Can the Alliance remain unified and effective in the face of such problems?

A: 1. THEME

The NATO Alliance is as strong today as it has been at anytime in my memory. Under U.S. leadership, NATO has developed a broad, coordinated and cohesive strategy for strengthening the Alliance. The Atlantic Alliance, together with our Alliances with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, is now and will remain the bedrock of Western collective security.

2. RECORD

- When I took office, the Alliance was indeed troubled. We faced serious security problems in Europe, with no common plan for dealing with them.
- A central objective of my Administration was to devise an effective response to the Alliance disarray we inherited from the previous Republican Administration.
- At the 1978 NATO Summit, the NATO Allies agreed to join with us in increasing real defense spending by 3% every year until 1986.
- In 1978 we launched a Long Term Defense Program to improve NATO's capabilities in ten key areas, ranging from air defense to maritime posture. This program is being vigorously implemented.

- NATO has made a historic decision to modernize theater nuclear forces with the deployment of long-range Pershing and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe which can strike the Soviet Union.
- But, our Allies can do more. The commitments they made in 1978 are all the more important in light of the security situation in Southwest Asia. NATO must face the possibility that U.S. forces we previously had hoped would be available for the defense of Europe might have to be committed to a conflict or crisis elsewhere, especially Southwest Asia.
- We have recently discussed this situation with our Allies and have agreed with them that we need to accelerate implementation of critical Long-Term Defense Program measures, and some countries must make a renewed effort to achieve three percent real growth in defense spending.

3. REAGAN

- Unlike Governor Reagan, I do not accuse our allies of drifting toward "neutrality" or a desire to accommodate the Soviet Union. An Alliance which is vigorously implementing a Long-Term Defense Program to improve its collective military capabilities, which is committed to increasing real defense spending by 3%, and which has decided to implement a major modernization of theater nuclear forces, is not trying to appease the Soviet Union. It is nonsense, and damaging to the Alliance, to make such a charge.
- Governor Reagan says he would consult with the allies and show them we value the Alliance. Governor Reagan's advisers must not have briefed him well on the record of consultations with NATO over the last three and one half years. I have met with allied leaders in five summits. I have had innumerable bilateral discussions with individual allied leaders on every issue confronting the Alliance today. Secretaries Vance, Muskie and Brown have met dozens of times bilaterally and in NATO with their counterparts. The record will show an unprecedented volume of correspondence and exchange at the highest levels with our Allies on major foreign policy issues, most of it quite sensitive. In short, no U.S. Administration has consulted as intensively with the Allies as has mine.

- As an example of his forceful policies, Governor Reagan says he would deploy the "neutron bomb" in Europe. This betrays an insensitivity to European political concerns that could cause serious strains in the Alliance. Governor Reagan ignores one essential fact: NATO is an Alliance of sovereign states. We do not tell our Allies that we are going to deploy a weapon their territory. We consult with them, we examine the military requirements, we consider the political implications, then we as an Alliance decide.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- Over the past three and one-half years, NATO has taken several major decisions to strengthen conventional and nuclear forces, to increase real defense spending, and redistribute security burdens in the Alliance so the U.S. can direct more effort at protecting our common interests in the Persian Gulf.
- This has been achieved under U.S. leadership. Without a vigorous effort by myself, my top foreign policy and defense advisors, and the concerted effort of my Administration, NATO could not have organized and begun the difficult task of implementing this tremendous effort. I am proud of what we have accomplished and I am determined that we shall do even more to strengthen the Alliance.
- NATO is a healthy strong alliance of free, equal and sovereign nations. From time to time, disagreements among free allies over the proper responses to the challenges we are facing is understandable. But, our common goals -- mutual security and preservation of our democratic way of life -- are deep and enduring. We should work even harder at coordinating our actions in Europe and wherever our interest are threatened. But the Alliance is dynamic and vibrant; it is not in disarray.

Persian Gulf

Q: President Carter, your critics have charged that we can't affect the course of the war between Iraq and Iran because we haven't built a policy or a position there. Hence we are neutral in the conflict. What have you done about that region and, if the war should escalate in the near future, does the United States have the capability to protect our vital interests in the region?

A: 1. THEME

In recent years the Persian Gulf has become vital to the United States and to many of our friends and allies. Over the longer term, the world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil is likely to increase. The denial of these oil supplies -- to us or to others -- would threaten our security and provoke an economic crisis greater than that of the Great Depression 50 years ago. Loss of this oil would create havoc not only in the world economy, but for the security of our alliances. The twin threats to the flow of Persian Gulf oil -- from regional instability such as the current conflict between Iraq and Iran, and potentially from the Soviet Union as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan -- require that we assist our friends in the region to enhance their security and that we clearly state our intention to defend our vital interests if threatened.

2. RECORD

- I ~~long ago~~ ^{have always} recognized the growing importance of the Persian Gulf, not just to other oil importing nations, but also to us. That's one reason I have pushed so hard on an energy policy -- which means that we are now importing 24% less oil now than when I was inaugurated. That also means that worldwide oil stocks are at an all-time high, so that both Iraqi and Iranian oil could come off the world market without causing a real crisis.
- We have also been building up our ability to act in our own interests, and those of our friends in the area, if that became necessary. We are creating a Rapid Deployment Force; we have prepositioned military stocks; we have two carrier battle groups in the region; we are making more use of the Diego Garcia base; and we have agreements giving us access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.

- It was no accident, therefore, that we were able to keep the Iran-Iraq war from spreading to the oil areas of the Gulf a few weeks ago. And it is no accident that we have the ability to keep open the Strait of Hormuz -- through which 60% of the world's exportable oil flows -- no matter what efforts are made to close it.
- As for the war itself, we have strongly supported international efforts, in the United Nations and elsewhere, to end the fighting and to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table.
- I have exchanged letters with President Brezhnev about the situation. It is my belief that the Soviets do not want war to break out in a general way throughout the Persian Gulf. The biggest threat to our security would be if the Soviets should be tempted to move into Iran or to move into an area where they can control the Persian Gulf itself or the access to it. This would be a direct threat not only to our own security, but the security of other western nations who depend on oil supplies from that region for economic well-being. President Brezhnev is fully aware of our views.
- We are also working to keep the conflict from spreading beyond Iran and Iraq. To this end we are helping our non-belligerent friends in the area who are threatened by this conflict. My decision to send advance warning-and-control aircraft to Saudi Arabia underscores our determination to strengthen the defenses of such friends -- so that they can guard their own independence and territorial integrity. We are also urging all other nations -- in the region and beyond -- to avoid involvement and to work to limit and resolve the fighting. It is in no one's interest to see the hostilities widen.
- Finally, we have pledged to do what is necessary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference. We have the ability to meet this pledge.

3. REAGAN

- We are told that greater American military might could have prevented the course of events in Iran. Governor Reagan has said that there was

a time that the revolt against the Shah could have been halted. He didn't say exactly how. But the fact is that in the world as it is, American military forces cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the internal problems of other nations. If we tried to order the affairs of other nations by force, we would be endlessly at war all over the globe. And how would we then differ from the Soviet Union and its actions in Afghanistan or Ethiopia?

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- Enhancing the security of the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East will require a sustained, long-term commitment. We are prepared to make such a commitment. We want to work with all of the countries in the region to achieve it. The present conflict between Iraq and Iran underscores the vital importance of this task.

JUN 27 1983

Iran: Hostages

Q: Mr. President, fifty-two Americans remain captive in Iran. The response of your Administration has been to try several diplomatic initiatives, invoke economic sanctions against Iran and attempt a military rescue mission. The latter, we know, was a failure. Less clear has been the effect of the diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions. Now, of course, we have the war between Iran and Iraq which has further complicated the release of our hostages.

Now that you have had the perspective of time and thought, please evaluate for us the effectiveness of the diplomatic and economic measures you have taken, and the wisdom of the rescue mission and why it collapsed. Finally, what do you propose we do now to win the release of the hostages?

A: 1. THEME

No single international issue has caused me greater personal concern as President than the continued, illegal detention of our hostages in Iran. Since the first day the hostages were taken, I have kept two goals in mind. First, to preserve the honor and integrity of our Nation and to protect its interests. Second, to take no action in this country that would endanger the lives of safety of the hostages nor interfere with their earliest possible release back to freedom.

2. RECORD

- International condemnation of Iran, the economic sanctions which we have imposed, and now the war with Iraq, have raised the costs to Iran of their illegal actions and are bringing home to Iranians the fact that the holding of the hostages is hurting their country and bringing dishonor to their revolution.
- But divisions with Iran have prevented progress, and this has been my greatest frustration as President.
- I have no regret that we attempted to rescue our hostages. Our rescue plan was well conceived and had an excellent chance of success.
- Our intelligence information is that the hostages are alive and safe, and that the Iranian authorities are not mistreating them.

- I believe the Iraq-Iran war has not endangered the hostages' lives. But, it has complicated our efforts to gain their release.
- There are rumors that we are prepared to trade the hostages for spare parts for Iranian military equipment. There is no such proposal, no such deal.
NO Pres, but would do to distort America!
- I cannot, for obvious reasons, go into any details about our continuing diplomatic efforts. However, we have made it clear from the very beginning that we were prepared to meet at any time or any place with anyone authorized to speak with authority on behalf of the Iranian government on this issue. The reluctance has always been on the side of Iran, because of their own internal political considerations. This problem can be solved and it will be solved. But I cannot say when a solution will be reached.
- I also understand the intense interest and speculation on the nature of any agreement which might lead to the release of the hostages. I have consistently refused to comment on the Iranian conditions or the possible U.S. response. This is not an issue which is going to be solved by a public exchange. It must be handled in diplomatic channels out of the glare of publicity.

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan believes we should have issued an ultimatum to Iran. *also wanted to "literally quarantine" Iran.*

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- We have pursued a policy of firmness and restraint. We have not issued ultimatums, as Governor Reagan has said he would do. Nor have we attempted to "literally quarantine" Iran as he has suggested. I believe such actions would be reckless and would pose a serious threat to the lives of the hostages.
- I can't mislead you by saying that there are some immediate prospects that the hostages will be released. My hope and prayer is that they will be and I believe that we have made as much effort as possible to secure their safe return.

- - - - Middle East Peace Process

Q: President Carter, there has been no progress in the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel. None is expected until after the November election, if then. Many believe that the autonomy issues are so intractable that the Camp David process is finished. The Europeans have apparently reached this conclusion.

Would it not be fair to say that the Middle East peace process is at a dead end? Would it not be better to start on a new approach?

And, isn't it true that Israeli intransigence on West Bank settlements and the status of Jerusalem are the real roadblocks to peace in the Middle East. Shouldn't the United States bring pressure to bear on Israel to change its policy on these issues?

A: 1. THEME

My Administration has sought to achieve peaceful resolutions of disputes in troubled areas of the world -- in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Regional conflicts pose the danger of wider confrontations and draw the interest of the Soviet Union to exploit disorder. We can take satisfaction that real progress in the pursuit of peace has been made.

2. RECORD

- When I took office, peace in the Middle East was only a prayer. There had been four wars in 30 years between Israel and her neighbors.
- Two years ago Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat joined me at Camp David. Last year they signed a peace treaty at the White House between their two countries.
- Today, Israel and Egypt are at peace. Ambassadors have been exchanged; borders have been opened; two-thirds of the Sinai has been returned to Egypt.
- I am very proud of this accomplishment. It was achieved through patient negotiation and hard work, by all parties. It was not achieved through coercion or pressure.

Today the largest Arab nation is at peace with Israel!

- In this regard, the United States has no intention of pressuring Israel to make concessions in the autonomy negotiations. And there can be no peace in the Middle East unless Israel is secure. I am committed to that security:
 - nearly half of all U.S. aid to Israel since its creation as a sovereign state - more than \$10 billion - has been requested during my Administration.
 - just recently our two countries signed a five-year agreement guaranteeing Israel access to U.S. oil if it cannot obtain its own supplies on the world market. You will remember that Israel made a great sacrifice in agreeing to give up control of the Sinai oil fields as part of the Camp David accords and peace treaty.
- Despite the accomplishments of the Camp David process, much remains to be done. Camp David led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. It also established the framework for a comprehensive peace among all parties in the region. Progress has been made toward that goal.
- Two weeks ago the chief Israeli and Egyptian negotiators in the autonomy talks met in Washington. Our special Mideast negotiator, Sol Linowitz, reported that the two sides were moving closer to agreement. The negotiators will meet again on November 17. And I hope to meet with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat shortly after that. We have come this far; we don't intend to fail.

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan has said that the United States should not try to impose a settlement on the Middle East or dictate its will. I would simply remind him that neither the Camp David accords nor the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel were imposed by the United States. Both were achieved through patient and persistent negotiation and hard work, not coercion. I would also remind Governor Reagan that,

at the request of both Israel and Egypt, the United States is currently involved as a full partner in the autonomy negotiations. As Camp David demonstrated, the United States can contribute in a major way to the peace process -- not by imposing its will -- but by acting as a catalyst, and by helping the parties overcome difficult issues.

- I also find it somewhat surprising that Governor Reagan would express such concern about the United States imposing a settlement on the Middle East when he has made just the opposite recommendation for other disputes around the world, including Lebanon, Cyprus, Ecuador and Rhodesia, among others. In each of these instances he suggested that the United States should use, or threaten to use, military force to resolve the dispute. Governor Reagan's concern for imposing settlements appears to be selective at best.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- The Camp David process has brought peace between Israel and Egypt. This is an historic accomplishment and one that all Americans can be proud of. During my next term, I hope to see all parties at peace in the Middle East.
- Camp David has not resolved all the problems in the Middle East. But let me remind you of this. It is the first time that the two issues of Israeli security and Palestinian rights -- issues at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- have been at the top of the agenda together. And no other approach has been suggested, by Governor Reagan or anyone else, that can do that.

US Policy Toward China

Q: United States policy toward the People's Republic of China and toward Taiwan surfaced early as a major foreign policy issue in this campaign.

President Carter, do you believe it would be possible to upgrade our unofficial relationship with Taiwan without doing damage to our relations with the PRC? More generally, what do you see as the major benefits to date of your decision to normalize relations with the PRC?

A: 1. THEME

When I assumed office in 1977, I set two central tasks - to improve America's political position in the world and to improve our strategic condition. Normalization of relations with China has made a positive contribution to both these objectives.

2. RECORD

- I am very pleased with the progress we have made in U.S.-China relations. When I took office in 1977, our relations were at a standstill. The leaders of the People's Republic were unsure of the reliability of the United States and of our determination to respond to Soviet activities around the globe. The deadlock in our relations was broken in December, 1978, when I announced that we would formally recognize the PRC.
- Since that time, the benefits of normalization have become clear. Trade, travel, cultural exchange and, most of all, the security and stability of the Pacific region is greater now than at any time in this century. And, for the first time in our history we have good relations with both China and Japan.

3. REAGAN

- I am very concerned that Governor Reagan's ill-advised and confused statements on Taiwan and China may place these important accomplishments in jeopardy. If the United States were to adopt Governor Reagan's position on Taiwan, I believe the damage to our important strategic relationship with China would be severe. Perhaps he does not understand that the resumption of an official relationship with Taiwan would not only be contrary to the January 1979 Joint Communiqué we negotiated and agreed to with China, but would void all of the preliminary understandings beginning with the Shanghai Communiqué President Nixon agreed to in 1972.

- Governor Reagan's concern about Taiwan also is ill-informed. At the time of normalization, I made it clear that we would continue practical relations with the people of Taiwan, but without an official relationship, and that we would do nothing to jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan. We have fulfilled that commitment. There has been no betrayal of Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan has done exceedingly well since derecognition. The clearest evidence of this is that United States trade with Taiwan is at an all-time high and that tension in the strait between Taiwan and the People's Republic is at an all-time low.
- I hope that Governor Reagan now understands the importance of our relationship with the People's Republic of China. He didn't in 1978 when he said "it is hard to see what is in it for us." Beyond the questions of trade and cultural exchanges, the fact is that our national security is enhanced by our relationship with the PRC. What Governor Reagan has not understood is that a strong, peaceful and secure China is in our national interest. A China confident in its ability to defend its borders enhances stability in the Far East and contributes to our security and that of our allies.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- Over the next four years I hope to see our new relationship with China grow. At the same time, we have no intention of improving our relations with China for tactical advantage against the Soviet Union. We are developing our relations with China on their own merits. We want good relations with China and the Soviet Union, but we will not slow down progress in U.S.-China relations just because Soviet behavior makes it impossible to move ahead with Moscow.
- We will not sell arms to China. Neither we nor the Chinese seek a military alliance relationship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of dual use technology and defensive military equipment.
- In the absence of frontal assaults of our common interests, the United States and China will remain -- as at present -- friends rather than allies.

Central America

Q: President Carter, next to the Persian Gulf, perhaps the most most volatile region of the world today is Central America. No country seems immune from the revolutionary fervor sweeping the region. The Republicans have sharply criticized your policy there. They state you have stood by while Castro's Cuba -- assisted by the Soviet Union -- arms, trains and supports revolutionary forces throughout the region.

The Republicans further state that they do not support United States assistance to any Marxist government in this hemisphere and, specifically, oppose your aid program for the government of Nicaragua.

On few foreign policy issues are the lines so tightly drawn between your policies and those of the Republicans. How do you account for this sharp policy difference? Do you believe the Cubans and Soviets are responsible for the turmoil in Central America? How best can the United States influence the direction of the change sweeping through the region?

A: 1. THEME

It is important for Americans to recognize that we live in a changing world, a world of diversity and turmoil. Scores of new nations have emerged since the Second World War. The international landscape has been fundamentally altered. We must seek positive relations around the world not because we have a compulsion to be liked but because our interests are at stake. We cannot return to the 1950's, a time of unique American military and economic preparedness in this hemisphere and the world. By attempting to understand and identify with the world as it is, the United States is in a much better position to channel this change in a constructive fashion and to resolve regional disputes. The turmoil in Center America today is a test of America's ability to deal constructively with global change.

2. RECORD

- Those who are most concerned about the potential for radical revolution in Central America and growing Cuban influence in the region should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to help Nicaragua and El Salvador. But, Governor Reagan is not.

- We are encouraged that Nicaraguan moderates and businessmen have chosen to stay in Nicaragua and help work to make it a more democratic country. They have asked for our help, and we will not abandon them. They have asked for our economic assistance. We have provided it, most recently in the form of a \$75 million economic package to Nicaragua.
- In El Salvador, we have been encouraged by the changes and reforms that the new government began implementing. The government there is moderate, reformist and interested in a productive relationship with the United States. We are providing more than \$70 million of economic assistance.

3. REAGAN

- Governor Reagan seems to believe that Cuban and the Soviet Union are behind all the problems in Central America. In fact, Governor Reagan has said: "The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in the game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world." If he expects to force a policy toward the hemisphere based on that perception, he is in for a surprise. The people of Latin America and the Caribbean do not see the struggle between the East and West as their principal problem; they care about food and freedom, and, under my Administration, we have formulated an approach which identifies with those two aspirations.
- I was pleased to hear that Governor Reagan intends to initiate a program of "intensive economic development with cooperating countries in the Caribbean." He might be interested in knowing that he has proposed a program that is already in existence. Since I took office, the United States has more than doubled its aid to the Caribbean and, working with the 30 nations and 15 international institutions known as the Caribbean Group. Multilateral assistance to the region has increased by 400 percent between 1976 and 1980.
- Governor Reagan has sharply criticized the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and my handling of this issue. After the discovery of the brigade, I took steps to insure that Soviet activities in Cuba would in no way constitute a threat to the United States or the region. I have increased surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers

in the region and established a full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force at Key West. And, you will remember, I stated that the brigade was unacceptable. To say that something is unacceptable in world affairs -- as we did with the Berlin Wall -- means that you disapprove it, that you will not recognize it, that you not endorse it. It doesn't mean that you will go to war to change it.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- ||| Under my Administration, the United States will not sit by on the sidelines and abandon moderate elements in Central America to Cuba and its radical Marxist allies. Those who say that Nicaragua is already "lost" are the same people who said Portugal was lost five years ago. •
- We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold in Nicaragua or El Salvador. But if we turn our backs on those countries or revert to the threat of outside intervention, we can help guarantee that democracy will fail.

Human Rights

Q: President Carter, your Administration has made espousal of human rights a central theme of your foreign policy. Some argue that you have persisted in advocating human rights even when it has damaged other U.S. interests and weakened regimes friendly to the United States. The Republicans charge that you have pressed hardest on our friends and little on Marxist regimes with the worst human rights records, such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba.

You have contrasted your pursuit of human rights and "morality" in foreign affairs with the supposed indifference to these considerations by the previous Administration. In view of the charge that your pursuit of human rights has harmed U.S. interests in key areas such as Iran, Central America and Africa, do you intend to continue to assert this as a global, universal U.S. objective? Are you now ready to show more discrimination and weigh other U.S. objectives as well, before attacking a regime for alleged abuses?

A: 1. THEME

In my Inaugural Address I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights. Human rights is as central to America's interests today as when our nation was first born. We know from our own national experience that the drive for human freedom has tremendous force. Our human rights policy identifies America with the basic aspirations of our time.

2. RECORD

- I regard making human rights an essential element of American foreign policy and an item on the agenda of every major international organization a major accomplishment of my Administration.
- We have made it clear that the United States believes that torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances, and that officially sanctioned "disappearances" are abhorrent in any society. We have insisted on the right of free movement everywhere. And we have worked hard to give aid to the world's refugees, compelled to flee from oppression and hardship.

- I believe our words and actions have left their mark on the world. Many governments have released their political prisoners. Others have lifted states of seige, curtailed indiscriminate arrests, and reduced the use of torture. We have seen several dictatorships, some of them in this hemisphere, change into democracies. And, because of our leadership, the defense of human rights now has its rightful place on the world agenda.

3. REAGAN

- The Republican Party has stated that it will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend, without apology. I do not believe that we should simply drop our human rights concerns because a country is anti-communist. Not when that country imprisons and tortures its citizens.
- Verify
|||
 Governor Reagan has said: "Isn't it time we laid off South Africa for awhile?" Does he really mean that we should no longer express our strong opposition to the racist and repugnant South Africa policy of apartheid? He has also referred to "a few innocents" - being caught in the crossfire of violence in Argentina. Did he not know when he made this statement that between 1976 and 1979 there were at least 6,500 cases of unexplained disappearances in that country?
- Governor Reagan has also suggested that the United States should stay away from the upcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid, that we should drop out of the Helsinki process. To do so would be folly. It would only please those who are most guilty of violating the principles of Helsinki, including human rights. I do not intend to let the Soviet Union and other violators be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion. A Republican administration signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. My Democratic Administration is committed to carrying out those agreements.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- My commitment to human rights is as deep and important to me today as it was when I became President. My own faith in the ultimate outcome of this struggle is undimmed. The American people can be proud of the role the United States is playing in promoting human rights around the world.
- Human rights is not just an expression of our ideals. The tide in the world is running toward human rights and it is in our national security interests to support it. Our support for human rights also enables us to regain the political high ground in the competition for world influence. It stands in vivid contrast to the practice of the Soviet Union.
- One of the best ways to express our commitment to human rights is to quote from the words of Archibald MacLeish. "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It's the American dream."

Foreign Policy

Q: What are your top foreign policy and national security priorities for a second term?

A: 1. THEME

I recognize that we live in an age of complexity, of change, of political and social awakening of peoples who demand a share of their own destiny. My foreign policy goals have been designed to identify America with global change, to promote the rule of law over the use of force, to recapture a moral and political leadership role for America, and to keep America strong both through its alliances and its own defense efforts.

2. RECORD

- o As with my first term, I will not back away from the difficult and controversial issues which confront our Nation. I have no intention of looking for easy answers or quick fixes. Rather, I will continue to seek solutions that are meaningful and lasting and in long-term interests of the United States.
- o First, we will continue as we have over the past four years, to build America's military strength and strong defense and economic relations with our allies and friends.
- o Second, we will continue to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that a price will be paid for its refusal to abide by the accepted norms of international conduct. At the same time, we will make it clear to the Soviet Union that we seek no return to the Cold War, no indiscriminate confrontation. The choice is the Soviet Union's, we will respond to either.
- o Third, we will remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control and the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. I intend to push for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty as soon as possible after the election.
- o Fourth, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working -- together with our friends and allies -- to resolve regional conflicts and to promote peace -- in the Middle East, and Persian Gulf, southern Africa, Central America, the Eastern Mediterranean.

- Fifth, we will strive to resolve pressing international economic problems -- particularly energy and inflation -- and continue to pursue our still larger objective of global economic growth through expanded trade and development assistance.
- Finally, and underlying all that we do, we will continue vigorously to support the process of building democratic institutions and improving human rights protection around the world.

3. REAGAN

- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe a lasting world order is achievable by substituting the threat of intervention for diplomacy, by suggesting that we quarantine those nations which challenge our interests, or by seeking to regain an unachievable military superiority at an unimaginable cost.
- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe we are a weak and floundering Nation, dismissed with contempt by our enemies, abandoned by our allies and sinking into decline as a major power. Rather, I know, our resolve is steady, our military powerful, our alliances are strong and we are gaining new friends among the young nations of the world.
- Unlike my opponent, I do not believe we can return to an early day when American interests went unchallenged in the world arena. The world of today is a world of upheaval and unrest and will be for decades to come. But, as a powerful and self-confident nation, we can live with a good deal of turmoil in the world while we protect our interests and be a friend to those who seek a new life free from tyranny.
- Unlike my opponent, I would not return us to the days of the Cold War. I do not believe, as he does, that the Soviet Union is responsible for all the unrest in the world today. The world is much too diverse for such a simple explanation. But I will continue to insist, through our actions and our words, that the Soviet Union respect the legitimate interest of other nations.
- Unlike my opponent, I would not accuse our allies of leaning toward accommodation with the Soviet Union. Leading an alliance of proud sovereign nations requires

endurance and understanding. We and our allies share profound political, security and economic interests, but we must never forget that ours is an association of free peoples, and the United States must lead, not dictate.

- Unlike my opponent, I would not abandon the arms control process, which has contributed to our Nation's security and has taken so many years to construct. That would be the consequence of his intention to scrap the SALT II Treaty.
- Unlike my opponent, I would not jeopardize our new relationship with the People's Republic of China by tampering with the form of our good relations with the people of Taiwan. Our new relationship with China is clearly in our national interest and contributes to the peace and security of the Pacific region.
- And, finally, unlike my opponent, I would not jettison human rights as a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy. I believe the true interests of our Nation are best served by honoring the ideals of our heritage.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

- I do not believe the American people share Governor Reagan's view of the future, a world filled with fears of change and unrest and damaging self-doubts about our military capability and strength, in which foreign policy is reduced to threats, bluster and reliance on military power.
- I have learned a good deal in my four years of office: I know more now about the limits of power; I know better how hard it is to put policies into effect; I understand how frustrating it is to see one's policies distorted and misdirected. I know that a leader cannot achieve everything he wants, or knows is desirable.
- But, my vision remains. It is based on reality, and filled with faith and an unbending determination to achieve a life of meaning and purpose for every American in a Nation that is strong and secure. Above all, I want us to be what the founders of our Nation meant us to become -- a symbol of freedom, peace and hope throughout the world.

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C. INTERNATIONAL AND DEFENSE ISSUES

7. Foreign Policy and Defense: Overview
 - Send in the Marines: A Reagan Defense
8. Defense
 - Defense
 - Arms Control
 - Nonproliferation
9. Foreign Policy
 - USSR
 - China
 - Iran Hostages
 - Persian Gulf
 - Middle East
 - Africa and the Third World
 - Refugees/Human Rights

Reagan & Bush

Reagan Bush Committee

400 South High Street, Arlington, Virginia 22204-4141

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ronald Reagan
 FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin
 DATE: October 24, 1980
 RE: Summary of the Debate Strategy*

1. Be yourself. Don't hesitate, however, to attack Carter strongly on his record or to diffuse with disarming humor his personal charges when they become overblown.
2. Focus the thrust of each answer on Carter's incompetence and weak record.
3. In the presentation of your public policies show how they will impact people.
4. Cite the specific steps in your strategies for peace and economic growth.
5. Millions of voters are frustrated and disillusioned; they are looking for a competent, compassionate leader capable of giving them hope about the prospects for the future.
6. The key to the debate is to motivate Republicans and ticket-splitters to turnout on election day.
7. Our advantage lies in the fact that you are the best electronic media candidate in history.
8. Regardless of Carter's challenges, it is critical that you demonstrate constraint, firmness, moderation and compassion.
9. Use selected examples of Carter's mismanagement of government, his misstatements and flip-flops.

*Attached is a longer memo for your perusal.

Reagan & Bush

Reagan Bush Committee

900 South Highland Street, Arlington, Virginia 22204 (703) 683-1400

MEMORANDUM

TO: Reagan/Bush Campaign
 FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin, Richard S. Beal & Myles Martel
 DATE: October 21, 1980
 RE: Reagan-Carter Debate Strategy

Campaign and Debate Axiom

If the Governor succeeds Tuesday in making Jimmy Carter's record the major issue of the debate and the campaign, we will succeed in the debate and win the general election.

If, however, Carter makes Ronald Reagan the issue of the debate and the campaign, we will lose both.

The above axiom holds because the major debate task turns on enhancing Ronald Reagan's perceived trustworthiness.

- Simply, if voters believe Ronald Reagan is more worthy of their trust after the debate than they did before, his vote support will expand and strengthen.
- This can be accomplished if the debate focuses on Carter's incompetence and weak record in office, and Reagan's compassion. Neither position can be reinforced when the Governor defends past positions.

Target Audience and the Voter Turnout Objective

The target audience consists of a key segment of the American vote--Republicans and ticket-splitters. It is these voters, not the panel and certainly not Carter the Governor is addressing.

- The Governor has already built a coalition large enough to win the presidential election, and hence, we want to use this debate to re-inforce our base and motivate them to turn out on election day.

- Our empirical studies show that if we increase the turnout of our voters by 2% over Carter's, it increases our electoral margin by 30 electoral votes.

The campaign strategy has been to deal initially to our Republican and conservative base, then to broaden our appeal, and finally to return to the base during these last two weeks of the campaign.

- The surveys show that we need, at this juncture, to increase our appeal among Republicans and ideologically moderate ticket-splitters who need to be reinforced through the Governor's debate performance.
- In answering the questions during the debate, the Governor must remember that ticket-splitters are solution oriented, somewhat skeptical and more interested in the issues and public policy than the image traits of the candidates.

These voters will respond to references to the "Nine Steps" in the Governor's peace strategy with the three critical elements of the "Strategy for Economic Growth." It is extremely important to avoid references to "Republicans and Democrats" or "I am a conservative" because ticket-splitters are non-partisans who are put-off by these words.

The Anderson debate helped, generally, to broaden our political base. Today the Reagan vote is larger, more committed and includes more segments of the voting population than does Carter's. Carter's base remains very fluid and uncertain.

The debate should help to solidify further the Reagan base and motivate them to turn out on election day. Only 22% of the electorate are self-identified Republicans, hence without the support of these ticket-splitters the Governor could not be elected.

Major Advantages

The principal advantages the Governor maintains going into this debate are:

- He has already debated six times before in this campaign and is more accustomed to such events.
- He is the best electronic media candidate in history.
- He will appear robust and vigorous by comparison to Carter who will likely appear bleached out and tense.

Principal Strategic Objectives

Televised political debates focus on image attributes more than issue positions. The image attributes we need to reinforce are:

- Competence
- Compassion
- Reasonableness, moderation, and thoughtfulness
- Strength

Essentially, the debate objective is:

Present Ronald Reagan as a reasonable and compassionate man with a vision of America and the competence to take us from simply providing the hope that vision conveys to its actualization.

How is this objective achieved?

Carter's attack strategy will undoubtedly try to represent Reagan's policies as "naive, unrealistic, anachronistic, and Alice-in-Wonderlandish." In response to this attack, the Governor has an excellent opportunity to show constraint, thoughtfulness and strength. And, when the attack becomes overblown, he should use disarming humor which will build both rapport and trust with the electorate.

It is essential for the Governor to use his answers to show that he is aware of different sides of the issues, that they are complex and that only after thoughtful consideration has he settled on a particular policy orientation. In response to the Carter attacks that "he has flip-flopped," the Governor can use such attacks to demonstrate reasonableness and the lack of policy rigidity.

Carter's Attack Strategy

Exploit Reagan's flip-flops.

Make extensive use of Reagan quotes, e.g. during Democratic Convention.

Attack the Reagan California record and how Reagan has "distorted it."

Reagan's Response Strategy

Use changes to show reasonableness; defend public policy changes because circumstances have changed.

Counter with Carter and Kennedy quotes; avoid unnecessarily strident reactions; bring the discussion back to the Carter record.

Defend with confidence and indignation moving as quickly as possible back to the Carter record as the real issue; avoid unnecessary stridency; counter with "when Governor Carter approached this problem in his state, the record shows..." but the real issue of this is the Carter record which shows he still hasn't been able to solve the

Carter's Attack Strategy:

Attack Reagan's ideas as "quick fixes" that are unrealistic and even unworkable.

Suggest Reagan would be a dangerous man in the White House.

Reagan's Response Strategy:

problems and maintain presidential tone and demeanor; act humored by Carter California record attacks--he doesn't understand the problems of California anymore than of the nation.

Given the Carter record, the Carter Administration is incapable of evaluating what would work or not work; argue most Carter policies are in place for such a short time before Mr. Carter changes his mind that their only impact is a quick fix.

Respond with righteous indignation; no one wants peace more than I, after all, what reasonable person would not; the difference between Mr. Carter and I is my commitment to deter conflict by being economically and militarily strong, and pursuing a consistent foreign policy; uncertainty in our foreign policy is more apt to cause an international crisis that would result in war, than to have a strong economy and military.

Several general points should be followed in the Governor's response strategy during the debate.

- It is not necessary to answer or respond to each of Carter's charges.
- It is especially important that the Governor be prepared for Carter's distortions of the California record. A good response to much of what Carter will say in this regard is something the Governor has already said: "You know, it's one thing when the Carter Administration jimmies its own economic figures to make its record look good, but when Mr. Carter starts jimmying my figures, that's going too far."
- The bottom line on the California record is that Californians were better off after the Governor's two terms of office, than this country is after four years of Jimmy Carter.

- The Governor's responses must appear confident and strong, not strident.

Reagan Attack Strategy

The Governor should use his answers to remind the public of:

- Carter, instead of leading the people to greater peace and prosperity, was content to declare there was a malaise in the country and that it would not matter who was President the economy would be just as bad.
- Carter has failed to provide a steady hand at the helm, especially in foreign policy. We have very little support from our allies and largely undeveloped and fragmented policies toward our adversaries.
- Carter has been indecisive, and unwilling to pursue vigorously domestic and international policies.
- More than any previous administration, the Carter Administration has politicized the cabinet and compromised the non-partisan functions of the Departments of State and Defense.

Tactics and Special Considerations

- Emphasize strength and decisiveness while avoiding stridency. Anderson's stridency hurt him in the previous debate.
- Use of a combination of "Mr. Carter" and "President Carter" with more frequent use of "Mr. Carter."
- Remember the debate is between Ronald Reagan the candidate for President, and Jimmy Carter the candidate for the same office. When making references to the 1976 campaign, use "Jimmy Carter."
- Compassion is most easily communicated by referring to situations during the course of campaign experiences.
- Make use of the voter appeal of George Bush by referencing consultations and policy discussions with him.
- Avoid unnecessary references to "the past" and buzz words that alienate blocs of voters, e.g. "detente."

Reagan: Competence and Compassion

The man who will be the President of the United States for the next four years is:

The man who correctly identifies the nation's most pressing problems, and has the drive and ability to resolve them compassionately.

- What the American people want most is leadership in the White House that will give them hope that the country is heading in a direction that will mean greater security and prosperity.
- They are tired of pessimism and the acquiescence to mediocrity. But they are equally wary of political promises by office seekers who are not truly committed to the welfare of the people.
- Americans are looking for specific policy options such as those enumerated in the two speeches--"Strategy for Peace" and "Strategy for Economic Growth," which will already be given by the time of the debate. The Governor should not hesitate to repeat the steps outlined in each.

The Governor must communicate to the American people through his answers that it is the people's interests he intends to serve. The people say the thing that is killing them is inflation, and a weak economy. What will restore this country to its proper bearings is a President committed to reducing inflation and improving the economy.

MEMO TO: Governor Reagan
 FROM: James A. Baker III/Myles Martel
 RE: 10/28/80 Cleveland Debate Strategy
 DATE: October 24, 1980

1. When responding to a question or being attacked, turn to Carter's record, proposals, campaign style, or a faulty logic as soon as possible.

Attack him harder on domestic matters than on international matters. Even anger may be appropriate on economic issues.

Meet offensive with offensive. Don't feel obligated to defend particulars of your positions.

Teddy Kennedy quotes and verbatim 1976 Carter promises can be most useful in waging the anti-Carter attack.

2. Let Carter set the attack tone of the debate. Attempt to equal -- but not surpass -- his tone. He will probably -- but not definitely -- attack you hard on most fronts: California record, misstatements, flip-flops, positions, programs.
3. You are debating "Carter the candidate" more than "Carter the President".
4. Show righteous indignation in responding to:
 - a. Carter's attacks or innuendos that you are dangerous
 - b. Attacks directed at your California credentials

Looking directly at Carter in such instances may be very effective. This not only causes Carter's strategy to backfire, but also makes you appear strong and in control.

5. Humor or a confident smile can also disarm Carter when he thinks he's got you where he wants you.
6. Avoid appearing too defensive when responding to a sharp attack. Remaining in control -- composed -- Presidential is an absolute must.
7. When Carter is speaking -- especially when he is attacking you -- look at him or take notes. Avoid looking downward (Baltimore).
8. Wherever possible, weave your major theme into responses.

"Jimmy Carter has had his chance and has blown it (relate to examples that fit question); you offer promise -- hope."

9. When referring to Presidential actions, call Carter "Mr. Carter". When referring to Carter's 1976 campaign promises -- as you should -- refer to him as "Jimmy Carter".
10. When answering a question about a "people problem", identify with the problem (compassion), then state your position.
11. Conclude your responses with an attack line against Carter or a people-oriented line based on your proposals. Try to balance negative and positive endings of responses.
12. Avoid unnecessary references to the past and buzz words that alienate voters, e.g. detente.
13. Work George Bush into your responses.
14. Show compassion by drawing from experiences on the campaign trail as you do so well (anecdotal references).

Reagan and Carter Advisers Work on Debate Strategies

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

THE NEW YORK TIMES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1980

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 — In next Tuesday's Presidential debate in Cleveland, which both sides regard as the potentially decisive event of the campaign, Ronald Reagan and President Carter are aiming toward several collisions on the issues as well as contrasts of style.

The Republican challenger has said that he sees the debate as an opportunity to come off the defensive on foreign policy and to press Mr. Carter on his record, especially his handling of the economy. "It's a unique opportunity to point out the failures of the Carter record," said Edward Meese 3d, Mr. Reagan's chief of staff.

Mr. Reagan's advisers have set up three days of briefings to prepare their candidate so that he comes across to voters as knowledgeable and reasonable and to reassure the still considerable body of undecided voters that he is neither rash nor risky.

The Carter side sought to structure the debate for a maximum amount of exchange and rebuttals between the two men, to give the President a chance to show his expertise as well as to confront Mr. Reagan on his specific positions.

'Smell of Political Expediency'

"Reagan is vulnerable on both last-minute positions that have the smell of political expediency and in terms of other positions that aren't workable," said Jody Powell, the White House press secretary. "We're going to have at that in pretty direct fashion."

"We expect Carter to come on pretty hard," acknowledged Mr. Meese. "But it's going to be a lot harder for Carter to engage in low blows with someone there facing him."

Some Presidential strategists are already counseling that he should soften what some have criticized as the shrill tone of some of his attacks on Mr. Reagan. "We wouldn't want him to look too tough," said one senior Carter aide.

A few Reagan aides hope the President will have a sharp edge, expecting to gain from a backlash among viewers. But most believe that Mr. Carter will deliver a cool and polished performance.

Appearance, Not Facts

The Reagan camp does not want its man to try to make debating points against the President or match Mr. Carter fact for fact, on the ground that the Californian's great strength is in conveying reassurance to viewers with his calm, telegraphic manner, his soothing voice and his easy smiles and folksy nods.

"I think appearance is more important than a whole bunch of facts — how you look, how you act, and how you present yourself," said William E. Timmons, Mr. Reagan's deputy campaign manager. "Reagan will be calm, cool and collected and the President will be tense, just as he was at the Al Smith dinner in New York the other night."

Right now each side is seeking to lower expectations and talk up the other man's skill. Reagan aides contend that the President, as incumbent, has an advantage because of his detailed knowledge of the day-to-day workings of the Government. But Carter lieutenants say that their man has more to lose because the public expects more of him.

For the Carter side, the ideal result would be for Mr. Reagan to make a gaffe that would leave him on the defensive. For the Reagan team, the best outcome would be for the President to come across as tense and shrill.

Neither Side Taking Chances

Each side has laid on extensive preparations and slowed its pace so its candidate can catch his breath and aides can focus on this one event.

The Reagan camp, following techniques used for the earlier debate with John B. Anderson, is making plans to set up mock panels of questioners over the weekend to run Mr. Reagan through live rehearsals of likely questions.

Getting ready for the Anderson debate, Mr. Reagan was put through his paces by Senators Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee and John G. Tower of Texas, former Treasury Secretary William E. Simon and Representative Margaret Heckler of Massachusetts, who acted as questioning reporters. David Stockman, a former Ad-

derson aide who joined the Reagan campaign, was a stand-in for Mr. Anderson.

James A. Baker 3d, the Reagan debate manager, refuses to say who will stand in for President Carter in the rehearsals.

Movies and Briefing Books

Although Mr. Reagan will probably be shown movies of the 1976 Presidential debates to study Mr. Carter's debating style, Mr. Carter's aides said that the President had already watched Mr. Reagan debate several times this year. Mr. Carter will use the extensive question-and-answer briefing books that he normally employs for news conferences.

The Carter team initially proposed that the two men debate each other with only a moderator and no questioners. But the Reagan side objected, Mr. Meese said, on the ground that Mr. Carter would be evasive and that a structured format with follow-up questions would "make it easiest to call him into account."

Mr. Powell said the Carter side was particularly pleased that the debate, which will be held in Cleveland Convention Center, would permit reporters to follow up questions and the candidates to rebut and counter-rebut each other.

"I don't think anyone's counting on getting Reagan rattled," he said. "What we've got to do is make sure he gets called on inconsistencies and implausibilities in his positions."

Other Carter aides disclosed that memorandums had been prepared detailing shifts in Mr. Reagan's positions on tuition tax credits, the Iranian hostage issue, relations with Moscow, Social Security and the selection of judges.

Reagan aides said their man would welcome the chance to talk more about war and peace issues as well as the economy. They said that he would be ready to discuss the hostage issue but would not raise it. "That's a hand grenade for both sides," said one Reagan aide.

LIKELY CARTER ATTACK LINES

- Carter Attacks
- RR Flip-Flops

CARTER ATTACK LINESEconomy

1. RR economic proposals are wildly inflationary.
2. RR can't cut taxes, raise defense spending, and balance the budget -- unless he uses mirrors or drastically cuts social programs.
3. RR plan is Robin Hood in reverse -- take from the poor and give to the rich. More GOP trickle down.

Energy

RR claims of massive domestic oil and gas supplies are exaggerated.

RR's plans would greatly enrich big oil.

Environment

RR believes pollution is caused by elements of our own environment -- trees, volcanoes, etc. RR thinks pollution under control; yet, there is a long way to go.

Urban - Housing

RR proposal to turn urban problems over to cities means abandoning urban areas to further decay. Fed must help because local governments don't have resources to help themselves.

Labor

RR pretends to be a friend of labor, but opposes decent minimum wage, Davis-Bacon wage protection.

Health

RR at one time opposed Medicare and Medicaid, and now opposes comprehensive national health insurance, yet there are so many individuals who can't afford private care.

Education - Welfare

RR opposes Department of Education which will provide coordinated, comprehensive policy of education for this country.

Women's Issues

RR doesn't support keystone of women's rights campaign.
Supreme Court suggestion is selling seat for votes.

Minorities and Civil Rights

RR has been insensitive to the needs of blacks and other minorities. Would divide nation.

Defense

RR has habit of calling for use of military force in every tense international situation. A dangerous habit.

Defense -- Arms Control

RR would scrap SALT II treaty, leaving no arms control policy in place and no basis for SALT III. This would encourage arms race.

Nonproliferation

RR states nonproliferation is "none of our business."
This simplistic policy leads to dangerous potential for expansion of nuclear club and nuclear holocaust.

China

RR would disrupt the U.S. friendship with China over Taiwan issue, a policy which has been prompted by 3 Presidents and has provided for increased trade opportunities, as in the case of grain sales, and is helpful in counterbalancing the power of USSR.

Overall

RR has been flip-flopping on issues just to win votes.
Who is the real Ronald Reagan?

DEFENSE ON REAGAN "FLIP-FLOPS"

Carter and Mondale have been charging that RR is shifting his position on many issues (e.g., OSHA NYC bailout, Chrysler, etc.) in order to win votes.

Points to be Made:

1. Amazed that Mr. Carter would dare to raise that issue -- given his performance. Since 1976, he's changed his position so many times that State Dept. may have to stop giving policy briefings every day -- and make them every hour.

- 5 economic policies, 3 in past 8 months
- Changed his mind on defense, natural gas deregulation, UN resolution on Jerusalem, etc., etc.

2. With regard to RR's position, his philosophy has not changed -- basically believes that we must get America moving again and that instead of a weak America, we must have a strong America.

3. On some issues, RR has indeed modified his stance but these have been for good reasons:

- On some issues, circumstances have changed. Example: Mayor Koch has done an excellent job in NYC that RR believes Washington should continue to support the city. Anyone running for President must know enough to take changing circumstances into account.
- RR also knows that a President -- to be a good President -- must represent all the people -- rich and poor, white and black, hardhats and shopkeepers -- and that's what he intends to do.

4. So, there may have been some changes and no doubt, if elected, RR may occasionally make changes in the future. But there is one thing that unfortunately cannot be changed today -- and that is the record of the Carter administration over the past 4 years and the misery, suffering it has caused. That is the heart of this campaign -- and that is what we must address in this debate.

RR ATTACK/CARTER VULNERABILITIES

- Broken Promises from 1976 Debates
- Selected Quotes from 1976 Debates
- Carter Flip-Flops
- Carter Misstatements
- From Friends of Carter
- What Foreigners Think of Carter

BROKEN PROMISES FROM THE 1976 DEBATES

1. Never raise taxes

"I would never do anything that would increase the taxes for those who work for a living, or who are presently required to list all their income." (1st debate)

2. Reduce unemployment to 4½

3. Control inflation

4. Balanced budget by end of 1st term

5. High economic growth; 5-5½ a year

6. Increased development and use of coal

7. No food embargoes

"I would never single out food...as a trade embargo item."
(2nd debate)

8. Stand by Taiwan

"I would never let that friendship with the People's Republic of China stand in the way of the preservation of the independence and freedom of the people on Taiwan."
(2nd debate)

9. Strong and respected overseas.

10. Less sacrifice than under a Ford Presidency

"We'll never have a balanced budget, we'll never meet the needs of our people, we'll never control the inflationary spiral, as long as we have seven and a half or eight million people out of work, who are looking for jobs. And we probably got two-and-a-half more million people who are not looking for jobs anymore, because they've given up hope. That is a very serious indictment of this administration. It's probably the worst one of all." (3rd debate)

Other Promises: reduce White House staff and budget. . .reorganize the federal government. . .merit selection of judges. . .government do nothing to encourage abortions. . .good health care. . .

Total Broken Promises From 1976 Campaign

667	<u>Total Promises Made</u>
130	Kept
227	Broken
238	Unkept, Unkeepable, Unverifiable
	(Source: RNC, January 1980)

DO
NOT
USE

SELECTED JIMMY CARTER QUOTES FROM THE 1976 DEBATESBalanced Budget, Economy

"I believe by the end of the first four years of the next term we could have the unemployment rate down to 3 percent,...a controlled inflation rate and have a balanced growth of...about 5%, which would give us a balanced budget..."

9/23/76

"We'll never have a balanced budget, we'll never meet the needs of our people, we'll never control the inflationary spiral, as long as we have seven and a half or eight million people out of work, who are looking for jobs. And we probably got two-and-a-half more million people who are not looking for jobs anymore, because they've given up hope. That is a very serious indictment of this administration. It's probably the worst one of all."

10/22/76

Foreign Policy, Defense

"I think the Republican Administration has been almost all style and spectacular,...not substance...the Ford Administration has failed...Our country is not strong any more. We are not respected any more. We can only be strong overseas if we are strong at home. And when I become President, I will not only be strong in those areas but also in defense."

10/6/76

"We also want to revert back to the stature of and the respect that our country had in previous Administrations...it will come if I am elected."

10/6/76

"The number one responsibility of any President, above all else, is to guarantee the security of our Nation, an ability to be free of the threat of attack or blackmail, and to carry out our obligations to our allies and friends..."

10/6/76

"With our economy in such terrible disarray, and getting worse by the month...this kind of deterioration in our economic strength is bound to weaken us around the world."

10/6/76

CARTER FLIP-FLOPSNatural Gas Policy

'76 Campaign -- promised deregulation of natural gas.
Sent letter to governors of 3 states (Okla., La., Miss.)
to win critical votes.

'77 -- came out for continued regulation and expanded
regulation. Called decontrol a rip-off.

'78 -- signed decontrol legislation.

Economy

5 Economic programs in 3½ years.

National Defense

'76 Campaign -- promised to cut military spending by
\$5-7 billion.

'77 through December '79 fights Congressional attempts
to increase defense budget, delays MX, cancels B-1.

'80 Campaign -- claims to be increasing military spending
(Democratic Senators say "hypocrisy".)

Government

'76 Campaign -- promised to reduce size of government

'80 Campaign -- created Departments of Energy and Education.

Military

Convinced Helmut Schmidt to accept neutron bomb deployment
in West Germany.

Then left Schmidt open to attack by left-wing faction when
decided not to deploy; pulled rug out from under Schmidt
2 days after Schmidt public announcement.

Foreign Policy

9/7/79 -- Said of Soviet brigade in Cuba "unacceptable"

Three weeks later, accepted Soviet brigade.

On Cuban Refugees

Announced "open heart and open arms."

Ten days after, ordered halt.

CARTER MISSTATEMENTSSenator Henry Jackson

--Carter said Senator Jackson has a habitually "warlike attitude" toward other nations. March 31, 1976-New York Times.

--Carter accused Jackson of "making deliberately false statements about me" and "consistently telling falsehoods."

--He also accused Jackson of exploiting the busing issue and its "racial connotations" in Massachusetts.

President Lyndon Johnson

LBJ: A LIAR

--Carter in his Playboy interview said of Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson, "But I don't think I would ever take on the same frame of mind that Nixon or Johnson did-lying, cheating and distorting the truth." November 1976-Playboy Interview.

Senator Hubert Humphrey

--Carter apologized for having said Hubert Humphrey was "too old" to be President. March 31, 1976-New York Times.

Vietnam

--U.S. bombing of Vietnamese villages reflected "racial discrimination." By May on the campaign trail he was calling the war "racist" and condemning the U.S. decision to "firebomb villages." July 7, 1976-Washington Post. (Reappearance-Democratic Issues-November 23, 1975.)

"Killer Rabbit"

"I was by myself in the boat, and I saw this animal swimming... toward me...When it got close enough that I could see the rabbit was going to come in the boat with me, I took the boat paddle and hit the water at the rabbit, and he eventually and reluctantly turned away and went to the shore...the rabbit I don't think was trying to attack me...it was a fairly robust looking rabbit." April 29, 1979-Washington Post. Repeated-August 29, 1979.

"Temporary Inconveniences"

In response to a question about inability to solve problems of inflation and unemployment, Carter responded (in part):

"you know people tend to dwell on the temporary inconveniences and the transient problems that our nation faces." October 20, 1980. Appearance in Youngstown, Ohio-Washington Star-Repeated October 21, 1980.

DO
NOT
USE

FROM THE "FRIENDS" OF JIMMY CARTER• Senator Edward Kennedy

- "You really have to be sniffing the roses in the Rose Garden to think there is no suffering in the steel industry."
-- April 4, 1980 Washington Star
- "We have an administration that believes in throwing people out of work to fight inflation. That is an administration without heart. . ."
-- April 1, 1980 Washington Post
- On the UN vote blunder: ". . . makes American foreign policy the laughingstock of nations throughout the world."
-- New York Press Conference
- Asked about Carter's view that the economy was looking up. "What Carter is saying is that the country is getting better because it's getting sicker at a slower rate."
-- May 24, 1980 Washington Post
- "The only environment he (Carter) wants to save is his own rose garden."
-- May 31, 1980 LA Times

• State Senator Julian Bond (Georgia) (on Black issues)

- "In 1976, this nation turned to a man who clearly knew the words to our hymns, but who in less than a year had forgotten the numbers on our paychecks."
-- July 19, 1980 Washington Post

• Senator Daniel P. Moynihan

- "I will go up and down the state of New York and say that the Administration broke its word. I am tired of people lying to us on this first subject. . ."
-- January, 1980 hearings on tuition tax credits
- "President Carter's likening of the 'Palestinian cause' to 'the civil rights movement here in the United States' has properly evoked utter disbelief."
-- August 2, 1979

• Senator Henry Jackson

- "'We appear to be going from one crisis to another.'"
-- May 13, 1980 Wall Street Journal

- Senator Ernest P. Hollings (Senate Budget Committee Chairman)
(Democrat, S.C.)
 - Accused President Carter yesterday of the "height of hypocrisy" and "outrageous, deplorable conduct" for assailing a compromise congressional budget plan as too defense heavy.
 - May 29, 1980 Washington Post re FY 81 defense spending plan.
- Representative John E. Moss (Demo.
 - "President Carter has been the least effective president since he (Rep. Moss) came to Capitol Hill."
 - February 8, 1978 Washington Star (on retiring after 26 years in Congress)

FOREIGN COMMENTS TOWARDS CARTER

Helmut Schmidt sought repeatedly to determine U.S. plans only to "read about it, with newspapers." (Time reports Schmidt broke into tears over Carter's failure to understand his responsibility as leader of the U.S.)

Singapore's P.M. Lee Kuan Yew: "a sorry admission of the limits of America's power", referring to Carter's vision of U.S. role.
-- Time, August 18, 1980

High-level British policymaker: "Consultation by the Americans with their European allies has been at its lowest ebb since Suez."
-- Time, June 30, 1980

The prestigious London "Economist" says in its 10/18/80 edition: "The conviction that Mr. Carter is a dangerously second-rate president rests upon the observation that his first term has been marked more by failure than by success, and the fear that there is something in the man which makes it unlikely that the pattern would change in a second term."

The following quotes were taken from the Chicago Tribune, August 21, 1979:

"The American presidency is experiencing its most serious crisis in 50 years, in many respects more serious than Watergate."
-- Il Giornale, Milan

"Placing a 34-year-old imagemaker, Hamilton Jordan, at that power level of the Western world leaves some people uneasy. The members of Carter's young team are the most expensive apprentices in the world."
-- Handelsblatt, Dusseldorf

"Jimmy Carter's difficulties are the result of his ambiguous relationship with the traditional political groups that dominate Congress."
-- Le Matin, Paris

"After 30 months in office, Carter appears to be more a preacher than a statesman, with many exhortations but little action."
-- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Memorandum To: Governor Reagan

Subject: Carter's Welfare Record in Georgia
 From: Caspar W. Weinberger
 Copies to: Ed Meese
 Martin Anderson

October 20, 1980

The Governor and Carter were both governors during the period 1970-1974.

Under Carter: Welfare rolls rose in Georgia by 19.3%. The average benefit declined by \$1 per month (from already very low levels)

Under Governor Reagan: Welfare rolls in California declined 8%. (If you use the period 1971-1974, they declined 23%) The average monthly benefit rose \$67 a month (or 34%).

State Employees: During the same period, State Employees increased 8% in California, 34% in Georgia. The average increase for all states was 16%.

Spending: In Georgia, 1971-1975, all state spending rose 35%. In California, same period, state spending rose only 9%.

The national average state spending increase during this period was 25%, so state spending was held well below the national average in California during these 4 years; ~~but in Georgia it rose more than twice the national average.~~

The above figures came from Warren Brooks of the Boston Herald. I checked with him, and he confirms those figures. His sources were: HEW for the Welfare figures (based on reports from the states); the U.S. Statistical Abstract, published by the Census Bureau, for the years 1974-79. The spending figures are in constant 1971 \$, measured by the GNP deflation.



Caspar W. Weinberger

CWW:pl

REAGAN'S CALIFORNIA RECORD ON THE TOUGH ISSUES

Spending

- Between 1967 and 1975, California's rate of per capita spending growth was the lowest among the ten most populous states, and was lower than in 45 of the other 49 states.
- Reagan reduced the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of spending growth by two-thirds of what it had been under Pat Brown.
- Reagan vetoed 994 bills in his two terms, which prevented an estimated \$15½ billion in spending. Only 1 veto overridden.
- Between 1971 and 1975, when both Reagan and Carter were governors, real per capita spending grew by three percent in California versus 14 percent in Georgia.

Taxes

- Between Reagan's first full fiscal year in office (FY 1968) and the end of his second term (FY 1975) per capita state taxes in California grew at a lower rate than in 47 of the other 49 states.
- Per capita state and local taxes combined grew at a lower rate than in 45 of the other 49 states between fiscal years 1968 and 1975.
- There were some tax increases during Reagan's terms, but they helped to turn a million dollar a day deficit when he took office to a \$554 million surplus when he left.
- Prudent fiscal practice paid off. When Reagan was Governor, California's bonds were upgraded to the highest possible bond rating, Moody's Triple-A, for the first time in 31 years.

State Government Employment

- The civil service work force under RR's control grew as much in RR's entire eight years as it did in only one year under his predecessor. Based on State Personnel Board figures, California's full-time civil service work force grew by only 6000 employees (5.8%) in 8 years, or an average only 750 employees a year (less than one percent annually).
- State employment, relative to population, grew at less than one-third the national state average (10% versus 33%) between 1966 and 1974.
- Between 1970 and 1974, the appropriate benchmarks for comparing Carter's and Reagan's records as Governor, California state employment, relative to population, grew at one-sixth the rate of Georgia's (4% versus 26%).

Welfare

Reagan's welfare reform program began in January, 1971 through administrative means, and was incorporated into legislation in October, 1971. The results were:

- The California welfare rolls were growing at the rate of about 40,000 per month as 1971 began. But between April and November of 1971, as the reform program began to take effect, 175,000 people left the rolls. The decline continued through the end of 1974.
- From the time the welfare reforms started to take effect in 1971 until late 1974, the close of the Reagan Administration, there were over 850,000 fewer persons on family welfare and general assistance programs than had been projected by legislative and other experts prior to the 1971 reforms.
- Between fiscal years 1967 and 1975, real per capita welfare spending in California grew 42% versus a national state average growth of 131%.
- Benefits to truly needy increased by an average of more than 40%.

Consumer Protection

- Reagan reorganized the various consumer protection bureaucracies into a single Department of Consumer Affairs, thereby giving consumers a single department with which to deal.
- Reagan supported the establishment of a Division of Auto Repairs to crack down on unscrupulous practices, signed legislation protecting the public against unordered merchandise, and approved legislation giving consumers the power to sue for damages and injunctions in deceptive practices cases.

Environmental Protection

- Reagan created an Air Resources Board which greatly strengthened the state's powers to control air pollution.
- Reagan implemented a program that outfitted cars with the most sophisticated smog control devices available, reducing hydrocarbon emissions by 90%. Nader group later said Calif. had toughest anti-smog laws in the U.S.
- Reagan played a major role in enacting the California Water Quality Quality Act of 1969--the strongest water pollution control law in U.S. history.

Occupational Safety

- Reagan presided over the 1973 creation of Cal/OSHA, California's safety agency. None of Cal/OSHA's standards have been challenged in court since the agency's inception.

Unemployment: Ohio -- 10.2% (July, 1930)
9.1% (Aug., 1930)
Cleveland (city) -- 12.7% (July, 1930)

- RR spoke at largely abandoned Jones and Laughlin plant in Mahoning Valley, where 13,000 jobs have been lost in last 3 years . . . and buildings were "shells of what once were busy rolling mills and blast furnaces."

- Ford Motor Company -- out of 8500 workers, 7000 have now been laid off.
- City economy: City defaulted on \$15 million in municipal notes in 1978. Has embarked on 3-year recovery plan, now has first balanced budget in long time. Much of progress due to new Republican mavor, George V. Voinovich. But for complete recovery, city needs healthy national economy.
- Mortgage rates for 30-year mortgage, now 12.73.
- Housing costs (medium priced new/old home sales average)

1976	\$43,200
1980	\$64,300
1984	\$95,800 (projected under Carter inflation)

For the Cleveland, Akron and Lorain areas.

ECONOMY

- The Economy
- A Bright Economic Future Under Carter?
- Attack Points on Carter Reindustrialization Program (RIP)
- Reagan's 5-Point Strategy for Economic Growth
- Responding to Carter's Attacks on RR's Economic Plan

THE ECONOMY

The Carter Record--Worst of any President in 50 years.
His "Seven Deadly Sins:"

1. Created the worst inflation since WWII
--As high as 18% this spring
2. 8 million unemployed now--highest since Great Depression
✓ --If all the men and women out of work stood in line (2 feet apart), the line would stretch from New York to Los Angeles.
3. Nearly doubled the level of taxation.
--The average family of 4, pays \$5,000 more in taxes a year.
4. Increased federal spending by more than 50%.
5. Four year deficit is biggest of any President in history.
--Last year's deficit (including off budget) single largest in history ---\$77 billion.
6. Increased national debt by over 40%.
7. Highest interest rates since the Civil War.

	<u>When Carter Elected</u>	<u>Today</u>
Inflation	4.8%	12%+
Unemployment	7.3	7.5
Misery Index	12	20
Mortgage Interest Rates	9	14

Carter in 1976 debates promised that by end of 1st term, would reduce unemployment to 4%, inflation would be controlled, budget would be balanced. Also promised in debates never to raise taxes for working people.

What 4 More Years of Carter Will Be Like:

-- Another four years of Carter inflation will mean that goods will cost twice as much as when he was elected. In the September '80 figures released last Friday, the cost of groceries was escalating at the annual rate of 25.3%. Examples of 1984 prices with continued Carter inflation:

✓ Milk	\$3.60 /half gallon
Bread	1.85 /loaf
Hamburger	2.17 /pound

Senate budget committee estimates that with Carter programs, federal taxes will double once again by 1985 (to \$1.1 trillion).

Under Carter economic programs, Washington scheduled to take 30 cents out of every new dollar earned in the economy. Washington already taxing at war-time levels.

THE ECONOMY:Carter Blames Everyone But Himself

1. Has blamed OPEC
2. Has blamed American people (their malaise)
3. Has blamed Federal Reserve most recently (even though he appointed 5 of 7 members, including the chairman).

Symbol administration: Finger pointed the other way. /

Carter Still Fails to Recognize the Source of the Problem

September 12, 1979 speech: "Government cannot... reduce inflation."

Oct. 14, 1980 speech. Listed as first cause of inflation "The failure to raise adequate revenues at a time of greatly increase public spending."

Carter Also Fails to Appreciate the Suffering

Oct. 20, 1980, speech, when asked about inflation and unemployment, told audience in Youngstown, Ohio: American people shouldn't dwell on "temporary inconveniences."
--Not temporary inconvenience to elderly and poor.

Under Carter, "real spendable median income" (after taxes and inflation) has dropped about 10% since 1977. (NOTE: some other measurements show slight increase since 1977, but all show that upward escalator has stalled for personal income in U.S. The pie has just stopped growing.)

A BRIGHT ECONOMIC FUTURE UNDER CARTER?

The nation's economy is "well on the way to a full recovery...I think the future looks very bright for us."

Jimmy Carter
Youngstown, Ohio
October 20, 1981

Points to be Made:

1. Inflation may choke recovery: There is a widespread concern among economists that high interest rates and high inflation will cause the fragile recovery to stall out within a matter of weeks.

"As we look ahead, after several months of improving real activity, the recovery is likely to suffer a setback around the turn of the year...The recent run-up in interest rates reduces the likelihood that the summer economic rebound will initiate a sustained recovery."

Walter Heller
John Kennedy's chief
economic advisor
October 17, 1980

2. Can anyone trust Carter this time? Last time, he promised us less inflation, less unemployment, a balanced budget -- and look what we got. Why should we trust him again?

Example of Carter's lousy forecasting: At beginning of 1978, he forecast a 6% inflation over next 12 months. Turned out to be 13%. Jimmy Carter's license as a forecaster ought to be revoked.

3. Even Carter's own men don't believe him: Consider recent comments from some of those closest to him:

✓ "We're not going to see any quick progress for inflation...it will take seven or eight years for the rate to drop" to an acceptable level.

Treasury Secretary
William Miller
New York Daily News
October 23, 1980

On that same day, Alfred Kahn, Carter's chief inflation fighter, warned that consumer food prices will rise sharply for the remainder of the year -- nearly 12% in months ahead.

Washington Post
October 23, 1980

4. A Reagan Dare: If Jimmy Carter believes the economy is so bright, I agree with what Ted Kennedy said some months ago -- he's been so busy sniffing roses in the rose garden that he's lost touch with America. I dare him to come with me tomorrow morning -- and I'll take him on my own plane -- to see the real America of 1980:

South Bronx
Youngstown (Jones & Laughlin)
Detroit (where auto sales announced last week
were sharply below a year ago)

ATTACK POINTS ON CARTER REINDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM (RIP)

- Carter revitalization program is fifth program in this administration and the third economic program in last eight months.
- Program jeopardizes pension funds by using them to bail out firms in financial trouble. Very troublesome for union members.
- Many observers believe this plan is election-year window dressing. Has never been sent to Hill and there is little evidence that serious work is being done on it.
- Federal tax burden would rise more than \$80 billion next year.
- Carter plan does not significantly impact unemployment. Administration's own spokesmen say that even with the plan unemployment would run at 8.5% a year.
- Credit against Social Security tax is meager, a bandaid for largest peace-time tax increase (Carter social security tax); barely offsets inflation of last 4 years.
- Economic Revitalization Board designed to create a working partnership for business and industry, has potential for further government interference. We don't need another agency. Federal welfare for business. Parallels British economic sickness.

REAGAN'S FIVE-POINT STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH1. REDUCE GOVERNMENT SPENDINGReagan Proposed Percentage Reduction in Senate Budget Committee Projected Spending

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Expected Reductions	2%	4%	5%	6%	7%
Reductions Goal	3%	6%	8%	10%	10%

--Carter projects annual federal spending will increase from \$563.6 billion in FY 80 to over \$900 billion in 1985.

--RR expects to cut the FY 85 amount by \$64 billion (\$13 billion in FY 81)

- Through comprehensive assault on waste and inefficiency, including:
 - Appointments of men and women who want spending control.
 - Immediate freeze on level federal employment (note: partial freeze now in effect).
 - National Citizens' Task Forces to rigorously examine every department, agency (as RR did in California).
 - Spending Control Task Force (chaired by Weinberger, former OMB director) to submit detailed report during transition on elimination of waste, extravagance.
 - RR plan will carefully preserve necessary entitlements already in place -- e.g., Social Security. But RR will restrain Congressional desire for "add ons" and will make administrative savings.

2. REDUCE TAXES

--Senate Budget Committee estimates federal tax revenues will more than double by FY 85 to \$1.1 trillion a year (rise of about \$117 billion a year, total of \$584 billion). Taxes next year will rise by \$86 billion under Carter.

--RR proposes a three-part program:

- (1) Across-the-board reduction of 10% a year in individual income tax rates, 1981, 1982, and 1983.
- (2) Indexation for personal income tax brackets thereafter.
- (3) Accelerated depreciation to stimulate job-creating investments.

RR 5-Point Economic Strategy

- Revenue effects
 - Estimated loss in taxes: \$172 billion in 1985.
 - Cuts would stimulate an additional 1% in annual economic growth by FY 85. Conservative Senate Budget Committee estimates are that such growth will produce an additional \$39 billion in revenue in FY 85. RR, as a supply sider, has confidence that more revenues will be generated.
 - Federal budget would move into balance in FY 83 -- the first time since 1969 -- and would show surplus of \$93 billion in FY 85. (Source: U.S. Budget FY 81).
- Federal share of GNP
 - Under Carter, Federal share of GNP rising steadily:

1976	18.5%	(Source: U.S. Budget FY 81)
1981	21.7%	(projected)
1985	24.4%	(projected) Highest rate in history
 - Under RR plan, federal share of GNP in 1985 would be 20.4%.
 - 16% lower than Carter and much closer to historical average. (Source: Sen. Budget Committee Minority)
 - Note that under Carter, Washington's projected share of economic growth through 1985 expected to be stunning 31%.
- Note RR still in favor of repealing destructive elements windfall profits tax, estate and inheritance taxes, and providing tuition tax credits. But these not included in above estimates. Would be phased in when fiscally possible.

3. DEREGULATION

- Thorough and systematic review pledged: RR to see how regulation has contributed to economic deterioration without backing away from general goals.
- Steps to implement include:
 - Effective economic impact statements re future regs -- weighing cost against benefit.
 - Working with Congress to tighten the reins on regulators -- too much discretion today.
 - Priority analysis of every current regulation to see if needed -- like sunset review.
 - Special task force (headed by Dr. Murray Weidenbaum, one of nation's foremost authorities on subject) to submit detailed recommendations in November.

RR 5-Point Economic Strategy4. SOUND MONETARY POLICY

-- Independent Federal Reserve; but RR appointees would be men and women who share commitment to restoring value of US dollar and believe in sound, stable, and predictable monetary policy.

5. RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

-- Carter has announced 5 new economic policies, 3 in the past 8 months. Uncertainty has created mass confusion, undermined credibility of his policies (only Carter certainty: more taxes, more hardship, more confusion).

-- RR plans to establish and implement economic policy early -- within first 90 days -- and then stick to essentials of this policy.

-- Policy will be oriented toward the long-term; no sudden or capricious change of "rules of the game."

RESPONDING TO CARTER ATTACKS ON RR'S ECONOMIC PLANI. Carter: RR economic proposals are wildly inflationary.

1. Would never take advice on inflation from economists in the Carter administration. They have been about as helpful to the economy as the iceberg was to the Titanic.

- Gave us the worst inflation in peactime history.
- Act as if no one can cure. But Gerald Ford cut inflation in half in less than 2 years. And Germany and Japan, even though they are more dependent on oil than U.S., last year had inflation rates less than half our own. Inflation can be controlled.
- Finally, they misunderstand the cause of inflation. Carter said last year that "government cannot..... reduce inflation" (Washington Star 9/12/79). Absolutely wrong: government is the chief cause of inflation.

2. RR would cut to the heart of problem by cutting the growth of govt spending. Would cut at least 7% -- goal of 10% -- from projected Carter spending. Comprehensive assault on waste and fraud, begin to return some responsibilities to the states. Would balance the budget by 1983.

3. Cuts would be joined by reduction in tax rates designed to spur economic growth, increase productivity of our workers.

- By producing more goods, we will finally end the inflationary cycle of too much money chasing too few goods.
- Disagree with Carter economists that it is not inflationary for government to spend your money but is inflationary for you to spend it. That's the kind of elitist thinking that has gotten us in such a mess.

4. The projections in my proposal are very conservative -- project inflation rate of about 7.5%, but convinced that if we finally jolt the economy out of stagnation, we can do much, much better.

Ford -- with his strong use of veto power -- actually brought the inflation rate down 20% faster in 1975 than his advisers predicted.

- RR in California also brought down inflation. Veto a powerful weapon there too.

So it can be done.

II. Carter: RR can't cut taxes, raise defense spending and balance the budget -- unless he uses mirrors or drastically cuts social programs.

1. Accept the fact that Mr. Carter sincerely believes this -- because the way he intends to balance the budget over the next four years is to raise taxes by over a trillion dollars. Under Carter, Washington alone will take better than 30 cents out of every dollar in the economy over next four years.

2. But the Carter economists are living in the past with ideas that no longer work. They still cling to the notion that the answer to our economic and social problems is for Washington to spend and spend, tax and tax, elect and elect. That may have worked 40 years ago, but it is bleeding us dry today.

-- RR puts his faith in new and more powerful idea: economic growth through a revival of the supply side of the economy. Inject new life into the private sector.

3. RR has been working with some of best economists in country -- two former chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers (Greenspan and Burns), a Nobel laureate (Milton Friedman), former secretary of the Treasury (Simon) and others -- to build an economic program based on hope -- not despair.

4. Because Carter has built so much inflation into the economy, tax revenues will be growing faster than Washington will be able to effectively use. Carter wants to have Washington spend most of that extra revenue; RR wants to give some of it back to the taxpayers.

5. Cuts in tax rates will then allow both consumers and business to expand their buying power, will increase overall growth. Start up the economic engine again -- while also keeping all of Washington's social commitments and still balancing the budget.

6. One point often overlooked: the underground economy. Professor Edgar Feige of University of Wisconsin has recently estimated that underground economy may be as high as 27% of GNP and it is growing at roughly triple the rate of the rest of the economy. (WS Journal, Oct. 20, 1980)

-- Most Americans want to live within the law. If taxes can be lowered, RR believes that a good deal of this underground economy will go above ground -- becoming tax-supporting again. Carter economics is just driving them below ground.

-- Also noteworthy that in underground economy -- where there are no real taxes -- prices may be as much as 20-40% lower than above ground. Shows what can be done in a more tax-free environment.

7. But the key point is this: RR is putting his faith in private enterprise and economic growth. Carter is putting his faith in more government -- and economic stagnation.

III. Carter: RR plan is Robin Hood in reverse -- take from the poor and give to the rich. More GOP trickle-down.

1. When Mr. Carter came back from Texas last week, he brought some of that horse manure with him. He's absolutely wrong about these tax cuts -- everyone in America gets the same cut in tax rates over the next three years.

2. Proposal is heavily weighted toward middle income people, because they are the backbone of the American economy. Under RR plan, those who make under \$30,000 each year would get more than half of the tax benefits -- even though they pay less than half of the taxes today. (Joint Committee on Taxation)

3. As for the rich, just recall the tax cuts of Jack Kennedy that were so successful in the 1960s and ignited one of the strongest periods of economic growth in 40 years. RR plan very similar to Kennedy's. After Kennedy cut taxes across the board like this, the taxes paid by millionaires doubled within two years.

ENERGY

- Conservation desirable, but key is higher production. It can be done:
 - US has 47 year supply of oil (including shale)
 - 27 years of natural gas
 - 321 years of coal. (1980 report from DOE & reports from US Geological Survey)
- Carter talks about more production, but his actions discourage it:
 - His Dept of Energy (\$12 billion, 35,000 pages of regs) has increased red tape, bureaucracy.
 - Oil:
 - His "windfall profits tax" will reduce production by 500,000 barrels/day by 1990 (enough for 250,000 cars/year).
 - Burdensome restrictions on offshore leasing. Only 4% of Outer Continental Shelf offered for lease; no off-shore leasing in Alaska, and Carter has locked up nearly 100 million square miles of Alaskan land.
 - Coal: 1,000 new pages of regs has contributed to one of worst slumps in history (22,000 miners out of work)
 - Natural gas: His opposition to dereg and then signature on faulty bill (creating 23 pricing categories, extending controls to intrastate natural gas) holding production down.
 - Nuclear: Under JC, net of 4 new plants ordered, 36 orders cancelled. Net loss of 32 plants equivalent to 900,000 barrels/day of oil.

• Result of Carter policies: production far below potential

- Oil: In lower 48 states, production has fallen each year under JC; overall, down 12% (Total US production has gone up slightly because of new inflow from Alaska -- but that's only because of Alaskan pipeline, built over objections of many Democrats in Congress & long before Carter).
- Natural gas: production up only 2% in JC's first 3 years.
- Coal: Carter promised in 1979 to double production by 1985, but it has been increasing only 4% a year under JC so far.
- Nuclear: no new orders in 2 years.

• American consumers also paying high price for Carter policies:

- Gasoline prices have doubled under JC; frequent long lines.
- Home heating oil also up sharply. US average has increased from 41¢ per gallon in 1976 to \$1.00 per gallon in 1980.
- Oil import bill has also doubled, creating worst trade deficits in US history, weak dollar.

• Reagan 4-Point Energy Policy

1. Greatly accelerate production
 - Dereg oil and natural gas ASAP.
 - Accelerate federal leasing for oil, eliminate unnecessary regs on coal (consistent with good environment)
 - Streamline nuclear licensing, upgrade nuclear safety standards, accelerate solutions for waste.

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ENERGY

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2. Encourage greater conservation, relying primarily on market.
 - Between 1973-78, industry on own produced 12% more goods with 6% less energy.
 - Continue tax credits, faster depreciation to encourage greater energy investment.
3. Accelerate development of national petroleum reserves
 - 4 year old program is now 3 1/2 years behind schedule. Designed to have 6 month supply, has only 2 weeks. Carter vulnerable in light of unsettled situation in Middle East.
4. For long term future, provide research funds to stimulate new technologies such as solar, fusion.

Other Notes

1. Abolition of DOE: Carter will criticize as simplistic. RR would transfer necessary functions such as defense research to other departments. Reduce reg/related programs now costing \$2 billion a year.
2. Synthetic Fuel: RR has opposed Carter call for \$88 billion Syn Fuels Corporation which commits government to subsidize syn fuels. More big government; could create white elephants. Better to support research on new technologies, let private enterprise develop the most promising.
3. Windfall profits: Carter will assert RR trying to enrich big oil. But the tax actually hits small independents who drill 80-90% of exploratory wells essential to new oil finds. Tax also makes US most expensive place to search for oil.
4. 55 mph speed limit: RR does not reject -- wants to leave to states.
5. Other Carter attack lines:
 - RR statement about more oil in Alaska. Some estimates do show potential in Alaska greater than Saudi reserves, but critical point is Alaska shouldn't be locked up.
 - RR statement that US could be energy self-sufficient in 5 years. Critical point again is to move consistently in right direction. Not like Carter.
 - RR statement that conservation only means running out more slowly. If Carter raises, point out pure conservation/anti-production will lead there. Critical point is to achieve balance
6. US dependence on OPEC. Carter may claim it is down from 1979. But reason is the recession in 1980 and skyrocketing prices. If we get economy back on track, will discover that we are still excessively dependent on OPEC.

NUCLEAR POWER

- In next several years, U.S. has no choice but to rely upon more nuclear power and increased production of coal.
- Carter agrees, but his ineffective leadership has jeopardized nuclear industry:
 - JC unable to prevent Democrats from adopting platform calling for phase-out of nuclear plants.
 - Since 1977, plans for 32 nuclear plants (net total) have been cancelled. Will mean loss of nearly 900,000 barrels of oil/day.
 - Cancellations due in large part to public concern about safety, unresolved issue of nuclear waste disposal.
 - Carter Administration apathetic about safety until Three Mile Island. Then appointed Kemeny Commission to review safety efforts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Safety recommendations welcomed -- and we should proceed on them; give us a safer foundation on which to build.
 - Administration and Congress also slow to address problem of nuclear waste. Technology has been largely developed, per experts, but hard political decisions still must be made on waste. Carter hasn't shown enough leadership here.
- Reagan Approach: Move ahead with safe program.
 1. Accelerate development of nuclear power through technologies that have been proven safe, efficient.
 2. Streamline licensing process through consolidation of present review process and through standardization of reactor design (outrageous that U.S., once the pioneer in nuclear power, now takes more than twice as long to plan and build new plant as Japan, many nations of Europe).
 3. Accelerate safety effort along lines of Kemeny report.
 4. Demonstrate waste disposal alternatives and try to solve difficult siting problems (no one wants in his backyard).

ENVIRONMENT

- Healthy environment not a luxury but a necessity. RR bows to no one in commitment.
- As Governor of California
 - Clean air program left California with "toughest anti-smog laws in the country," according to Nader group.
 - 1st major revision of water quality laws in 2 decades.
 - Added 145,000 acres of park land.
- RR concerned that federal government going overboard. In the name of environmental purity, many regulations bring little environmental gain but have devastating impact on the economy.

Example: Steel industry subject to 5,600 regulations, terrible unemployment, failing to compete.
Carter election-year conversion not believable.
- As President, would carefully balance environmental and economic needs.
 - Move positively on urgent environmental problems -- toxic and nuclear wastes. Must be no more Love Canals, and we must solve the nuclear waste problem.
 - Carter response has been weak on both; extraordinary that 1976 Toxic Wastes Act insufficiently funded until FY 81 budget; that little progress made on nuclear waste disposal
 - Comprehensive review of all regulations, modifying those that are inadequate, streamlining the burdensome, and eliminating the unnecessary.
 - Re-evaluate goals and standards set by legislation passed nearly a decade ago (e.g., Clean Air Act up for review, renewal in 1981), using updated scientific evidence.
 - Permit greater flexibility in meeting federal standards. Set standards but let individuals and companies find best way to meet.
 - Open up more federal land to exploration for energy and minerals. Example: Alaska.
- Summary: Make no mistake. RR will not permit the safety of our people or our environmental heritage to be jeopardized, but RR reaffirms that economic prosperity of our people is a fundamental part of our environment.

Environment

• Other Notes on Environment

1. Carter may attack RR on:
 - a. Recent press statement that air pollution "substantially under control." Carter misunderstands RR's point: namely, that U.S. has made great deal of progress in cleaning up air pollution, but cost of achieving absolute purity (as some extremists want) could be extremely high in terms of lost jobs, weak economy. Carter's own Council on Environmental Quality, in latest report (Dec. 1979, pg. ix) said that "overall, the nation's air quality is improving."
 - * b. Idea that pollution comes from trees, Mt. St. Helens. The general point is that pollution comes from many sources; some are more dangerous than others; what the nation needs is a balanced program to preserve environment while also bringing economic growth.
 - c. Carter may also charge that RR as governor defied Clean Air Act of 1970, proposing air pollution control program rejected by EPA on 5 counts. RR rebuttal: that was draconian plan for state, would have included gas rationing, parking restrictions, land use control, restrictions on 70-80% LA auto traffic. CA and other states rejected such plans. RR vindicated in 1977 when Congress revised Clean Air Act, preventing EPA from carrying out such impractical measures.
2. Acid Rain: current issue in North East, Great Lakes (including Ohio), and eastern Canada. Acid rain believed by many to come from weak sulfuric and nitric acid precipitation resulting from power plants (coal esp.). CEQ has said that cause and impact of acid rain still not clear. RR recognizes that problem needs further study.
3. Toxic wastes: Hot issue. Public aroused by Love Canal in NY where 263 families evacuated. CEQ estimates 1200-2000 U.S. disposal sites may pose risks; but 76 law (enacted under Ford) insufficiently funded under Carter. FY 81 budget finally requests increases. Costs estimated for clean-up range from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars (Love Canal alone as high as \$150 million). Controversy continues, especially regarding \$4-5 billion Superfund which Congress now debating. Two issues involved: (1) Coverage -- should oil spills be covered, for example? (2) Who should pay -- industry, government, combination?

URBAN & HOUSING POLICIESURBAN

- The Carter Record: Carter proclaims his "Comprehensive Urban Policy"; the only thing comprehensive about it is its comprehensive failure. Examples:
 - South Bronx: promises cruelly broken.
 - Cleveland: out of 8500 workers in Ford plant, 7000 laid off now.
 - Detroit: unemployment this summer hit 18% (for minorities, 56%).
 - Miami: riots showed unrest seething below the surface.
 - New York: over past 5 years, has lost 73,000 manufacturing jobs (problem afflicting other cities).
 - Mayor Koch has hands tied by Federal regulations in trying to solve problem.
 - Overall, number of large cities operating in the red has doubled over last two years (over half of cities of over 100,000 now in red according to Joint Economic Committee report).

Note: Carter claims big progress on legislation, but all three of his major bills abandoned by Congress because too complex. Carter's own 1980 National Urban Policy Report documents continued pattern of decline in central cities.

• Reagan Agenda for the Cities

1. Economic growth -- single most important solution.
2. Private enterprise zones: in depressed urban areas, taxes and regulations would be reduced, encouraging new investment, job creation. Idea from England and now being tried there.
3. ~~MADE COMPREHENSIVE~~ Urban Homesteading: initiated by Ford in 1975, scaled down by Carter to bare minimum. Part of effort to revitalize neighborhoods.
4. Give cities greater discretion over federal aid (block grants).
5. Reduce federal regulatory requirements that increase local tax burdens or skew expenditures.

HOUSING

- Carter Record: As RR saw in housing development in Kansas City, Carter economic policies have been devastating for American housing:
 - Under Carter, cost of new housing has doubled; housing starts (while showing temporary improvement) are half the level when JC took office; rental construction down 12%.
 - Under Carter, interest rates have been highest since Civil War (prime rate recently raised to 14% by major banks; mortgage rates now at 14%).

- In 1976, Carter attacked Ford on basis that only 25% of families could afford new home; today, less than 10% can afford. Median monthly payment on new house up to \$556.
- Total loss to economy of housing slump est. at \$125 billion in lost jobs, income equivalent of bankruptcy of 5 Chryslers.

- Reagan Agenda for Housing

1. Economic growth -- again the solution.
2. Encourage new savings through tax provisions (saving rate at lowest level in 30 years).
3. Reduce regulatory maze (Seidel study for Rutgers est. that local, state, federal regs add 20% to cost of new house).
4. Expand home ownership thru alternative mortgage instruments for new homebuyers, older Americans, middle income Americans.
5. Place greater emphasis upon rehabilitation of existing stock (thru local initiatives for neighborhoods).

REAGAN AS FRIEND OF LABOR

RR happy to run as friend of working men and women:

- 1st Presidential candidate in history who is former union president.
- Solid labor record in California.
- Welcome endorsements of Teamsters, Maritime unions.
- Basic goal is that shared by working men and women: economic growth with lower inflation.
- Also firmly support:
 - Open door in Oval Office for everyone - including labor.
 - Safety and health in workplace; no retreat;
 - Adequately funded unemployment relief programs
 - Fair trade as well as free trade - make US exports competitive again.

How can 4 more years of Carter economics help working people?
Look at 1st 4 years:

- 8 million people out of work (highest since Great Depression)
- Hourly wages going down for past 2 years (real terms)
- Taxes are nearly doubled.
- Inflation has tripled.
- And industries like steel, autos fighting for their lives against ever-increasing imports.

New Carter economic plan -- in curious reversal of roles for parties -- tilts more heavily toward business. Carter forgetting the working man and woman.

Note: During campaign, RR has spoken out on several key labor issues that show he is friend of working men and women. Among them:

Agree with Labor on

Don't repeal Davis-Bacon -- seek administrative improvements
 Don't dismantle OSHA -- reform it.
 Don't apply anti-trust laws to labor.
 Support collective bargaining in public sector.
 Support for Polish workers.

Disagree with Labor on

Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill (RR does not support)
 Labor law reform bill (RR does not support)

Know
GENERALLY

HEALTH CARE

Carter Record abysmal on 3 counts:

1. Soaring costs of health care
 - Cost of Hospital bed in NY up 36% under Carter -- from \$169 a day in '76 to \$230 in '79 (Hospital Assn. of NY).
 - Prescription drug expenditures up 33%.
 - Nursing home expenditures up 56%.
2. Has created legislative merry-go-round
 - His mandatory, national health insurance program never moved in Congress.
 - Now pressing cost containment proposal that has twice been rejected by House as regulatory nightmare.
3. Failed to curb fraud/waste in Medicare & Medicaid
 - In '76, claimed Medicaid "a national scandal", claimed as much as \$7.5 billion wasted/stolen each year.
 - In '77, set up special unit in HEW to attack but only has 54 inspectors, has managed only 21 indictments.
 - When Sec. Joe Califano resigned last year, said massive fraud still plagues federal health, welfare.

Reagan sees 4 critical problems to address in 80s:

1. Cost of health care
 - Must cut general rate of inflation (that accounts for over half of health care increases in 80s).
 - Reduce regulatory burden (NY Hospital Assn. has estimated that 25% of cost of daily hospital bed due to federal, state, local regulations).
 - Encourage "Voluntary Effort" already underway in hospitals. Has shown promising results over past 2½ years; since late '78, health care rising more slowly than CPI; Congress endorsed idea in 1979. Better than cost containment.
2. Access to health care
 - Instead of federally directed systems (favored by JC), RR favors tax incentives, loan programs to encourage physicians to work in underserved areas. (U.S. moving toward a physician surplus by mid-80s per experts)
3. Insurance coverage
 - Key problem the working poor. Middle income/upper income mostly covered through private plans (180 million Americans now enrolled in private plans); poor mostly covered by Medicare, Medicaid. Working poor -- 11-18 million strong -- have the serious problem.
 - RR would stimulate private system (through tax incentives) to broaden coverage to these, also has supported catastrophic coverage during campaign.
4. Root out fraud and waste in health/welfare programs

EDUCATION - WELFARESCHOOLS

- Carter taking country down wrong track:
 - Only accomplishment is creation of new bureaucracy, the Dept. of Education (\$15 billion, 17,000 employees). Will create more paperwork, more federal intrusion. Parents, local governments losing control of education.
 - Carter also broke 1976 campaign promise, working against tuition tax credits.
 - Meanwhile, test scores on college boards falling; lack of discipline continues to plague many schools
 - A report released this month by the White House entitled "Science and Engineering Education for the 1980s and Beyond" concluded that most Americans are headed toward "virtual scientific and technological illiteracy."
- Reagan Alternative
 - Reduce federal intrusion, paperwork -- 5,000 man-years devoted by principals, teachers on federal forms annually.
 - Encourage local leadership -- that's the key to quality education.
 - convert 70 categorical grant programs to block funding for elementary-secondary education.
 - tuition tax credits: strengthen parental freedom over children's education.

WELFARE

- Carter Failures
 - Has failed to make much of a dent. Some 18 million now on welfare rolls; in NYC, one out of 6 on some form of welfare. In some families, beginning 2nd generation of welfare.
 - Carter 1st proposed massive federalization (cost est. from \$20-60 billion: Sen. Long put \$60 billion price tag on it). Plan failed in Congress. More recently, Carter has proposed scaled down program (\$3-5 billion) but points in direction of guaranteed income, reduced work requirements. (Moyrhan terms abandonment of reform in exchange for tireless tinkering of bureaucrats).
 - Democratic platform of 1980 calls for federalization.
- Reagan Alternative
 - Build on CA record, where trends reversed, number on welfare rolls reduced by 350,000 while benefits to truly needy up 40%. Proved good state leadership could solve much of problem.
 - Would decentralize through states; free states from wasteful federal rules (savings could help truly needy); orderly transfer of authority and financial resources to states.
 - Economic growth -- as in other areas, that again will take sting out of welfare problem.

WOMEN'S ISSUESGeneral

- Ronald Reagan firmly committed to equal rights; but interested in results, not rhetoric: legislative and Executive action rather than Constitutional amendment.
- As President, Ronald Reagan proposes:
 - At the Federal Level: To follow President Ford's suggestion for legislation to make effective the intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 re sex discrimination in federal programs.
 - At the State Level: To set up a liaison with Governors of the 50 states to seek out and change laws which continue to discriminate against women.
 - Appointments: To appoint qualified women to important positions throughout the government; to make one of his first appointments to Supreme Court a woman.
 - Programs: Tax credit policy for locally-based dependent care programs (children, elderly, disabled).
 - Correct inequities in social security and pension systems.
 - Eliminate (not reduce -- Carter) discriminatory marriage tax.
 - Explore alternate work schedules (including part-time, flex-time, job sharing).
- Carter has substituted rhetoric for results.
 - Under Carter median average income of women has remained 59.4% of that of men.
 - Carter has ignored suggestions of his own Justice Dept. to attack sex discrimination in federally assisted programs.
 - Despite '76 endorsement ERA, no state ratified since he was inaugurated as President (Democrats control 13 out of 15 state legislatures that have not ratified ERA).
- Staff Notes
 - Avoid references to supporting "protective laws" for women (e.g., maximum hour limits); these laws are invalid under Civil Rights Act of '64, and EEOC administrative rulings.
 - Stress link with President Ford.
 - Do not reiterate abortion position.
 - California Record. Established credit and improved property rights for women; signed laws prohibiting sex discrimination (employment, real property, insurance, business); initiated programs to develop and improve child care centers.

MINORITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Carter has been tremendous disappointment for Blacks, other minorities:

- Minority groups (Blacks, Hispanics and Indians) hardest hit by inflation and unemployment. Minority unemployment today 13.6%. Unemployment among black youths 40%+. After previous gains, black family income as a percentage of white family income has fallen under Carter to 57%.
- Carter Administration has not met its minority goals: Example: South Bronx (which Carter promised would be showpiece of his urban development program) remains in poverty, with 1/3 on welfare.

Reagan Approach

- Sound economic policies to reduce inflation and provide permanent, not makework, jobs (including tax cuts and accelerated depreciation to encourage investment for jobs).
- Enterprise zones to bring new businesses and jobs into urban communities.
- Put life into Urban Homesteading program started under Ford.
- Reduce government spending and regulation to stimulate private jobs.
- Vigorous enforcement of laws protecting minorities in marketplace.
- In area of education, tuition tax credits to give minority parents a choice in their children's education.
- Temporary youth differential minimum wage to help minority youth.
- Will work with Congress to improve enforcement provisions of Fair Housing Act.

Other Notes:

- Endorsements by Ralph Abernathy/Hosea Williams/Charles Evers.
- RR has good record of minority appointments in California.

FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE OVERVIEW

- Carter inheritance: As with the economy at home, Carter inherited an international situation that was greatly improving:

-- Ford was healing wounds of Vietnam, and America was at peace.

✓ -- A supportable SALT II treaty was 90% complete.

-- After decade of Congressional cuts in defense budgets, Ford in 1976 and 1977 achieved a turnaround of about 5% real budget authority increases per year; he put in place a sound defense budget for the future.

-- Alliances were solid (leaders of Germany, Japan, Israel all publicly agreed on that).

-- Soviet ambitions held in check in places like Persian Gulf, Afghanistan.

- Carter has squandered that inheritance thru policies that are inconsistent, incoherent, inept.

-- Inconsistencies

e.g., In Sept. 1979, said Russian troops in Cuba "not acceptable"; three weeks later, he humbly accepted them.
 In March, 1980, administration failed to veto UN resolution condemning Israel's policy on Jerusalem; 2 days later, reversed course.
 In summer, 1980, announced "open heart and open arms" to Cuban refugees; 10 days later, doors shut.
 Many other examples: Korean troop withdrawal, support for Shah, etc.

-- Incoherence

e.g., In June, 1978, Carter asserted his "deep belief" that Brezhnev "wants peace and wants to have a better friendship"; on New Year's Eve, 1979 (3 years into Presidency), admitted Afghan invasion made him realize "what the Soviets' ultimate goals are."
 For 3 years, hacked away at defense budget; cut Ford's budgets by \$38 billion, delaying or cancelling vitally needed programs like MX, B-1; now campaigning for military build-up, MX, etc.
 Human rights policy has stuck it to U.S. friends (e.g., Argentina) while turning blind eye to genocide in S.E. Asia (some 4 million have died there) and repression in Soviet bloc.

-- Ineptness

e.g., Failures hastened downfall of Shah, allowed old friendship with Iran to be destroyed, contributed to seizure of hostages, outbreak of war in area.

Emasculation of CIA (fired 816 personnel, including top experts on Iran, China, USSR, Middle East) left U.S. blind in a dangerous world.

Negotiated defective SALT II treaty that has been blocked by his own party in the Senate.

- Carter's tragic legacy; Decline of U.S. respect & power; Soviet threat growing; rising tide of violence and warfare; many fear that world is slipping toward chaos.

-- Under Carter, a number of countries have fallen under totalitarian Marxist rule for 1st time; Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, South Yemen.

-- American embassies have been stormed or burned in Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan; an American Ambassador has been murdered in Afghanistan. (When was last time Soviet embassy or ambassador was hit?)

-- On single day that shall live in infamy (2/14/79) U.S. ambassador killed in Afghanistan, U.S. embassy stormed in Iran, U.S. President publicly insulted in Mexico.

-- Soviets invaded Afghanistan (1st direct military intervention outside Warsaw Pact since WW II) and military influence has grown in Persian Gulf, Asia, Africa, Caribbean

-- Massive Soviet military buildup and weak U.S. response has allowed them to open "window of maximum danger" for U.S. in early 80s; our land-based missiles vulnerable to pre-emptive strike.

-- Number of Cuban troops overseas has doubled -- from 20,000 to 40,000.

-- War in Gulf area between Iran, Iraq. Chaos in Iran may turn out to be most critical event of postwar period.

-- At time of growing danger for U.S. our alliances are frayed;

-- Schmidt and Giscard much less inclined to follow U.S. lead.

-- Latin nations like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico have expressed anger, frustration with U.S. human rights, nuclear policies (Argentina openly defied U.S. call

- . for grain embargo).
- Pakistan, once one of staunchest friends, openly refused U.S. aid after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan
- Saudis, other moderate Arabs worry about U.S. sticking power.
- Other friends (like Israel) privately worry about U.S. tendency to dump old allies (e.g., Taiwan)
- As detente falls apart, new areas of world (e.g. Caribbean) began to appeal to Soviet appetite.

- Stark symbol of U.S. impotence; Hostages (debate marks 359th day).

THE REAGAN 9 STEP STRATEGY FOR PEACE -

1. Improved policy-making structure for State, NSC.
2. Clear approach to East-West relations (seek balanced, realistic relationship)
3. More realistic policy toward hemisphere (intensive economic development in Caribbean, North American Accord with Canada and Mexico)
4. Plan to assist African and other Third World development (promote more private investment overseas)
5. Send U.S. message abroad (strengthen Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc.)
6. Realistic policy for strategic arms reduction (move directly to Salt III)
7. Strengthen armed services (better compensation, benefits; reinstate GI bill)
8. Take leadership role concerning international terrorism; beef up CIA.
9. Restore margin of safety for peace.

SEND IN THE MARINES

Carter likely to charge this is RR's instinctive reaction.

Points to be Made:

1. Quoted out of Context: Mr. Carter has distorted many old quotes, blown them way out of proportion. Let's set record straight.
2. There are rare occasions when America must show its strength in order to keep the peace.

Examples:

- a. Dwight Eisenhower sent the marines into Lebanon in 1957, preserved freedom there, permitted elections to be held.
- b. John Kennedy stood up to Russians and their Cuban missiles in 1962.
- c. Even Mr. Carter sent troops into Iran to rescue hostages from their humiliating captivity. The mission was badly bungled, but all Americans supported it in spirit.

No American President has ever totally renounced the use of force -- nor can he.

3. But force must always, always be a last resort.
For America to stay at peace -- as we must -- there must be two bulwarks:

First, we must have an effective foreign policy -- one that is bipartisan in nature, closely coordinated with our allies, principled and consistent. That is lacking today, and I intend to rebuild such a policy.

Second, history shows that America has never gone to war when America has been strong. I intend to rebuild the strength of America so that we can keep the peace for the rest of this century. As a parent -- as a grandparent -- my deepest wish is that my children and my grandson may grow up in a stable, peaceful world.

DEFENSE

- RR's purpose is peace. Peace is best assured by strength and preparedness; it is risked by weakness and vacillation.
- Peace is in jeopardy. The margin of safety enjoyed for more than 30 years has eroded, as Soviets have engaged in most massive military buildup in history (outspending U.S. by over \$200 billion over the past decade), while the American defense effort has relatively declined.
 - 1) Armed Services readiness has badly deteriorated
 - Six of the Army divisions in the U.S. not combat ready.
 - Six of thirteen carriers not combat ready.
 - All services suffer severe shortages of key personnel, both NCOs and officers.
 - \$40 billion backlog of needed operations and maintenance funding.
 - 2) Ammunition and spare parts shortages critical
 - 3) Navy cut in half; Chief of Naval Operation says 14 ocean navy for 3 ocean world. Navy can't meet basic requirements Ford 157 ship 5-year construction program has been slashed to 97.
 - 4) Army Chief of Staff (Gen. Meyer) says "we have a hollow army":
 - "inadequate funds to provide the type of Army we need."
 - Commander of Army in Europe says we have an "obsolete" Army in Europe.
 - 5) Warsaw Pact outnumbered NATO on Central Front in Germany by 3-1 in tanks (Soviet tank armor a generation more advanced than any Western tank), 3-1 in artillery (generally better than ours), 2-1 in aircraft; and has more rapidly modernized than NATO. (Soviets and strategists advantages, large advantage in theater nuclear forces.)
 - 6) U.S. airborne divisions too heavy to move, too light to fight; to date, rapid deployment force has not really proceeded beyond 250-man staff in Florida.
- Note: Carter has attempted to paper over our problems; Services ordered recently to "emphasize the positive in evaluation reports.
- Carter Administration bears prime responsibility-Ford was seeking to reverse U.S. decline, but Carter--fulfilling campaign pledges
 - sought to gut Ford program.
 - Since taking office, has cut \$38 billion from projected Ford budget, and is underfunding his own inadequate program.

--Has cancelled or delayed many key systems; B-1, TRIDENT, naval buildup, Minuteman III, etc., and has failed to provide needed improvements.

--Carter now talking tougher, but after 4 years of him, can't afford another 4 of indecision, uncertainty and continued delay.

--Not until 1980, did Carter call for real increases; his first two years had real decreases in budget authority; he rejected Senate call for 5% real increase in September.

--Consistently opposed funding increases supported by Congress. In May, his Secretary of Defense said increased funding not needed. Joint Chiefs, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, unanimously disagreed and testified they were not even consulted. Each specifically said, "I do not agree" with the President and Secretary of Defense.

• My concern, as any President's should be, is not based on partisan consideration.

--Distinguished Democratic Senators (Sam Nunn, Fritz Hollings, Scoop Jackson) have deplored record, in particular his budgets:

--"height of hypocrisy"--Hollings (Chairman, Senate Budget Committee)

--Carter programs are "business as usual" when need is urgent-1990 "solutions" to 1980 problems.

--Carter Administration coming up with invisible aircraft (Stealth) to go along with its invisible army and invisible navy.

• A Reagan Administration will seek to restore the margin of safety --to put U.S. in a new peace posture that will ensure world stability.

--Would make volunteer force more attractive; more respected.

--Would restore fleet to 600 ships.

--Would build a new, modernized bomber.

--Would ensure that weapons systems are made to work, modernized; improved acquisition.

--Would take immediate steps to erase critical vulnerabilities in deterrent forces and deficiencies in all forces in a timely fashion.

--Would close window of vulnerability as quickly as possible.

--In short, would put into place a plan that would convince our adversaries they dare not seek conflict with us.

With that plan underway, can then turn to larger task: negotiating for arms control. Can achieve peace only when strong. As John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural address, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

• Staff Notes:

Make sure audience asks itself: Why did Carter try to cut defense budgets, oppose Congressional pressures to increase defense until the Presidential campaign

- Carter claims RR position on military superiority will lead to all out arms race, skimping on conventional forces.

Response:

Not so. The Russians need to be contained not accommodated until they give up their idea of being top dog. Second to none must not become second to one. U.S. determination to increase its military strength is more likely than anything else to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table, and thus reduce the risk of an all out nuclear confrontation.

- Carter will also claim RR inaccurate re Ford defense record and Carter accomplishments. In 1977 he claims no program for a mobile ICBM, no final decision on MX or how to deploy it, no cruise missile program, no plans to deploy additional Minuteman III, TRIDENT bogged down in contracts disputes, lame duck naval ship-building program.
- Carter says he resolved TRIDENT disputes, cancelled B-1 because doubtful it could penetrate Soviet defenses, favored a workable basing system for MX, signed into law 11.7% military pay increase effective 10/1.

Response:

- Carter is wrong in each instance: While no final decision (prudently so) on MX basing in 1977, MX program was scheduled for initial deployment in 1983 and basing choices were reduced to two.
- Carter indecisively delayed the decision, flirting with some half a dozen different schemes, before choosing one agreed by all to be sub-optimum.
 - Cruise missile program was begun in mid-1970s, before Carter, and has, in fact, been delayed under Carter.
 - Sea launched cruise missile program, in particular, is encountering serious delay.
 - Ford decided to keep Minuteman III production line open in 1976 to produce more XMIII in order to have SALT-hedge option of additional deployment. Carter closed the line, so that now U.S. has no active ICBM production line while Soviets have four very active ones. (Note: SALT II would permit production and stockpile of as many additional ICBMs as wished and Soviets are doing it.)
 - TRIDENT submarine has been further delayed under Carter, and most recently announced slippage must now be slipped again by several months. Carter has also made plans either to delay the TRIDENT II missile or to cut it altogether.
 - Carter mistakenly cancelled B-1, as Chairman of Joint Chiefs recently acknowledged and as Congress also knows in calling for Administration to decide on a bomber program by early next year. His "workable basing mode" for MX is subject to much uncertainty and opposition; and is a 1990s solution for 1980s problems--MX program will not be fully operational until 1990 optimistically. Need more rapid, effective, streamlined solution to problem of immediate ICBM vulnerability.
 - Yes, Carter signed 11.7% military pay increase, but only after he had strongly opposed it and Congress voted it over his opposition.

ARMS CONTROL/SALTKNOW
GENERALLY

- ✓ • Objective for strategic arms negotiations on reductions in Soviet weapons. Will sit down with Soviets for as long as it takes.
- President Carter would like the public to forget about what happened during the 1979 Senate SALT debate.
 - Dem-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee only reported treaty out of Committee (9-6 vote) with more than 20 recommended changes. Other Senators would have offered amendments from the floor. ✓ Senate Armed Services Committee voted 10-0 (with 7 abstentions) declaring SALT II not in our national interest.
 - Dem-Chairman Senate Budget Committee Fritz Hollings thinks the Administration is "wrong as can be about SALT II." Senator Henry Jackson, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, said that "to enter into a treaty that favors the Soviets, as this one does, on the ground that we will be in a worse position without it is...appeasement in its purest form."
 - ✓ --Senator Glenn (D-Ohio; former astronaut) also opposes SALT II, rightly "not at all pleased that those of us expressing reservations and concern regarding the Treaty are characterized by some as warmongers?" As to the warmonger charge, Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat from Carter's own state of Georgia, advised Jimmy Carter to let the Russians invent their own propaganda; they shouldn't play back ours.
- RR regrets the Carter record on arms control has been mostly rhetoric
 - Why should the Russians agree to arms reductions when the American President continues to fight a strong consensus in Congress that we need to strengthen American defenses?
- ✓ • RR approach: immediate preparations for negotiations on a SALT III Treaty. SALT II is fatally flawed and would not gain Senate consent. Goal of beginning meaningful arms reductions that are equitable, verifiable, and set a good precedent for future negotiations at significantly lower levels.
 - When Carter became President, he sought a new approach with his Spring 77 "Comprehensive" proposal. I would - also - as perhaps any new President would - invent a new approach - only I would not be so clumsy in proposing it to the Soviets publicly and so willing to fall back and concede to Soviets as Carter has.
- | • If asked: SALT III should include a variety of provisions aimed at actually reducing weaponry equally, e.g.,

ARMS CONTROL/SALT

- Reductions should be not only in numbers but in capabilities (It does no good to limit and reduce numbers and then allow Soviets to continue to expand capabilities).
- Missiles and warheads should be limited, not just "launchers"
- Urgently reduce or eliminate heavy ICBM's.
- Count the Backfire bomber as part of SALT.

But RR does not want to negotiate in public. It was a mistake of Carter Administration to rush in with public proposal.

NOTE

- Carter will claim SALT II is in our interest:
 - No reductions in U.S. strategic systems while Soviets will have to reduce 250.
 - U.S. will be able to carry out modernization programs.
 - Soviets limited to one new land-based missile instead of four.
 - U.S. would be required to spend \$30 billion more over 10 year period.

Response

The claims made on behalf of the treaty were thoroughly debunked during SALT debate. If it is such a good treaty, why didn't the Senate pass it? If SALT is the centerpiece of our foreign policy, and the votes were there, why didn't Mr. Carter bring it up for a vote last year? Why is he playing politics with SALT II now in his faltering campaign? In politics, there is an old adage, "If the issue is important and the votes are there, vote it."

- Carter may also claim he tried SALT III approach in 1977 and failed, therefore went for modest SALT II approach.

Response

Carter presented Soviet Union with two proposals. Just like saying, here, we can't decide, you decide for us. Why present the fallback position at the same time we present a proposal for reductions? And then he caved in on his "SALT III" approach at the first Soviet Nyet. In addition to being a better negotiator than Jimmy Carter, I will take steps to assure the survivability of our strategic deterrent and I will move to reverse the adverse trends in the strategic balance, trends which are due to Mr. Carter's failure to keep our forces strong and modernized. He's been too late, with too little.

ARMS CONTROL/SALT

- Carter may say RR stance on SALT contrary to RR stance on developing closer relations with allies; Germans in particular counting on SALT II.

Response

RR would keep commitment to allies on jointly agreed arms control approaches. Allies will see his approach to SALT far more in their interest than Carter's approach.

OBER 23, 1980

A19

George F. Will

On Honorable Disagreement

MEMORANDUM TO: Ohioans and others who, like me, admire Sen. John Glenn.

RE: Carter's improvident use of SALT II as an issue.

Three years ago this week, at a Democratic rally in Des Moines, Carter, as is his wont, got carried away. He declared that within "a few weeks" he would produce a SALT agreement. The fact that he was revealing to the Russians his hunger for an agreement, and was pressuring his negotiators, guaranteed that the Russians would wait for concessions that his negotiators were, anyway, all-too-ready-to-offer. I said then that he would get an agreement, not in weeks but before the 1980 elections, and that it would be so weak it would be unratifiable.

Even the dovish Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved it only 9-6, less than the two-thirds margin required in the full Senate. The Senate Armed Services Committee, which unlike Foreign Relations is expert about armaments, voted 10-0 for the report opposing ratification. The committee said, *inter alia*:

"In our judgment the SALT II Treaty . . . fails to meet the criteria laid down in 1972 when the Congress adopted an amendment to the resolution authorizing the interim agreement that called for equal . . . in any future SALT Treaty.

"The Treaty is unequal because it confers on the Soviet Union the right to deploy modern large ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, a right denied to the United States.

"It is unequal because it permits the continued deployment, outside the Treaty ceiling, of a Soviet bomber [the Backfire] that has the capability to operate over intercontinental distances against targets in the United States.

"It is unequal because it permits the Soviets to deploy more warheads on their strategic missiles than we are able to deploy on ours.

"The SALT II Treaty constraints on the growing Soviet threat are not militarily significant. . . . Within the Treaty the Soviet Union could deploy about as many warheads as is believed they would reasonably wish to do if there were no Treaty."

When the committee said SALT II "is unequal in favor of the Soviet Union and, thus, is inconsistent with Public Law 92-448," it was referring to standards enacted in response to SALT I, principally because of Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.). Carter, early in his term, sent Jackson a handwritten note pledging to achieve a SALT II agreement that satisfied eight criteria. The agreement-Carter accepted does not satisfy even one.

Now, in desperation, Carter wraps himself in the mantle of his predecessor. He implies that in producing SALT II he merely dotted the 'i's and crossed the 't's on what President Ford had negotiated. Ford emphatically disagrees. Ford, like Reagan and many Democratic senators, supports the SALT process, deplores Carter's incompetent participation in it and opposes ratification of SALT II as negotiated. Carter's attempt to implicate Ford in Carter's SALT II fiasco is one reason Ford, normally the least angry of men, today burns with a hard, gem-like flame of determination to see Carter defeated.

Carter, in his new-found "moderation," has taken to putting distance between himself and his surrogates who say, as surrogates young just did, things like: the election of Reagan would signal that "killing niggers" is acceptable. And he sits placidly while Leonard Bernstein (who is as good a musician and political thinker as Ezra Pound was a poet and political thinker) labels Reagan as "the candidate-of (among other people) anti-Semitism. But Carter reserves for himself the pleasure of the accusation that because Reagan opposes SALT II as negotiated, Reagan threatens peace.

Such calumny is threadbare by now. Last year Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) declared: "I am not at all pleased when those of us expressing reservations and concern regarding the treaty are characterized by some as 'warmongers' . . . Such a charge is unfounded and does a disservice to the constitutional principle of 'advice and consent.' It is tantamount to asking the Senate to withhold its passage of the treaty without amendments or face a barrage of reproaches as the administration's heavy hitters, including the charge that the treaty's opponents are advocating war over peace.

Glenn opposed SALT II in the Foreign Relations Committee. Had Carter pushed for a vote on the Senate, Glenn would have been the first to vote against it.

CHARLESTON, W.Va. — A Yale psychiatrist

'Stress' Seen in Hostage-Taker

33-896 1535

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

"With our allies, we can conduct a realistic and balanced policy toward the Soviet Union. I am convinced that the careful management of our relationship with the Soviet Union depends on a principled, consistent American foreign policy. We seek neither confrontation nor conflict but to avoid both we must remain strong and determined to protect our interests."

RR TV Address, 10/19/80

- Carter Presidency marked by naive view of Soviets:
 - Early in term, in 1977 address at Notre Dame, Carter warned Americans against "inordinate fear of communism;" 18 months into presidency expressed "deep belief" that Brezhnev "wants peace and wants to have a better friendship..." Only the Afghan invasion 3 years into term, by his own confession, made him realize "what the Soviets' ultimate goals are." And even now, that is open to doubt.
 - Approach to arms negotiations has reflected this same naive view. Began with ambitious proposal, immediately backed down, and wound up with badly flawed SALT II treaty.
 - Similarly, backed away from his early, tough stance on human rights in USSR, and, more recently, backed down on Soviet troops in Cuba.
 - Also slashed away at Ford defense budget despite Soviet buildup.
 - In face of U.S. weakness, Soviets have become more aggressive over past 4 years.
 - Invasion of Afghanistan first direct Soviet military intervention outside Warsaw Pact since WW II.
 - Soviet military involvement has also increased in Africa (the Horn, Mozambique & Angola); Persian Gulf (South Yemen); Asia (Vietnam); and Latin America (influence growing in Caribbean).
 - Soviets have also encouraged a doubling of Cuban troops (from 20-40,000) for use outside Cuba.
 - Soviets continue most massive military buildup in peacetime history.
- REAGAN SOLUTIONS:
- Rebuild U.S. defense capabilities.
 - Restore reliability of commitments to allies and friends.
 - Negotiate genuine arms limitations (SALT **III**)

- Work with allies on common approaches to East-West trade; minimize technology transfer of help to Soviet military capability. (No more grain embargoes unless made effective; call off current one.)
- Support Helsinki Accords on human rights (U.S. should take vigorous human rights stance at Madrid conference starting in mid-November where 35 nation signatories review the Helsinki Accords).

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

"There is an historic bond of friendship between the American and Chinese peoples, and I will work to amplify it wherever possible. Expanded trade, cultural contact and other arrangements will all serve the cause of preserving and extending the ties between our two countries." RR TV Address 10/19/80.

● RR Approach

- Strengthen and extend relationship with PRC; welcome close cooperation on areas of mutual interest, while safeguarding Taiwan's interest.
- Continue to supply military equipment to meet Taiwan's defense needs.
- Agrees China and U.S. have mutual interests in deterring expansion of Soviet powers.
- Favor economic relations, with prudent precautions on high-level technology. Does not preclude limited and prudent arms sales to PRC.

● RR's Disagreement with Carter over China

In eagerness to normalize relations with PRC, Carter abandoned old, valued friend.

- First time in history that U.S. unilaterally terminated such a treaty.
- Friendship with Taiwan stretched back 30 years--upheld from Truman on.
- In negotiations, Carter conceded on all PRC demands but backed down on U.S. demand--Peking guarantee not to use force against Taiwan.

✓ ● RR belief: can carry out Taiwan Relations Act (i.e., he would of course not turn back clock) and still enjoy expanding friendship with People's Republic of China.

Deng Xiaoping (1st deputy) is key Chinese leader today.
(DÜNG SHAU PÄNG) for pronunciation.

PERSIAN GULF

- Gulf area vital to Western security:
 - ✓ -- Provides 40% of oil to non-communist world; 19% of U.S. oil.
 - Currently only a 100-day supply of oil in non-communist world.
- In past 4 years, dramatic increase in instability & Soviet threat to Gulf area. Most serious threat to world peace today.
 - Iran, once a bulwark of peace in region, now totters under tyrannical regime.
 - Shah fell in January, 1979; a year earlier, Carter had called him an island of "stability." U.S. probably could not have saved Shah, but Carter vacillation hastened his downfall, led to radical regime, planted further doubts about strength of U.S. friendships (Saudis shaken).
 - Area now aflame with Iran-Iraq war (five weeks old).
 - Iraq has nearly taken over oil-rich province of Khuzestan.
 - In past 4 years, Soviets tightened pincer movement on the Gulf, moving troops into Afghanistan, setting up puppet regimes and arsenals in South Yemen, Ethiopia.
 - Before Afghanistan, Soviet fighter planes were 700 miles from Straits of Hormuz; today, there are only 300 miles away -- within easy striking distance.
- Carter response has been dangerous.
 - First pursued arms agreement with the Soviets for Indian Ocean which had Soviets accepted would have prohibited our present naval deployment there.
 - This January in State of Union Address, asserted "Carter Doctrine" -- assault on Gulf will be repelled, if necessary by force. Six days later, administration admitted it didn't have military strength to enforce.
 - Carter's Rapid Development Force still an empty shell.
 - Hostage humiliation a stark symbol of declining U.S. capability in region.
- RR APPROACH
 - Strengthen U.S. defense forces.
 - Work more effectively with Allies on coordinated approaches to Gulf.
 - Develop secure and defensible U.S. presence. (Carter trying for military facilities in unstable Somalia; should explore more secure bases, perhaps in Sinai.)

THE MIDDLE EAST1. The Carter Record: A Violation of Commitments

- In October 77, Carter agreed to joint approach with Soviets for Geneva talks, calling for "comprehensive" settlement and recommending joint Soviet-American "guarantees". This approach was incompatible with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
- Then Carter prejudged the final outcome and threw 'monkey wrench' into autonomy negotiations by aligning himself with Arab positions. Proclaimed in news conference "settlements in occupied territories are illegal and an obstacle to peace".
- 1978 sale of 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia destabilized the balance of power, causing increased arms purchases by both sides.
- Carter failed to veto UN resolution condemning Israel's presence in Jerusalem; 2 days later, reacting to public outcry, Carter reversed position, blamed Secretary Vance, yet the Vote on Record in UN was never amended as it should have been.
- Carter Administration has even courted the PLO: Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador in Vienna.
- This August, Muskie gave a long speech publicly denouncing pernicious U.N. resolution on Jerusalem, then abstained when time came to vote.

2. Reagan Approach• Peace Making and Camp David

- Peace between Israel and her neighbors should be governed by Resolutions 242 and 338; RR will not tolerate any effort to supersede or be divorced from these resolutions.
- Camp David started as a repudiation by Sadat and Begin of Carter's comprehensive peace plan (including Soviets).
- But, since Camp David accords derive from Resolutions 242 and 338, we will continue the Camp David process as long as there is utility in it.
- RR will not try to force the hand of either Israel or Egypt at the negotiating table. RR will support the agreements made between Israel and Egypt as long as no outside pressures.

- Jerusalem

- Jerusalem is central to religious faiths throughout the world. Thus, Jerusalem must remain one city (Optional: under Israeli sovereignty) undivided and with continued free access for all faiths to its holy places. Thankfully, Jerusalem today -- unlike the time prior to 1967 -- enjoys freedoms.

- Arms Sales

- RR would avoid shipment of massive quantities of sophisticated armaments to so-called "moderate" Arab states who might directly threaten Israel's existence once in possession of such arms. These sales could promote dangerous arms races.

- UN

- Defeat any U.N. resolution to expel Israel; if necessary, use threat to stop U.S. funding.

Africa, Third World

- Carter Record

- During Carter years, Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa increased, adding to the refugee misery.
- Carter Administration claims success in relations with Africa and other "Third World" nations. Yet, its policies have led to needless confrontation, encouraged radicalization, and enabled Castro to posture as leader of Third World. Carter claims to have improved relations with Nigeria, opposing racial discrimination.

- RR Approach

- Not lump so-called "Third World" nations together. Deal with these nations on bilateral basis.
- Opposed to racial discrimination in any form. Continue progress towards peaceful solution of problems in Southern Africa. Put political pressure on Castro to reduce his mercenary forces in Africa.
- Reduce large U.S. trade deficit with Africa by encouraging U.S. exports--enhance private investment.

REFUGEES & HUMAN RIGHTSREFUGEES

- Carter's poor handling of Cuban refugees.
 - Inconsistent, uncoordinated policy based on crisis planning. Over 10 thousand Cubans now locked up on U.S. bases.
 - No effective effort to develop real consensus. No one country can carry full burden, provide resources; international solution needed.
 - Trying to dump 1200 refugees on Puerto Rico (no electoral votes).
- RR Approach
 - Need to distinguish between refugees from oppression and refugees from want.
 - economic problems of other nations should be addressed through development and investment.
 - political problems through coordinated international effort to encourage both political improvements and provide humanitarian relief and resettlement. Note that largest number of refugees flee from communist countries.
 - Sustain long-standing American value of openness to immigrants and refugees.
 - must recognize impact on U.S. labor markets.
 - protect basic civil liberties and human rights of citizens and immigrants.
 - Most important: Develop worldwide consensus on a strategy to deal with refugee problem. RR would make this a priority because worldwide there are estimated to be more than 15 million refugees (U.S. Commission for Refugees).

HUMAN RIGHTS

- Carter policy very inconsistent.
 - In Inaugural Address: "Our commitment to human rights must be absolute."
 - But applied it selectively -- most strongly against those least able to resist (usually pro-Western governments) as opposed to regimes, such as Cambodia, engaged in genocide.
 - in Argentina, Brazil, South Korea.
 - and not in Poland: in Poland Carter praised human rights situation in 1977, and now Muskie tells Polish people to be sensitive to Soviet pressure.

- Carter Administration in U.N. gave support to Pol Pot whose regime killed 3 million of his people (Cambodia).
- RR Approach
 - Support human rights; has long been U.S. objective.
 - Develop refugee policy.
 - Vigorously use Helsinki Accord to improve human rights in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union.
 - Convey to the world the value and strength of American principles of freedom, justice, equal protection. Carter Administration failed to use our moral resources; instead retreated in front of totalitarian propaganda.



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